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Tata Iron And Steel Co. Ltd. v. D.R Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Jamadoba, sought to dismiss its employee, respondent D.R. Singh. Because four industrial references (Nos. 45, 56, 63 and 65 of 1961) were already pending between the company and its workmen, the employer—by way of abundant caution—filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, requesting approval of the proposed dismissal.
In its written statement, the respondent opposed the application. At the hearing, the appellant first asked the Tribunal to decide, as a preliminary issue, whether the respondent was “a workman concerned in the industrial disputes,” asserting that if he was not, Section 33 would not apply and no approval was required. The Tribunal declined to entertain that contention, holding that the employer must either withdraw the application or face a merits inquiry. Proceeding to the merits, the Tribunal found no prima facie case for dismissal and refused approval. Special leave brought the matter to the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Tribunal seized of an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is bound to decide, as a preliminary question, if the employee is “a workman concerned in the dispute,” and hence whether Section 33 applies at all.
- If Section 33 is inapplicable, whether the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to accord or refuse approval of the employer’s disciplinary action.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The respondent was not a “workman concerned” in the pending industrial disputes; therefore, Section 33 did not apply.
- In light of conflicting High Court rulings on that phrase, the company prudently filed the application without prejudice and was entitled to have the jurisdictional issue decided first.
- The Tribunal erred in refusing to consider the preliminary objection and in proceeding directly to the merits.
Respondent's Arguments
- The application should be opposed on the merits; the Tribunal correctly examined whether a prima facie case for dismissal existed.
- Approval was rightly refused because the employer failed to justify the termination.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. N.L. Vyas (1958 II LLJ 573) | Narrow construction of “workman concerned in the dispute.” | Cited to show divergence among High Courts. |
| Eastern Plywood Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Plywood Mfg. Workers’ Union (1952 I LLJ 628) | Broader construction of the same phrase. | Part of the conflicting High Court views reviewed by the Supreme Court. |
| Newton Studios Ltd. v. T.R. Ethirajulu (1958 I LLJ 63) | Broader construction. | Referenced in the survey of differing approaches. |
| Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. v. A. Seshagiri Rao (1959 II LLJ 717) | Broader construction. | Included among precedents showing judicial inconsistency. |
| New India Motors (P) Ltd. v. K.T. Morris (1960 I LLJ 551) | Supreme Court adoption of the broader test. | Relied on as binding precedent clarifying the law. |
| Digwadih Colliery v. Ramji Singh (1964 II LLJ 143) | Supreme Court approval of the broader construction of “workman concerned.” | Affirmed by the Court to support its view that Section 33’s scope had been authoritatively settled. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Chief Justice Gajendragadkar observed that divergent High Court rulings had created genuine uncertainty over the meaning of “a workman concerned in such dispute.” Given that uncertainty, it was “idle and unreasonable” to require an employer to decide the jurisdictional question at its peril. An employer could legitimately file an application under Section 33(2)(b) while reserving the right to contest applicability.
The Tribunal therefore erred in refusing to entertain the employer’s preliminary objection and in compelling a merits determination. Normally, the question of applicability would have to be resolved first because, if Section 33 did not apply, the Tribunal would lack jurisdiction.
However, more than three years had elapsed since the respondent’s dismissal. The appellant’s counsel candidly stated that the appeal was pursued chiefly to establish the legal principle rather than to enforce the dismissal. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that remanding the matter for a fresh decision on the preliminary issue would be “inexpedient and unjust.”
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
While the Court confirmed that a Tribunal must entertain an employer’s plea that Section 33 is inapplicable before reaching the merits, it declined to grant relief due to the lapse of time and the appellant’s limited objective. The decision clarifies procedural rights under Section 33 but sets no new substantive precedent; its immediate effect is that the respondent’s dismissal remains unapproved and the appellant obtains no operative relief.
