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Karni Dan Singh v. Ram Chandra And Others

Rajasthan High Court
May 17, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant originally filed a suit for declaration and possession on 10-02-1981. The suit was posted for the plaintiff's evidence on 02-03-1994; on that date neither the plaintiff nor his counsel appeared and the trial Court dismissed the suit for default. On 31-03-1994 the plaintiff filed an application seeking restoration of the original suit, which was dismissed for non-appearance under Order 9, Rule 8, CPC. Subsequent orders (including orders dated 02-04-1994 and 18-09-1997) directed issuance of notices or fresh notices to the defendant-respondents conditioned on payment of process fee and filing of notices by the plaintiff-appellant. The plaintiff failed to comply with those directions.

The trial Court gave repeated last opportunities, including on 12-12-1997, but on 19-12-1997 — when neither party appeared — the trial Court dismissed the restoration application for want of payment of process fee and for failure to file notices for service on defendant-respondents. That dismissal was recorded as being made under Rule 2 of Order 9, CPC (and the court's reasoning also referred to Rule 3 of Order 9 read with Section 141, CPC). The plaintiff-appellant challenged the 19-12-1997 order by filing the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) read with Order 9, Rule 9, CPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal filed under Order 43 Rule 1(d), CPC is maintainable against the trial Court's order dated 19-12-1997 which dismissed the restoration application for failure to pay process fee and failure to file notices for service on defendant-respondents.
  2. Whether the impugned order is to be characterized as an order under Rule 13 or Rule 9 of Order IX, or instead as an order passed under Rules 2 and 3 (Order IX) read with Section 141, CPC — and the consequence of that characterization for the availability of appeal.
  3. What remedies are available to the plaintiff where a suit or an application is dismissed under Rules 2 or 3 of Order IX read with Section 141 (i.e., whether a fresh suit or an application under Rule 4 of Order IX read with Section 141 is the appropriate course).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appeal was filed under Order 43, Rule 1(d), CPC. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that although the appeal was couched under Rule 1(d), the appeal was in substance maintainable under Clause (c) of Rule 1 of Order 43 (i.e., appeal under Clause (c) from an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application to set aside dismissal of a suit).
  • The appellant's counsel relied on several precedents (Full Bench and Single Bench decisions) to support the proposition that alternative remedies (restoration application and appeal) can be available in certain contexts.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the present appeal is not maintainable because no appeal is provided against the impugned order under the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1 (Clauses (a)–(w)).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nathu Prasad v. Singhai Kapurchand, AIR 1976 MP 136 Full Bench held that when an application under Order 9, Rule 9 is dismissed for default, both remedies are available to the applicant: (i) apply for restoration under Order 9, Rule 9; and (ii) appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(c). Both remedies can be alternative and simultaneous. The Court observed this decision was relied upon by the appellant but distinguished it as inapplicable because the impugned order in the present case was a dismissal for failure to pay process fee and file notices (i.e., under Rules 2/3 of Order 9), not under Rule 9. Thus the Full Bench decision does not govern the present facts.
C.P. Properties Ltd. v. Matadin Bhagwan Dass, 1993 Civil Court Cases 484 (Allahabad) Considered the limitation applicable to a second restoration application under Order 9, Rule 9; held limitation governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The Court noted this case dealt only with the point of limitation and therefore it was not applicable to the present question of maintainability of appeal.
Haridas Das v. Smt. Santa Rani Das, 1993 Civil Court Cases 627 (Gauhati) Held that Section 141, CPC allows an application under Order 9, Rule 9 for restoration of an earlier application; however, an order passed in the second petition (i.e., for restoration of an application) is not appealable under Order 43, Rule 1(c), because it concerns restoration of an application, not restoration of a suit. The Court cited this authority to support the distinction between restoration of an application and restoration of a suit, and to show limits on appealability where the petition seeks restoration of an application rather than of the suit itself.
Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 Principle that inherent powers of the Court cannot override express provisions of the Code; where the Code exhaustively covers a matter, inherent power cannot be invoked to cut across statutory provisions. The Court applied this principle to emphasise that the right of appeal is statutory; inherent power cannot be used to create or expand a right of appeal beyond what Order 43, Rule 1 provides.
Mst. Nurnahar Bewa v. Rabindra Nath Dev, AIR 1988 Cal 358 Three Judges Special Bench held that proceedings under Order 9 are miscellaneous proceedings within Section 141 and that an application under Order 9, Rule 4 or Rule 9 for setting aside dismissal of a misc. case is maintainable under Order 9 read with Section 141. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that an application under Order 9, Rule 4 read with Section 141 for restoration of a miscellaneous application is maintainable.
Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, (1999) 4 SCC 468 : AIR 1999 SC 1818 Held that if the statute does not create a right of appeal, no appeal can be filed; the right to appeal is not inherent but must be conferred by law. The Court invoked this authority to reinforce that appeals are creatures of statute and that absence of a statutory provision in Order 43, Rule 1 for the particular order means no appeal lies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the content of Order 43, Rule 1 (Clauses (a)–(w)) which enumerates the types of orders from which an appeal shall lie. Clause (d) of Rule 1 concerns an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) to set aside a decree passed ex parte; Clause (c) concerns an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside dismissal of a suit.

