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B.B Bhalla v. Rameshwar Krishore Badhwar
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (respondent) instituted a suit on April 1, 1978 for eviction and arrears of rent against the defendant (appellant) on the ground of default under Section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (the Rent Act). The plaint alleged that the defendant was a monthly tenant agreeing to pay Rs. 138 per month and failed to pay rent from April 1977 onward, making him a defaulter; the plaintiff sought eviction and arrears (stated sums included).
The defendant filed a written statement denying default, alleging that the plaintiff had enhanced the rent and refused to accept rent tendered, and sought determination of provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act. The trial court determined provisional rent (order dated November 17, 1978) and directed deposit. The trial court later extended time to deposit; the defendant deposited the determined provisional rent and additional months' rent on January 30, 1979.
The plaintiff moved an application under Section 13(5) of the Rent Act (alleging delayed payment for November and December 1978) for striking out the defence against eviction. The trial court, by order dated December 10, 1980, struck out the defence against eviction, holding it had no power to condone the delay. The defendant's appeals against that order were unsuccessful; revision dismissed May 20, 1983, and a Special Leave Petition was dismissed as withdrawn on January 27, 1986.
At trial the plaintiff led no evidence; the defendant appeared as DW-1. The trial court formulated issues (initially six; an additional issue 4A was added) including whether the defendant committed default in payment of rent (Issue No. 3). The trial court placed the burden to prove non-default on the defendant, struck out the defence against eviction and ultimately decided all issues against the defendant, decreeing the plaintiff's suit by judgment and decree dated February 16, 1990. The first appeal was unsuccessful, and the defendant preferred the present second appeal which was admitted on substantial questions of law; the judge re-formulated the core questions going to root of the matter.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court had rightly placed the burden on the defendant tenant to prove that he had not committed default in making payment of rent.
- Whether it was incumbent on the plaintiff landlord to lead any evidence in respect of the ground of default which he incorporated in the plaint.
- What is the effect of the order of striking out the defence against eviction under Section 13(5) of the Rent Act? Specifically, whether the plaintiff landlord is exonerated from proving the facts averred in the plaint after such an order is passed.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff (Respondent) — Allegations and Procedural Steps
- Alleged that the defendant entered as a monthly tenant at Rs. 138 per month and failed to pay rent from April 1977 onward, making him a defaulter under Section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Act.
- Sought eviction, arrears of rent (specific sums pleaded in the plaint), use and occupation charges and costs.
- Moved an application under Section 13(5) of the Rent Act (March 26, 1980) seeking striking out the defence against eviction on the ground that the defendant delayed payment for November and December 1978.
- No evidence was adduced by the plaintiff at trial (as stated in the opinion).
Defendant (Appellant) — Pleas and Evidence
- Denied being a defaulter and denied the plaint's allegations.
- Pleaded that the plaintiff intentionally enhanced the monthly rent and purposefully refused to accept rent tendered by the defendant.
- Requested determination of provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act; the trial court determined provisional rent and directed deposit.
- Deposited the determined provisional rent (including rent for November and December 1978 and January 1979) within the extended time (on January 30, 1979).
- In reply to the Section 13(5) application, asserted that the deposit for November and December was bonafide, delay was bonafide and sought condonation.
- The defendant himself appeared as DW-1 and testified (the opinion records that he was examined).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nataraja Deekshidar v. Aiyathural Padayachi (Madras High Court) | When onus is wrongly placed, it is a question of law and assailable in second appeal. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that misplacement of onus is reviewable in a second appeal as a question of law. |
| Murlidhar (Murli Dhar) v. Mukund (Mukand) Ram | Wrong placement of burden is a question of law amenable to interference in a second appeal; landlord must establish tenant's default. | The court invoked this decision to hold that the trial court's placing of the burden on the tenant was wholly erroneous and could be corrected in second appeal. |
| Chandu Kishore Sharma v. Kampawati (Delhi High Court) | Initial burden to prove the ground of eviction lies on the landlord; tenant cannot be asked to prove the negative. | The court relied on this principle to affirm that the landlord bears the initial burden of proving default under Section 13(1)(a). |
| Durairaj v. Ratnabai | In eviction for wilful default, the burden lies heavily on the landlord to prove circumstances justifying inference of wilfulness. | Used to emphasize that landlord must prove not only default but the circumstances (in wilful default cases) that justify eviction; supports placing burden on landlord. |
| Mohan Lal v. Lakhe Khan | If a defendant's defence is struck out against eviction, allegations of the plaintiff are not automatically assumed true; plaintiff must still satisfy sectional requirements. | Cited to show that striking out defence does not entitle the plaintiff to decree without proving conditions of Section 13(1). |
| Paradise Industrial Corporation v. Klin Plastic Products (Supreme Court) | Even if defence is struck off, the party is entitled to appear, cross-examine witnesses and contend that decree cannot be passed against him on the basis of material. | Applied to reinforce that striking out the defence does not eliminate the defendant's ability to challenge the plaintiff's proof and that decree should not automatically follow. |
| DCG & M v. Hem Chand (Supreme Court) | Landlord must prove the case by fulfilling statutory conditions (example cited: section 14(1) of Delhi Act) that tenant defaulted in payment of rent. | Relied upon to support the proposition that landlord must lead evidence to satisfy statutory conditions before decree can be granted after striking out defence. |
| Kalyan Mal v. Shakuntla Devi | If trial court strikes out defendant's defence under Section 13(5), the court may proceed to adjudicate and must examine whether plaintiff established that defendant defaulted for six months. | Used to affirm that the trial court, even after striking out defence, must examine whether plaintiff proved the statutory default period required for eviction under Section 13(1)(a). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by (i) identifying the critical questions going to the root of the matter (onus of proof, plaintiff's duty to lead evidence, and effect of striking out defence under Section 13(5)); (ii) examining the pleadings and trial proceedings; and (iii) applying statutory text and binding authority to the facts found by the courts below.
