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J. Narayana Rao v. V.G. Basavarayappa And Ors.

Supreme Court Of India
May 9, 1956
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff purchased the mortgaged property in suit from Gangamma by a registered sale-deed dated 28-4-1943 and instituted a suit for redemption of the prior mortgage and for possession. The appellant (defendant 3) had already purchased the same property on 31-8-1942 from the father of defendants 1 and 2. Claiming to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of the mortgage, he asserted that he had effected substantial improvements on the property.

On 30-6-1945 the Munsiff passed a preliminary decree for redemption and possession, holding that the appellant was a bona fide purchaser entitled to compensation for improvements under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decree required the plaintiff, within two months, either (i) to pay the cost of improvements and obtain possession or (ii) to sell the property to the appellant. The plaintiff elected on 25-7-1945 to pay the cost of improvements.

A Commissioner was appointed to value the improvements. Relying mainly on the Commissioner's evidence, the Munsiff fixed the cost of improvements at Rs. 7,986 and, by a final decree dated 27-2-1948, directed the plaintiff to deposit that amount (in addition to Rs. 1,000 due under the mortgage) before taking possession.

The appellant’s appeal was first remanded by the Additional Subordinate Judge, but the High Court of Mysore set aside the remand and ordered a fresh hearing. A different Subordinate Judge upheld the appellant’s right to compensation but raised the figure to Rs. 14,146. Both parties appealed. The High Court restored the Munsiff’s original valuation of Rs. 7,986. The present appeal is against that High Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, the correct date for assessing compensation for improvements is the date of the plaintiff’s election (25-7-1945) or the date of actual eviction/dispossession (1-7-1948).
  2. What is the proper quantum of compensation payable to a bona fide purchaser who has effected improvements on the mortgaged property.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in restoring the Munsiff’s valuation of the improvements.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The compensation should be assessed as of the date of actual eviction (1-7-1948), not the date of election, because Section 51 speaks of payment “at the time of eviction.”
  • Alternatively, the appellant claimed he should at least recover the full amount expended so as not to be out of pocket.
  • The High Court erred in accepting the Munsiff’s figure; on the evidence, the new construction was worth about Rs. 25,000 while the old building was worth only about Rs. 4,522, making fair compensation roughly Rs. 21,000.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments

  • The Munsiff’s valuation was correct and properly restored by the High Court.
  • The Subordinate Judge relied on “worthless” evidence from incompetent witnesses to reach the valuation of Rs. 25,000.
  • The legally relevant date is the date of election because dispossession necessarily occurs after the decree is drawn up and enforced.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayanaswami Ayyar v. Rama Ayyar, 57 I.A. 305 (AIR 1930 PC 297) Authority for applying Section 51, Transfer of Property Act, to balance equities between parties where a bona fide purchaser has made improvements. The Court relied on this Privy Council decision to affirm that a decree could require either payment for improvements or conveyance of the property, and to justify applying equitable principles in fixing compensation.
Kidar Nath v. Mathu Mal, 40 Cal 555 Need for reliable evidence (e.g., production of accounts) when assessing the cost and value of improvements. Cited to criticise the appellant for not producing his books of account, thereby complicating precise valuation and necessitating reliance on other evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted that Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies an equitable principle permitting it to adjust the rights of the parties in a redemption suit. It observed that, where possible, valuation should be assessed “at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction” rather than the earlier date of election adopted by the courts below.

Reviewing the evidence, the Court found the oral testimony offered by the appellant unconvincing and noted that the appellant’s failure to produce his books of account weakened his claim. The most reliable evidence was the detailed valuation prepared and orally supported by the Court-appointed Commissioner (P.W. 6), an Executive Engineer experienced in building valuation. His measurements, rate calculations, and cross-checked data (taken in January–February 1947 and examined in court on 25-7-1947) were accepted.

From the Commissioner’s comparative table the Court determined that, on values proximate to February 1947 (close to the appellant's dispossession), the old building was worth about Rs. 5,818 and the newly constructed building about Rs. 24,733, yielding an improvement value of approximately Rs. 18,915. Recognising the impossibility of mathematical precision, the Court rounded this figure and held that Rs. 19,000 constituted a fair assessment of the worth of the improvements “as a vendible subject.”

Consequently, the valuations adopted by the Munsiff (Rs. 7,986) and by the Subordinate Judge (Rs. 14,146) were rejected as unsupported by the most credible evidence.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; decree modified.

