Bharat Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

M.M Dutt, J.— In these appeals and writ petitions, the appellants and the petitioners have challenged the validity of the acquisition of their land by the State of Haryana under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, for a public purpose, namely, for the development and utilisation of land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (for short “HUDA”). Although, both in the appeals and in the writ petitions the validity of acquisition has been challenged, we propose to deal with the appeals first.

2. The appeals are directed against the judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petitions of the appellants questioning the validity of the acquisition of their land and praying for the quashing of such acquisition.

3. The first ground of attack to the acquisition, as urged by Mr Lalit, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 1984, is the non-publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality of the land sought to be acquired. It is true that Section 4(1) enjoins that the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality. It is, however, pre-eminently a question of fact. The allegation of the appellants as to the non-publication of the notification under Section 4(1), as made in the writ petition before the High Court, was emphatically denied and disputed in para 8 of the affidavit in opposition affirmed by the Land Acquisition Collector. para 8 reads as follows:

“8. In reply to para 8 of the writ petition, it is submitted that the averments of the petitioners are wrong and denied. The publicity of the substance of the notification was made in concerned locality of village Dundahera on 6-7-1981 through Shri Chhattar Singh Chowkidar with loud voice and beating of empty tin. The report existed in Roznamcha Vakyati at Serial No. 519 dated 6-7-1981. Similarly, the publicity was made in concerned locality of village Mulahera through Shri Surjan Singh Chowkidar with loud voice and beat of empty tin (kanaster). A report to this effect exists in Roznamcha Vakyati at Serial No. 520 dated 6-7-1981. The publicity was made on this very day on which the notification was issued. In response to this publicity 157 landowners filed objection applications which clearly shows that due publicity was made in the concerned locality and the averments of the petitioners are wrong, baseless and hence denied.”

4. It is apparent from the statement made in para 8 that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was published in the concerned localities of villages Dundahera and Mulahera. It is, however, urged on behalf of the appellants that it was not at all possible to make entries in the Roznamcha as to the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) on the same day it was published in both, the villages. It is submitted that on this ground the statement in para 8 as to the publication of the substance of the notification in the localities should not be accepted, and it should be held that there was no such publication as alleged. We are afraid, we are unable to accept the contention. Apart from the statement that there was publication of the notification, there is a further statement in para 8 that pursuant to such publication, 157 landowners filed objections to the proposed acquisition. This fact has not been disputed before us on behalf of the appellants. Moreover, Mr Tewatia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana, has produced before us the original objection petitions filed by the landowners. In each of these objection petitions there is a note at the end which reads as follows:

“Note.—The above referred notification was announced by the beat of drum in Village Dundahera on 6-7-1981, vide Patwari's Roznamcha Report No. 519 dated 6-7-1981.”

5. Similar notes, as extracted above, are there in the petitions of objections filed by the landowners of Village Mulahera. In view of the facts stated above, the allegation of the appellants that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was not published in the localities of the two villages mentioned above, is without any foundation whatsoever. The contention of the appellants in this regard is rejected.

6. The next ground of attack to the acquisition comes from Mr Kalra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 572 and 573 of 1985. It is urged by the learned counsel that the sole purpose of the acquisition is for a profiteering venture of the government to acquire land of the helpless farmers at a nominal price of Rs 10, Rs 20 or Rs 50 per square yard and then to resell the same at a high profit. It is submitted that a welfare State should work for the poor and the downtrodden of the society rather than to displace them from their land for the sake of making profit. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel to an application filed in this Court by the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (for short “HSIDC”) praying for impleading it as a party respondent in these appeals. In this application it has been stated, inter alia, by HSIDC that it plays an important role in the industrialisation of the State by providing concessional finance and offering land at no profit no loss basis along with infrastructure facilities for setting up new industrial units in the State. Further, it is stated that the land in Udhyog Vihar, Phase IV, (land which is the subject-matter of these appeals), was acquired by HUDA and later sold to HSIDC at the approximate price of Rs 55,000 per acre. In para 5 of the application, it is stated that on account of the price of the above land of Phase IV, approximately Rs 1.74 crores was paid by the HSIDC to HUDA. The said payment was made out of the amounts received from the intended allottees/entrepreneurs and also out of the funds/reserves of the HSIDC, and that a sum of Rs 4.90 crores is estimated to be spent on the development of the industrial complex in question.

7. Relying upon the above statements in the said application of HSIDC, the learned counsel for the appellants, endeavours to substantiate his contention that the impugned acquisition is nothing but a profiteering venture of the government. It is urged that the said statements in the application prove that the government has made huge profit in the guise of development and utilisation of the land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon.

