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Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad v. Lakhiramdas .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 17, 1962
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, conducting a cloth business headquartered at Ahmedabad with later-opened branches at Karachi and Bombay, was assessed to income tax for Assessment Year 1945-46 on 13 September 1946. After completion of that assessment, the Income-tax Officer (ITO) learnt that the assessee had purchased a bank draft for Rs 1,10,000 on 17 July 1944, deposited in the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd., Ahmedabad branch. Treating this as income that had escaped assessment, the ITO, on 24 March 1954, reopened the assessment under Section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and added the amount as income from an undisclosed source.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the reassessment, but the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench “C”, set it aside on 7 November 1955, holding that Section 34(1)(a) was inapplicable because the assessee had neither failed to file a return nor withheld material facts.

The revenue’s request to the Tribunal for a reference under Section 66(1) was rejected; its subsequent application under Section 66(2) was summarily dismissed by the High Court of Bombay on 14 December 1956. The Commissioner then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against (i) the Tribunal’s order and (ii) the High Court’s refusal to direct a reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s power under Article 136 of the Constitution, a direct appeal against the Tribunal’s order should be entertained, bypassing the High Court.
  2. Whether any question of law arose from the Tribunal’s finding that the assessee had fully and truly disclosed all material facts, thereby obliging the High Court to compel a reference under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Commissioner of Income-tax)

  • The Tribunal’s conclusion that the assessee had made full and true disclosure was allegedly based on “surmises and conjectures” and unsupported by evidence; therefore a question of law arose.
  • Consequently, the High Court erred in refusing to require the Tribunal to state a case under Section 66(2).

The opinion does not detail the respondent’s submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar, (1961) 43 ITR 498 (SC) The Supreme Court ordinarily will not bypass the High Court by entertaining a direct appeal from the Tribunal save in exceptional circumstances. Used to dismiss the appeal filed directly against the Tribunal’s order.
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, (1960) 4 ITR 191 (SC) For reopening under Section 34(1)(a), the ITO must have “reason to believe” that income escaped assessment due to the assessee’s omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. Cited to define the prerequisite that the Tribunal had to examine; reinforced that its conclusion on disclosure was factual.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Appeal against the Tribunal’s order: Relying on Chandi Prasad Chokhani, the Court reiterated that Article 136 should not be used to circumvent the statutory route via the High Court. No “exceptional or special circumstances” existed; the appeal was therefore dismissed.

2. Appeal against the High Court’s refusal under Section 66(2):

  • The question proposed by the revenue before the Tribunal and the High Court concerned whether the bank-draft transaction warranted initiation of Section 34(1)(a) proceedings. The Court agreed with the Tribunal that this was misconceived; the real enquiry was whether the assessee had failed to disclose material facts.
  • The Tribunal had scrutinised the original assessment record, noting that the assessee produced separate books for Ahmedabad, Bombay and Karachi and that an Examiner of Accounts had reported on the Exchange Bank account.
  • Given that evidence, the Tribunal’s finding of full and true disclosure constituted a pure question of fact. Whether such disclosure occurred is not ordinarily a question of law unless the finding is unsupported by evidence.
  • The appellant’s new contention before the Supreme Court—that the finding lacked evidentiary basis—had never been urged in its Section 66 applications; it could not be raised for the first time at the apex stage.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that no referable question of law arose and the High Court had rightly dismissed the Section 66(2) petition.

Holding and Implications

Both appeals are DISMISSED. No order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The Tribunal’s decision in favour of the assessee stands restored, and the reassessment adding Rs 1,10,000 is nullified. Broader Implication: The judgment reaffirms that a Tribunal’s determination on whether an assessee failed to make full and true disclosure is ordinarily factual; absent any patent error, courts will not compel a reference on such findings.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.K Das, J.— These are two appeals by special leave of this Court. One appeal is from the judgment and order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench C (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) dated 7-11-1955, by which the Tribunal held that Section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 was not applicable in the case, as there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 for Assessment Year 1945-46, or to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. The second appeal is from the order of the High Court of Bombay dated 14-12-1956 by which the said High Court rejected an application made by the present appellant under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act. By that order the High Court refused to ask the Tribunal to state a case for its consideration of a question of law which the appellant said arose from the order of the Tribunal dated 7-11-1955.

2. A preliminary objection as to limitation was raised before us on behalf of the respondent with regard to the appeal from the order of the Tribunal. It is not necessary to deal with that preliminary objection, because learned advocate for the appellant has conceded that the appeal direct from the order of Tribunal must be dismissed in view of the decision of this Court in Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar (1961) 43 ITR 498 which laid down that save in exceptional and special circumstances, this Court would not exercise its power under Article 136 of the Constitution in such a way as to bypass the High Court by entertaining an appeal direct from the order of the Tribunal and thereby ignore the decision given by the High Court. Therefore, the appeal from the order of the Tribunal dated 7-11-1955 must be dismissed.

