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Badri Narayan Singh \ v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh And Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
During the 1957 general election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly, five candidates, including the appellant Badri Narain Singh and respondent Kam Deo Prasad, contested one seat. Two candidates withdrew before the final date. The appellant polled the highest votes and was declared elected on 14 March 1957. Respondent 1 (Kam Deo Prasad) filed an election petition under Sections 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, alleging that the appellant and another candidate (Respondent 2) were disqualified because, as “Ghatwals,” they held an office of profit under the State, and further alleging corrupt practices by the appellant.
The Election Tribunal found the appellant guilty of corrupt practices but ruled that a Ghatwal did not hold an office of profit. It therefore set aside the appellant’s election but declined to declare Respondent 1 elected. The appellant appealed (Election Appeal No. 7/1958), seeking restoration of his seat; Respondent 1 filed a cross-appeal (Election Appeal No. 8/1958) seeking to be declared elected. The Patna High Court, in a single judgment, disagreed with the corrupt-practice finding yet accepted that a Ghatwal holds an office of profit, thereby (i) dismissing Appeal No. 7, and (ii) allowing Appeal No. 8, declaring Respondent 1 elected.
Separate decrees were drawn. The appellant sought special-leave to appeal only against the decree in Appeal No. 8. Respondent 1 raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was barred by res judicata because the appellant had not appealed against the decree dismissing Appeal No. 7, which had already upheld the finding that he held an office of profit and set aside his election.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present appeal is barred by the principle of res judicata because the appellant did not challenge the Patna High Court’s decree in Election Appeal No. 7, which had already become final.
- Consequently, whether the appellant can, in this appeal, contest the High Court’s finding that a Ghatwal holds an office of profit under the Bihar Government.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s Preliminary Objection
- The dismissal of Election Appeal No. 7 became final; therefore, the finding that the appellant held an office of profit is conclusive between the parties.
- Under res judicata principles, the appellant cannot relitigate that finding in an appeal confined to Election Appeal No. 8.
- If the appellant cannot dispute that finding, no other ground survives to upset the High Court’s declaration of Respondent 1 as duly elected.
Appellant’s Response
- Relied on Narhari v. Shankar, 1950 S.C.R. 754, contending that a common judgment arising from the same proceeding does not give rise to separate final decisions capable of creating res judicata when only one appeal is prosecuted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narhari v. Shankar, 1950 S.C.R. 754 | Illustrates circumstances where a single appeal may suffice against multiple decrees arising from one judgment without attracting res judicata. | Distinguished: the Supreme Court held that Narhari dealt with identical subject-matter in both decrees, whereas here Appeals 7 and 8 had distinct subject-matters, generating separate decisions; hence Narhari did not preclude the application of res judicata. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant’s failure to appeal against the decree in Election Appeal No. 7 barred the present appeal. It reasoned as follows:
- Although both High Court appeals emanated from one Election Tribunal proceeding, each concerned a different subject-matter: Appeal No. 7 addressed the validity of the appellant’s election; Appeal No. 8 concerned Respondent 1’s right to be declared elected once the appellant’s election was set aside.
- The High Court’s single judgment actually embodied two distinct decisions. The decree dismissing Appeal No. 7, unchallenged by the appellant, became final and conclusively established that he held an office of profit and that his election was void.
- Applying general principles of res judicata (distinct from the narrower scope of Section 11 CPC), the Court held that a party cannot contest in a subsequent proceeding a finding that has already become final between the same parties.
- The precedent in Narhari v. Shankar was inapplicable: in Narhari there was truly “one trial, one finding, one decision” on identical issues, whereas here separate issues and reliefs produced separate, appealable decisions.
- Because the appellant’s election had been finally set aside in Appeal No. 7, he could not, in this appeal against Appeal No. 8, reopen the foundational finding that he was disqualified as a holder of an office of profit.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
By upholding the preliminary objection, the Supreme Court confirmed that the unchallenged decree in Election Appeal No. 7 is conclusive. Consequently, the declaration of Respondent 1 as duly elected stands. The ruling reinforces the application of general res judicata principles to separate decrees arising out of connected election appeals, emphasizing that litigants must appeal every adverse decree if they wish to contest its findings. No broader electoral or constitutional precedent was set beyond this clarification.
Raghubar Dayal, J.— Badri Narain Singh, the appellant, and four other persons including Kam Deo Prasad, respondents, were candidates to the Bihar Legislative Assembly during the last general election held in 1957. Two of those candidates withdrew before the relevant date. The appellant secured the largest number of votes and was declared elected on 14-3-1957. Respondent 2 secured larger number of votes than Kam Deo Prasad, Respondent 1, who filed an election petition under Sections 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951), challenging the election of the appellant on the ground that the nomination of the appellant and Respondent 2, who, as Ghatwals, held an office of profit, was against the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, and that the appellant had also committed corrupt practices. Kam Deo Prasad, by his election petition, not only prayed for the declaration that the election of the appellant was void, but also for the declaration that he himself was duly elected. The appellant denied the allegations against him. The Election Tribunal held that Badri Narain Singh, the appellant, was guilty of corrupt practices and that a Ghatwal was not a holder of an office of profit under the State of Bihar. It therefore set aside the election of the appellant, but did not grant the declaration that Kam Deo Prasad was a duly elected candidate.