On careful reading of the impugned order of the trial Court dated 19-12-1997, the Court observed that the restoration application was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to pay the process fee and failed to file the requisite notices for service on defendant-respondents. The impugned order expressly records that neither party appeared when the application for restoration was called on. That factual matrix, in the Court's view, fits within the operation of Rule 2 of Order IX (dismissal where summons were not served because of failure by plaintiff to pay court-fee or postal charges) and/or Rule 3 of Order IX (where neither party appears the Court may dismiss the suit) read with Section 141 (miscellaneous proceedings).

The Court held that where a suit or a miscellaneous application is dismissed under Rules 2 or 3 of Order IX read with Section 141, the statutory remedy is provided by Rule 4 of Order IX read with Section 141: the plaintiff may bring a fresh suit (subject to limitation) or apply for an order to set aside the dismissal by showing sufficient cause. The Court further noted Rule 5(2) (one-month rule for issuing fresh summons) as another related provision for dismissal as against an unserved defendant.

Because Order 43, Rule 1(a)–(w) does not make orders passed under Rules 2 or 3 (and related Rules 4 and 5) of Order IX appealable, the Court concluded that the present appeal cannot be maintained under Order 43. The judgments cited by the appellant (including the Full Bench and Single Bench decisions) were examined and either distinguished on their facts (they dealt with Rule 9 dismissals or limitation questions) or used to show limits on appealability where a petition seeks restoration of an application rather than of a suit. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's statement that inherent powers cannot be used to override the Code, and on the proposition that the right of appeal is statutory, to conclude there is no basis to read into Order 43 a right of appeal in the present circumstances.

The Court did accept, consistent with precedent (Mst. Nurnahar Bewa), that an application under Order 9, Rule 4 read with Section 141 for restoration of a miscellaneous application is maintainable as a remedy; but that remedy is different from a statutory appeal under Order 43, Rule 1.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed.

APPEAL RESULT: APPEAL DISMISSED. The Court ordered that there be no order as to costs and recorded "Appeal dismissed." (as per the concluding part of the opinion)

Implications and Consequences:

  • Because an appeal against the impugned order (dismissal for failure to pay process fee and to file notices) is not provided under Order 43, Rule 1(a)–(w), the statutory right of appeal did not exist for the present order; hence dismissal of the appeal for want of maintainability.
  • The statutory remedies available to the plaintiff-appellant in respect of a dismissal under Rules 2 or 3 of Order IX read with Section 141 are (i) to bring a fresh suit (subject to limitation) or (ii) to apply under Rule 4 of Order IX read with Section 141 to set aside the dismissal by satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for the failure which led to dismissal.
  • The Court made clear that no new precedent expanding the scope of Order 43 was created; rather, the decision enforces the rule that the right of appeal must be founded on the statute and cannot be supplied by inherent powers of the Court.

