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Smt. Madhu Jajoo v. State Of Rajasthan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Chair-person of the Municipal Council, Bhilwara, challenged an order of suspension passed by the State Government removing her from the Chair-personship and membership of the Municipal Council, Bhilwara by filing a writ petition before the principal seat of the High Court. The writ petition was admitted and listed for final hearing; however, the Court refused interim relief by a speaking and reasoned order dated 1-9-1998 and directed listing for final hearing on 16-9-1998. On 17-9-1998 the petitioner applied to withdraw that writ petition so she could pursue a fresh or successive writ petition before the Jaipur Bench challenging, inter alia, the validity of Section 63 (specifically Section 63(4)) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, and also challenging the same order of suspension. The application to withdraw was initially unsupported by affidavit; the Court ordered an affidavit and the petitioner filed one on 9-10-1998 disclosing that the pendency of the originating writ petition had not been disclosed in the petition before the Jaipur Bench because the petitioner believed it was unnecessary. The State raised serious objections to the withdrawal application, alleging suppression of material facts and abuse of the process of the Court. The Court heard counsel for the petitioner, the State and respondent No. 2 (Mr. Ramrich Pal Nuval, M.L.A.). The Court concluded that withdrawal with liberty to proceed in Jaipur would amount to permitting fraud on the Court and dismissed the application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner can withdraw the writ petition filed before the principal seat with liberty to pursue a subsequent writ petition before the Jaipur Bench where the subsequent petition was filed without disclosing the pendency of the earlier petition.
- Whether permission to withdraw a writ petition to file a successive petition (or to pursue remedy elsewhere) should be granted where the petitioner is alleged to have suppressed material facts and acted without bona fides, thereby amounting to abuse of the process of the Court.
- Whether the principles of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as argued by petitioner) are applicable by analogy to writ proceedings to permit such withdrawal when it may prejudice respondents or facilitate an ulterior motive.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner (through Mr. M. Section Singhvi) submitted that a petitioner's right to withdraw a writ petition is absolute and that the Court cannot force a party to proceed with the case.
- Petitioner sought liberty to withdraw and to pursue remedy before the Jaipur Bench, asserting she had been advised to file a writ petition there challenging Section 63 (4) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and the same suspension order.
- Petitioner initially did not file an affidavit in support of withdrawal and later filed an affidavit stating the pendency of the principal-seat petition was not disclosed before the Jaipur Bench because she bona fide believed disclosure was unnecessary when challenging the statutory provision.
- Reliance was placed upon the principle (and the decision in Sheikh Hussain v. M.G. Kannaiah) that withdrawal could be considered to avoid public inconvenience—an argument the petitioner urged by analogy.
Respondents' / State's Arguments
- The State and respondent No. 2 raised serious objections that the petitioner suppressed the pendency of the principal-seat writ petition when she filed before the Jaipur Bench, amounting to suppression of material fact and abuse of the process of the Court.
- It was contended that the petitioner lacked bona fides, had an ulterior motive, and was attempting to play “hide and seek” or to perpetrate a fraud on the Court by instituting a successive petition without disclosure.
- The State pointed to the absence of an affidavit in support of the withdrawal application initially, arguing this failure further demonstrated lack of candour and clean hands.
