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Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, trading as Deepak Trading Corporation in Bombay, was found on December 27, 1958 to be storing and manufacturing large quantities of absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze. These articles were falsely passed off as products of a reputed firm in Secundrabad. Samples were analysed by the Government Analyst, who reported that all items except lint were below the prescribed standard.
The Presidency Magistrate, 16th Court, Bombay, acquitted the appellant on the ground that possession had not been proved. On appeal, the Bombay High Court re-examined the evidence, held that the appellant possessed and manufactured the sub-standard goods, and convicted him under Section 18 of the Drugs Act, 1940, sentencing him to three months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 500 on each count. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was brought by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze are “drugs” within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Drugs Act, 1940 as amended by the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1955.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The articles in question are not “drugs” under Section 3(b) because they are more akin to surgical instruments, which counsel suggested would not fall within the statutory definition.
- Reliance was placed on a report of a high-powered medical committee which opined that surgical dressings did not come within the scope of the Drugs Act and therefore were not subject to quality control under that statute.
- An appeal was made for reduction of sentence on the ground that the punishment was excessive.
Respondent's Arguments
- The definition in Section 3(b) explicitly embraces “substances intended to be used for or in the treatment” of disease; the disputed articles are such substances because they are essential for surgical dressings.
- Maintaining quality standards for these items is integral to the Act’s purpose of safeguarding medical treatment; excluding them would defeat the legislative objective.
- The sentence imposed was already lenient given the gravity of manufacturing and distributing sub-standard medical supplies.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court interpreted Section 3(b) of the Drugs Act as a deliberately broad definition that covers not only medicines but also “substances” used for or in the treatment of disease. The Court reasoned as follows:
- “Substances” in the statute should be construed as “things” other than medicines yet necessary for treatment.
- Absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze are undeniably “substances” and are sterilised or otherwise treated to become disinfectant, making them indispensable to surgical treatment.
- The articles must meet specified standards—such as absorbency for gauze—because failure to do so would compromise medical care. Including them within the definition of “drug” aligns with the Act’s purpose to eradicate sub-standard medical supplies.
- The Court dismissed reliance on the expert committee’s report as irrelevant to statutory interpretation.
- Having affirmed that the articles are “drugs,” the Court found no ground to disturb either the conviction or the sentence, deeming three months’ rigorous imprisonment “more lenient than severe” in view of the large-scale manufacture of spurious goods.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; conviction and sentence affirmed.
The ruling confirms that surgical dressings such as absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze fall within the statutory definition of “drug” under the Drugs Act, 1940. The immediate consequence is the upholding of the appellant’s conviction and sentence; the judgment also clarifies the Act’s scope, reinforcing regulatory control over quality standards for essential surgical supplies, but it does not establish new precedent beyond construing Section 3(b).
Subba, Rao, J.— This appeal by special leave against the Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay raises the question of construction of Section 3(b) of the Drugs Act, 1940, as amended by the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1955, hereinafter called “the Act”.
2. This appeal has been argued on the basis of facts found by the High Court. The appellant was carrying on business in the name of Deepak Trading Corporation at Bulakhidas Building, Vithaldas Road, Bombay. On December 27, 1958, the Sub Inspector of Police accompanied by the Drug Inspector, raided the said building and found large quantities of absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages, guaze and other things. It was found that the appellant was not only storing these goods in large quantities but was actually manufacturing them in Bombay and passing them off as though they were manufactured by a firm of repute in Secundrabad. The samples of the aforesaid articles and lint were sent to the Government Analyst, who reported that out of the samples sent to him only the lint was of standard quality and the other articles were not of standard quality. The appellant was prosecuted before the Pendency Magistrate, 16th Court, Bombay, for an offence under Section 18 of the Act, inter alia, for manufacturing drugs which were not of standard quality. The learned Presidency Magistrate acquitted the appellant on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the articles were in the possession of the appellant. The High Court on a resurvey of the evidence came to a different conclusion and found that the said articles were not only found in the possession of the appellant but also were manufactured by him and that they were below the standard prescribed. On the finding, it convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs 500 under each count. Hence the appeal.
3. Though an attempt was made to argue that the said articles were had been proved to be below the prescribed standard, it was subsequently given up. The only question that was argued is whether the said articles are drugs within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. The said section reads:
“ ‘drug' includes:
(i) all medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used for or in the treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or animals other than medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine, and
(ii) such substances (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the human body or intended to be used for the destruction of vermins or insects which cause disease in human beings on animals as may be specified from time to time by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
The said definition of “drugs” is comprehensive enough to take in not only medicines but also substances intended to be used for or in the treatment of diseases of human beings or animals. This artificial definition introduces a distinction between medicines and substances which are not medicines strictly so-called. The expression “substances”, therefore, must be something other than medicines but which are used for treatment. The part of the definition which is material for the present case is “substances intended to be used for or in the treatment”. The appropriate meaning of the expression “substances” in the section is “things”'. It cannot be disputed, and indeed it is not disputed, that absorbent cotton wool, roller bandages and gauze are “substances” within the meaning of the said expression. If so, the next question is whether they are used for or in “treatment”. The said articles are sterilized or otherwise treated to make them disinfectant and then used for surgical dressing; they are essential materials for treatment in surgical cases. Besides being aseptic these articles have to possess those qualities which are utilized in the treatment of diseases. Thus for instance, in the case of guaze-one of the articles concerned in this appeal — it has to conform to a standard of absorbency in order that it might serve its purpose: otherwise the fluid which oozes is left to accumulate at the site of the wound or sore. The legislature designedly extended the definition of “drug” so as to take in substances which are necessary aids for treating surgical or other cases. The main object of the Act is to prevent sub-standards in drugs, presumably for maintaining high standards of medical treatment. That would certainly be defeated if the necessary concomitants of medical or surgical treatment were allowed to be diluted: the very same evil which the Act intends to eradicate would continue to subsist.. Learned Counsel submitted that surgical instrument would not fall within the definition and that guaze and lint would fall within the same class. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to definie exhaustively “the substances” falling within the definition of “drugs”; and we consider that whether or not surgical instruments are “drugs”, the articles concerned in this case are. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon a report of a high powered committee consisting of expert doctors, who expressed the opinion in the report that as the surgical dressings did not come under the purview of the Drugs Act, no control on their quality was being exercised. Obviously, the opinion of the medical experts would not help us in the construing a statutory provision. We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the High Court, that the said articles are substances used for or in the “treatment” within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act.
4. An impassioned appeal was made for reducing the sentences imposed upon the appellant. When a similar argument was advanced in the High Court, it pointed out that this was a gross case where large quantities of spurious drugs had been manufactured by the appellant and passed of as goods manufactured by a firm of repute. The appellant was guilty of an anti-social act of a very serious nature. In our view, the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for three months was more lenient than severe. There is no case for interfererence with the sentences. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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