Key steps in the court's legal analysis (as stated in the opinion):
- Statutory and evidentiary principle: The court recalled Section 101 of the Evidence Act that the party asserting facts must prove them. It held that the question of onus probandi is a question of law and misplacement of the onus permitting a miscarriage of justice is corrigible in a second appeal (citing Nataraja Deekshidar and Murlidhar v. Mukund Ram).
- Placement of burden: On scrutinising the pleadings, the court concluded that the learned trial court wrongly placed the burden on the defendant tenant to prove that he had not committed default. The court relied on Section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Act which defines a defaulter as one who has neither paid nor tendered rent for six months; therefore, the landlord must prove by evidence that the tenant neither paid nor tendered rent for six months.
- Effect of striking out defence under Section 13(5): The court analysed Section 13(5) and concluded that striking out the defence prevents the defendant from taking benefit of provisions of the Rent Act against eviction, but does not automatically entitle the landlord to a decree without proof. The phrase "shall proceed with the hearing of the suit" indicates that the court must continue the hearing to determine whether the Section 13(1) grounds are proved.
- Precedential support: The court relied on Mohan Lal v. Lakhe Khan to reject the proposition that striking out defence makes the plaint's allegations assumed true. It relied on Paradise Industrial Corporation v. Klin Plastic Products and DCG & M v. Hem Chand to emphasise that the defendant can still participate and that the landlord must prove statutory conditions. Kalyan Mal v. Shakuntla Devi was cited to show that after striking out defence the court must adjudicate whether the plaintiff established six months' default.
- Application to the facts: Both courts below assumed plaint averments to be true and held eviction appropriate because the defence was struck out and (erroneously) placed the burden on the defendant. The appellate scrutiny found that neither court recorded a finding that the defendant had defaulted for six months as required by Section 13(1)(a). Because the landlord led no evidence at trial, the courts below erred in decreeing the suit.
The court expressly limited itself to the evidence (or lack of evidence) and to statutory text and precedent; it did not accept that striking out the defence absolved the landlord of the obligation to prove default.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the judgments and decrees of the two lower courts. In the opinion's words, the appeal "succeeds and is hereby allowed" and the impugned judgments and decrees are set aside.
Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; JUDGMENTS/DECREES SET ASIDE
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The decree and judgment dated October 6, 1993 (Additional District Judge No. 5 Jaipur City in Civil Regular Appeal No. 181/90) and dated February 16, 1990 (Additional Civil Judge No. 6 Jaipur City in Civil Suit No. 157/88) are set aside.
- No order as to costs was made.
- Because the plaintiff had not led evidence proving the statutory condition of six months' non-payment or non-tendering under Section 13(1)(a), the eviction decree could not stand; the landlord remains required to prove the essential facts for eviction under the Rent Act if the matter proceeds further.
Broader implications: The opinion reiterates existing principles (placement of onus, effect of striking out defence under Section 13(5)) but does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond the application of the cited authorities to the facts. No separate order as to costs was issued.
Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.:— The suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent for eviction in regard to tenanted premises against the defendant appellant was based on the ground of default enumerated under Section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (for short the Rent Act). The defendant appellant submitted written statement denying the allegations. After plaintiff respondent filed a rejoinder, the learned trial court formulated as many as six issues out of which issue No. 3 was as follows-
“Whether the defendant committed default in making payment of rent?
2. Burden to prove this issue was laid on the defendant appellant. Learned trial court determined the rent under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act. Thereafter vide order dated December 10, 1980 struck out the defence against eviction of the defendant under section 13(5) of the Rent Act holding that the defendant did not deposit the rent for the month of November and December 1978 in time. The plaintiff respondent did not at all adduce the evidence. The defendant himself appeared in the witness Box as DW. 1. Learned trial court vide decree and judgment dated February 16, 1990 decided all the issues against the defendant and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. After unsuccessful first appeal, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal.
