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Suresh Chandra v. General Manager, Rajasthan State Bridge And Construction Corporation

Rajasthan High Court
Jan 10, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

These writ petitions challenge the same award dated 25 April 2000 by the Labour Court, Udaipur. The workman contended that the Labour Court should have reinstated him rather than awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The employer challenged the award on the grounds that it was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction and that the factual findings were perverse. The dispute arose from the workman’s claim that he was employed continuously from 26 September 1979 to 28 February 1987 and that his services were terminated without compliance with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, effective 1 March 1987. The appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court on 29 July 1995, querying whether the termination effective 1 March 1989 was justified and what relief was due. The Labour Court found the workman had worked from 1979 to 1987, had completed 240 days in a calendar year, and the establishment was a single unit. Due to the long lapse of over 13 years, the Court awarded compensation of Rs. 38,000 instead of reinstatement, leading to these petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute given the reference was made regarding termination effective 1 March 1989, while the workman claimed termination effective 1 March 1987.
  2. Whether the Labour Court erred in awarding compensation instead of reinstatement to the workman.
  3. Whether the award dated 25 April 2000 is a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction and perverse findings.
  4. Whether the Labour Court can amend or modify the terms of the reference to do justice between the parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Workman's Arguments

  • The Labour Court should have reinstated the workman instead of awarding compensation.
  • Although the reference mentioned termination as of 1 March 1989, the parties led evidence on termination effective 1 March 1987, which was the real dispute.
  • Since both parties were aware of the actual termination date, the award cannot be held null for want of jurisdiction.
  • The Labour Court rightly amended the reference to reflect the true date of termination to do justice.

Employer's Arguments

  • The Labour Court lacked jurisdiction as the reference was made regarding termination effective 1 March 1989, not 1 March 1987.
  • The award is null and void due to want of jurisdiction and the factual findings are perverse.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. Their Workmen (Constitution Bench) An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and unenforceable. Established that jurisdiction is fundamental and lack thereof renders orders inexecutable.
Kesar Singh v. Sadhu [(1996) 7 SCC 711] A decree without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged even in execution proceedings. Supported the principle that jurisdictional errors invalidate awards.
State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot [(1996) 5 SCC 477] Findings of a court without jurisdiction are irrelevant and unenforceable. Reinforced that jurisdictional defects nullify decisions.
Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 (1) L.L.N 42] Jurisdiction is conferred only by legislature; courts cannot usurp legislative functions. Emphasized the legislative exclusivity in conferring jurisdiction.
Karnal Improvement Trust v. Prakash Wanti [(1995) 5 SCC 159] Acquiescence of parties cannot confer jurisdiction; erroneous interpretation should not defeat legislative intent. Rejected the argument that parties’ consent can create jurisdiction.
Uttar Pradesh Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. Indure (Private) Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 667] Similar principle that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. Supported the limitation on jurisdictional conferral.
Sardar Hasan Siddiqui v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [A.I.R 1986 All. 132] A tribunal cannot derive jurisdiction apart from statute; decisions without jurisdiction are nullities. Affirmed that lack of jurisdiction nullifies tribunal decisions.
A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602] Jurisdictional decisions must be consistent with constitutional and statutory provisions; courts cannot create jurisdictional rights. Reiterated limits on judicial creation of jurisdiction.
Attorney-General v. Herman Jamas Sillern [(1864) 10 H.L.C 704] Legislative authority is required to create or limit jurisdiction; courts cannot extend jurisdiction by implication. Supported the principle that jurisdiction is a legislative function.
Bombay Gas Company, Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva [A.I.R 1964 S.C 752] Labour Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can only deal with disputes referred to it. Confirmed that Labour Court cannot go beyond the reference terms.
Hochlief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1746] Industrial Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to the terms of reference and incidental matters only. Clarified the scope of tribunal jurisdiction.
Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Company, Ltd. [1979 (1) L.L.N 336] Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction beyond terms of reference; awards beyond are nullities. Applied the principle of limited jurisdiction to invalidate excess jurisdiction awards.
Madanpal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2000 (1) L.L.N 370] Labour Court cannot modify terms of reference; amendment of reference must be sought from appropriate Government. Held that Labour Court’s award on bad reference is null; amendment is prerequisite for valid adjudication.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court acknowledged the settled legal principle that jurisdiction is conferred solely by statute and cannot be created or extended by consent, acquiescence, or judicial amendment. It examined the factual matrix and found that the reference made by the appropriate Government pertained to termination effective 1 March 1989, whereas the workman’s claim concerned termination effective 1 March 1987. Although both parties led evidence on the latter date, the Labour Court lacked statutory jurisdiction to amend or modify the terms of the reference. Reliance was placed on authoritative Supreme Court and High Court decisions establishing that a tribunal or court of limited jurisdiction cannot travel beyond the terms of the reference, and any award beyond such jurisdiction is a nullity. The Court emphasized that jurisdictional defects render awards unenforceable and inexecutable. The Labour Court’s attempt to amend the reference to reflect the correct date of termination was held to be beyond its competence, resulting in a null award. The Court directed that the workman approach the appropriate Government to seek amendment of the reference, which, if granted, would allow the Labour Court to adjudicate afresh. The Court also urged expeditious disposal given the age of the matter.

