- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sheikh Mohd. Afzal v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter was referred by a Division Bench to a Larger Bench for the question: “Whether admission of a candidate applied for reserved quota and entitled to be admitted in M.B.B.S Course on the basis of his/her own merit, should be first against the reserved quota or against the general category?” The petitioners (Sheikh Mohd. Afzal and Sonika Bahedia) had been denied admission to the M.B.B.S. course in 1995 and filed a writ petition seeking, inter alia, (i) declaration that the respondents' interpretation of the 1995 Guidelines was illegal and unconstitutional and quashing thereof; and (ii) direction to admit the petitioners against the quota for disabled candidates and to declare the method of computing/filling that quota illegal and unconstitutional. A Single Judge (V.K. Singhal, J.) dismissed the writ petition on 31 January 1996, and that judgment was challenged in a special appeal to a Division Bench. The Division Bench framed the referred question after noting earlier authorities (including Ajay Kumar) and two Supreme Court decisions (Ritesh R. Sah and State of Bihar v. Neethi Chandra). The case had been heard by a previous Full Bench (arguments concluded 3 June 2004), but the order was not pronounced and the Full Bench was later reconstituted; the matter was then heard by the present Bench which considered relevant Supreme Court authorities and set aside the Single Judge's judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- “Whether admission of a candidate applied for reserved quota and entitled to be admitted in M.B.B.S Course on the basis of his/her own merit, should be first against the reserved quota or against the general category?”
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ajay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (D.B Civil Writ Petition No. 3429/88) (7 Nov 1988) | Held that handicapped candidates who come in on merit should be given admission against the general quota and not treated as admitted against the reserved quota (illustrated by two handicapped candidates who had come in merit but were admitted against reserved seats). | The Division Bench relied on the view in Ajay Kumar when framing the referred question; the Single Judge had not followed Ajay Kumar and was criticized for doing so. |
| Ritesh R. Sah v. Dr. Y.L. Yamul (AIR 1996 SC 1738; JT 1996 (2) SC 495) | Established that a reserved-category student who is entitled to admission on the basis of merit should not be considered admitted against reserved seats; the Court explained that such candidates are to be treated as open-category for the purpose of counting reservation while ensuring they are not disadvantaged compared to less-meritorious reserved candidates (including giving such candidates options so they are not placed in a worse position). | The Full Bench held that, in view of Ritesh R. Sah, it was unnecessary to refer the question for consideration because Ritesh had directly addressed the issue. The Bench adopted Ritesh's legal position in its analysis and conclusion. |
| State of Bihar v. Neethi Chandra (1996) 6 SCC 36 | Cited as one of the Supreme Court authorities addressing related issues of reservation and selection (referenced together with Ritesh R. Sah). | Used by the Division Bench and considered by the Full Bench in the context of prior Supreme Court jurisprudence on reservation and merit; cited as supporting authority. |
| Indra Sawhney v. Union of India ((1992) Supp (3) SCC 210) | Referred to by the Supreme Court when formulating the legal position in Ritesh R. Sah; included among prior authorities shaping the rule on reservation and merit. | Referenced (via Ritesh) as part of the cluster of Supreme Court decisions underpinning the conclusion that a reserved-category candidate selected on merit is to be treated as an open-category selection for counting reservation purposes. |
| Ajay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1994) 4 SCC 401 | One of the Supreme Court decisions referred to in Ritesh as part of the legal foundation for treating meritorious reserved candidates as open-category for counting reservations. | Referenced by the Court (through Ritesh) to support the legal proposition adopted by the Full Bench. |
| R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab (1995) 2 SCC 745 (AIR 1995 SC 1371) | Referred to by the Supreme Court in Ritesh as part of the jurisprudential basis for the position on reservation and merit. | Included among the authorities relied upon (via Ritesh) to formulate the rule adopted by the Full Bench. |
| Anurag Patel v. U.P. Public Service Commission (2005 (9) SCC 742; AIR 2005 SC 1262) | Considered earlier decisions (including Ritesh and State of Bihar v. Neethi Chandra) and upheld the approach of respecting merit while ensuring reserved-category candidates who qualify on general merit are treated accordingly; explained that rearrangement to respect merit will not change the total number of posts filled and that reserved posts may be re-filled by appropriate candidates. | The Full Bench relied on Anurag Patel as recent authoritative support for the principle expounded in Ritesh and used it to reinforce the conclusion that the Single Judge's view was incorrect. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Bench proceeded through the following reasoning, strictly reflecting the text of the opinion:
- Procedural posture and participation: The appellants were not represented and the Government advocate was absent; notwithstanding this, the Full Bench proceeded because a Full Bench had been constituted to decide the referred question (paras 2, 7).
