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Ibrahim v. State Of Rajasthan .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Ibrahim s/o Miru, originally a resident of Rajgarh (Bikaner Division), was alleged to be a Pakistani national who entered India on a Pakistani passport issued in 1954 and a visa granted in December 1956. After overstaying beyond February 18, 1957, the Government ordered his deportation in March 1957. On April 21, 1957, police officials escorted and deported him across the Indo-Pakistan border at the Munabao Check-post.
Sometime after this deportation, Ibrahim clandestinely re-entered India without informing the authorities and was again found in Rajgarh. Acting on a police report, he was apprehended and charged with contravening Section 3(2)(a) read with Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, for entering India without a valid passport or visa.
The trial Magistrate acquitted him, doubting his identification as the earlier deportee. The State appealed, and the High Court of Jodhpur reversed the acquittal, convicted Ibrahim, and sentenced him to imprisonment. This Supreme Court appeal was brought by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution proved beyond doubt that the appellant was the same Ibrahim who had been deported on 21 April 1957, thereby establishing his status as a “foreigner”.
- Whether a Pakistani citizen who initially entered India before 19 January 1957 (the date on which Pakistani nationals became “foreigners” under the amended Act) could be prosecuted for a subsequent entry after that date without valid travel documents.
- Whether courts were barred, by Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, from determining the appellant’s status as a foreigner.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Denied identity: asserted he had never been to Pakistan, was never deported, and therefore could not have re-entered India illegally.
- Contended that as he allegedly entered India before 19 January 1957, he was not a “foreigner” when he first arrived; hence he could not incur liability under the Foreigners Act.
- Claimed that courts lacked jurisdiction to decide his nationality in view of Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act.
- Attempted (belatedly) to question whether the State Government was properly delegated power under Section 3, but this point had not been raised below.
State's (Respondent's) Arguments
- Produced documentary evidence: deportation order, general diary entry, and deportation register confirming Ibrahim’s 1957 deportation.
- Called two public-servant witnesses (PW 2 Shiv Rattan, PW 3 Govind Singh) who identified the appellant as the deportee.
- Maintained that the appellant’s clandestine post-1957 entry, after Pakistani nationals had become “foreigners” under the Act, constituted a clear offence under Section 3(2)(a).
- Denied any bar on the court’s jurisdiction; the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act lay on the appellant to prove he was not a foreigner, which he failed to discharge.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Identity established: The Court accepted the High Court’s view that PWs 2 and 3, both disinterested public officials, reliably identified the appellant as the same Ibrahim who was deported in 1957. Minor discrepancies in the English transliteration of the father’s name (“Murra” vs “Miru”) were found inconsequential, especially as age and other particulars matched.
Status as foreigner on date of offence: Pakistani citizens became “foreigners” with effect from 19 January 1957 (Central Act 11 of 1957). Even if the appellant had entered India before that date, his undisputed re-entry occurred after April 1957, when he was unquestionably a foreigner. Liability under Section 3 therefore attached at the time of the charged offence.
Citizenship Act objection rejected: Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act applies only where a person initially holds Indian citizenship and a question arises about its loss. Because the prosecution’s case—and accepted facts—showed the appellant to be a Pakistani national, no such issue arose. Moreover, Section 9 of the Foreigners Act places the onus on the accused to prove he is not a foreigner, an onus the appellant did not discharge.
Delegation argument barred: The Court refused to entertain the fresh contention about delegation of power to the State Government, noting it was neither raised nor evidenced in the courts below and, in any event, was irrelevant to the offence under Section 3(2)(a).
Accordingly, the Court found the conviction well-founded.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed; the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court are affirmed.
Implications: The decision confirms that a person’s status as a “foreigner” is assessed at the time of the offending act, that identity can be proved by credible official testimony, and that the burden of disproving foreign status rests on the accused under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act. No new legal precedent was announced, but the ruling reinforces the enforceability of deportation orders and the scope of judicial inquiry under the Foreigners Act.
