- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sankatha Singh And Others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were convicted by the Magistrate, 1st Class, Gyanpur for offences under Sections 452 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC); one appellant, Kharpattu, was additionally convicted under Section 324 IPC. They filed an appeal before the Sessions Judge, which was listed for hearing on 30 November 1956. On that date neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared. The Sessions Judge nevertheless examined the trial record and, finding “no ground for any interference,” dismissed the appeal.
On 17 December 1956 the appellants filed an application seeking restoration of the appeal, explaining their earlier absence as due to an accident en route to court. On 2 July 1957 the same Sessions Judge, Shri Tej Pal Singh, allowed the application and ordered a rehearing.
His successor, Shri Tripathi, held that a Sessions Judge has no power to review or restore an appeal once finally disposed of, declared the restoration order ultra vires, and directed execution of the original convictions. The High Court, in revision, affirmed Shri Tripathi’s view. The present appeal challenges those rulings before the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Sessions Judge can recall or set aside his own final order dismissing a criminal appeal and direct its rehearing.
- Whether inherent powers—if any—permit such recall despite the prohibitions contained in Sections 369 and 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The Sessions Judge possessed inherent powers to recall his earlier order and restore the appeal to further the ends of justice.
- Because the restoration application was within his jurisdiction to entertain, the consequent order could not be treated as void; any error was at most an error within jurisdiction.
No separate respondent arguments were detailed in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 369, read with Section 424 CrPC, an appellate court cannot “alter or review” a judgment once signed, save for correction of clerical errors. The initial dismissal on 30 November 1956 was not for default alone; the Sessions Judge had, albeit briefly, considered the merits and concluded no interference was warranted. The omission to draft a detailed judgment might invite appellate scrutiny, but did not empower the judge himself to reopen the case.
The Court rejected reliance on Section 423 CrPC, noting that the requirement to hear the appellant applies only “if he appears.” Absence of both appellant and counsel after due notice permits the court to decide the appeal on the record. Regarding Section 422, the Court found nothing to show that no notice had been served on counsel; indeed, the appellants were aware of the hearing date.
As to inherent powers, the Court held they cannot be invoked to override an express statutory prohibition. Consequently, Shri Tej Pal Singh’s order of 2 July 1957 was without jurisdiction. Shri Tripathi, therefore, rightly declared the restoration order invalid, and the High Court properly refused to interfere.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The Supreme Court affirmed that a criminal appellate court lacks authority to recall or review its own final judgment except to correct clerical errors. The convictions stand, and the Magistrate’s original orders are to be executed. The decision reinforces the statutory bar in Sections 369 and 424 CrPC and does not create new precedent beyond clarifying that inherent powers cannot be used to circumvent explicit statutory prohibitions.
Raghubar dayal, J.— Sankatha Singh and others appeal against the order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing their application for revision of the order of the Sessions Judge, Gyanpur, holding the order of his predecessor for the rehearing of an appeal which had been dismissed earlier to be ultra vires and without jurisdiction and directing the Magistrate to take immediate steps to execute the order passed by it, according to law.
2. The appellants were convicted by the Magistrate, Ist Class, Gyanpur, of offences under Sections 452 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC Kharpattu, one of the appellants, was also convicted of an offence under Section 324 IPC. They appealed against their conviction. The appeal was fixed for hearing on 30-11-1956. On that date, neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared in Court and the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal. The relevant portion of his order is:
“The appellants have been absent, and their learned counsel has also not appeared to argue the appeal on behalf of the appellants. I have perused the judgment of the learned Magistrate and seen the record. I find no ground for any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
3. On 17-12-1956, an application was presented by the appellants praying that the case be restored to its original number so that justice be done to them. In explaining their absence from court on the date of hearing, it was said that they reached the court somewhat late due to the Ekka, by which they were travelling, overturning accidentally on the way and, as a result, their getting injuries. This application was allowed, on 2-7-1957, by the learned Sessions Judge, Shri Tej Pal Singh, who had dismissed the appeal. His reasons for allowing the application appear, from his order, to be that the application, supported by an affidavit, showed that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the appellants-accused at the time of the hearing of the appeal, that Section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called “the Code”) enjoined the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits after hearing the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor, that no notice was ever issued to the appellants as required by Section 422 of the Code, that Section 367 of the Code laid down what a judgment should contain and that his judgment of 30-11-1956, amounted to no judgment as it did not contain some of those salient points, that the judgment was without jurisdiction as the case was not really considered and no independent judgment was arrived at and that it was necessary that the appeal be reheard in the ends of justice.
