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State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Sabir Ali And Another
Case Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The District Magistrate, Bahraich, lodged a complaint on 11 February 1959 alleging that the first respondent had sold a tamarind tree to the second respondent, who then felled and removed it without the requisite permission under Section 15(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act, 1949. The matter was transferred several times before reaching Mr. T. B. Upadhaya, a Magistrate of the Second Class. After he recorded all evidence, powers of a First Class Magistrate were conferred on him, and he convicted both respondents, sentencing each to a fine of Rs 50 or one month’s simple imprisonment in default.
The respondents challenged the conviction before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bahraich; the appeal was later treated as a revision. The Additional Sessions Judge, citing Jaddu v. State, recommended quashing the trial for lack of jurisdiction. A single judge of the High Court (Mulla J.) disagreed with that precedent and referred the matter to a larger Bench. A Division Bench split on the issue; the third judge (Verma J.) sided with the view that jurisdiction was lacking, and the High Court set aside the conviction. The High Court, however, certified the case as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court, leading to the present proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does the phrase “shall be triable by a Magistrate of the Second or Third Class” in Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act exclude jurisdiction of Magistrates of the First Class?
- If jurisdiction is lacking, are the proceedings rendered void under Section 530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments (State)
- Schedule III of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants a First Class Magistrate all ordinary powers of a Second Class Magistrate; therefore, a First Class Magistrate can try the case.
- The opening words of Section 29(1) CPC—“subject to the other provisions of this Code”—permit reliance on the broader powers found elsewhere in the Code, overriding any limitation in the special statute.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Section 15(2) explicitly limits jurisdiction to Magistrates of the Second or Third Class, thereby excluding Magistrates of the First Class.
- The Allahabad High Court rulings in Jaddu v. State and Harbans Singh v. State support the view that a trial by a First Class Magistrate is void for want of jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jaddu v. State, AIR 1952 All 873 | Offences under Section 15 of the U.P. Private Forests Act are triable only by Magistrates of the Second or Third Class. | Cited to support the conclusion that a First Class Magistrate lacks jurisdiction. |
| Harbans Singh v. State, AIR 1953 All 179 | Reaffirmed the jurisdictional limitation and highlighted the right of appeal from convictions by lower-class Magistrates. | Used to reinforce the interpretation that Section 15(2) is exclusive. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined Sections 28 and 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, noting that Section 29(1) mandates that when a special law specifies the court competent to try an offence, that specification is controlling. The residual allocation “any Magistrate” in the Second Schedule becomes relevant only if the special law is silent, which is not the case here.
Schedule III confers general powers but does not create jurisdiction. Relying on it would render Section 29(1) “redundant and useless.” Accordingly, the words of Section 15(2) confine jurisdiction to Magistrates of the Second and Third Class, and a First Class Magistrate cannot assume jurisdiction merely because he possesses broader powers under the Code.
The Court also observed a policy justification: convictions by Second or Third Class Magistrates carry a right of appeal, whereas certain convictions by First Class Magistrates do not, indicating legislative intent to preserve appellate oversight. This practical consideration, while not decisive, bolstered the textual interpretation.
An ancillary argument—that lower-class Magistrates lack authority under Section 32 CPC to impose the higher penalties available for repeat offences—was addressed by noting that such Magistrates may (i) be deemed to have enlarged powers by necessary implication, or (ii) refer the matter under Section 349 CPC to a competent Magistrate if a stiffer sentence is warranted.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that a First Class Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to try offences under Section 15(1) of the U.P. Private Forests Act, rendering the prior proceedings void under Section 530(p) CPC.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that where a special statute designates particular courts for trial, that designation is exclusive notwithstanding broader powers conferred elsewhere in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It preserves the statutory right of appeal and reinforces strict adherence to jurisdictional prescriptions without creating new substantive precedent.