Ayyangar, J.— This appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the High Court of Jodhpur raises for consideration the legality of the conviction of the appellant for a contravention of Section 3 of the Foreigners Act (Act 31 of 1946) which is an offence under Section 14 of that Act. The relevant portion of Section 3 enacts:
“3. (1) The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigners, for prohibiting regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or other departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made under this section may provide that the foreigner—
(a) shall not enter India or shall enter India only at such times and by such route and at such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be prescribed; .…”
Section 14 reads:
“14. If any person contravenes the provisions of this Act or of any order made thereunder, or any direction given in pursuance of this Act or such order, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine; and if such person has entered into a bond in pursuance of clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 3, his bond shall be forefeited, and any person bound thereby shall pay the penalty thereof, or show cause to the satisfaction of the convicting Court why such penalty should not be paid.”
2. The facts given rise to the appeal are briefly these: The case of the prosecution was that the appellant — Ibrahim, s/o Miru — a resident of Rajgarh in Bikaner Division — was a Pakistani national who had originally come over to India on a Pakistani passport issued to him in 1954 and on the strength of a visa granted in December 1956. He was then found to be overstaying in India since February 18, 1957 and an order was thereupon passed in Macrh 1957 for his deportation. This order was given effect to and on April 21, 1957 he was taken across the Pakistan border at the Check Post Munabao by the Indian police officials and deported. Then followed the events which have given rise to the present proceedings. Subsequent to his deporation to Pakistan and on a date as regards which the prosecution had no information, the appellant had, unknown to the Indian authorities, managed to come over to India clandestinely and he was found again in Rajgarh. On seeing him there the Sub-Inspector of Churu made a report to the Station House Officer of Rajgarh by which he drew the latter's attention to the fact that the appellant who had been deported had managed to cross the border on the side of Ganganagar and had re-entered India and he brought this to his notice for the purpose of action being taken. The accused was thereupon apprehended and was charged with an offence of having entered India without a passport in contravention of Section 3(2)(a) of the Foreigners Act.
3. The defence of the appellant was simple. He said he had been in India all the time, since birth had never gone to Pakistan and so had never come here in 1957 with a Pakistani passport, was never deported therefrom and therefore there was no question of his having entered India without a passport. In other words, his defence was that he was not the person who had come over in 1957 and had been deported to Pakistan in April 1957.
4. In support of their case the prosecution proved the order of Government by which Ibrahim, son of Meeru of Rajgarh had been directed to be deported in which is found a reference to his having come over to India with a passport and having overstayed the time permitted by the visa, the general diary of the Emigration Check Post, Munabao dated April 21, 1957 which recited that on April 21, 1957 the deportee — Ibrahim — had come with a Head Constable and that the deportation order had been given effect to and an entry in the deportation register of the Check Post which recited the date and number of the Pakistani passport and the authority by which the order of deportations had been passed and the carrying out of, the actual deportation. In order to establish the identity of the appellant with the Ibrahim mentioned in these documents the prosecution examined two witnesses — Shiv Rattan who was the Police-Inspector in-charge of the Munabao Check post at the relevant date (PW 2) and Govind Singh who was a peon who was posted at the police lines at Churu and who accompanied Dube Singh, Head Constable when Ibrahim was taken from Rajgarh to the Check post at Munabao for being deported. These two witnesses identified the appellant who was present in Court as the Ibrahim whom they had seen off at. the border Check Post in execution of the order to deport. The learned Magistrate, however, was not satisfied with this proof of identity, because he was of the view that the two prosecution witnesses — PWs 2 and 3 — could not, after the lapse of 4 years, be believed when they said that they remembered that the appellant was the Ibrahim whom they had seen deported at the Check Post. The learned Magistrate also held that there was some discrepancy in the father's name of Ibrahim in one of the documents produced by the prosecution which, according to him, did not tally with the name of the appellant's father. On these grounds the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused.
5. The respondent State filed an appeal to the High Court against this order of acquittal and the learned Judges holding that there could be no doubt about the identification by PWs 2 and 3 of the appellant as the Ibrahim whom they had deported, reversed the order of acquittal and held the appellant guilty of the offence charged and sentenced him to a terms of imprisonment. It is from this judgment of the High Court that the present appeal has been filed pursuant to leave granted by this Court.