4. Shri Tripathi, who succeeded Shri Tej Pal Singh as Sessions Judge, and before whom the appeal was put up for rehearing, was of the opinion that the appellate court had no power to review or restore an appeal which had been disposed of and that therefore the order of his predecessor dated 2-7-1957, was ultra vires and passed without jurisdistion.
5. Against this order, the appellants went in revision to the High Court. The learned Judge of the High Court agreed with the views of Shri Tripathi and accordingly, dismissed the revision application.
6. The sole point for determination in this appeal is whether Shri Tej Pal Singh could set aside his first order dated 30-11-1956, dismissing the appeal, when neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared and could order the rehearing of the appeal. We are of opinion that he could not do so and that therefore the view taken by the High Court is correct.
7. A criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for the default of the appellants or their counsel. The court has either to adjourn the hearing of the appeal to enable them to appear, or should consider the appeal on merits and pass the final order. Shri Tej Pal Singh was aware of this as his order itself indicates. He did not dismiss the appeal for default. He himself perused the judgment of the Magistrate and the record and did consider the merits, as he says in his order “I find no ground for any interference”. The mere fact that he had not expressed his reasons for coming to that opinion does not mean that he had not considered the material on record before coming to the conclusion that there was no case for interference. His omission to write a detailed judgment in the circumstance may be not in compliance with the provisions of Section 367 of the Code and may be liable to be set aside by a superior court, but will not give him any power to set it aside himself, and rehear the appeal. Section 369, read with Section 424 of the Code, makes it clear that the appellate court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed, except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error.
8. Shri Tej Pal Singh was in error when he thought that Section 423 of the Code enjoined the appellate court to dispose of the appeal after hearing the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor. He omitted to notice the words “he appears” after the expression “and hearing the appellant or his pleader”. None of these appears at the hearing, the appellate court can proceed with disposal of the appeal on merits. Of course, a notice to the appellant or counsel of the date of hearing is an essential precedent for the hearing of appeal, in view of Section 422 of the Code. Shri Tej Pal Singh states, in his order dated 2-7-1957:
“It will also appear that the conditions of Section 422 CrPC also not fulfilled, as no notice was ever issued to the appellant.”
He again missed noticing that a notice of the hearing of the appeal has to be given either to the appellant or to his pleader and need not be given to both does not say in his order that no notice of the date of hearing had been given the appellants' counsel. The practice, usually, is to give notice of the date of hearing of the appeal to the counsel who informs the appellant, and not to appellant personally. The application for restoration indicates that the appellants knew of the date of hearing.
9. It has been urged for the appellants that Shri Tej Pal Singh could order the rehearing of the appeal in the exercise of the inherent powers which every court possesses in order to further the ends of justice and that Shri Tripathi was not justified in any case to sit in judgment over the order of Shri Tej Pal Singh, an order passed within jurisdiction, even though it be erroneous. Assuming that Shri Tej Pal Singh, as Sessions Judge, could exercise inherent powers, we are of opinion that he could not pass the order of the rehearing of the appeal in the exercise of such powers when Section 369, read with Section 424 of the Code, specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a court. Inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the court from doing. Shri Tripathi was competent to consider when the other party raised the objection whether the appeal was validly up for rehearing before him. He considered the question and decided it rightly.
10. It is also urged for the appellants Shri Tej Pal Singh had the jurisdiction to pass orders on the application presented by the appellants on 17-12-1956, praying for the rehearing of the appeal and that therefore his order could not be said to have been absolutely without jurisdiction. We do not agree. He certainly had jurisdiction to dispose of the application presented to him, but when Section 369 of the Code definitely prohibited the court's reviewing or altering its judgment, he had no jurisdiction to consider the point raised and to set aside the order dismissing the appeal and order its rehearing.
11. We therefore see no force in this appeal and accordingly dismiss it.
Alert