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Karnani Industrial Bank, Ltd. v. Province Of Bengal And Others .

Supreme Court Of India
May 4, 1951
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Province of Bengal (“Respondent 1”) leased 1,125 bighas of land in Akra village to the Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. (“appellant”) for ten years beginning 24 February 1928 at an annual rent of Rs 6,000. The lease forbade assignment or sub-letting without consent and contained two clauses governing (i) premature termination for breach and (ii) the lessee’s right to leave brick-making materials on the land for three months after expiry, after which unremoved “bricks and other materials” would vest in the lessor.

Near the end of the term, the appellant paid the rent for the financial year 1 April 1937–31 March 1938. On 27 August 1937 it sought a renewal for another ten years, but the Government refused and demanded possession from 24 February 1938. The appellant remained in occupation.

Respondent 1 sued for ejectment, damages, mesne profits and an injunction restraining removal of materials left on the premises. The trial court (24 November 1941) found no “holding over”, granted ejectment and mesne profits of Rs 4,000, dismissed the damage claim and declined injunction; it allowed the appellant three months to remove machinery and bricks.

The High Court of Calcutta (13 February 1948) dismissed the appellant’s appeal and partly allowed Respondent 1’s cross-objection, upholding ejectment, recognising the vesting clause as valid, and again rejecting the damage claim. The present appeal challenges that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant “held over” under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 after 23 February 1938 or whether the lease had validly terminated by efflux of time.
  2. Whether the clause vesting unremoved bricks and “other materials” in the lessor after three months is enforceable or an unenforceable penalty.
  3. Whether Respondent 1 is entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from removing such materials.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Payment and acceptance of rent up to 31 March 1938 constituted the landlord’s assent, creating a tenancy by holding-over under Section 116.
  • No damage was caused to the land and hence no damages were recoverable.
  • The vesting clause was penal and therefore unenforceable; the appellant retained ownership of all articles on the premises.
  • An injunction was unwarranted because Respondent 1 lacked possession and had not sued for a declaration of title.

Respondent 1’s Arguments

  • The appellant unlawfully sub-let, damaged the property, and refused to deliver possession after lease expiry.
  • No holding-over occurred; both parties acted on the footing that the lease ended on 23 February 1938.
  • The vesting clause is a valid contractual term, not a penalty.
  • An injunction is proper because title to the bricks and materials vested in Respondent 1 by contract.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.B. Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Warden (1959 FCR 262) Acceptance of rent after expiry of a lease can create a tenancy by holding-over under Section 116 even if the landlord uses restrictive language like “without prejudice”. Distinguished: unlike Capadia, rent here was paid and accepted nearly a year before expiry; hence no post-expiry assent could be inferred.
Ratnasabhapathi Pillai v. Ramaswami Aiyar A plaintiff out of possession ordinarily cannot obtain a perpetual injunction without also claiming declaration of title and possession. Court found the authority inapplicable because Respondent 1’s title to specific materials was contractually established, making injunction proper.
Bhramar Lal Banduri v. Nanda Lal Chowdhuri Same principle regarding injunction when out of possession. Held inapplicable on the same reasoning as above.
Valia Tamburatti v. Parvati Same principle regarding injunction and possession. Likewise found inapplicable; did not bar the grant of an injunction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding-over. Section 116 requires (i) occupation after lease termination and (ii) the lessor’s assent manifested by accepting rent or otherwise. Although rent for the financial year ending 31 March 1938 was accepted, the payment occurred on 5 April 1937—before lease expiry—and both parties contemporaneously treated 23 February 1938 as the end-date. Acceptance almost a year earlier could not amount to assent to continued possession after expiry. The concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court that no assent existed were affirmed.

Extension up to 31 March 1938. The pattern of rent payments aligned with the Government’s financial year. At best, this created an implied agreement extending occupancy until 31 March 1938. After that date the respondent was entitled to re-enter without notice under Section 106.