8. In support of the contention, Mr Kalra has placed reliance upon an observation of Mahajan, J. (as he then was) in the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh 1952 SCR 889, AIR 1952 SC 252, namely, that it is a well accepted proposition of law that property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under the power of compulsory acquisition for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on the observation in the minority judgment of Wanchoo, J. in Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1966 SC 1788, 1967 Mah LJ 1. In that case, the enquiries purported to be held under Section 5-A and Section 11 of the Act were challenged as illegal, invalid and inoperative in law. In that connection, the validity of the definition of “public purpose” in clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act, as amended by the Bombay Amendment Act 35 of 1953, also came to be considered. Clause (2) of the amended definition in clause (f) reads as follows:

(f) the expression ‘public purpose’ includes—

(1) ***

(2) the acquisition of land for purposes of the development of areas from public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or sale, will be object of securing further development.”

9. Wanchoo, J. observed as follows: (AIR p. 1802, paras 33 and 34)

“The attack of the petitioners is on the second part of the addition in 1953 which provides for ‘subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment, or sale, with the object of securing further development’. It is urged that all these words means that after the development envisaged in the first part of the addition the State or the local authority would be free to dispose of the land acquired in whole or in part by lease, assignment or sale, apparently to private persons. This, it is said, means that the State or the local authority would acquire land in the first instance and develop it in the manner already indicated and thereafter make profit by leasing, assigning or selling it to private individuals or bodies. It is also said that the object of securing further development which is the reason for sale or lease etc. is a very vague expression and there is nothing to show what this further development comprises of.

It is true that when this part speaks of ‘subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or sale’, it is not unlikely that this disposal will take place to private persons and thus in an indirect way the State would be acquiring the land from one set of individuals and disposing it of to another set of individuals after some development. If this were all, there may be some force in the argument that such acquisition is not within the concept of ‘public purpose’ as used in Article 31(2). But this in our opinion is not all. We cannot ignore the words ‘with the object of securing further development’, which appear in this provision. It would have been a different matter if the provision had stopped at the words ‘lease, assignment or sale’; but the provision does not stop there. It says that such lease, assignment or sale must be with the object of securing further development, and these words must be given some meaning. It is true that the words ‘further development’ have not been defined, but that was bound to be so, for further development would depend upon the nature of the purpose for which the land is acquired. Of course, it is possible that further development can be made by the State itself or by the local authority which acquires the land; but we see no reason why the State or the local authority should not have the power to see that further development takes place even through private agencies by lease, assignment or sale of such land. So long as the object is development and the land is made fit for the purpose for which it is acquired there is no reason why the State should not be permitted to see that further development of the land takes place in the direction for which the land is acquired, even though that may be through private agencies. We have no doubt that where the State or the local authority decides that further development should take place through private agencies by disposal of the land so acquired by way of lease, assignment or sale, it will see that further development which it has in mind does take place. We can see no reason why if the land so acquired is leased, assigned or sold, the State or the local authority should not be able to impose terms on such lessees, assignees or vendees that will enable further development on the lines desired to take place. We also see no reason why when imposing terms, the State or the local authority may not provide that if the further development it desires the lessee, assignee or vendee to make is not made within such reasonable time as the State or the local authority may fix, the land will revert to the State or the local authority so that it may again be used for the purpose of further development which was the reason for the acquisition of the land.”

10. We fail to understand how does the above observation help the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the acquisition has been made by the government with a motive for profiteering in the guise of development and industrialisation. The observation of Wanchoo, J. relates to the definition of “public purpose” under Section 3(f) of the Act as amended by the Bombay Amendment Act 35 of 1953. The amended provision specifically provides for the disposal of acquired land in whole or in part by lease, assignment or sale, but there is no such provision in the unamended Section 3(f) of the Act with which we are concerned. Wanchoo, J. overruled the contention as to profiteering by the State or local authority as the amended provision made it very clear that such subsequent disposal of the acquired land will be for the purpose of securing further development. We do not think we are called upon to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the above observation, and all that we say is that there is no such provision like the amended definition in Section 3(f) of the Act with which we are concerned. In the circumstances, the observation has no manner of application in the instant case.

11. In the writ petitions, the point was taken as an abstract point of law. There was no attempt on the part of the appellants to substantiate the point by pleading relevant facts and producing relevant evidence. It is apparent that there was no material in the writ petitions in support of the contention of the appellants that the impugned acquisition was nothing but a profiteering venture. The contention was not also advanced before the High Court at the hearing of the writ petitions. The facts stated in the said application of the HSIDC do not, in our opinion, support the contention of the appellants. It is true that, as stated in the said application, HSIDC paid a sum of Rs 1.74 crores to HUDA, but nothing turns on that. The land was acquired by the government for the purpose of development and industrialisation. The government can do it itself or through other agencies. In the instant case, the land was acquired at the instance of HUDA and, thereafter, HUDA had transferred the same to HSIDC. It is not that the land was transferred in the same condition as it was acquired. But, we are told by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of HUDA and HSIDC that before transferring, HUDA had made external developments incurring considerable cost and HSIDC in its turn has made various internal developments and in this way the land has been fully developed and made fit for industrialisation. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for HUDA and HSIDC to the various external developments made by HUDA at a total cost of Rs 1,66,200 per acre before it was transferred to HSIDC and the cost that was incurred for external developments was included in the price. Thus, there was no motive for HUDA to make any profit.

