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State Of West Bengal v. S.N Basak .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 26 March 1960 Sub-Inspector B. L. Ghose of the Police Enforcement Branch lodged a written report with the Officer-in-charge of Chakdah Police Station alleging that the respondent—then serving as an Assistant-cum-Executive Engineer, Kanchrapara Development Area, Kalyani Division—had, in conspiracy with three others, cheated the Government of West Bengal of ₹20,000. A first-information report was drawn up and investigation commenced.
The respondent surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, on 4 April 1960 and was released on bail of ₹1,000. On 9 May 1960 he petitioned the Calcutta High Court under Sections 439 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to quash the investigation (Chakdah P.S. Case No. 33 of 26 March 1960). The High Court held that offences triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 were outside the investigative powers conferred on the police by Chapter XIV of the Code, and therefore quashed the investigation.
The State of West Bengal obtained a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statutory power of the police to investigate cognizable offences under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends to offences triable by a Special Court under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949.
- Whether a High Court can, in exercise of its powers under Section 439 or its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code, quash an ongoing police investigation into such cognizable offences.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 71 I.A. 203 | The police have an unfettered statutory right to investigate cognizable offences, and the judiciary’s role begins only when a charge is brought before the court; Section 561-A does not enlarge judicial power. | The Supreme Court adopted this interpretation to hold that the High Court erred in interfering with the police investigation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by noting that only a written report and consequent FIR existed when the High Court intervened; no proceeding was then pending before any court competent to try the offences. Sections 154 and 156 of the Code confer on the police a statutory mandate to investigate cognizable offences without prior judicial authorization. The Court affirmed that this mandate cannot be curtailed by the supervisory powers under Section 439 or the inherent jurisdiction preserved by Section 561-A.
Relying on the Privy Council decision in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, the Court emphasized the complementary—rather than overlapping—functions of the judiciary and the police. Judicial interference before a charge is filed would disturb the statutory balance between individual liberty and law-enforcement. Consequently, the High Court’s view that offences triable by a Special Court oust police investigative jurisdiction was found to be legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court’s order quashing the investigation set aside.
Immediate Effect: The police investigation into Chakdah P.S. Case No. 33 of 1960 may proceed in accordance with law.
Broader Implications: The decision reaffirms that the existence of a Special Court for trial does not negate the police’s statutory power to investigate cognizable offences, and that High Courts should not invoke Section 439 or Section 561-A to stifle such investigations prior to the filing of a charge-sheet.
Kapur, J.— This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Calcutta quashing the investigation started against the respondent in regard to offences under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 120-B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. On March 26, 1960, Sub-Inspector B.L Ghose of Police Enforcement Branch filed a written report before the Officer-in-charge Chakdah P.S, alleging that the respondent in conspiracy with three others had cheated the Government of West Bengal of a sum of Rs 20,000. The respondent at the time was an Assistant-cum-Executive Engineer, Kanchrapara Development Area, Kalyani Division. On the basis of this report a first information report was drawn up and the police started investigation. On April 4, 1960, the respondent surrendered in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate at Ranaghat and was released on bail for a sum of Rs 1000. The respondent then on May 9, 1960, filed a petition under Sections 439 and 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and prayed for a rule against the District Magistrate, Nadia, to show cause why the case pending in the Court of the Senior Judicial Magistrate, Ranaghat, arising out of the Chakdah Police Station Case No. 33 dated March 26, 1960, be not quashed. The High Court held:
“In our view, the statutory power of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV is not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act 1949, and that being so, the investigation concerned is without jurisdiction. In so saying, we are conscious of the observations of Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad case, 71 Indian Appeals, 203.”
And therefore quashed the police investigation of the case holding it to be without jurisdiction. It is against this judgment and order that the State has come in appeal to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court under Article 134(l)(c).
3. At the time the respondent filed the petition in the High Court only a written report was made to the police by the Sub-Inspector of Police Enforcement Branch and on the basis of that report a first information report was recorded by the Officer-in-charge of the police station and investigation had started. There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent power of the court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the judiciary in regard to statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad observed as follows:
“The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, as Their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act.”
With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the police station.
4. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The investigation will now proceed in accordance with law.
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