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Ramgir Uttamgir Goswami v. State Of Gujarat And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court challenging the proposed acquisition of 1 acre and 39 gunthas of land at Village Bhairav, Taluka Kamrege, District Surat, Gujarat (“the said land”). The land lies on the bank of the river Tapti and was to be acquired for extension of the village site to rehabilitate twelve families rendered homeless by floods.
A preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 30 April 1970, followed by a Section 6 declaration on 8 December 1970 and Section 9 notices on 8 January 1971. The High Court dismissed the writ petition; however, it granted a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acquisition is invalid because, under Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, the Collector or a survey officer was required to determine that the existing village site was insufficient before initiating acquisition proceedings.
- Whether the acquisition is vitiated by the authorities’ alleged failure to consider other more suitable and unoccupied lands for the stated public purpose.
- Whether the lapse of time since the 1970 notification renders the public purpose (extension of the village site for flood-affected families) non-existent.
- Whether Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are unconstitutional (a contention ultimately conceded in light of binding precedent).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is analogous to Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code; therefore, acquisition could proceed only after the revenue authority formally decided that existing abadi land was insufficient and that no unoccupied land was available.
- The acquisition authorities failed to explore other suitable parcels; the appellant could have identified alternative sites for housing the displaced families.
- The passage of many years since the Section 4 notification shows that the displaced families must have been resettled elsewhere, so the public purpose has ceased to exist.
- (Initially) Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are unconstitutional; however, this point was conceded after the decision in Manubhai Jehtalal Patel v. State of Gujarat.
Respondents' Arguments
- The appellant furnished no concrete details of alternative lands; allegations of availability were therefore unsubstantiated.
- Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code merely enables the Collector to fix or vary village limits; it does not impose a pre-condition to acquisition akin to Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Code.
- The suitability of land for the notified public purpose is a matter for the Land Acquisition Officer, whose decision should not be disturbed absent compelling reasons.
- The delay in completion of acquisition is attributable to the appellant’s own litigation; he cannot rely on it to undermine the public purpose.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manubhai Jehtalal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 4 SCC 553 | Upheld constitutional validity of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. | Used to reject the appellant’s constitutional challenge; appellant conceded the point. |
| Chandrabhagabai Udhaorao v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division, (1962) 45 Nag LJ 466 | Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code requires Deputy Commissioner’s finding of insufficiency of abadi land before acquisition. | Cited by appellant; distinguished on the ground that Section 226 is materially different from Section 126 of the Bombay Code. |
| Sitaram Maroti Girnale v. State of Maharashtra, (1963) 65 Bom LR 241 | Reaffirmed the principle laid down in Chandrabhagabai. | Similarly cited by appellant and distinguished for the same reasons. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Distinction between statutory schemes: The Court undertook a textual comparison of Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code with Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. While Section 226 mandates a Deputy Commissioner’s prior opinion of insufficiency and absence of unoccupied land as a condition precedent, Section 126 merely empowers the Collector or survey officer to demarcate or vary village limits. It does not require any preliminary finding before invoking the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, precedents interpreting Section 226 were inapplicable.
2. Suitability and availability of alternative land: The appellant’s allegations were held to be vague; no specific parcels were identified. The respondents’ counter-affidavit stated that lands mentioned by the appellant were low-lying and unsuitable for habitation. Determining suitability is primarily the domain of the Land Acquisition Officer, and no mala fides or patent unreasonableness was shown to warrant judicial interference.
3. Effect of delay: The Court rejected the argument that the public purpose had vanished owing to the passage of time. The delay resulted from the appellant’s own legal proceedings and interim orders. Moreover, extension of the village site remains a continuing public purpose, possibly more pressing due to population growth.
4. Constitutional challenge: In light of Manubhai Jehtalal Patel, the Court treated the challenge to Sections 4 and 6 as settled and not open to re-agitation.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Gujarat High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition, thereby upholding the land acquisition proceedings. The decision clarifies that Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code does not impose a substantive pre-condition comparable to Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Code before resorting to compulsory acquisition. No new constitutional doctrine was announced; the ruling’s practical effect is limited to the parties, confirming the validity of the acquisition and allowing the State to proceed with extending the village site.