Direct quotation of the Court's final disposition: "For the reasons stated above, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed."

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) read with Order 9, Rule 9, CPC is directed against the order dated 19-12-97 passed by Additional District Judge No. 1, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’) whereby the application filed by the plaintiff-appellant for restoration of the suit was dismissed for want of payment of process fee and filing of notices for service on defendant-respondents. Aggrieved by the order impugned of the trial Court, the plaintiff-appellant has preferred the present appeal.

2. Briefly stated facts to the extent they are relevant and necessary for disposal of this appeal are that on 10-2-1981 the plaintiff-appellant originally filed a suit for declaration and possession with other consequential reliefs in respect of the property in dispute. The original suit was posted for the plaintiffs evidence on 2-3-94. On this date neither the plaintiff nor his counsel appeared and the trial Court dismissed the suit for default. Against the order dated 2-3-94, the plaintiff-appellant filed an application on 31-3-94 seeking restoration of the original suit which was dismissed on account of non-appearance of plaintiff-appellant under Order 9, Rule 8, CPC. By order dated 2-4-94 notices of restoration application to defendant-respondents were ordered to be issued on payment of process fee and filing of notices. By order dated 18-9-97 the trial Court directed to issue fresh notices to the defendant-respondents and the plaintiff-appellant was directed to pay process fee and file notices. The trial Court also gave last opportunity to the appellant to file the process fee and notices. However, the order dated 18-9-97 was not complied by the plaintiff-appellant which failed to pay process fee and file notices. The matter came up again on 12-12-97. The trial Court observed that despite the last opportunity to the plaintiff-appellant to pay the process fee and file notices, the appellant has failed to file process fee and notices for defendant-respondents. However, in the interest of justice a further last opportunity was granted to the plaintiff-appellant to pay process fee and file notices. The matter again came up on 19-12-97. Despite repeated last opportunities granted to the plaintiff-appellant, he failed to pay the process fee and file the notices for service on defendant-respondents. The trial Court dismissed the restoration application in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff-appellant to pay process fee and failure to file notices for service on defendant-respondents. As noticed from the order impugned neither party appeared when the said application for restoration was called on. The order of the trial Court dated 19-12-97 purported to be under Rule 2 of Order 9, CPC, which is challenged in this appeal.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the impugned order.

4. The present appeal has been filed under Order 43. Rule 1(d), CPC. Order 43 deals with appeals from orders. Rule 1 of Order 43, CPC reads as under:—

“1. Appeals from orders.— An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely:—

(a) an order under Rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court except where the procedure specified in Rule 10-A of Order VII has been followed:

(b) omitted;

(c) an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit;

(d) an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte;

(e) omitted;

(f) an order under Rule 21 of Order XI;

(g) omitted;

(h) omitted;

(i) an order under Rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement;

(j) an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale;

(ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 of that Order is appealable;

(k) an order under Rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit;

(l) an order under Rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave;

(m) omitted;

(n) an order under Rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit;

(na) an order under Rule 5 or Rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent person;

(o) omitted:

(p) orders in interpleader-suit under Rule 3, Rule 4 or Rule 6 of Order XXXV;

(q) an order under Rule 2, Rule 3 or Rule 6 of Order XXXVIII;

(r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX;

(s) an order under Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order XL;

(t) an order of refusal under Rule 19 of Order XLI to re-admit, or under Rule 21 of Order XLI to rehear, an appeal;

(u) an order under Rule 23 or Rule 23A of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court;

(v) omitted;

(w) an order under Rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review.”