Vesting clause. Clause 11 (Part I) applied only when the lessor terminated the lease prematurely for breach, which was not the present situation. Clause 1 (Part III) applied to normal expiry: bricks and “other materials” left beyond three months would vest absolutely in the lessor. The Court construed “other materials” as confined to building materials like bricks and tiles, excluding machinery, kilns, boilers, engines, trucks and tram-lines. The clause was contractual, not penal, and therefore enforceable.

Injunction. Once ownership of the bricks and other building materials vested in Respondent 1, an injunction to restrain their removal was appropriate. The precedents cited by the appellant concerning injunctions when out of possession were inapplicable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs. The decree is clarified to state that only building materials (bricks, tiles and similar articles manufactured on the premises) vest in Respondent 1; machinery and plant remain the appellant’s property, with three months from the date of decree granted for their removal.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that acceptance of rent well before lease expiry does not by itself constitute assent to post-expiry occupation under Section 116. Contractual vesting clauses relating to unremoved materials are enforceable if not penal. No new legal doctrine is created; the judgment chiefly impacts the parties by confirming Respondent 1’s right to possession and title to specific building materials while permitting the appellant to remove its machinery within a fixed period.

Show all summary ...

Fazl Ali, J.— The principal question for determination in this appeal is whether a certain lease had validly terminated by efflux of time or whether there was “holding over” by the lessee of the leasehold property as contemplated in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The circumstances under which this question and several subsidiary questions to which reference will be made later have arisen may be briefly stated as follows:

2. The Province of Bengal, (hereinafter referred to as Respondent 1 or plaintiff) is admittedly the owner of an area of 1125 bighas and odd of land in Village Akra. On 17th February, 1928, Respondent 1 executed a lease (Exhibit 3) in respect of the said land for 10 years for manufacture of bricks in favour of the appellant, at a rental of Rs 6000 a year. The lease was to commence from 24th February, 1928, and a year's rent was payable in advance. By the terms of the said lease, the lessee was prohibited from assigning or subletting the premises or any part thereof without the consent of the lessor except to a limited company and the lease also contained a general provision that the lessee would at the expiration of the lease restore to the lessor the demised premises in as good condition as it was at the date of the lease, reasonable wear and tear excepted. Two further clauses in the lease, which are material for the decision of this appeal, may be reproduced verbatim:

Clause 11 of Part I of the Schedule.
“The Secretary of State reserves the right to terminate the lease at any time subject to six months' notice in the event of the lessee's failing to observe and duly perform the conditions hereinbefore and after mentioned and it is hereby agreed that the lessee shall before the expiration or prior termination of the lease hereby granted remove his boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines, bricks, tools and plant and all other materials whatsoever and yield up the said demised premises unto the Secretary of State and that those bricks, tools and plant and other materials that shall not be removed before such expiration or prior termination shall become the property of the Secretary of State.
Clause 1 of Part 111 of the Schedule.
The lessee shall be at liberty to keep on the said premises hereby demised for three months after the expiration or prior termination of the term of this lease any bricks, boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines and all other materials whatsoever as may have been manufactured by him in the premises in accordance with the conditions of these presents but any bricks and other materials left in contravention to this condition shall become the absolute property of the Secretary of State without payment.”

3. It may be stated here that at the time of the execution of the lease, the lessee had purchased from the lessor for Rs 50,000 “all the boilers, engines trucks, kilns, railway and tramway lines and all other movable property, plant and machinery on the demised premises”.

4. The case of Respondent 1, who is the plaintiff in the present litigation, is that the appellant (Defendant 1) had, in contravention of the terms of the lease sublet the brickfield to Defendant-Respondents 2 to 18 without the consent of Respondent 1. and they had caused serious damage to the brickfield in general and failed to maintain the embankments, sluices etc. in proper repair resulting in a total loss of Rs 16,840. It was further alleged that the defendants had refused to deliver possession though the lease had terminated, and they had not removed the bricks, pugmills and other materials within 3 months from the termination of the lease. On these allegations, the Respondent 1 prayed for the following reliefs:

(a) a decree for ejectment and khas possession over the brick field;
(b) damages amounting to Rs 4000 for the period between the termination of the lease and institution of the suit and mesne profits for the subsequent period;
(c) a decree for Rs 16,840 for damages caused to the field; and
(d) a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from removing or otherwise disposing of the bricks, pugmills etc. which were claimed to have become the property of the plaintiff.

