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Deokuer And Another v. Sheoprasad Singh And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 8, 1965
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants filed a suit in 1947 seeking a declaration that certain deeds executed in favour of the defendants first party (now the respondents) conferred no right or title over the disputed property and were therefore void. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal, the High Court of Patna set aside the decree, holding that because the appellants were not in possession and had not sought recovery of possession, the suit was barred by the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The High Court granted a certificate of fitness, leading to the present appeal. At the time the suit was filed, the property had been attached by a Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was in custodia legis, a fact not noticed by the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for a mere declaration of title, without a consequential prayer for possession, is competent under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act when the property is under attachment pursuant to Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • An attachment under Section 145 places the property in custodia legis; therefore, no party is in actual possession, and the defendants are incapable of delivering possession.
  • Under established authority, when the defendant is not in possession and cannot deliver possession, a declaratory suit without a prayer for possession is permissible.
  • The proviso to Section 42 only requires further relief against the defendant, not against a Magistrate holding the property.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The Magistrate under Section 145 is deemed to hold possession on behalf of the party ultimately found entitled to it; consequently, the respondents should be treated as being in possession.
  • A declaratory suit filed during such attachment must include a claim for recovery of possession; otherwise, it is barred by the proviso to Section 42.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sunder Singh—Mallah Singh Sanatan Dharam High School Trust v. Managing Committee, Sunder Singh-Mallah Singh Rajput High School (1957) LR 65 IA 106 Where the defendant is not in possession and cannot deliver possession, a suit for declaration without a prayer for possession is competent. Relied upon to show that the respondents, not being in possession after attachment, could not be required to deliver possession; hence, no relief for possession was necessary.
Nawab Humayun Begam v. Nawab Shah Mohammad Khan, AIR 1943 PC 94 The “further relief” mentioned in the proviso to Section 42 is relief against the defendant alone. Used to emphasise that no relief could be sought against the Magistrate; therefore, absence of a possession claim did not bar the suit.
K. Sundaresa Iyer v. Sarvajana Sowkiabil Virdhi Nidhi Ltd., (1939) ILR Mad 986 Possession need not be claimed when property is in custodia legis. Applied to equate property under Section 145 attachment with property in custodia legis, supporting the competence of a purely declaratory suit.
Dukkan Ram v. Ram Nanda Singh, AIR 1961 Pat 425 Held that a declaratory decree obtained during Section 145 attachment would not bind the Magistrate, hence a possession claim was essential. Expressly disapproved; Supreme Court held the reasoning erroneous and not reflective of correct law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that, upon attachment under Section 145 CrPC, the property is in custodia legis and neither party is in possession. Consequently, the defendants are incapable of transferring possession to the plaintiffs. Precedents such as Sunder Singh and K. Sundaresa Iyer establish that where the defendant lacks possession and the ability to deliver it, a declaratory action without an accompanying possession claim satisfies Section 42. The Court emphasised that the “further relief” contemplated by the proviso is relief against the defendant; since the Magistrate is not a party to the suit, no such relief could be sought against him. Addressing the contrary view in Dukkan Ram, the Court held that the potential non-binding effect of a declaratory decree on the Magistrate is irrelevant to the competence of the suit. On this reasoning, the High Court’s dismissal of the suit for non-joinder of a possession claim was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; decree of the High Court set aside; matter remanded to the High Court for decision on merits; costs awarded to the appellants in all courts.

Immediate Effect: The appellants’ suit is restored for adjudication on the substantive issues of title. Broader Implication: The decision clarifies that, during an ongoing Section 145 attachment, a plaintiff may seek a mere declaration of title without accompanying relief for possession, thereby overruling the contrary Patna High Court view in Dukkan Ram.

Show all summary ...

Sarkar, J.— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellants in 1947 for a declaration that the defendants first party had acquired no right or title to a property under certain deeds and that the deeds were inoperative and void. The suit was decreed by the trial court but on appeal by the defendants first party to the High Court at Patna that decree was set aside. The High Court having granted a certificate of fitness, the appellants have brought the present appeal. The defendants first party have alone contested the appeal and will be referred to as the respondents.