- Scope and source of legal guidance: The Bench examined the matter in the light of two Supreme Court decisions (Ritesh R. Sah and State of Bihar v. Neethi Chandra) and related Supreme Court authorities (paras 2, 6, 13–15).
- Background of petitioners' claim: The petitioners challenged the respondents' interpretation of the 1995 Guidelines and sought admission against the quota for disabled candidates; the Single Judge dismissed their writ petition and declined to follow Ajay Kumar on the ground that Ordinance 272 had not been considered and thus that decision was per incuriam (paras 3–4, 8).
- Assessment of earlier authority: The Division Bench had earlier referred to the Ajay Kumar view that reserved-category candidates who are meritorious should be given admission against the general quota and not counted against the reserved quota (para 5).
- Application of Supreme Court jurisprudence: The Full Bench found that Ritesh R. Sah directly addressed the referred question. The Court quoted Ritesh's conclusion that a reserved-category student entitled on merit should be treated as an open-category admission for counting purposes, but that mechanisms must exist to ensure such candidates are not placed at a disadvantage relative to less-meritorious reserved-category candidates (para 14).
- Support from subsequent authority: The Bench also relied on Anurag Patel which considered Ritesh and Neethi Chandra and approved directions that preserve merit while ensuring reserved-category quotas are appropriately filled; the Full Bench relied on Anurag Patel to confirm that rearrangement to respect merit does not alter the total number of posts filled and can be implemented without displacing the reserved-category allocations improperly (paras 15–17).
- Conclusion as to correctness of Single Judge: In view of the law expounded in Ritesh R. Sah and Anurag Patel, the Single Judge's conclusion was held to be incorrect (para 11).
- Formulation of legal position: The Bench articulated the principle (drawn from the cited Supreme Court decisions) that when a reserved-category candidate is selected competing with open-category candidates on merit, that selection is to be considered in the general category and not counted against the reserved quota; simultaneously, the candidate's constitutional rights cannot be taken away and the candidate should not be disadvantaged relative to less-meritorious reserved-category candidates—practical steps (such as offering options) may be used to ensure this balance (para 12).
- Remedial outcome: On this basis the Court set aside the Single Judge's judgment and disposed of the special appeal (paras 19–20).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the Single Judge's judgment and allowed the appeal. The special appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs. The opinion ends with the notation:
Appeal allowed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Single Judge's dismissal of the petition was quashed; the decision implicitly vindicates the petitioners' position to the extent that the legal principle adopted (from Supreme Court jurisprudence) applies to the facts before the court.
- Operational consequence for admission authorities: The Bench instructs that competent authorities must adhere to the legal position laid down by the Supreme Court (in Ritesh R. Sah and Anurag Patel) — namely, that a reserved-category candidate who secures selection on the basis of open merit is to be treated as having been selected in the general category for the purpose of counting reservation, while ensuring that such treatment does not place the candidate at a disadvantage compared with other reserved-category candidates (para 12).
- Precedential effect: The Court applied and followed existing Supreme Court authorities (Ritesh R. Sah and Anurag Patel) rather than announcing a novel principle. The opinion does not state that a new precedent is being created; instead it directs adherence to the cited Supreme Court decisions and sets aside the Single Judge's contrary view.
