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Jhummamal Alias Devandas v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns possession of a shop premises originally held by Asgar Ali as mortgagee (17-10-1969). On 7-8-1982 Asgar Ali allegedly leased the shop to the present appellant, who then took possession. A rival claim by the respondent triggered police action, and on 13-8-1982 the Additional District Magistrate, Ujjain, initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). After nearly three years of inquiry, the Magistrate’s final order dated 17-5-1985 found that the appellant (Party 2) was in possession within two months preceding the preliminary order and was therefore entitled to be restored to possession.
The respondent thereafter:
- Filed a civil suit for injunction on 15-7-1985 and obtained an ex-parte temporary injunction on 14-8-1985, which was subsequently vacated on appeal.
- Lodged criminal complaints that resulted in his own conviction under Sections 380 and 454 of the IPC, later set aside on appeal; revision against acquittal was dismissed by the High Court.
- Filed a criminal revision against the Section 145 order, which was dismissed on 27-9-1985.
- Invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, leading to the impugned order dated 25-4-1986 quashing the entire Section 145 proceedings on the strength of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P.
The appellant obtained special leave and challenged the High Court’s order before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court correctly applied Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. in quashing a concluded Section 145 CrPC order merely because a civil suit concerning the same property was pending.
- Whether the Supreme Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in view of the respondent’s objection regarding the nature of the property dispute.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC 427 | Parallel criminal proceedings under Section 145 CrPC should not continue when a civil court is already seized of the dispute. | The Supreme Court clarified that Ram Sumer bars simultaneous proceedings but does not justify quashing a concluded Section 145 order; the High Court’s opposite interpretation was erroneous. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had “totally misunderstood” Ram Sumer. The guiding principles articulated were:
- Section 145 CrPC addresses only the factum of possession on the relevant date to avert breach of peace; it confers no title and is always subject to the eventual decision of the competent civil court.
- Ram Sumer precludes pending parallel proceedings, but does not empower a court to annul a final and binding Section 145 order simply because a civil suit has subsequently been filed by the losing party.
- The respondent’s proper remedy is to pursue substantive relief in the civil court (e.g., a suit for declaration or possession) rather than undermine the Magistrate’s concluded order through Section 482 CrPC.
- The Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s plea that the Court should forbear from exercising Article 136 jurisdiction, noting the “patently erroneous” nature of the High Court’s order.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court order dated 25-4-1986 set aside; Magistrate’s final order under Section 145 CrPC restored.
Immediate Effect: Possession of the shop reverts to the appellant in accordance with the Magistrate’s 17-5-1985 order. The respondent remains free to litigate title or superior possessory rights before the civil court, but cannot disturb the Section 145 determination through criminal proceedings. No new precedent is set; the Court merely reaffirmed the correct scope of Ram Sumer and the limited purpose of Section 145 CrPC.
K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.— We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal.
2. The appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 25-4-1986 quashing the final order made under Section 145 CrPC in respect of a shop premises. The shop was in possession of one Asgar Ali son of Akbar Ali as mortgagee since 17-10-1969. On 7-8-1982, Asgar Ali was said to have leased out the shop to the petitioner and also delivered possession thereof. The entering of possession by the petitioner became a subject matter of dispute. Apprehending breach of peace, the police initiated proceedings under Section 145 CrPC before the Additional District Magistrate, Ujjain. In that proceedings, the petitioner was party 2 and Respondent 2 was party 1. On 13-8-1982, the Magistrate made a preliminary order. The proceedings continued for about three years. On 17-5-1985, the Magistrate made the final order in the following terms:
“Hence I believe that Party 2, Jhummamal alias Devandas s/o Jethanand had the occupation within two months from 13-8-1982 on which summons were issued by the court under Section 145 sub-section (1).
Hence I order that Party 2, Jhummamal is entitled for the occupation of the shop unless he is evicted by procedure established by law. And I issue injunction that there should not be any obstacle in handing over the possession to Jhummamal. And if there are locks placed by Motilal or his accomplices, the same should be broken open. And the goods, if any, found in the shop be handed over to a responsible person after making a panchnama.”
It will be seen from the above order that the petitioner is entitled to restoration of possession since he was dispossessed forcibly and wrongfully within the terms of proviso to Section 145(4) CrPC. But unfortunately, the petitioner could not be put into possession.