3. Now, we proceed to consider the appeal from the order of the High Court dated 14-12-1956. The short facts are these. The respondent, who was the assessee in the case, carried on a cloth business at Ahmedabad. Later he opened branches at Karachi and Bombay. He was assessed to income tax in the status of a Hindu undivided family. In the account period relevant to Assessment Year 1943-44, the assessee opened a branch at Karachi. The total income for that assessment year was determined at Rs 38,4100. For Assessment Years 1944-45 and 1945-46 the assessee maintained joint accounts for the whole period of two years. In Assessment Year 1945-46 he opened a branch office at Bombay. The original assessment for the aforesaid two years was completed under the provisions of Section 23(3) of the Income Tax Act on 13-9-1946. In the assessment for the year 1945-46 (Samvat year 2000) the assessee's income was derived from his cloth business carried on at Ahmedabad, Karachi and Bombay and certain other properties. Separate sets of accounts were maintained for the head office as well as for the two branches. The books of accounts were produced and were examined by the Examiner of Accounts who submitted a report to the Income Tax Officer concerned. The total income for Assessment Year 1945-46 was determined to be Rs 15,294. Sometime after the completion of the said assessment, Income Tax Officer concerned received information that the assessee had purchased a draft of Rs 1,10,000 from the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd. at Bombay and the draft was deposited on 17-7-1944 in a branch of the said bank at Ahmedabad for realisation. In consequence and on the basis of this information the Income Tax Officer initiated a proceeding under Section 34(l)(a) of the Income Tax Act against the assessee by issuing a notice to the latter on 24-3-1954. It may be stated here that the exact date on which the Income Tax Officer came to know of the purchase of the draft for Rs 1,10,000 is not known. The Income Tax Officer also issued a notice to the assessee under Section 22(4) to produce his account books for the Samvat year 2000 and his passbooks of the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd. The assessee gave a certain explanation for not being able to produce either his account books or the passbooks of the said Bank. The Income Tax Officer disbelieved the explanation and by a revised assessment order made on 15-10-1954, added a sum of Rs 1,10,000 as income from an undisclosed source, which had escaped assessment in the original assessment. There was an appeal to the Appellant Assistant Commissioner who confirmed the order of the Income Tax Officer. Then, there was an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on the ground that Section 34(1)(a) was not applicable inasmuch as there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under 22 for the year 1945-46, or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year. The Tribunal pointed out that at the time of the original assessment the assessee had produced his books of account with regard to all the three offices at Ahmedabad, Bombay and Karachi. The assessee also filed the balance-sheet relating to his business at the aforesaid three places. The Tribunal further pointed out that before completing the assessment for the years 1944-45 and 1945-46, the Income Tax Officer had called for all the relevant account books which had been examined by an Examiner of Accounts, an officer subordinate to the Income Tax Officer. This officer submitted a report relating to the account books of the Ahmedabad business and he mentioned therein that the assessee had account with the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd. and certain other banks. The Tribunal held that in these circumstances it could not be said that there was any omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year 1945-46. The present appellant then moved the Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act and asked the Tribunal to state a case to the High Court of Bombay on the following question of law, which, according to the appellant, arose out of the Tribunal's order:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and having particular regard to the fact that the return and the statement accompanying the return furnished by the assessee during the course of the assessment proceedings for 1945-46 did not indicate such a large transaction as Rs 1,10,000 by a single bank draft, the Income Tax Officer was right in starting proceedings under Section 34(1)(a) on the receipt of the information about the above transaction, to make assessment for 1945-46?”

4. The Tribunal rejected the application under Section 66(1) on two grounds: firstly, that the question which the appellant said arose out of the Tribunal's order was a question of fact and not a question of law; and secondly, that the question suggested by the appellant was misconceived, because the question before the Tribunal at the time of the hearing of the appeal was not whether the assessee had failed to disclose the transaction of Rs 1,10,000 in his return and the statements accompanying it, but whether there was any omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year in question. The appellant then moved the High Court of Bombay under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act. That application, as me have stated already, was summarily dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 14-12-1956.

5. The learned advocate for the appellant has contended before us that the finding of the Tribunal that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment was based on surmises and conjectures and there were no materials on which the Tribunal could come to such a conclusion; therefore, it has been argued that a question of law arose out of the Tribunal's order and the High Court was wrong in summarily rejecting the petition made by the appellant under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. First of all, it must be pointed out that the question which the appellant suggested should be referred to the High Court in his petitions under Section 66(1) and Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act is different from the question which is now raised by the learned advocate for the appellant. The question now raised for the first time before us by the learned advocate for the appellant is that the Tribunal had no materials on which to find that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and that the finding of the Tribunal was based on surmises and conjectures. That, however, was not the question which was suggested for reference to the High Court at the stage when the petitions under Section 66 were made. At that stage the question suggested was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having particular regard to the return made by the assessee the statements accompanying it, the assessee did not indicate that he had obtained a bank draft for Rs 1,10,000. We agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the question suggested was misconceived, because what the Tribunal had to consider was whether the proceeding under Section 34(1)(a) was properly initiated by the Income Tax Officer in the year 1954. It must be remembered that the original assessment was completed on 13-9-1946 and more than four years had passed, and at the relevant time the period during which the Income Tax Officer could take action under Section 34(1)(a) was eight years. It is true that the eight years had not expired on 24-3-1954 when the notice under Section 34(l)(a) was issued. But the perequisite condition for the initiation of a proceeding under Section 34(l)(a) is that “the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee … to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year”, income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment etc. That condition mast be fulfilled before the Income Tax Officer can take action under Section 34(l)(a). (See Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta (1960) 4 ITR 191.) Therefore, what the Tribunal had to consider was whether the assessee had fully and truly disclosed all material facts necessary for the assessment. The Tribunal examined all the relevant materials produced by the assessee at the time of the original assessment and came to the conclusion that there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. The Tribunal referred to the account books produced by the assessee and particularly to the report of the Examiner of Accounts who submitted a report to the Income Tax Office with regard to the bank account of the assessee in the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case the question whether the assessee had or had not failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment was a question of fact and we are unable to accept the argument of the learned advocate for the appellant to the contrary.

6. In the result we hold that no question of law arose in this case and the High Court of Bombay rightly rejected the petition under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act. Both the appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.