The Court substituted Rs. 19,000 for the earlier figure as the compensation payable by the plaintiff to the appellant for improvements. The plaintiff must pay the balance (after crediting any amount already deposited) by 30-11-1956, failing which the appellant will be entitled to restitution of possession. The appellant is awarded costs in the Supreme Court.

Implications: The decision underscores that, under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, compensation for improvements should be valued with reference to a date close to actual eviction and should reflect the market worth of the improvements rather than merely the cost incurred. While applying established equitable principles, the judgment refines their practical application but does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond this factual context.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Mysore on a Certificate granted by that Court to the appellant, who was defendant 3 in the suit,

2. The plaintiff had purchased the property in suit from one Gangamma, daughter of Grurushanthamma, under a registered sale-deed dated 28-4-43. The property was already mortgaged. The plaintiff accordingly brought a suit for red emption and possession. The appellant had previously purchased the property from the father of defendants 1 and 2 on 31-8-42. His contention was that he was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the mortgage and had effected improvements on the property.

3. A preliminary decree for redemption and possession was passed by the Munsiff on 30-6-45. The Munsiff found that the appellant was a bona fide purchaser and had in fact effected improvements on the property. He was entitled to compensation under Section 51, Transfer of Property Act. The preliminary decree accordingly directed the plaintiff to choose within two months either to pay to the appellant the cost of improvements and take possession of the property or to sell the property in suit to the appellant. The plaintiff elected on 25-7-45 to pay the appellant the cost of improvement and take possession of the property.

The plaintiff filed an application on 26-7-46 for the preparation of a final decree. A Commissioner was appointed by the Court to enquire into and report on the value of the improvement effected by the appellant. The Munsiff examined the Commissioner and other persons for the plaintiff and the appellant as witnesses. He came to the conclusion, on the evidence, that on 30-6-45 the cast of the old building which existed on the property in suit at the time of the appellant's purchase was Rs. 10,854 and the cost of the new construction made by the appellant was Rs. 18,840.

Deducting the cost of the old building he held that the cost of the improvement was Rs. 7,986 and directed the plaintiff to deposit that amount in Court and take possession of the property. It may be mentioned here that this amount was in addition to the sum of Rs. 1,000 mentioned in the preliminary decree payable by the plaintiff towards the mortgage money, interest, costs, repairs and taxes. A final decree was accordingly made on 27-2-48.

4. Against the decision of the Munsiff the appellant appealed and his appeal was heard by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Banglore. The Subordinate Judge, by his order dated 9-9-48, set aside the decree of the Muusiff and remanded the case to him for a fresh finding on Issue No. 5, the relevant issue on the question of improvement effected by the appellant. Against the order of remand the plaintiff moved the High Court. The High Court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and directed him to hear the appeal and dispose of it according to law.

The appeal was reheard by another Subordinate Judge, who, while upholding the decision of the Munsiff that the appellant was entitled to compensation for cost of improvement, disagreed with him as to the quantum of compensation to be paid to the appellant by the plaintiff. In his opinion the cost of improvement was on 25-7-45, the date of election by the plaintiff, Rs. 14,146. The difference between that sum and the sum fixed by the Munsiff therefore would be Rs. 6,160. The plaintiff and the appellant both being dissatisfied with this result appealed to the High Court. The High Court was of the opinion that the Munsiff's view on the evidence, was the correct one. It accordingly set aside the decision of the Subordinate Judge and restored that of the Munsiff. Against the decision of the High Court, the present appeal has been filed.

5. That the appellant was a bona fide purchaser of the property in suit without notice of the mortgage has been consistently held by all the Courts below and we see no reason to take a contrary view. The Courts below applied the provisions of Section 51, Transfer of Property Act to determine the equities between the parties and we think that they were right, having regard to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Narayana-swami Ayyar v. Rama Ayyar 57 Ind. App. 305: (A I R 1930 P C 297) (A).

6. It was strongly contended on behalf of the appellant that the Courts "below erred -in fixing the date of election (25-7-45) by the plaintiff as the date of eviction and assessing the amount of compensation accordingly. On a true reading of the provisions of Section 51, Transfer of Property Act the date is the date of actual eviction and the cost of improvement on that date should be the compensation payable to the appellant. The appellant was actually dispossessed on 1-7-48. In the alternative, it was said that the appellant did not wish to make any profit out of the transaction. He should not, however, be out of pocket and if he was paid the amount he had spent on effecting improvement, he would be content.