6. The 1st point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was as regards the identity of the appellant with Ibrahim. On this we are quite satisfied that the learned Judges were correct in their appreciation of the evidence in the case. Both the witnesses — PWs 2 and 3 — are public servants and there is no reason why they should depose falsely against the appellant. The document produced as regards which there is no challenge give the name of the person deported as Ibrahim, his father as Miru and besides, they specify his age as 27 which, it is conceded, tallies with the description of the appellant. The only point that was suggested by learned counsel was that in Ex. P-l — the deporting register at the Check Post — the name of Ibrahim's father was stated to have been entered as Murra and not Miru. When, however, it was pointed out to learned counsel during the course of the arguments that there was a possibility of these words written in Urdu being wrongly transliterated into English learned counsel did not persist in the point. If then Ibrahim s/o Miru, aged 27 was deported and there is evidence adduced which has been accepted by the High Court that it was the appellant that was deported on the former occasion, we find no substance in the argument as regards this question of identity.
7. The second submission of the learned counsel was based on the fact that under Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, as originally enacted, a citizen of Pakistan which was a member of the British Common Wealth was not “a foreigner” within that Act and that citizens of Pakistan became “foreigners” only by virtue of the amendment effected by Central Act 11 of 1957 which came into force on January 19, 1957. The argument based on this feature was as follows: A person who can be held guilty of a contravention of Section 3 of the Foreigners Act is only a “foreigner”. Even according to the case of the prosecution the appellant had come over to India on the strength of a Pakistani passport issued in 1954 and under a visa of December 1956. It must, therefore, be taken that he had crossed over to India before 19th January, 1957. On that date he was not a foreigner, though a Pakistani as he was a citizen of a Commonwealth country. He could not, in law, become a “foreigner” subsequently and no action could be taken against him on the footing that he had become a “foreigner”. We see no merit in this submission. A prima facie reading of the Foreigners Act would show that if on the date when the offence is committed a person is a “foreigner”, as defined by the Act, it would be no excuse for him to say that on an earlier date he was not a foreigner. But it is, however unnecessary to consider this point further because, firstly, there is no proof on the record before us that the appellant entered India before January 19, 1957. But even if he had it would only mean that the earlier order of deportation which was passed in March/April 1957 was a wrong order and that certainly is not a matter with which we are concerned, because it is common ground, if the identity of the appellant is held to be established, that the appellant was deported to Pakistan in April 1957. He could come over to India only subsequent to April 1957 and if he did come over it is also common ground that he came over without a passport. As the date upon which he could have come over was certainly after April 1957 by which date Section 2(a) of the Foreigners Act containing the definition of “Foreigner” had been amended, the appellant was a foreigner when he came into India without a valid passport and visa in contravention of the provisions of Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, and that is the offence with which he is now being charged. We find therefore that there is no substance in this point.
8. Lastly, it was submitted that the Courts could have no jurisdiction to determine whether the appellant was a “foreigner” and that their jurisdiction in that regard was barred by the provisions of Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. This argument proceeds upon a misappprehension of the legal position. In the first place, under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act the onus is upon the person who is accused under the Act to prove that he is not a foreigner. In the present case once the plea regarding the absence of identity of the appellant with the deportee of April 1957 was rejected it could not be suggested that the appellant was ever an Indian citizen. It is only where there is proof that a person is to start with, a citizen of India and it is alleged that he has lost his Indian citizenship by reason of acquiring the nationality of a foreign State that any question of invoking the provisions of Section 9(2) of the citizenship Act arises. That is not the case here. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant was a Pakistani national who had come over to India on a valid Pakistani passport in 1957 and had been legally deported out of India in April 1957. On those facts there is no question of Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act being invoked or coming into play. The offence charged was that having been deported once out of India, he again entered India without proper travel documents in violation of the provisions of Section 3(2)(a) of the Foreigners Act.
9. There was one further point that was mentioned by learned counsel but which we did not permit him to argued. Learned counsel said that the order now passed was one by the State Government and that there was no proof that the Central Government had delegated this power to the State Government. Apart from the point being without substance in view of the terms of Section 3(2)(a) we have extracted earlier, and which was the offence with which the appellant was charged, this point about delegation was never urged in the courts below and consequently no evidence was led to establish delegation under Section 12 of the Act if that was necessary for sustaining the prosecution in the present case. As this point was not raised in the courts below we declined to permit learned counsel to raise it before us:
10. We consider that the learned Judges were right in holding that the prosecution had established the offence charged against the accused.
11. There are no merits in the appeal which fails and is dismissed.
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