3. The instant appeal stood admitted in respect of substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 framed by the appellant in the memo of appeal. First question relates to the determination of rent under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act and the second to the interpretation of section 13(5) vis-a-vis law subsequently expounded by the binding decisions of this court and the Apex Court. But looking to the fact that the learned trial court laid burden to prove issue No. 3 on the defendant tenant and the plaintiff did not examine even a single witness, I am satisfied that the substantial questions of law that go into the root of the matter are as follows:
(i) Whether the trial court had rightly placed the burden on the defendant tenant to above that he had not committed default in making payment of rent?
(ii) Was it not incumbent on the plaintiff land lord to lead any evidence in respect of ground of default which he incorporated in the plaint?
(iii) What is the effect of the order of striking out the defence against eviction under section 13(5) of the Rent Act? Whether the plaintiff landlord is exonerated from proving the facts averred in the plaint, after the order of striking out the defence against eviction is passed?
4. Although aforequoted questions were not formulated at the time of admission of the appeal but in view of the power provided under the proviso appended to sub-section (5) of section 100 CPC., I have heard the rival submissions in regard to these questions also.
5. The question of onus probandi is a question of law. Wrong placement of onus of proof when brings about a miscarriage of justice can be interfered with in second appeal. Madras High Court in Nataraja Deekshidar v. Aiyathural Padayachi (1), indicated that when onus is wrongly placed, it is a question of law and assailable in second appeal. This court in Murlidhar v. Mukund Ram (2), also held that if burden is wrongly placed, it is a question of law and can be interfered with in second appeal.
6. The facts giving rise to the appeal, as found by the courts below may be summarised thus:
7. On April 1, 1978 the plaintiff instituted a civil suit against the defendant in the trial court seeking decree for eviction and arrears of rent. It was averred in the plaint that the defendant came into occupation of the suit premises as a monthly tenant, agreeing to pay monthly rent of Rs. 138/-. The defendant failed to pay rent from the month of April 1977 and became defaulter making himself liable to be evicted from the suit premises. The plaintiff prayed for the eviction of the defendant, arrears of rent in the sum of Rs. 1380/- for the month of April 1977 to January 1978 and Rs. 276/- towards use and occupation charges and the costs of the suit. The defendant in the written statement denied the allegations of his being defaulter and pleaded that the plaintiff with an ulterior motive enhanced the monthly rent and purposefully refused to accept the rent while tendered by the defendant. The defendant desired the determination of provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act. Learned trial court determined the provisional rent vide its order dated November 17, 1978 and the defendant was directed to deposit Rs. 2738=90 i.e rent from April 1, 1977 to October 31, 1978 including interest. Defendant was further required to pay to the plaintiff the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which the determination was made. On the prayer of the defendant the trial court vide its order dated December 1, 1978 extended time to deposit the provisional rent upto February 2, 1979 and the defendant within the extended time i.e on January 30, 1979 deposited Rs. 3153=91 i.e the determined provisional rent including the rent for the months of November and December 1978 and January 1979. Thereafter the plaintiff on March 26, 1980 moved an application under section 13(5) of the Rent Act for striking out defence against eviction of the defendant on the allegations that the defendant delayed the payment of rent for the months of November and December 1978. The defendant in his reply asserted that the rent for the month of November and December was deposited alongwith the determined provisional rent bonafidely and delay in depositing the same was bonafide and the same may be condoned. But the learned trial court vide its order dated December 10, 1980 struck off the defence against eviction of the defendant holding that it had no power to condone the delay. The defendant preferred appeal and revision against the said order but did not get success. This court vide order dated May 20, 1983 dismissed the revision preferred by the defendant. Thereafter Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11738/1983 submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dismissed as withdrawn on January 27, 1986.
8. From the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed by the trial court:
(1) Whether the period of eleven months written in the Rent deed was incorporated with a view to keep Rent deed unregistered and to save stamp duty?
-Defendant
(2) Whether the defendant put his signatures on the Rent Deed, just to observe the formality?
-Defendant
(3) Whether the defendant committed default in making payment of rent?
-Defendant
(4) Whether the plaintiff had served a valid notice on the defendant for terminating the tenancy?
-Plaintiff
(5) Relief.
Additional issue 4A was added on February 9, 1982 as under-
(4A) Whether the defendant had deposited Rs. 260/- against the rent?
-Defendant
9. As already stated no evidence at all was adduced by the plaintiff whereas the defendant examined himself but as his defence against eviction was struck out, the trial court decided all the issues against him and the appellate court also affirmed the findings arrived at the trial court.