In any event the High Court erred in restoring the decision of the Munsiff. On the evidence, which was open to this Court to examine as the High Court's Judgment was one of reversal, it would be clear that the newly constructed building, after demolishing the old one, was worth at the least Rs. 25,000. The old building at the time of the appellant's purchase was not worth more than Rs. 4,522. It had to be remembered that the appellant had purchased the property, including the land and the old building, for Rs. 8,750. The land on which the old building stood had a value. In these circumstances the least amount of compensation payable to the appellant should be Rs. 21,000 in round figures.

7. On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that the Munsiff's decision was correct and the High Court was justified in restoring it. The Subordinate Judge had arrived at the value of Rs. 25,000 for the new building on worthless evidences of incompetent witnesses who were merely expressing loosely their estimate of the value of the said building. The date of election, in law, would be the date of eviction. The date of actual dispossession could not be the true date as such eviction must take place after the decree had been drawn up and enforced.

8. In our opinion Section 51, Transfer of Property Act merely lays down an equitable principle and enables a Court to determine the equities between the parties. A decree in the form in which it has been passed in this case, which was a suit for redemption and possession, could have been passed.

We regard the decision of the Privy Council in 57 Ind App 305: (A.I.R. 1930 P C 297) (A) as an authority which supports our opinion. We think, however, having regard to the provisions of Section 51, Transfer of Property Act, that, if the evidence enable a Court to do so it should assess the valuation of the improvement as at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction rather than the date of election as has been done in this case.

9. Coming now to the evidence in the case, the appellant has created difficulties for himself in not producing his books of account, which would have enabled a Court to know exactly how much he had spent on improvement and thus assist it in arriving at the relevant conclusion in the case, namely, what was the saleable value of the improved property. See Kidar Nath v. Mathu Mal 40 Cal 555 (B). Oral evidence, such as it is on the side of the appellant, is not very convincing.

The only reliable evidence in the case is that of the Commissioner, P. W. 6, appointed by the Court. He is a qualified person and has had to do valuation of buildings regularly in the course of his employment as an Executive Engineer of City improvement Trust Board, Bangalore. A fair reading of his evidence does not disclose any substantial ground for disbelieving him. We proceed, therefore, to rest our decision on his evidence only and such other evidence as may support him. The Commissioner was examined in Court on 25-7-47. He had checked his measurements several times in January and February 1947, He has given the various rates prevailing in the various years and he has computed his valuation on that basis for the old building and the new construction.

A comparative table as stated below may be convenient in order to understand his evidence.

From this table the respective values of the old and the new building at the date of the preliminary decree, at the date of election by the plaintiff and at a time nearest to the dispossession of the appellant become apparent on the supposition that the buildings were built at those stages There is no evidence as to the actual cost of constructing the old building or the new. Whatever the actual value of the old building may have been at the time of its demolition by the appellant, the appellant's witness B Sagappa, D. W. 10 has stated in the clearest terms that in 1945 that building was worth Rs. 9,000/- to Rs. 10,000/. This, in our opinion, supports the valuation of that building on 30-6-45 arrived at by the Commissioner.

We would, therefore, rely on the calculation arrived at by the Commissioner and would conclude that at the time of the appellant's purchase in August 1942 and at about the time of its demolition the old building was worth about Rs. 5,818/-. As a vendible subject the building as newly constructed would be worth about Rs. 24,733/- in February 1947. The improvement effected by the appellant therefore would amount to Rs. 18,915/-having regard to values in February 1947. It is impossible to ascertain with any degree of precision the exact value of the improvement in the absence of definite evidence. All that can be done is to arrive at a fair assessment on the materials available.

We think the evidence of the commissioner gives sufficient data on which to proceed and there is no need to take additional evidence. In cases of this kind it is not the actual cost of improvement which concludes the matter. The principle on which one must proceed is what is the worth of the improvement in the property as a vendible subject. The value arrived at by the Courts below is not acceptable to us.

10. We hold, on the evidence, that the value of the improvement effected by the appellant amounts to Rs. 19,000/- in round figures. That sum will be entered in the decree of the Court as the amount of compensation payable by the plaintiff to the appellant upon which the former would be entitled to possession. As the appellant has already been dispossessed, he would be entitled to restitution if the plaintiff fails to pay the balance due after deducting the amount of compensation already deposited in Court. We give the plaintiff time to pay the balance of the compensation on or before 30-11-1956.

11. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decree of the Court below is modified as above. As the appellant has substantially succeeded, he is entitled to the costs of the appeal in this Court to be paid to him by the plaintiff respondent.