5. The suit was contested by the appellants, and the other defendants, and their defence was that the appellants had held over with the implied consent of Respondent 1, and hence the lease had not validly terminated, that no damage or injury had been caused to the land, that Respondent 1 was not entitled to forfeit the properties of the appellants lying in the brickfield inasmuch as the term in the lease to that effect was by way of penalty and as such unenforceable, and that Respondent 1 was not entitled to the relief of injunction.

6. The trial Judge by his judgment dated 24th November, 1941, held that there was no holding over with the assent of the plaintiff and both parties were under a mistaken belief that the lease had expired on 23rd February, 1938. He however held that the evidence did not show that there was any damage or injury caused to the property. On these findings, the suit was decreed in part, and the Respondent 1 was directed to be put in possession of the brickfield and was also granted a decree for Rs 4000 as mesne profits up to the date on which Respondent 1 was put in possession. The prayer for damages for injury alleged to have been caused to the field and the prayer for injunction were however disallowed. The trial Judge allowed the appellants 3 months' time to remove their belongings from the Akra brickfield including kilns, pugmills, bricks, coals and any other brick-making material that may be lying there”; after this period these properties, if any, left in the field, were to become the absolute properties of the plaintiff. The appellants thereafter preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta, and the Respondent 1 also preferred a cross-objection claiming that the prayer for injunction should have been allowed and the claim for damages should have been decreed in full. The learned Judges of the High Court who heard the appeal by their judgment dated 13th February, 1948, dismissed the appellants' appeal and allowed the cross-objection of Respondent 1 in part. They held that on the facts established in the case there was no holding over, and that the clause in the lease stating that if the appellants did not remove the bricks etc from the field within 3 months after the termination of the lease they would become the property of Respondent 1, was not a clause by way of penalty and should be given effect to. They further held that the claim of Respondent 1 for damages for injury caused to the demised premises was not established. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court.

7. The admitted facts of the case are briefly these: The appellants duly paid Rs 6000 as rent to Respondent 1 in February 1928. In February, 1929, a sum of Rs 6714 and odd was paid by the appellants as rent for the period 17th February, 1929, to 31st March, 1930, and thereafter they continued to pay Rs 6000 as rent for the yearly period, 1st April to 31st March of the succeeding year, and the last payment was made in April 1937 by means of a cheque sent with a covering letter, the material portion of which runs as follows:

“We beg to enclose herewith a cheque for Rs 6000 in payment of rent of Akra brickfield for the year 1937-38 ending 31st March, 1938, and shall thank you to please favour us with your formal receipt for the above.”
The cheque was duly cashed and the amount was entered in the cash book of the plaintiff in the following terms:
“5-4-37 (date of receipt)... Received without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. on account of yearly rent for Akra brickfield for the year ending 31st March, 1938.”

8. On 27th August, 1937, the appellants applied to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Public Works Department, for renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years, but no reply was received to that letter. After addressing several other letters, the appellants received a letter dated 23rd February, 1938, with which was enclosed a copy of an extract from a letter addressed by the Executive Engineer, Suburban Division to the Assistant Engineer, No. III Sub-division, which was as under:

“He is requested to make arrangements with Messrs Karnani Industrial Bank Limited for vacant possession of the Akra brickfield on the 24th instant as the lease with the Bank will expire on the 23rd instant according to the terms of the agreement.”

9. Ultimately, on 17th March, 1938, the appellants received the following communication from the Executive Engineer, Suburban Division:

“I would inform you that it is not the intention of Government in this Department to lease out the brickfields and arrangement is being accordingly made to make over the lands to the Government in the Revenue Department for disposal.”

10. In a subsequent letter dated 14th September, 1938, the Executive Engineer wrote to the appellants as follows:

“I am instructed to state that Government have decided that you cannot be allowed to continue in occupation of the premises any further .... However, as a matter of grace Government will allow you time till the 30th day of September next, to dismantle the kilns and to remove all your bricks, boiler etc from the site, on which date Government will take over possession of the property from you.”