2. The appellant filed Election Appeal No. 7 of 1958 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna, against the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside his election, and prayed that the order of the Election Tribunal be set aside and that it be held that he had been duly elected. Kam Deo Prasad also filed Election Appeal No. 8 against the order of the Election Tribunal not declaring him to be the duly elected candidate and prayed for a declaration that he had been duly elected. The grounds of appeal questioned the correctness of the finding of the Election Tribunal that Badri Narain Singh and Respondent 2, as Ghatwals, were not the holders of offices of profit and that Kam Deo Prasad could not be declared duly elected.
3. Both these appeals were disposed of by the High Court by one judgment. It did not accept the finding of the Election Tribunal that Badri Narain Singh had committed any corrupt practice and accepted the contention for Respondent 1 that Badri Narain Singh and Respondent 2 held offices of profit under the Bihar Government as they were Ghatwals. It was in this view of the matter that it confirmed the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside the election of the appellant and, allowing the appeal of Respondent 1, declared him duly elected.
4. The concluding portion of the judgment of the High Court may be usefully quoted here:
“To conclude, the election of the returned candidate is not valid, and the order of the Tribunal is, therefore, right, though on different grounds. Further, there was only one seat, and three persons contested it, namely, the petitioner and the two respondents. The two respondents were disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, members of Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of the State, and, therefore, their nomination papers were not validly accepted. If their nomination papers are rejected, and it cannot but be rejected, the only person left in the field was the petitioner Kamdeo Prasad Singh, and, therefore, he must be declared to be duly elected.
In the result, Election Appeal No. 7 of 1958 is dismissed, and Election Appeal No. 8 of 1958 is allowed, and Kamdeo Prasad Singh is declared to be duly elected to Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Sarnath State Assembly constituency in the district of Santal Parganas.”
5. As a result of this order, separate decrees were prepared in the two appeals. Decree in Election Appeal No. 7 said, “It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed”. The decree in Appeal No. 8 said, “It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be and the same is hereby allowed and Kamdeo Prasad Singh is declared to be duly elected to the Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Sarnath State Assembly constituency in the district of Santhal Parganas.”
6. The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave against the order in Election Appeal No. 8 of 1958. All the grounds of appeal relate to the finding of the High Court that the office of a Ghatwal is an office of profit. The petition for special leave to appeal does not mention the relief the appellant seeks from this Court. Presumably, he prays for the setting aside of the order in Appeal No. 7 confirming the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside his election and also the order in Appeal No. 8.
7. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of respondent Kamdeo Prasad Singh that this appeal is incompetent as barred by the principle of res judicata inasmuch as the appellant did not appeal against the order of the High Court in Appeal No. 7 whose dismissal by the High Court confirmed the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside the election of the appellant. It is urged that the order setting aside the appellant's election having become final, it cannot be set aside and that the finding arrived at in that appeal about a Ghatwal being a holder of an office of profit operates as res judicata in this appeal and therefore no appeal against the order in Appeal No. 8 declaring Respondent 1 to be the duly elected candidate can be pressed on the ground that the view of the High Court about the appellant's holding an office of profit is wrong. If the correctness of that view cannot be challenged, the correctness of the declaration in favour of Respondent 1 cannot be challenged in this appeal on any other ground when no other ground had been taken in the application for special leave. The contention in effect, therefore, is that it is not open to the appellant in this appeal to question the correctness of the finding that he held an office of profit under the Bihar Government, a finding which formed the basis of the dismissal of Appeal No. 7 and the confirmation of the order setting aside his election.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of this Court in Narhari v. Shankar 1950 S.C.R 754 in support of his contention that the judgment in Election Appeal No. 7 cannot operate as res judicata in this appeal. That case is distinguishable on facts and is with respect to the interpretation of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. In the suit, in that case, the plaintiffs claimed possession over 2/3rds of the Plot No. 214. They claimed 1/3rd which was in the possession of one set of defendants, namely, Defendants 1 to 4 and the other 1/3rd was in possession of another set of defendants, namely, Defendants 5 to 8. Each set of defendants claimed that they were entitled to the land in their possession as their share of the family property and denied the allegations of the plaintiffs that the senior branch was under custom entitled to exclusive possession of the plot which was Inam land. The suit was decreed by the trial court. Each set of defendants then filed an appeal claiming 1/3rd of the plot. The first appellate court allowed both the appeals and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit by one judgment and ordered a copy of the judgment to be placed on the file of the other connected appeal. Naturally, it decided the one point of contention common to both the appeals, namely, that the senior branch was not entitled to exclusive possession of the plot. This was the finding in each of the appeals.