R.M Lodha, J.:— The following question has been referred by the Division Bench to the larger Bench for consideration:
“Whether admission of a candidate applied for reserved quota and entitled to be admitted in M.B.B.S Course on the basis of his/her own merit, should be first against the reserved quota or against the general category?”
2. It appears to us that the appellants have lost interest in the matter because of long lapse of time and, therefore, none appears for them. But absence of the Government advocate is not understandable. Be that as it may, since the Full Bench has been constituted to decide the reference, we considered the matter in the light of two decisions of the Supreme Court.
3. Sheikh Mohd. Afzal and Sonika Bahedia (hereinafter referred to by us, “the petitioners”) were not allowed admission in M.B.B.S Course by the respondents in the year 1995. They filed a writ petition before this Court praying for the following reliefs:
“(i) declaring the interpretation placed by the respondents and the illustrations quoted below para 2(g) of the Guidelines of 1995 to be illegal and unconstitutional and quashing the same;
(ii) directing the respondents to give admission to the petitioners in the MBBS study course commencing from the year 1995 against the quota meant for disabled candidate and further declaring the method of computing/filling of this quota by the respondents to be illegal and unconstitutional;
(iii) any other appropriate order or direction which may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed including award of cost of litigation in favour of humble petitioners.”
4. The single Judge (V.K Singhal, J.) vide his judgment dated 31st January, 1996 dismissed the writ petition. He did not follow the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Ajay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (D.B Civil Writ Petition No. 3429/88) decided on 7th November, 1988 on the ground that some provision of the Ordinance 272 was not considered and, therefore, the decision is per incuriam.
5. The judgment of the single Judge was challenged before the Division Bench in the special appeal. The Division Bench referred to the decision in Ajay Kumar case wherein the following view was taken:
“In Pre-Medical Test, four candidates were declared passed as handicapped candidates. Out of the four candidates, candidates having Roll Nos. 8925 and 12107 came in merit, but they were not treated as such, and, they were admitted against the reserved quota of the handicapped candidates. There were only two seats reserved for handicapped candidates. The aforesaid two handicapped candidates have come in merit, should be given admission against the general quota and cannot be treated against the reserved quota for the handicapped candidates.”
6. The Division Bench also referred to the two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely; (i) Ritesh R. Sah v. Dr. Y.L Yamul, JT 1996 (2) SC 495 : (AIR 1996 SC 1738) and (ii) State of Bihar v. Neethi Chandra (1996) 6 SCC 36) and framed the aforereferred question for answer by the larger Bench.
7. From the proceedings; we find that the matter was heard by the previous Full Bench and arguments were concluded on 3rd June, 2004 and the order was reserved. However, the then Full Bench did not pronounce the order and, accordingly, the Chief Justice reconstituted the Full Bench and this is how the matter has been posted before us.
8. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ritesh R. Sah which has been noticed by the Division Bench in its order dated 5th December, 1997, we are of the view that it was unnecessary to refer the aforesaid question for consideration by the larger Bench. The question for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Ritesh R. Sah was: whether a candidate belonging to Scheduled Caste or any other reserved category even if he is entitled to be selected for admission in the open competition on the basis of his own merit, yet can he be counted against the quota meant for reserved category or will he be treated as a open competition candidate?