5. A plain reading of Clause (d) of Rule 1 of Order 43 makes it clear that the present appeal has not been filed against the order under Rule 13 of Order 9 rejecting the application for an order to set aside the decree passed ex parte. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the present appeal though has been filed under Order 43, Rule 1(d), CPC but in fact, it is maintainable under Clause (c) of Rule 1 of Order 43. Clause (c) of Rule 1 of Order 43 provides an appeal from an order under Rule 9 of Order 9 rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit. In the instant case, it is evident from the order Impugned of the trial Court that the dismissal of restoration application by the trial Court was for failure of the plaintiff-appellant to pay process fee and file the notices for service on defendant-respondents and, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of the trial Court was under Rule 9 of Order 9, CPC. The impugned order of the trial Court in clear terms speaks that the restoration application was dismissed in consequence of failure of the plaintiff to pay process fee and also failure to file requisite notices for service on defendant-respondents. On careful reading of Order 43, Rule 1, Clauses (a) to (w), it is clear that under the said provisions, no appeal is provided from an order rejecting an application in exercise of power under Order 2, Rule 9, CPC. Here Rule 3 of Order 9 read with Section 141, CPC is also relevant because on the date of dismissal of the restoration application neither party appeared. The trial Court dismissed the said restoration application on failure of the plaintiff-appellant to pay the process fee and filing of notices for service on defendant-respondents. Such dismissal was purported to be under Order 9, Rule 2 read with Section 141, CPC. Rule 2 of Order 9, CPC provides dismissal of suit where summons fire not served in consequence of failure of the plaintiff to pay court-fee or postal charges, if any, chargeable for such service. Section 141, CPC provides the procedure in miscellaneous proceedings which includes any proceeding under Order 9, CPC. Rule 3 of Order 9 provides that where neither party appears when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the suit be dismissed. As against the order made under Rules 2 and 3 of Order 9, the remedy lies under Rule 4 of Order 9 read with Section 141, CPC, which provides that where a suit is dismissed under Rule 2 or Rule 3, the plaintiff may (subject to the law of limitation) bring a fresh suit; or he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for such failure as is referred to in Rule 2, or for his non-appearance, as the case may be, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. In this context Rule 5 of Order 9, CPC is also relevant which provides that where, after a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defendants, and returned unserved, the plaintiff fails, for a period of one month from the date of the return made to the Court by the officer ordinarily certifying to the Court returns made by the serving officers, to apply for the issue of a fresh summons the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed as against such defendant, unless the plaintiff has within the said period satisfied the Court.

(a) he has failed after using his best endeavors to discover the residence of the defendant, who has not been served, or

(b) such defendant is avoiding service of process, or

(c) there is any other sufficient cause for extending the time,

in which case the Court may extend the time for making such application for such period as it thinks fit. In such case the plaintiff may (subject to law of limitation) bring a fresh suit.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the present appeal is not maintainable as against the order impugned, no appeal is provided under Order 43, Rule 1, CPC.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nathu Prasad v. Singhai Kapurchand, AIR 1976 MP 136 and a Single Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in C.P Properties Ltd. v. Matadin Bhagwan Dass, 1993 Civil Court Cases 484 (Allahabad) and a Single Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court in Haridas Das v. Smt. Santa Rani Das, 1993 Civil Court Cases 627 (Gauhati). In Nathu Prasad's case (supra), the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that when an application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC is dismissed for default, both the remedies are available to the applicant: (i) he can apply for restoration under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC, and (ii) he may appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(c). Thus, side by side, two remedies are open to him. There is no provision in the Code to the effect that either of them will exclude the other. However, if an appeal has been filed and decided, the order of the lower Court will merge in the order passed by the appellate Court. There is nothing wrong or unusual that a party should have two alternative and simultaneous remedies against an adverse order.