11. The correspondence to which reference has been made does not show that at any point of time the plaintiff had assented to the appellant's continuance of possession. On the other hand, some of the letters written by the appellants show that, notwithstanding their having paid rent up to 31st March, 1938, they had proceeded all along on the footing that the lease was to expire in February 1938. For instance, in the appellants' letter of 23rd August, 1937, it is stated: “we are desirous of renewing the lease of the brickfield for a further period of 10 years from the date of the expiration of the period of the lease dated 17-2-1928”. Again, in the letter dated 23rd October, 1937, reference is made to the appellants' application for renewal of the lease for a further period of 10 years on its expiry. Even in the letter which was written on behalf of the appellants on the 3rd March, 1938, after the expiry of the date on which the lease was to terminate, the statement made in the earlier letters was repeated, and it was further stated: “we applied for renewal of the lease on the 23rd August, 1937, six months prior to the date of expiration of the lease”. In this letter, it is nowhere suggested that the appellants were holding over by reason of the acceptance of rent up to 31st March, 1938. On the other hand, at the end of this letter, we find the following statement:

“We therefore pray that if the Government is not at all inclined to renew the lease, time may be granted to us for dismantling and removing till the end of December 1938, and we shall pay the proportional rent to the Government for seven months time in pursuance of the terms of the lease.”

12. The reference to the period of 7 months shows that it was assumed that the lease had expired in February 1938.

13. The letters written on behalf of the Government point to the same conclusion, namely, that both the parties were acting on the assumption that the lease was to expire on 23rd February, 1938. For instance in a letter written on behalf of the Government on 25th February, 1938, the following statement is made:

“I have the honour to inform you that none of your agents was present at the Akra brickfield today as previously arranged to make over the possession of the brick fields. You are therefore requested to please inform me about as to what arrangements are being made by you to make over the possession of the said brickfield to this department. The term of lease expires on the afternoon of 23rd February, 1938.”

14. Apart from the fact that the appellants did not set up in any of their letters a case of holding over, we have to see whether the plea can be said to have been successfully made out by them. There is no doubt that the appellants have established that the rent was paid on their behalf up to 31st March, 1938, and it was accepted by Respondent 1. It has also been established that this payment was made by a cheque and that cheque has been cashed by the Government. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants, runs as follows:

“If a lessee or underlessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased ....”

15. This section was construed by the Federal Court in K.B Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Warden (1959) FCR 262 and it was held that where rent was accepted by the landlord after the expiration of the tenancy by efflux of time, Section 116 applied even though the landlord accepted the amount remitted to him as “part deposit towards his claim for compensation for illegal use and occupation, and without prejudice to his rights”. It is to be noted that in that case rent had been accepted after the expiry of the tenancy. In our judgment, the present case cannot be governed by that decision, because of the fact, which in our opinion is important; that here the payment of rent up to 31st March, 1938, was made not after the date of expiry of the lease, but on 5th April, 1937, nearly a year before the expiry of the lease. A reference to Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act will show that for the application of that section, two things are necessary: (1) the lessee should be in possession after the termination of the lease; and (2) the lessor or his representative should accept rent or otherwise assent to his continuing in possession. The use of the word “otherwise” suggests that acceptance of rent by the landlords has been treated as a form of his giving assent to the tenant's continuance of possession. There can be no question of the lessee “continuing in possession” until the lease has expired, and the context in which the provision for acceptance of rent finds a place clearly shows that what is contemplated is that the payment of rent and its acceptance should be made at such a time and in such a manner as to be equivalent to the landlord assenting to the lessee continuing in possession. Both the courts below, after dealing with the matter elaborately, have concurrently held that in the circumstances of the case the consent of Respondent 1 to the appellants' continuing in possession cannot be inferred, and we agree with this finding.