Holding and Implications

The impugned award dated 25 April 2000 is declared a nullity, unenforceable, and inexecutable, and is hereby set aside.

The direct consequence is that the award cannot be enforced against the parties. The workman is directed to apply to the appropriate Government for amendment of the reference to correctly state the date of termination. Upon such amendment, the Labour Court may adjudicate the dispute afresh. No new legal precedent is established beyond the reaffirmation of well-settled principles regarding jurisdiction and the limits of tribunal powers. There shall be no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

1. Both these writ petitions have been filed against the same impugned award, dated 25 April, 2000, made by the Labour Court, Udaipur. The workman has filed it on the ground that the Labour Court ought to have reinstated him instead of granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The other petition has been filed by the employer on the ground that the award is nullity for want of jurisdiction and even the findings of facts recorded by the Labour Court are perverse, hence it is liable to be quashed.

The facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are that the workman raised an industrial dispute that he had worked from 26 September, 1979 to 28 February, 1987 continuously with the employer and his services stood terminated with effect from 1 March, 1987 without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act). The appropriate Government made a reference, vide order, dated 29 July, 1995, to the Labour Court as to whether the termination of services of workman Suresh Chandra with effect from 1 March, 1989 was justified and if not, to what relief he was entitled for. In view of the reference, the workman filed the claim that he had worked from 26 September, 1979 till 28 February, 1987 and his services stood terminated with effect from 1 March, 1987. The employer disputed the claim of the workman on various grounds, inter alia, that he had worked in different units of the establishment, which were not interdependent, rather independent; he had not completed 240 days work in any of the unit in a calendar year counting backward from the date of termination; his services had not been terminated with effect from 1 March, 1989 and he was not entitled for any relief. After considering the averments made by the parties and appreciating the evidence available on record, the Labour Court made the award, dated 25 April, 2000, recording the findings of facts that the workman had worked from 26 September, 1979 to 28 February, 1987; he had completed 240 days in a calendar year counting backward from the date of termination; and the establishment was the same unit and not different units. As a period of 13 years and two months had passed in-between, the Labour Court, instead of granting the relief of reinstatement, awarded a sum of Rs. 38,000 as the compensation. Hence these petitions.

2. Learned counsel for the parties have raised the same issues which had been raised before the Labour Court. Sri H.S Sidhu, learned counsel for the workman, has placed reliance upon a large number of judgments before this Court and submitted that the relief of reinstatement should have been granted instead of awarding the compensation in lieu thereof. On the other hand, Sri Vinay Jain, learned counsel for the employer, has raised a large number of issues, including the issue of jurisdiction, submitting that the reference had been made as to whether the termination of services of the workman with effect from 1 March, 1989 was justified. According to the workman himself, his services stood terminated with effect from 1 March, 1987. The reference was in respect of termination of services with effect from 1 March, 1989. Thus, the reference itself was bad, therefore, the award is nullity. Sri Sidhu has submitted that undoubtedly the reference was in respect of termination with effect from 1 March, 1989 and the workman's claim was in respect of termination of his services with effect from 1 March, 1987. The parties led evidence knowing the controversy that the workman had been retrenched with effect from 1 March, 1987. As both the parties were aware of the real dispute, the award cannot be held to be nullity for want of jurisdiction and as the Labour Court itself has considered this issue and came to the conclusion that though the reference was in respect of termination with effect from 1 March, 1989 but it would proceed as if the services stood terminated with effect from 1 March, 1987 as per the claim of the workman and while doing so, the Labour Court itself amended the reference accordingly to do justice between the parties, no interference is required on this count.