2. The High Court held that as the appellants were not in possession of the property at the date of the suit as found by the learned trial Judge and the respondents were, their suit must fail under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act as the appellants had failed to ask for the further relief of recovery of possession from the respondents. In this view of the matter the High Court did not consider the merits of the case. The fact however was that at the date of the suit the property was under attachment by a Magistrate under powers conferred by Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was not in the possession of any party. This fact was not noticed by the High Court but the reason why it escaped the High Court's attention does not appear on the record.

3. The only point argued in this appeal was whether in view of the attachment, the appellants could have in their suit asked for the relief for delivery of possession to them. If they could not, the suit would not be hit by the proviso to Section 42. The parties seem not to dispute that in the case of an attachment under Section 146 of the Code as it stood before its amendment in 1955, a suit for a simple declaration of title without a prayer for delivery of possession is competent. The respondents contend that the position in the case of an attachment under Section 145 of the Code is different, and in such a case the Magistrate holds possession for the party who is ultimately found by him to have been in possession when the first order under the section was made. It was said that a suit for declaration of title pending such an attachment is incompetent under the proviso to Section 42 unless recovery of possession is also asked for. It appears that the attachment under Section 145 in the present case is still continuing and no decision has yet been given in the proceedings resulting in the attachment.

4. In our view, in a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under Section 145 of the Code, it is not necessary to ask for the further relief of delivery of possession. The fact, if it be so, that in the case of such an attachment, the Magistrate holds possession on behalf of the party whom he ultimately finds to have been in possession is, in our opinion, irrelevant. On the question however whether the Magistrate actually does so or not, it is unnecessary to express any opinion in the present case.

5. The authorities clearly show that where the defendant is not in possession and not in a position to deliver possession to the plaintiff it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a suit for a declaration of title to property to claim possession: see Sunder Singh — Mallah Singh Sanatan Dharam High School, Trust v. Managing Committee, Sunder Singh-Mallah Singh Rajput High School (1957) LR 65 IA 106. Now it is obvious that in the present case, the respondents were not in possession after the attachment and were not in a position to deliver possession to the appellants. The Magistrate was in possession, for whomsoever, it does not matter, and he was not of course a party to the suit. It is pertinent to observe that in Nawab Humayun Begam v. Nawab Shah Mohammad Khan AIR (1943) PC 94 it has been held that the further relief contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is relief against the defendant only. We may add that in K. Sundaresa Iyer v. Sarvajana Sowkiabil Virdhi Nidhi Ltd. (1939) ILR Mad 986 it was held that it was not necessary to ask for possession when property was in custodia legis. There is no doubt that property under attachment under Section 145 of the Code is in custodia legis. These cases clearly establish that it was not necessary for the appellants to have asked for possession.

6. In Dukkan Ram v. Ram Nanda Singh AIR (1961) Pat 425 a contrary view appears to have been taken. The reason given for this view is that the declaratory decree in favour of the plaintiff would not be binding on the Magistrate and he was free in spite of it to find that possession at the relevant time was with the defendant and deliver possession to him. With great respect to the learned Judge deciding that case, the question is not whether a declaratory decree would be binding on the Magistrate or not. The fact that it may not be binding would not affect the competence of the suit. The suit for a declaration without a claim for the relief for possession would still be competent in the view taken in the cases earlier referred to, which is, that it is not necessary to ask for the relief of delivery of possession where the defendant is not in possession and is not able to deliver possession, which it is not disputed, is the case when the property is under attachment under Section 145 of the Code. We think that Dukkan Ram case AIR (1961) Pat 425 had not been correctly decided. We may add that no other case taking that view was brought to our notice.

7. For these reasons, we hold that the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was competent. We, therefore, allow the appeal but as the merits of the case had not been gone into by the High Court, the matter must go back to that court for decision on the merits. The appellant will get the costs here and below.