10. The first question that arises for consideration is, whether the trial court had rightly placed the burden on the defendant to prove that he had not committed default in making payment of rent?
11. Section 101 of the Evidence Act provides that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. The Delhi High Court in Chandu Kishore Sharma v. Kampawati (3), indicated that the initial burden to prove the ground of eviction is on the land lord, and not on the tenant. The tenant can not be asked to prove the negative. In Durairaj v. Ratnabai (4), it was held that in a case of eviction for wilful default, the burden lies heavily on the landlord to prove the circumstances which would justify the inference that not merely had a default occurred but that default was wilful. This court in Murli Dhar v. Mukand Ram (supra), observed thus: (Para 12)
“….I have taken into consideration the fact that no evidence was led before the trial court about the factum of default. Even the framing of issues regarding default was wholly erroneous, because, the learned trial court had placed the burden on the tenant to prove that he had not committed default. This approach of the learned trial court was wholly erroneous. In fact, it was the land lord to have established that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent for more than six months.”
12. After having closely scrutinised the pleadings of the parties I am satisfied that the learned trial court had wrongly placed the burden on the defendant to prove that he had not committed default in payment of rent. According to section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Act a tenant is defaulter only when he has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months and the land lord is required to establish by producing his evidence in proof of his averment that the tenant is defaulter. The burden is on the land lord to prove that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months and it cannot be placed on the defendants.
13. That takes me to second and third questions—
Was it not incumbent on the plaintiff land lord to lead any evidence in respect of ground of default which he incorporated in the plaint? and
what is the effect of the order of stricking out the defence against eviction under section 13(5) of the Rent Act? Whether the plaintiff land lord is exonerated from proving the facts averred in the plaint, after the order of striking out the defence against eviction is passed?
14. section 13(5) of the Rent Act makes it abundantly clear that if a tenant fails to deposit or pay rent month by month as envisaged by Section 13(4), the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. This clearly means that the court would not allow the defendant to take the benefit of any of the provisions contained in the Act against eviction, though it will be open to him to take other defences, outside the purview of the Rent Act.
15. In Mohan Lal v. Lakhe Khan (5), this court in para 16 indicated as under-
“…I am unable to appreciate the position that if the tenant's defence is struck out against eviction, the allegations of the plaintiff will be assumed to be true and he will be entitled to a decree without proof of the conditions laid down in clause (a) to sub-section (1). The defendant is not definitely reduced to a position worse than that when the case proceeds exparte. The plaintiff can only succeed in view of the mandate contained in section 13(1) when he satisfies the court that the tenant has made himself liable for one of the reasons mentioned in that section.”
16. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Paradise Industrial Corporation v. Klin Plastic Products (6), propounded that even if the defence is struck off, the party is entitled to appear, cross examine the witnesses and submit that on the basis of material decree cannot be passed against him.
17. The words “shall proceed with the hearing of the suit” of section 13(5) of the Rent Act connotes clearly that the eviction order will not automatically follow the order of striking off the defence and the court shall proceed to hear the suit so as to reach the conclusion that whether the grounds of section 13(1) stand proved or not. Evidently the landlord is required to prove his case by evidence. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in DCG & M v. Hem Chand (7), indicated that the landlord has to prove his case by fulfilling the conditions of section 14(1) of Delhi Act, that the tenant defaulted in payment of rent.
18. This Court (Hon'ble S.C Agrawal, J. as her then was) in Kalyan Mal v. Shakuntla Devi (8), held thus: (para 6)
“In case the trial court decides to strike out the defence of the defendant under section 13(5) of the Act the court may proceed with the adjudication of the suit and while doing so examine whether the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing her case that the defendant has committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months.”
19. In view of discussions indicated hereinabove I am of the considered opinion that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff landlord to lead the evidence that the defendant tenant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him from six months and he was a defaulter in view of section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Act. Even if the defence of the defendant had been struck out, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish his case by adducing evidence that the defendant was a defaulter.
20. Both the courts below decreed the suit of the plaintiff by holding that burden to prove the issue that the defendant had not committed default was on the defendant and as his defence against eviction was struck out, he was liable to be evicted from the suit premises. A close look at the impugned findings demonstrates that neither the trial court nor the first appellate court have recorded a finding that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months as required under section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Act. The bare averments of the plaint were assumed to be true by the courts below without proof of conditions laid down in section 13(1)(a) of the Rent Act. Under these circumstances the judgment and decree of both the courts below can not be upheld and must be set aside.
21. In the result the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed and the judgment and decree dated October 6, 1993 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 5 Jaipur City in Civil Regular Appeal No. 181/90 and dated February 16, 1990 passed by the Additional Civil Judge No. 6 Jaipur City in Civil Suit No. 157/88 are set aside. No order as to costs.
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