M.H Kania, J.— This is an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant herein. The appeal has been filed on a certificate of fitness granted by the Gujarat High Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
2. The main challenge in the writ petition was to the vires of Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. That challenge no longer survives in view of the validity of the sections having been upheld by this Court in Manubhai Jehtalal Patel v. State of Gujarat (1983) 4 SCC 553. The lands in question are situated at Village Bhairav, Taluka Kamrege, District Surat, Gujarat. The said lands are situated on the bank of the river Tapti which is known for its frequent floods and the lands are covered in Survey No. 2. The said lands admeasure 1 acre and 39 gunthas. We propose to refer to the said lands in the aggregate as “the said land”. The said land is also known as the “Maksheshwar Mahadev” land. The appellant claims to be the occupant and owner of the entire land comprising in Survey No. 2 which includes the said land. It may be mentioned that the claim of the appellant to be the owner and occupier of the said land is based on his being the senior member of his family but we are not concerned with that question as we propose to proceed on the footing that he is in actual occupation of the said land. The preliminary notification declaring the intention to acquire the said land was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and published in the government gazette of the State of Gujarat on 30-4-1970. It was notified that the proposed acquisition was for a public purpose, namely, for extension of the village site of the Village Bhairav. It is common ground that the extension of the village site was required for the purpose of housing 12 families who had been rendered homeless because of floods in Tapti river. An individual notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was served on the appellant on 2-5-1970. The appellant filed his objections against the proposed acquisition on 12-5-1970 and filed additional objections on 20-6-1970 and 6-7-1970 respectively. After consideration and rejection of the said objections, the notification for acquisition of the lands under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 8-12-1970. Notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued on 8-1-1971. The said acquisition was challenged by the appellant in the writ petition on various grounds.
3. The main ground on which the said acquisition was challenged in the writ petition was that the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Land Acquisition Act were ultra vires the Constitution of India. That challenge, as we have already pointed out, has been finally negatived by this Court. In view of this, Mr Mehta fairly conceded that the vires of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act could no longer be called in question before us. It was, however, pointed out by him that the said notification was also challenged on some other grounds.
4. It was contended by Mr Mehta that under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, it must be established that the lands in the existing village site are insufficient for the extension of the village site before any acquisition can be resorted to. It was submitted by Mr Mehta that before the said land could be acquired for the aforestated public purpose, the revenue authorities should have satisfied themselves that there were no unoccupied lands in the village which were suitable, appropriate and available for the extension of the village site or abadi and since that has not been done, the acquisition could not said to be for a public purpose. Mr Mehta sought support for these submissions from the decision of a Division Bench of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Chandrabhagabai Udhaorao v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division (1962) 45 Nag LJ 466. It was held in that case that the provisions of Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code require that the Deputy Commissioner of the District or any other person authorised under law by him must record a finding that the village abadi is insufficient and that there is no other unoccupied land suitable for the purpose of extension of the village abadi before land could be compulsorily acquired for that purpose. The decision as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the land in the abadi must be taken by the Deputy Commissioner. The Land Acquisition Officer cannot substitute his opinion for that of the Deputy Commissioner in purporting to comply with the provisions of Section 226. Reliance was also placed by Mr Mehta on the decision of a Division Bench (Nagpur) of the Bombay High Court, in Sitaram Maroti v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 65 Bom LR 241 which is to the same effect as the aforesaid decision and, in fact, follows it. It was submitted by Mr Mehta that the provisions of Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code were substantially similar to the provisions of Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which is really the provision applicable to the lands in question before us. We are totally unable to accept the submission of Mr Mehta that the provisions referred to above are in pari materia.
5. Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code provides as follows:
“226(1) Where the area reserved for abadi is in the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner insufficient, he may reserve such further area from the unoccupied land in the village as he may think fit.
