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Nisar Ali v. State Of Uttar Pradesh ..
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant and one Qudrat Ullah were tried before the Sessions Judge, Bareilly, for the murder of Sabir. The appellant faced a charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, while Qudrat Ullah was charged under Section 302 read with Section 114 for alleged abetment. On 11 May 1951, at approximately 6:30 p.m., an altercation arose near Qudrat Ullah’s butcher shop when the deceased questioned the appellant’s “dishevelled condition.” According to the prosecution, the quarrel escalated, the appellant asked Qudrat Ullah for a knife (Ex. II), and stabbed Sabir, who died from a punctured chest wound.
A First Information Report was lodged by Qudrat Ullah at 6:45 p.m., only fifteen minutes after the incident. The Sub-Inspector commenced an investigation the same evening and arrested the appellant at his residence. Post-mortem examination confirmed that death resulted from shock and haemorrhage caused by a sharp-edged weapon. Eyewitnesses included Yad Ali (PW 1), Banne (PW 2) and Mohd. Ahmed (PW 3).
The Sessions Judge disbelieved the eyewitnesses and acquitted both accused. The State appealed only against the appellant. The Allahabad High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced him to transportation for life, noting the provocation involved. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was brought by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the appellant for murder under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the credibility of eyewitnesses, who had allegedly given false evidence against Qudrat Ullah, could be selectively accepted against the appellant in view of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
- Whether the High Court’s observations effectively shifted the burden of proof onto the appellant, thereby offending the presumption of innocence.
- Whether the First Information Report lodged by a co-accused was admissible and of any evidentiary value in the circumstances.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The eyewitnesses were unreliable because they falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah; consequently, their entire testimony should have been discarded under the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
- The High Court’s remark that an innocent person “must have come out of his house” impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto the appellant, violating the fundamental presumption of innocence.
- The FIR made by a co-accused could not be used as substantive evidence against the appellant.
The opinion does not set out the State’s detailed arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 AC 462 | Prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt; presumption of innocence of the accused. | Cited to emphasise that any suggestion shifting the burden to the accused undermines a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence. |
| Chaubaria Singh v. Bhuneshwari Prasad Pal (Privy Council, unreported) | Reliability of witnesses who have given false evidence on another aspect of the case. | Relied upon by the appellant; the Court found it an insufficient basis to elevate the maxim falsus in uno to a rule of law, treating it only as a rule of caution. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the High Court’s approach, noting a problematic passage that appeared to place an evidentiary burden on the appellant. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the principle from Woolmington that the burden rests on the prosecution.
On the core evidentiary issue, the Court held that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a mandatory rule of evidence in India but merely a cautionary guideline. Therefore, even if witnesses erred regarding Qudrat Ullah’s role, their testimony could still be accepted against the appellant if otherwise credible. The Court endorsed the High Court’s evaluation that the eyewitnesses’ account of the stabbing was consistent, supported by medical evidence, and sufficient to establish guilt.
After analysing the discrepancies highlighted by defence counsel, the Court concluded that the trial judge’s acquittal was based on an unreasonable view of the evidence, whereas the High Court had correctly assessed the testimony. The Supreme Court found “not the slightest doubt” about the appellant’s guilt and deemed the conviction justified.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of transportation for life affirmed.
The decision upholds the High Court’s reversal of acquittal, reaffirming that: (i) the presumption of innocence cannot be displaced by judicial conjecture; (ii) the maxim falsus in uno has limited, cautionary value; and (iii) appellate courts may overturn acquittals where the trial court’s view is unreasonable. No new legal principle was created, but the judgment clarifies the treatment of partially unreliable testimony and reiterates foundational burdens of proof in criminal law.
Kapur, J.— The appellant along with one Qudrat Ullah was tried for the murder of one Sabir. The latter was tried under Section 302 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code for abetment, and the former under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Both the accused were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge of Bareilly. But the State took an appeal to the Allahabad High Court against the appellant only and the judgment of acquittal in his case was reversed and he was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to “transportation for life”. Against the judgment of the High Court the Appellant has brought this appeal by Special Leave.
2. The facts which have given rise to the appeal are that Sabir was murdered on May 11, 1951 at about 6.30 p.m The first information report was made by Qudrat Ullah the other accused at 6.45 p.m the same day i.e within about 15 minutes of the occurrence. The prosecution case was that there was an exchange of abuses between the deceased and the appellant near the shop of the first informant, Qudrat Ullah. The cause of the quarrel was that on the evening of the occurrence while Qudrat Ullah was sitting on his shop and the deceased was sitting just below the shop, the appellant came out of his house and on seeing him, the deceased asked him as to why he was in such a “dishevelled condition”, which annoyed the appellant and gave rise to an exchange of abuses. On hearing this noise, the prosecution witnesses arrived at the spot and saw the appellant and the deceased grappling with each other. The appellant is stated to have asked Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which Qudrat Ullah did; this knife is Ex. ‘II', with which the appellant stabbed the deceased and then fled away. As a result of the injuries the deceased fell down in front of Qudrat Ullah's shop; some witnesses have stated that he fell on the wooden plank in front of the shop. Qudrat Ullah picked up the knife which had been dropped by the appellant, put the deceased in a rickshaw and took him to the hospital from where he went to the police station and made the first information report. An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was made by a person who was a co-accused. A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence.