3. On 15-7-1985, the respondent filed a suit for injunction. On 14-8-1985, he obtained temporary injunction against the appellant. But upon appeal that temporary injunction was vacated. The learned first Additional District Judge, who delivered the judgment in that appeal, has recorded the following findings:
“Consequently it is clear from the above analysis that Asgar Ali was in possession of the disputed shop till 7-8-1982. It seems to be in his prima facie right to rent out the shop. That it seems that he received the rent in advance, executed the rent deed and transferred the possession to appellant Jhummamal. As it is mentioned above the first information report lodged by Kanhayalal on behalf of Jhummamal in which it is stated that Jhummamal obtained possession on 9-8-1982, does not seem right, when only respondent has demanded possession in his petition dated 13-8-1982. Hence I believe that Jhummamal obtained the possession of the disputed shop in his capacity as tenant. Respondent and his brothers put their locks later on. And as in my opinion on the date of occurrence of incident, Jhummamal was in possession of the shop, respondent/ plaintiff does not have a prima facie case in his favour....
Hence, I believe that the temporary injunction order passed by the lower court is not just and as per law. Consequently while disagreeing with the order passed by the lower court, I accept the appeal and quash the order passed by the lower court.”
4. In between the parties, there were also certain criminal proceedings regarding the theft from and house trespass on the same premises. A couple of days before the preliminary order was made under Section 145 CrPC, a relation of the appellant filed report before the police complaining against the respondent. On that report the respondent was prosecuted under Sections 380 and 454 of the Indian Penal Code. On 22-2-1984, he was convicted of the said offences. But upon appeal, he was acquitted by the Additional District Judge. The revision against the order of acquittal was also dismissed by the High Court.
5. It may also be relevant to state that the respondent challenged the final order under Section 145(6) of the Criminal Penal Code in a revision before the Sessions Judge. On 27-9-1985, that revision was dismissed. After becoming unsuccessful in the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC and also before civil court in the suit for injunction, the respondent moved the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC to quash the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC. The High Court accepted the petition and quashed the proceedings by following the judgment of this Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P (1985) 1 SCC 427 The operative portion of the High Court order is as follows:
“In view of the fact that civil proceedings in respect of the disputed premises is pending before the competent civil court, where interim reliefs have been prayed for and obtained, there appears to be no justification for continuing with the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC pending before the SDM.
Shri Tiwari learned counsel submitted that in case the plaintiff's suit is either withdrawn or dismissed, he would be left with no remedy. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P (1985) 1 SCC 427
Section 145 is intended to provide a special remedy for the prevention of breach of peace arising out of a dispute relating to immovable property. Its primary object is to maintain the public peace and not to decide disputes between the contending parties or adjudicate upon the rights of-the parties to possession. Now, that the civil court is seized of the matter, it is desirable that such parallel proceedings in respect of the same subject matter and dispute should not be allowed to continue in the criminal courts as it amounts to an abuse of the process of the court which is one of the grounds for invoking Section 482 CrPC.
For the foregoing reasons, this petition deserves to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. The proceedings under Section 145 CrPC pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ujjain, along with the orders passed therein is, therefore, quashed.”
6. The validity of the aforesaid order has been called into question in this appeal.
7. It will be obvious from the order of the High Court that the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer case (1985) 1 SCC 427 has been totally misunderstood. In that case, a title suit for possession and injunction in respect of certain property was instituted before the civil court. The suit was dismissed on 28-2-1981. The matter was taken up in appeal. When the appeal was pending for disposal, proceedings under Section 145 CrPC were initiated with regard to the same property. In that proceedings, the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the CrPC and also attached the property. The aggrieved party challenged that order in a revision petition before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court refused to interfere with that order. But this Court quashed the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC observing:
“There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for Respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction of appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed.”
8. We fail to understand how the High Court in this case took advantage of the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer case (1985) 1 SCC 427. The ratio of the said decision is that a party should not be permitted to litigate before the criminal court when the civil suit is pending in respect of the same subject matter. That does not mean that a concluded order under Section 145 CrPC made by the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction should be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party has approached the civil court. An order made under Section 145 CrPC deals only with the factum of possession of the party as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed property. The order is subject to decision of the civil court. The unsuccessful party therefore must get relief only in the civil court. He may move the civil court with properly constituted suit. He may file a suit for declaration and prove a better right to possession. The civil court has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which the Magistrate has reached.
9. Counsel for the respondent, however, suggested that having regard to the nature of dispute and the rights of parties relating to the property in question, we should not exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. We do not think that the contention could be accepted in view of the patently erroneous order of the High Court.
10. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Magistrate. The parties may work out their rights as per law.
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