8. In the instant case as noticed above, the application filed by the plaintiff-appellants was dismissed in consequence of failure of the plaintiff to pay the process fee and file the notices for service on defendant-respondents. Thus, the trial Court dismissed the application while exercising the powers, under Rule 2 of Order 9, CPC. At any rate the order impugned cannot be under Rule 8 of Order 9, CPC. Even otherwise, the order impugned can be said to be under Rules 2 and 3 of Order 9 as neither of the party was present when the restoration application was called for hearing. As against the dismissal of the restoration application under Rules 2 and 3 of Order 9 read with Section 141, CPC, twofold remedy is provided under Rule 4 of Order 9 read with Section 141, CPC wherein it is provided that where the suit is dismissed under Rule 2 or Rule 3, CPC, the plaintiff may (subject to the law of limitation) bring a fresh suit; or he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for such failure as is referred to in Rule 2, or for his non-appearance, as the case may be, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal. Thus, from the plain reading of Rules 2, 3, 4 and 5 read with Section 141, CPC, it is clear that the plaintiff-appellant had two remedies either to bring a fresh suit or may apply for setting aside the dismissal under Rule 4 of Order 9 with the aid of Section 141, CPC or may bring fresh suit (subject to law of limitation) under Rule 5(2) of Order 9, CPC. Both these remedies are simultaneous and would not exclude either of them. However, the orders made under Rules 2, 3 and 4 of Order 9 are not made appealable under Order 43, Rule 1(a) to (w). Thus, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have no application to the facts of the present case. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:—

“The inherent power of the Court cannot override the express provisions of the law. If there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be express but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates.”

9. In Haridas Das's case (supra), the Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court held that it is now settled that as per provision of Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, an application under the provision of Order 9, Rule 9 for restoration of an earlier application filed for restoration of a suit is maintainable. But, as stated above, any order passed in the second petition is not appeal-able under the provision of Order 43, Rule 1(c), inasmuch as, the second petition is not for restoration of a suit, but for restoration of an application filed under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.

10. Before the Allahabad High Court in C.P Properties Ltd.'s case (supra), the question which came for consideration was as to the limitation applicable to an application for restoration on an application under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC. The only point considered in the above-referred case was as to whether the limitation as provided under Article 122 of the Limitation Act will be applicable or as provided under Article 37 of the Limitation Act. The Allahabad High Court held that for filing second application for restoration of the application seeking restoration of the suit, the limitation is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the said decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case.

11. In Mst. Nurnahar Bewa v. Rabindra Nath Dev, AIR 1988 Cal 358, a question came up for consideration whether by invoking the provisions of S. 141, CPC an application under Order 9, Rule 4 or Order 9, Rule 9, CPC can be made for setting aside the order of dismissal for default of an application under Rules 4, 9 or 13 of Order 9, CPC. Three Judges Special Bench answered the question in affirmative and held that whatever may be the nature of the proceedings initiated under Order 9 of CPC, such proceedings are to be treated as miscellaneous proceedings within the meaning of S. 141. CPC as amended. It was further held that the application for restoration of a misc. case arising out of an application under Rules 4, 9 or 13 of Order 9, CPC for restoration of misc. case if such misc. case itself is dismissed for default, is maintainable under Order 9 read with S. 141, CPC.

12. In the instant case, indisputedly the order impugned came to be passed by the trial Court on the application seeking restoration of original suit under R. 4 of O. 9, C.P.C and not under R. 9 of O. 9, C.P.C and, therefore, no appeal lies under O. 43, R. 1(c) or (d) or any other clause of R. 1, O. 43, C.P.C but the application under O. 9, R. 4 read with S. 141. C.P.C for restoration of misc. application is maintainable.

13. Right of appeal is the creature of a statute. It is for the Legislature to decide what type of order should be made appeal-able. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (1999) 4 SCC 468 : (AIR 1999 SC 1818) held that if the statute does not create any right of appeal, no appeal can be filed. There is a clear distinction between a suit and an appeal. While every person has an inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by statute, however, in regard to an appeal, the position is quite opposite. The right to appeal inheres in no one and therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. Having considered the present case in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the provisions of O. 43, R. 1, Cls. (a) to (w) noticed above, I am of the considered opinion that against the order impugned, no appeal is provided under O. 43, R. 1(a) to (w) and, therefore, present appeal is not maintainable.

For the reasons stated above, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.