Hidayatullah, J.— This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) against its order dated March 12, 1962 quashing the trial of the respondents for an offence under Section 15(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act (6 of 1949). This trial commenced on February 11, 1959 on a complaint by the District Magistrate, Bahraich. The charge against the first respondent was that he sold one tamarind tree to Respondent 2 for the purpose of felling and removing it without obtaining permission from the competent authority and that against Respondent 2 was that he felled the tree and removed it. The complaint was transferred from one Magistrate to another till it came on the file of Mr T.B Upadhaya who was a Magistrate of the Second Class. After Mr Upadhaya had re- corded all the evidence and examined the two respondents the powers of Magistrate, First Class were conferred on him. Thereafter he pronounced judgment in the case and finding respondents guilty he sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs 50 each or to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The respondents filed an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Baharaich which was later converted into a revision. The learned Additional Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court recommending that the trial before the Magistrate, First Class be quashed as he had no jurisdiction to try the offence. This reference was heard by Mulla, J., who did not agree with the opinion of Beg, J. in Jaddu v. State AIR 1952 All 873 on which the Additional Sessions Judge had relied. Beg, J. had taken the same view in a subsequent case also — Harbans Singh v. State. AIR 1953 All 179 Mulla, J., was of the opinion that the trial was proper, but as these rulings stood in his way, he made a reference of the case to a larger Bench. The case was heard by a Division Bench consisting of B.N Nigam and S.D Singh, JJ. The learned Judges differed amongst themselves: Mr Justice Nigam was of the view that the trial was valid but Mr Justice Singh did not agree with him. The case was then placed before Mr Justice Verma who agreed with Mr Justice Singh. As a result, the conviction and sentence passed on the respondents were set aside. The case was, however, certified by the High Court as fit for appeal and the present appeal has been filed.
10. Which of the two views is the right one is the short question in this appeal. Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act confers jurisdiction to try offences under the first sub-section on Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class. The trial in the present case was by a Magistrate of the First Class, and if there was no jurisdiction in him to try the offence then the proceedings were rightly declared void under Section 530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the opinion of Mr Justice Nigam which finds support from the order of reference made by Mulla, J., there is nothing to prevent the First Class Magistrate from trying an offence under Section 15(1) of the Act, because under Schedule III of the Code of Criminal Procedure the ordinary powers of a Magistrate, First Class include the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the Second Class. According to the other view, the Forests Act confers jurisdiction on Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class and this excludes jurisdiction of any superior Magistrate.
11. Section 15 of the Forests Act reads as follows:
“15. Offences under this chapter and trial of such offences and penalties thereof.—(1) Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this Chapter or deviates from the prescriptions of a sanctioned working plan without the previous sanction of the Forest Officer shall be punishable with fine not exceeding one hundred rupees for the first offence and with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or simple imprisonment not exceeding three months or both for the second or any subsequent offence.
(2) Offences under this section shall be triable by a Magistrate of the Second or Third Class, and proceedings under this section may be instituted on a complaint made by the landlord of the notified area or forest in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed or by any right-holder of such a notified area or forest or by the Forest Officer or by any officer specially empowered by the Provincial Government in this behalf.
(3)-(4) * * *”
12. The question is one of interpretation of the first part of sub-section (2) which says that offences under Section 15 shall be liable by a Magistrate of the Second or Third Class. It does not use the phrase “any Magistrate” nor does it specify “a Magistrate of the First Class”. The question is whether the words of the sub-section exclude a First Class Magistrate. The answer to this in our opinion, is furnished by Sections 28 and 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They provide as follows:
Offences under other laws “29. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, any offence under any other law shall, when any court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such court. (2) When no court in mentioned, it may be tried by the High Court or subject as aforesaid by any court constituted under this Code by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of Second Schedule to be triable.” Offences under Penal Code. “28. Subject to the other provisions of this Code any offece under the Indian Penal Code may be tried— (a) by the High Court, or (b) by the Court of Session, or (c) by any other court by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the Second Schedule to be triable.”
The scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that it provides separately for trial of offences under the Penal Code and for offences under any other law. The court which is to try them is indicated in the Code in the eighth column of the Second Schedule. The first part deals with offences under the Penal Code and the second part with offences under any other law. The last entry in the Second Schedule provides for the trial for offences under any other law which are punishable with imprisonment for less than one year or with fine only and they are made triable by “any Magistrate”. If the matter were governed by the Second Schedule, the last entry would undoubtedly have comprehended a Magistrate, First Class. But Section 29 says that offences under any other law shall be tried by that court which that law mentions and it is only when no court is mentioned that the eighth column of the Second Schedule is applicable. Here sub-section (2) of Section 15 mentions the courts by which offences under Section 15(1) are triable and Section 29(1) excludes the application of the second part of the Second Schedule. The words of sub-section (1) of Section 29 are peremptory. There is no escape from them. They say that “subject to the other provisions of the Code” any offence under any other law shall be tried by the court when such court is mentioned in that law. A case under Section 15(1) therefore, is triable only by the two courts named therein, namely, Magistrates of the Second and the Third classes and not by any other Magistrate. The appellant relies upon the words “subject to the other provisions of the Code” and refers to the Third Schedule. But that Schedule deals with the ordinary powers of the Magistrates under the Criminal Procedure Code. The words of the second sub-Section of Section 15 are not rendered ineffective by the prescription of the ordinary powers of the Magistrates. To call in aid Schedule III would render the provisions of Section 29 redundant and useless at least in those cases where the second part of the Second Schedule applies. What Section 15(2)) does is to prescribe a particular court and in view of the words of Section 29(1) no other court can try offences under Section 15(1) even though the powers of those courts may be superior to those of Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class. If the Second Schedule itself, which prescribes the courts for the trial of offences under laws other than the Penal Code, is excluded, the Third Schedule cannot bring about the same result indirectly. The provisions of the Third Schedule must therefore be taken to define general powers and not to create jurisdictions to try offences which the Second Schedule does.
13. It was argued before us that there is no point in prescribing that the Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class can try subsequent offences because their powers under Section 32 do not extend as far as the punishment prescribed by Section 15(1). This question does not arise directly but it may be said that two views are possible: one is that by implication the powers of these Magistrates are extended beyond what is prescribed under Section 32. The other is that in a case where the Magistrate feels that a heavier punishment should be imposed he can take recourse to the provisions of Section 349 of the Code and make a recommendation to a Magistrate who can impose adequate punishment in the case. The words “subject to the other provisions of the Code” would enable this to be done.
14. In our opinion, therefore, the scheme of the Code read with the provisions of Section 15 of the Forests Act clearly show that offences under Section 15 are not triable by any Magistrate as it would be if the Second Schedule were applicable. They are therefore triable by such Magistrates as have been named in the second sub-section. There is good reason for holding this, because a conviction by a Magistrate of the Second or the Third Class, as the case may be, is open to an appeal whereas a conviction by a Magistrate of the First Class and a sentence of fine of Rs 50 or under or a fine of Rs 200 after a summary trial is not appealable. It is possible that it was intended that a right of appeal should be conferred and therefore the trial of these offences was restricted to Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class. This was pointed out by Mr Justice Beg in Harbans Singh v. State AIR 1953 All 179 and has also been referred to by Mr Justice Verma in the opinion in the present case. In our opinion, it is a circumstance which may be taken into account. It is illustrated in this case. An appeal would have lain against the same decision if the Magistrate had not been given the powers of a First Class Magistrate during the trial and the respondents were robbed of a right of appeal. In any event, in view of the clear words of Section 29(1), the trial of these cases ought to have been before a court designated in Section 15(2) and as the trial was before a Magistrate who was not empowered to try the offence the proceedings were rightly declared void under Section 530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We accordingly hold that the decision under appeal was correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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