9. While dealing with the aforesaid question, the Supreme Court referred to the Rules for selection to M.B.B.S and B.D.S Course for the year 1995-1996 issued by the Government of Maharashtra in the Department of Medical Education and Drugs. The Supreme Court also referred to its decisions, namely: (i) Indra Swahney v. Union of India (1992) Supp (3) SCC 210; (ii) Ajay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1994) 4 SCC 401 : (1994 AIR SCW 2515) and (iii) R.K Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745 : (AIR 1995 SC 1371) and culled out the legal position thus:
“In view of the legal position enunciated by this Court in the aforesaid cases the conclusion is irresistible that a student who is entitled to be admitted on the basis of merit though belonging to a reserved category cannot be considered to be admitted against seats reserved for reserved category. But at the same time the provisions should be so made that it will not work out to the disadvantage of such candidate and he may not be placed at a more disadvantageous position than the other less-meritorious reserved category candidates. The aforesaid objective can be achieved if after finding out the candidates from amongst the reserved category who would otherwise come in the open merit list and then asking their option for admission to the different colleges which have been kept reserved for reserved category and thereafter the cases of less meritorious reserved category candidates should be considered and they will be allotted seats in whichever colleges the seats should be available. In other words, while a reserved category candidate entitled to admission on the basis of his merit will have the option of taking admission to the colleges where a specified number of seats have been kept reserved for reserved category but while computing the percentage of reservation he will be deemed to have been admitted as a open category candidate and not as a reserved category candidate.”
10. In a recent decision in the case of Anurag Patel v. U.P Public Service Commission, 2005 (9) SCC 742 : (AIR 2005 SC 1262), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider its previous decisions in Ritesh R. Sah (AIR 1996 SC 1738) (supra) and State of Bihar v. M. Neethi Chandra, 1996 (6) SCC 36 and held thus:
“In the instant case, as noticed earlier, out of 8 petitioners in Writ Petition No. 22753 of 1993, two of them who had secured Ranks 13 and 14 in the merit list, were appointed as Sales Tax Officer II, whereas the persons who secured Ranks 38, 72 and 97, ranks lower to them, got appointment as Deputy Collectors and the Division Bench of the High Court held that it is a clear injustice to the persons who are more meritorious and directed that a list of all selected Backward Class candidates shall be prepared separately including those candidates selected in the general category and their appointments to the posts shall be made strictly in accordance with merit as per the select list and preference of a person higher in the select list will be seen first and appointment given accordingly, while preference of a person lower in the list will be seen only later. We do not think any error or illegality in the direction issued by the Division Bench of the High Court.
6. Mr. R.N Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Commission submitted that in case any rearrangement is made, the same persons who had already been appointed are likely to lose their posts. Going by the counter-statement filed by the State in Writ Petition No. 22753 of 1993 it appears that altogether 358 candidates were appointed and 57 posts earmarked for Backward Classes were filled up by the candidates belonging to Backward Classes. Amongst the 358 candidates, those from Backward Classes who secured higher marks than the cut-off mark for the general category also must have got selection in the general category even though they belong to the Backward Classes. If these candidates who got selection in the general category are allowed to exercise preference and then are appointed accordingly, the candidates who were appointed in the reserved categories would be pushed down in their posts and the vacancies thus left by the general category candidates belonging to Backward Classes could be filled up by the persons who are really appointed against the quota reserved for Backward Classes. There will not be any change in the total number of posts filled up either by the general category candidates or by the reserved category candidates.”
11. In view of the law expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Ritesh R. Shah and Anurag Patel, the view of the Single Judge cannot be said to be correct.
12. We state the legal position thus: where a candidate belonging to reserved category gets selected competing with open category candidates on the basis of merit, the selection of such candidate needs to be considered in the general category and cannot be counted against the reserved category since such selection is purely based on merit. However, the constitutional right of such candidate belonging to reserved category is not taken away and such selection of a reserved category candidate on merit in open competition does not put him or her in disadvantageous position than the other less meritorious reserved category candidates who are selected against the quota reserved for that category, be it a preference of subject or institution or place or to such other right to which he/she may be entitled as if he/she were selected in the reserved category. In the case of Ritesh R. Sah and Anurag Patel, the Supreme Court has emphasised this position. Obviously, in the matter of admission, the competent authority has to adhere to and abide by the legal position expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Ritesh R. Sah and Anurag Patel and noticed by us above.
13. In view of what we have observed above, the judgment of the Single Judge has to be set aside and we do accordingly. Special appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
Alert