3. I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties.

4. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that any order passed by any Court without jurisdiction is nullity and such order remains inexecutable and unenforceable.

5. Jurisdiction to deal with a case is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the party or by the order of the Court (vide the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the United Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. Their workmen. In Kesar Singh v. Sadhu [(1996) 7 SCC 711]), the Apex Court held that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity and when the matter goes to the root of the jurisdiction, it can be raised even in execution proceedings. The finding of a Court or a Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction, (vide State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot [(1996) 5 SCC 477 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 2664]).

6. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the Legislature. Conferring a Court or authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. In Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 (1) L.L.N 42], the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:

“the Court cannot usurp legislative functions. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate, The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts.”

7. In Karnal Improvement Trust v. Prakash Wanti [(1995) 5 SCC 159], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that acquiescence of parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a Court/authority and an erroneous interpretation equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate defeating of legislative animation. A similar view has been taken in Uttar Pradesh Rajkiya Nirman Nigam v. Indure (Private), Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 667 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 1373].

8. In Sardar Hasan Siddiqui v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [A.I.R 1986 All. 132], the Allahabad High Court observed that a Court or a Tribunal cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. “No amount of acquiescence, waiver or the like can confer jurisdiction which a Tribunal is lacking. The doctrine of nullity will come into operation and any decision taken or given by such a Tribunal will be a nullity.”

9. In A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602], the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to and relied upon the judgment of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Herman Jamas Sillern [(1864) 10 H.L.C 704], wherein it had been reiterated as under:

“A decision touching the jurisdiction…. has to be not only consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the same cannot even be inconsistent with substantive provisions of the statutory law…Creation of a right to an appeal is an act which requires legislative authority, neither an inferior Court nor the Superior Court nor both combined, can create such a right, if being one of the limitation and extension of jurisdiction.”

10. In the Bombay Gas Company, Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva [A.I.R 1964 S.C 752], the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the scope of jurisdiction and powers of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and held that the Labour Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction and it can deal with only the dispute referred to it and the matters incidental thereto, but cannot travel beyond the terms of the reference.

11. In Hochlief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1746], while dealing with the similar issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

“The Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, Its Jurisdiction is to try an industrial dispute referred to it for its adjudication by the appropriate Government by an order of reference passed under S. 10. It is not open to the Tribunal to travel materially beyond the terms of the reference, for it is well settled that the term of reference determines the scope of its power and jurisdiction from case to case… It may, while dealing with the said point, deal with the matters incidental thereto.”

12. In Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Company, Ltd., [1979 (1) L.L.N 336], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go beyond the terms of reference and to inquire into the question which is not involved in the reference. If the Tribunal travels beyond the terms of the reference, the award is nullity and would not confer any right upon the party.

13. In Madanpal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2000 (1) L.L.N 370], the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the case wherein, while making the reference, name of the workman had wrongly been mentioned. The parties led the evidence knowing who was the real workman, but the Labour Court made the award of “no dispute” recording its conclusion that there was no workman-employee served the establishment by the name the reference had been made and it was not possible for the Labour Court to proceed on the basis of the evidence led by the parties on treat the reference to have been made in favour of the correct person. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the award was justified as the Labour Court, being a Court of limited jurisdiction and having no power to go beyond the terms of the reference, could not deal with the matter. However, in such an eventuality, either of the parties could make the application before the appropriate Government to amend the reference and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Labour Court itself could also ask the appropriate Government to make an amendment. In the said case, on being approached by the workman, the appropriate Government amended the reference after the award had been made by the Labour Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Labour Court to decide the matter afresh.

Thus, in view of the above, I reach the inescapable conclusion that the Labour Court lacks competence to correct/modify amend/alter the terms of the reference or correct the name or the date of termination, etc. and in case it does so, the award becomes nullity, being without jurisdiction, based on the bad reference.

15. Thus, the impugned award, dated 25 April, 2000, is declared to be a nullity, unenforceable and inexecutable and is hereby set aside. The workman may approach the appropriate Government for amending the reference, As the matter is very old, if the workman makes such an application, the appropriate Government is requested to pass appropriate order oh his application expeditiously and in case the reference is made, the Labour Court is requested to dispose of the claim petition expeditiously. There shall be no orders as to costs.