3. The Sub-Inspector went to the spot, started investigation and arrested the appellant the same evening at his house. The post-mortem examination of the deceased showed injuries on the person of the deceased and, according to the doctor, death was due to shock and haemorrhage on account of the punctured wound in the chest, causing injuries to the lungs and these injuries could be caused with a sharp-edged weapon.
4. The appellant and the deceased both belong to a sect of Jogis. Evidence discloses that the deceased and the appellant were quite friendly with each other, and so were the deceased and Qudrat Ullah, who is a butcher and had a shop which is a part of his house. Adjacent to the shop is the house of the appellant. Eyewitnesses of the occurrence were Yad Ali, PW 1, Banne, PW 2 and Mohd. Ahmed, PW 3. Having been told by the sister of the deceased as to the occurrence, Ashraf, PW 4 came to the spot later and found the deceased lying unconscious. Shakir, PW 5, younger brother of the deceased, on arriving near the shop of Qudrat Ullah heard the appellant and the deceased exchanging abuses, but was not a witness of the assault as just at that time he had gone, at the request of Qudrat Ullah, to fill his Chillum for the hooka and when he came back he found the deceased lying unconscious and the appellant running away towards his house.
5. The evidence of Yad Ali, PW 1, is that he heard an exchange of abuses between the deceased and the appellant and when he moved about 4 or 5 paces he saw them grappling with each other. The appellant had the deceased “in his grip”, he asked Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which the latter did and with it the appellant stabbed the deceased and then went away to his house. The statement of Banne is similar and so is the statement of Mohd. Ahmed, PW 3. This evidence was not accepted by the learned Sessions Judge and he acquitted both the accused. The State took an appeal only against the appellant which was allowed by the High Court. It held
“We may concede that the eyewitnesses have falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah by deposing that he handed over his knife to the respondent on his demand. There was no enmity between him and Sabir and he had no motive to get him killed by the respondent. It does not at all appear probable that after abetting the murder of Sabir he at once took him on a rickshaw to the hospital and from there went at once to the police station and lodged a report against the respondent. This conduct of Qudrat Ullah is so inconsistent with the part said to have been played by him in the occurrence that we have little hesitation in rejecting the evidence about the part played by him.”
6. The High Court, however, accepted the testimony of the eyewitnesses as against the appellant's guilt and observed:
“We are satisfied that the prosecution has fully established the case against the respondent. There is not the slightest doubt about his guilt. The presumption of innocence has been fully rebutted by the prosecution. The case against him does not become doubtful merely because the learned Sessions Judge said that there was a doubt about his guilt.”
The learned Judges also came to the conclusion that the view taken by the learned trial Judge was one “which no reasonable person could have taken. It was a wholly erroneous view of the evidence which has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice inasmuch as a murderer escapes punishment”. In the circumstances of the case and considering that there was some provocation, the High Court sentenced the appellant to “transportation for life”.
7. There is a passage in the judgment of the High Court which appears to us to be disconsolate and indicative of a wrong approach in deciding the guilt of an accused person. Although the learned Judges recognised the principle that the onus was not on the accused, yet one of the observations is such that it comes perilously near to putting the burden on the accused if it does not actually do so. The High Court has said:
“The respondent himself did not have the courage to say that he did not find them at the spot. If he were innocent, he must have come out of his house immediately on hearing the noise and must have known who was present there and who was not.”
8. This passage is so destructive of the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence as to the presumed innocence of an accused person till otherwise proved that it has become necessary to reiterate the rule stated by eminent authorities “... that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt … subject to any statutory exception” 1935 AC 462.
9. It was next contended that the witnesses had falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah and because of that the court should have rejected the testimony of these witnesses as against the appellant also. The well-known maxim falsus in une falsus in omnibus was relied upon by the appellant. The argument raised was that because the witnesses who had also deposed against Qudrat Ullah by saying that he had handed over the knife to the appellant had not been believed by the courts below as against him, the High Court should not have accepted the evidence of these witnesses to convict the appellant. This maxim has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded. One American author has stated:
“...the maxim is in itself worthless; first in point of validity ... and secondly, in point of utility because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore, it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious….”
10. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”.
11. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a passage from an unreported judgment of the Privy Council, Chaubaria Singh v. Bhuneshwari Prasad Pal.
“The defendants own evidence and that of several of his witnesses is of no use to him. He cannot contend that any court of law can place reliance on the oath of people who have admittedly given false evidence upon the other branches of the case.”
12. This passage is a very slender foundation, if at all, for conferring on the doctrine the status of anything higher than a rule of caution and the Privy Council cannot be said to have given their weighty approval to any such controversial rule which has been termed as “worthless”, “absolutely false as a maxim of life” and “in practice pernicious” in works of undoubted authority on the law of evidence.
13. The High Court was not unmindful of what the witnesses stated as to Qudrat Ullah's part in the commission of the offence and having taken that into consideration, it said:
“While the learned Sessions Judge was right in acquitting Qudrat Ullah, he was completely wrong in acquitting the respondent of whose guilt there was not the slightest doubt. The direct evidence made out a clear case against him and there was no sound reason for disregarding it.”
14. After discussing the evidence of the witnesses and the discrepancies pointed out by the appellant the High Court held “there is not the slightest doubt about his guilt”.
15. It was because of the above two contentions raised by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and drew our attention to its salient features and to the discrepancies in the statements of witnesses and the improbabilities of the case; but we are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified in coming to the conclusion they did and the view of the trial judge was rightly displaced. Upon a review of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have come to the conclusion that the appellant was rightly convicted.
16. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment of the High Court is affirmed.
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