Gajendragadkar, C.J— This appeal raises a very short point for our decision. The appellant, Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Jamadoba, filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947)(hereinafter called “the Act”), before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”), asking for its approval of the action which it proposed to take against its employee, respondent D.R Singh. This application was made by the appellant, because certain industrial disputes were pending at the relevant time between the appellant and its employees under References Nos. 45, 56, 63 and 65 of 1961. This applications was opposed by the respondent who filed his written statement. At the hearing of the application, the appellant urged before the Tribunal that though it had made the present application as a matter of abundant caution, its case was that it was not necessary to apply under Section 33(2), because the respondent was not concerned with the industrial disputes which were pending between the appellant and its employees in the different references to which we have already referred. In other words, the appellant wanted the Tribunal to consider the question as to whether the respondent was a workman concerned in the relevant industrial disputes at all, before dealing with the merits of its application. The appellant case was that one of the conditions precedent for the applicability of Section 33 is that the workman against whom the employer seeks to take action falling under Section 33(2), must be a workman concerned in the main industrial disputes; if he is not so concerned, Section 33(2) will not apply. In order to avoid any complications and with a view to save itself from the charge that it had contravened Section 33 of the Act, the appellant had no doubt made an application as a precautionary measure; that is why it wanted the Tribunal to consider its contention that Section 33 did not apply as a preliminary point. The Tribunal took the view that the appellant could not raise such a contention. It held that if the appellant thought that Section 33 did not apply, it should withdraw the application and take the consequences. On that view, it refused to entertain the plea raised by the appellant and proceeded to deal with the merits of the application. In the result, the Tribunal was not satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out for the dismissal of the respondent, and so, approval was not accorded to the action which the appellant wanted to take against the respondent and its application was accordingly dismissed. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.
2. The learned Solicitor-General for the appellant contends, and we think rightly, that the Tribunal was in error in not dealing with the preliminary point as to whether Section 33 applied to the facts of this case. It is plain that in a situation like the present, even if the appellant took the view that the workman against whom it was taking action was not a workman concerned with the main industrial disputes, it would be justified in refusing to take the risk of deciding the said point for itself. It would be legitimate for an employer like the appellant to make an application under Section 33 without prejudice to his case that Section 33 did not apply. The question about the construction of the words “a workman concerned in such dispute” which occur in Section 33(1) and (2) has been the subject-matter of judicial decisions and somewhat inconsistent views had been taken by different High Courts on this point. Some High Courts construed the said words in a narrow way, vide New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagar v. N.L Vyas (1958) II LLJ 573 while others put a broader construction on them, vide Eastern Plywood Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Eastern Plywood Manufacturing Workers' Union (1952) I LLJ 628; Newton Studios Ltd. v. Ethirajulu (T.R) (1958) I LLJ 63; and Andhra Scientific Company, Ltd. v. Seshagiri Rao (A.) (1959) II LLJ 717. This problem was ultimately resolved by this Court in its two recent decisions viz. New India Motors (P) Ltd. v. Morris (K.T) (1960) I LLJ 551, and Digwadih Colliery v. Ramji Singh (1964) II LLJ 143. In this latter case this Court considered the conflicting judicial decisions rendered by the different High Courts and has approved of the broader construction of the words “workmen concerned in such dispute”. Where judicial decisions differed on the construction of the words “workmen concerned in such dispute”, it would be idle and unreasonable to suggest that the employer should make up his mind whether Section 33 applies or not, and if he thinks that Section 33 does not apply, he need not make the application; on the other hand, if he thinks that Section 33 applies, he should make an application, but then he cannot be permitted to urge that the application is unnecessary. Such a view is, in our opinion, wholly illogical and unsatisfactory. Therefore, we must hold that the Tribunal was in error in not considering the preliminary point raised by the appellant that the respondent was not a workman concerned with the main industrial disputes and as such, the application made by it was unnecessary.
3. That raises the question as to the course that we should adopt in dealing with the merits of the present appeal. Logically, it would be necessary to make a finding on the preliminary point raised by the appellant before the merits are considered, because if the appellant is right in contending that the respondent is not a “workman concerned with such disputes” within the meaning of Section 33(2), the application would be unnecessary and there would be no jurisdiction in the Tribunal either to accord or to refuse approval to the action proposed to be taken by the appellant against the respondent. In the present case, however, we do not propose to adopt such a course. The order terminating the services of the respondent was passed on December 4, 1961 and it was to take effect from December 9, 1961. The award was pronounced by the Tribunal on October 5, 1962, and when the appeal has come for final disposal before us, more than three years have elapsed since the date of dismissal of the respondent. The learned Solicitor-General fairly conceded that the appellant has come to this Court not so much to enforce its order of dismissal against the respondent, as to have a decision from this Court on the point of law raised by it before the Tribunal. Accordingly, we have decided that point in favour of the appellant; but having regard to the long passage of time between the date of the impugned order and the date when we are pronouncing our judgment in the present appeal, we think it would be inexpedient and unjust to send the matter back to the Tribunal with a direction that it should decide the preliminary point raised by the appellant as to whether the respondent is a “workman concerned in such disputes” within the meaning of Section 33(2) of the Act. That is why though we have reversed the finding of the Tribunal on the preliminary point, we do not propose to give this litigation any further lease of life.
4. In the result, without examining the merits of the findings recorded by the Tribunal for not according approval to the dismissal of the respondent, we direct that the appeal fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.
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