(2) Where unoccupied land for purposes of abadi is not available, the State Government may acquire any land for the extension of abadi and the Deputy Commissioner shall dispose of such land on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
(3) The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to such acquisition and compensation shall be payable for the acquisition of such land in accordance with the provisions in that Act.”
A perusal of the said section shows that before the State Government acquires any land for extension of abadi, the Deputy Commissioner has to give his opinion that the area reserved for abadi in the village in question is insufficient. A reading of sub-section (2) of the said section shows that it is only where unoccupied land for the purpose of abadi is not available, that the State can acquire any land for extension of abadi. Sub-section (3) merely makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act applicable to the procedure for acquisition and for determination of the compensation. The provisions of Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 read altogether differently. The said section runs as follows:
“126. Limits of sites of villages, towns and cities how to be fixed.—It shall be lawful for the Collector or for a survey officer, acting under the general or special orders of the State Government, to determine what lands are included within the site of any village, town, or city, and to fix, and from time to time to vary the limits of the same, respect being had to all subsisting rights of landholders.”
6. A perusal of Section 126 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code shows that unlike Section 226 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, there is nothing in Section 126 which indicates that the Collector or a Survey Officer acting under his orders has to first decide to enlarge or vary the site of any village, town or city before acquisition is resorted to for enlarging or varying such site under the Act. Section 126 merely deals with the limits of the site of any village, town or city and prescribes the procedure for fixing the limits of such sites. There is nothing in the Bombay Land Revenue Code or the Land Acquisition Act which would suggest that before acquisition can be resorted to for enlarging a village site, the Collector or a Survey Officer or revenue authority must decide upon such enlargement. Great emphasis was laid by Mr Mehta on the last part of Section 126 which shows that the enlargement of the site has to be made, keeping in mind the rights of the landholders. However, in our opinion, this factor is of no relevance in the present case as there is nothing on record to establish that such rights have not been taken into account.
7. The next submission of Mr Mehta was that the land acquisition authorities have failed to consider what were the other lands available which could have been more conveniently acquired for the public purpose referred to earlier. It was pointed out by him that in the writ petition, the appellant (petitioner) has alleged that he could have pointed out certain other lands and open spaces where the twelve families rendered homeless by the floods of Tapti river could have been housed. With reference to these allegations, the respondents in their counter-affidavit filed before the Gujarat High Court have rightly pointed out that the appellant had not given any details regarding other more suitable lands available for acquisition and hence it was not open to him to make a grievance on that score. Moreover, in para 29 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents have pointed out that the lands referred to by the appellant in his petition were not suitable for housing the victims of the floods because they were low-lying lands and not suitable for residential purposes. The assessment of suitability of the land proposed to be acquired for the concerned public purpose is primarily for the Land Acquisition Officer to consider and no good reason has been shown to us which could warrant interference with his decision. Moreover, we are satisfied that the appellant had not even given proper particulars of the other lands which, according to him, were available for acquisition and were more suitable for acquisition and hence he can make no grievance on the score of proper consideration not having been given to the question of acquiring such lands.
8. It was lastly submitted by Mr Mehta that since several years had passed from the date of the notification under Section 4, the victims of the floods must have been housed and rehabilitated elsewhere and hence the public purpose for which the lands were sought to be acquired does not survive. We are a little surprised at this argument. The delay has taken place on account of the legal proceedings adopted by the appellant himself and by reason of the interim orders obtained by him. He cannot take advantage of this delay and claim that the public purpose no longer survives. Moreover, the public purpose stated in the notification is the extension of a village site or goathan of the Village Bhairav and there is nothing to show that this public purpose has exhausted itself. In fact, we presume, on account of the increasing population, it will be more necessary today that the village site should be extended even than it was at the time when the notification was issued. This submission must also fail.
9. The other controversies sought to be raised by the appellant are factual in nature and we do not consider it necessary to go into the same.
10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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