12. The “public purpose” in question, already noticed, is development and industrialisation of the acquired land. The appellants have not challenged the said “public purpose”. In the absence of any such challenge, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that the acquisition was merely a profiteering venture by the State Government through HUDA. The appellants will be awarded the market value of the land as compensation by the Collector. If they are dissatisfied with the award they may ask for references to the District Judge under Section 18 of the Act. If they are still aggrieved, they can file appeals to the High Court and, ultimately, may also come to this Court regarding the amount of compensation. The appellants cannot claim compensation beyond the market value of the land. In such circumstances, we fail to understand how does the question of profiteering come in. Even assuming that HUDA has made some profit, that will not in any way affect the public purpose for which the land was acquired and the acquisition will not be liable for any challenge on that ground.

13. As has been already noticed, although the point as to profiteering by the State was pleaded in the writ petitions before the High Court as an abstract point of law, there was no reference to any material in support thereof nor was the point argued at the hearing of the writ petitions. Before us also, no particulars and no facts have been given in the special leave petitions or in the writ petitions or in any affidavit, but the point has been sought to be substantiated at the time of hearing by referring to certain facts stated in the said application by HSIDC. In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. In this context, it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. So, the point that has been raised before us by the appellants is not entertainable. But, in spite of that, we have entertained it to show that it is devoid of any merit.

14. Equally untenable is the contention of the appellants that the acquisition is for HSIDC which is a “company” within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act and, accordingly, the acquisition is invalid for the non-compliance with the provisions of Part VII of the Act. In the notification under Section 4(1), it has been clearly stated that the development and industrialisation of the acquired land would be made under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 by HUDA. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that HUDA was the acquiring authority and not HSIDC. It is for HUDA to develop the land fully either by itself or by any other agency or agencies. HUDA has transferred the land to HSIDC for the purpose of development and allotment to various persons. It is too much to say that as HUDA has transferred the acquired land to HSIDC, the latter is the acquiring authority. We do not think that there is any substance in the contention and it is, accordingly, rejected.

15. Now we may consider the contention made on behalf of the petitioners in the Writ Petitions Nos. 11106 to 11127 of 1984. The first point that has been urged by Mr Goburdhan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, is similar to that urged by Mr Lalit in Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 1984, namely, non-publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality. This contention need not detain us long, for in the counter-affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition Collector, it has been averred that the substance of the notification was published and out of 22 petitioners 16 filed their objections pursuant to the publication of the notification in the locality. A similar note, as extracted above, appears in all these objections. In the circumstances, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was not published in the locality.

16. Next it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that before starting the proceedings for acquisition, the government had not applied its mind to its policy decision, as contained in circular No. 2099-R-III-82/17113 dated 18-5-1982 wherein it has been stated that “in the matter of State's need for land for its development activities, utmost restraint should be exercised in the acquisition of land”. It is submitted that as the land is agricultural, it should not have been acquired in view of the said policy decision of the government. We are unable to accept the contention. In a welfare State, it is the duty of the government to proceed with the work of development and take steps for the growth of industries which are necessary for the country's progress and prosperity and for solving the question of unemployment. It is true that agricultural land is necessary and should not ordinarily be converted to non-agricultural use, but keeping in view the progress and prosperity of the country, the State has to strike a balance between the need for development of industrialisation and the need for agriculture. The allegation that before initiating the acquisition proceedings, the government has not applied its mind to the need for agricultural land is a very vague allegation without any material in support thereof. The contention is overruled.

17. Lastly, it is argued by Mr Goburdhan for the writ petitioners that the petitioners have been discriminated against inasmuch as the land of other persons in the village has not been acquired. This contention is without any substance whatsoever. The government will acquire only that amount of land which is necessary and suitable for the public purpose in question. The land belonging to the petitioners have been acquired obviously considering the same as suitable for the public purpose. The petitioners cannot complain of any discrimination because the land of other persons has not been acquired by the government. The contention is devoid of any merit whatsoever.

18. Before parting with these cases, we may consider a short submission on behalf of the appellants as also the writ petitioners that as by the acquisition of their land they have become landless, they should be allotted land by HSIDC, after development, so that they may start their businesses and earn their livelihood. After giving our anxious consideration to this submission, we direct that if any of the appellants or the petitioners, who has become really landless by the acquisition of his land, makes an application for the allotment of land, the HSIDC shall consider such application and give him priority in the matter of allotment provided he fulfils the conditions for such allotment and plot is available.

19. Another short submission has been made on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 1984. Our attention has been drawn to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants, and affirmed by one Sat Parkash, son of Mathura Prashad, one of the appellants, that in Khasra No. 21/6/2 and in Khasra No. 22/10/1, there are a temple, a piaou and a dharamshala. It is submitted that the land comprising the temple, piaou and dharamshala may be exempted from acquisition. We do not consider it necessary to give any direction in this respect. The appellants, however, will be at liberty to make a representation in that regard to the authority concerned. No other point has been urged in these cases.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, subject to the directions given on the short submissions, all the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs in any of them.