10. The plaintiffs thereafter filed two appeals to the High Court, one against the decree in the appeal filed by Defendants 1 to 4 and the other against the decree in the appeal filed by Defendants 5 to 8. The latter appeal was filed beyond limitation and the High Court refused to condone the delay. It was contended at the hearing of the appeal that the second appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation and was not maintainable and that when it was dismissed as not maintainable the first appeal would be barred by the principle of res judicata. The High Court agreed with the contention, dismissed the second appeal as time-barred and the first on the ground that the judgment in the appeal by Defendants 5 to 8 operated as res judicata. The plaintiffs then filed two appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Hyderabad State and, ultimately, they were disposed of by this Court in view of Article 374(4) of the Constitution.
11. The plaintiffs had impleaded all the defendants as respondents in their first appeal to the High Court. They had paid the full court fee necessary for an appeal against the dismissal of the entire suit. Their prayer covered both the appeals. This indicated that it was sought to be an appeal against the dismissal of the entire suit. It is not clear whether the common judgment passed by the first appellate court specifically stated that it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with respect to one-third of the plot by its order allowing one appeal and dismissed the suit with respect to the other one-third by its order allowing the second appeal. Possibly it just said that as a result of its finding the appeals are allowed and the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed and that such an order led the plaintiffs to actually file one appeal against all the defendants and against the dismissal of the entire suit. The prayer in the first appeal covered the subject-matter of both the appeals. Thus the first appeal was really a consolidated appeal against the decrees in both the appeals and could have been split up for the purposes of record into two separate appeals. This Court itself felt that the circumstances of the case were such that the High Court should have allowed the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the appellant.
It was in these circumstances that this Court observed, at page 757:
“It is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up.”
This does not mean that whenever there be more than one appeal arising out of one suit, only one appeal is competent against the order in any of those appeals irrespective of the fact whether the issues for decision in those appeals were all common or some were common and others raised different points for determination. The existence of one finding and one decision mentioned in this observation simply contemplates the presence of common points in all the appeals and the absence of any different point in those appeals, and consequently of one decision on those common points in all the appeals.
12. This Court further observed at p. 758:
“The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata.”
These observations do not apply to cases which are governed by the general principles of res judicata which rest on the principle that a judgment is conclusive regarding the points decided between the same parties and that the parties should not be vexed twice over for the same cause.
13. We are therefore of opinion that both in view of the facts of the case and the provision of law applicable to that case, that case can be no guide for determining the question before us in this appeal.
14. It is true that both the Appeals Nos. 7 and 8 before the High Court arose out of one proceeding before the Election Tribunal. The subject-matter of each appeal was, however, different. The subject-matter of Appeal No. 7 filed by the appellant related to the question of his election being bad or good, in view of the pleadings raised before the Election Tribunal. It had nothing to do with the question of right of Respondent 1 to be declared as duly elected candidate. The claim on such a right is to follow the decision of the question in Appeal No. 7 in case the appeal was dismissed. If Appeal No. 7 was allowed, the question in Appeal No. 8 would not arise for consideration. The subject-matter of Appeal No. 8 simply did not relate to the validity or otherwise of the election of the appellant. It related to the further action to be taken in case the election of the appellant was bad, on the ground that a Ghatwal holds an office of profit. The decision of the High Court in the two appeals, though stated in one judgment, really amounted to two decisions and not to one decision common to both the appeals. It is true that in his Appeal No. 8, the Respondent 1 had referred to the rejection of his contention by the Election Tribunal about the appellant and Respondent 2 being holders of an office of profit. He had to challenge the finding on this point because if he did not succeed on it, he could not have got a declaration in his favour when Respondent 2 was also in the field and had secured a larger number of votes. He could, however, rely on the same contention in supporting the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside the election of the appellant and which was the subject-matter of Appeal No. 7. This contention was considered by the High Court in Appeal No. 7 in that context and it was therefore that even though the High Court did not agree with the Election Tribunal about the appellant's committing a corrupt practice, it confirmed the setting aside of his election on the ground that he held an office of profit. The finding about his holding an office of profit served the purpose of both the appeals, but merely because of this the decision of the High Court in each appeal cannot be said to be one decision. The High Court came to two decisions. It came to one decision in respect of the invalidity of the appellant's election in Appeal No. 7. It came to another decision in Appeal No. 8 with respect to the justification of the claim of Respondent 1 to be declared as a duly elected candidate, a decision which had to follow the decision that the election of the appellant was invalid and also the finding that Respondent 2, as Ghatwal, was not a properly nominated candidate. We are therefore of opinion that so long as the order in the appellant's appeal No. 7 confirming the order setting aside his election on the ground that he was a holder of an office of profit under the Bihar Government and therefore could not have been a properly nominated candidate stands, he cannot question the finding about his holding an office of profit, in the present appeal, which is founded on the contention that that finding is incorrect.
15. We therefore accept the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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