16. It was pointed out to us on behalf of the respondent that the entry relating to this payment in the books of the plaintiff contains the words: “received without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank.” The same words however occur in several earlier entries, and we are not inclined to attach any special significance to them. But it seems to us that the very fact, that the payment was made at a time when there was no question of the lessor assenting to the lessee's continuing in possession and neither party treated the payment as importing such assent, is sufficient to take the case out of the mischief of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.

17. There is also another view which we think is possible to take upon the facts of the case. As we have seen the rent for the first year was paid in advance near about the time of the execution of the lease, and nothing turns upon it. When however the second payment was made, the sum paid was Rs 6714 and odd, and the payment was made in respect of rent up to 31st March, 1930. After this, all the subsequent payments were made up to 31st March of the succeeding year, evidently because the financial year, which the parties considered themselves to be governed by, ran from 1st April to 31st March of the succeeding year. It was presumably in view of this fact that the plaintiff filed an application on 6th November, 1941, for amending the plaint so as to include the following statement:

“The plaintiff submits that even assuming that the registered lease terminated on 23rd February, 1938, by an agreement between the plaintiff and the Defendant 1, the latter was allowed to hold over up to 31st March, 1938.”

18. This application however was rejected, because it was made at a very late stage, that is to say, after the defendants' evidence had been closed and an adjournment had been granted to the plaintiff to adduce rebutting evidence. However that may be, the utmost that can be said upon the evidence as it stands is that by the implied consent of the parties the period of the lease was extended up to 31st March, 1938. In this view, the Respondent 1 became entitled to re-enter after 31st March, and no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. In the circumstances, the decree for ejectment passed by the courts below must be upheld.

19. The next question which arises in the case turns on the proper construction of clause 11 of Part I and clause 1 of Part III of the lease, which have already been quoted. It seems to us that clause 11 should be read as a whole, and, when it is so read, it becomes clear that it was intended to be applicable only where the Secretary of State decided to exercise his right to terminate the lease at any time subject to 6 months' notice, in the event of the lessee failing to observe and duly perform the conditions mentioned in the lease. In such a case, if the lessee did not remove the boilers, engines and all other materials and yield up the premises to the Secretary of State, those articles were to become the property of the Secretary of State. This clause is evidently not applicable to the present case. The clause which applies to this case is clause 1 of Part III, which is intended to be applicable to the normal case of the lease expiring by efflux of time. This clause, as we have seen, provides that the lessee shall be at liberty to keep on the demised premises for 3 months after the expiration of the lease any bricks, boilers, etc., but it also provides that “any bricks and other materials left in contravention of this condition shall become the absolute property of the Secretary of State without payment”. There can be no doubt that under this clause, the bricks and other materials have become the absolute property of the plaintiff. The only question is as to the meaning of “other materials”. It seems to us on an examination of the lease as a whole that there must be a distinction between materials, and machinery and tools and similar articles, and the words “other materials” have no reference to engines, trucks, railway and tramway lines and plant. They mean building materials such as bricks, tiles and similar articles that might have been manufactured by the appellants on the demised premises. That being so, the decree under appeal should be modified accordingly.

20. The only other point which arises for consideration relates to the plaintiff's prayer for a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants, to restrain them from removing or otherwise disposing of the articles in regard to which the decree is to be passed. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that Respondent 1 not being in possession of these properties could not ask for the relief of injunction without asking for the declaration of its title in respect of them and possession over them, and in support of this proposition, the following cases were cited: Ratnasabhapathi Pillai v. Ramaswami Aiyar, Bhramar Lal Banduri v. Nanda Lal Chowdhuri and Valia Tamburatti v. Parvati. After reading and fully considering those cases, we find them to be wholly inapplicable to the present case. In the present case, it has been found that the bricks and other materials have become the property of the plaintiff, and there can be no legal objection to the granting of an injunction as prayed.

21. The appeal therefore substantially fails and it is dismissed with costs. But it should be made clear in the decree that only the building materials such as bricks, tiles and similar articles that might have been manufactured by the appellants on the demised premises shall become the property of the Respondent 1. As for the boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines etc. three months' time is given from the date of this decree to enable the appellants to remove them from the demised premises.