- Respondents argued that permitting withdrawal with liberty to file at Jaipur would prejudice their rights and facilitate evasion of process and political manipulation, particularly as respondent No. 2 (an MLA) had been seriously accused but was not impleaded in the Jaipur petition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 852 | General principle that a litigant must approach the Court with clean hands; courts may refuse relief where a party has not acted bona fide. | Used, together with other authorities, to support the proposition that the petitioner did not come with clean hands and therefore relief (withdrawal with liberty) should be refused. |
| G. Narainswami Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 1726 | Illustrates the clean hands principle and equitable conduct expected of litigants. | Relied upon to demonstrate that the petitioner’s conduct (suppression of pendency) militates against permitting withdrawal. |
| K. R. Srinivas v. R. M. Premchand, 1994 (6) SCC 620 | Authority cited in connection with the duty of litigants to act in good faith before the Court. | Referenced as part of a cluster of authorities showing that the Court should guard against abuse and require bona fides; supported refusal of withdrawal. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 | Describes the writ Court's duty as custodian of the Constitution to interfere for justice and refuse interference where against social interest and public good. | Cited to frame the Court's role in protecting public interest and social balance when deciding whether to permit withdrawal and successive petitions. |
| Andhra State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills, (1994) 2 SCC 647; AIR 1994 SC 2151 | Equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 should prevent perpetration of legal fraud; equity prevents crafty evasion of law. | Quoted to stress that the Court must prevent legal fraud and not allow crafty evasion—applied to conclude petitioner would be perpetrating fraud if withdrawal were permitted. |
| S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1; AIR 1994 SC 853 | Courts require parties to come with clean hands; process should not be used by unscrupulous persons to retain illegal gain. | Cited to reinforce that the petitioner’s alleged suppression of facts and ulterior motive justify denial of the withdrawal application. |
| K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi, 1998 (3) SCC 573; 1998 AIR SCW 1166 | Principle that a party cannot be permitted to file successive writ petitions for the same cause of action without disclosure of pendency, as that amounts to abuse of process. | Relied upon to hold that allowing withdrawal and filing elsewhere under the circumstances would be an abuse of process and must be prevented. |
| Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran, AIR 1996 SC 2687 | Litigants do not have a right to unlimited use of Court time and public resources; easy access to justice should not be misused to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. | Quoted to support the view that the Court should not allow litigation tactics that misuse judicial time and resources; reinforced denial of withdrawal. |
| Sheikh Hussain v. M. G. Kannaiah, AIR 1981 SC 1725 | Authority where High Court could consider withdrawal to avoid public inconvenience (facts distinguishable in that case). | Addressed and distinguished: Court noted facts were different and that principle did not apply where the petitioner seeks to settle political rivalries or evade process; thus it did not justify withdrawal here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the nature of the withdrawal application and the surrounding conduct of the petitioner. The analysis unfolded in the following steps, as reflected in the opinion:
- Characterization of application: The Court emphasized that this was not a mere procedural withdrawal; it was a request to withdraw at the principal seat with liberty to pursue a successive petition at another Bench (Jaipur), which required scrutiny to ensure no prejudice or abuse.
- Assessment of petitioner's conduct: The petitioner had initially failed to file an affidavit in support of the withdrawal, only doing so after the Court's order. The affidavit admitted nondisclosure of the pendency of the principal-seat petition before the Jaipur Bench because the petitioner believed disclosure unnecessary. The Court found this nondisclosure and the initial lack of affidavit to be indicative of lack of bona fides and an attempt to "play hide and seek" with the Court.
- Application of equitable and procedural principles: The Court relied on established equitable doctrines (clean hands, prevention of legal fraud under Article 226) and cited Supreme Court authority emphasizing that courts must prevent crafty evasions and abuse of process. The Court rejected the contention that the petitioner's right to withdraw is absolute where the withdrawal is sought to facilitate a successive petition that was filed without disclosure and would prejudice respondents.
- Rejection of analogy to Order 23 CPC: The Court considered and rejected the argument that principles under Order 23 CPC (permitting withdrawal in civil procedure) should be applied by analogy to permit the withdrawal. The opinion highlighted that Section 141 CPC and its Explanation envisage non-application of certain CPC provisions to writ proceedings, and that importing elaborate CPC rules to the writ jurisdiction could defeat the purpose of the writ process.
- Consideration of prejudice and ulterior motive: The Court noted that respondent No. 2 (an MLA) had not been impleaded in the Jaipur petition despite being the subject of mala fide allegations in the principal-seat petition, demonstrating a tactical attempt to evade proper process. The Court concluded that permitting withdrawal under these facts would amount to allowing the petitioner to perpetrate fraud upon the Court and to abuse judicial process.
- Reliance on precedent: The Court systematically invoked Supreme Court authorities addressing clean hands, equitable jurisdiction, abuse of process, and limitations on successive petitions to justify refusing the withdrawal.
The Court therefore concluded that the petitioner's request was materially tainted by nondisclosure and lack of bona fides and that permitting withdrawal with liberty to file elsewhere would facilitate fraud and abuse of process.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to pursue remedy before the Jaipur Bench is REJECTED.
Implications
- Direct effect: The petitioner is not permitted to withdraw the writ petition before the principal seat and pursue the same cause of action at the Jaipur Bench under the circumstances described. The petition remains before the principal seat and the withdrawal application has been dismissed.
- On parties' rights: The dismissal preserves the respondents' procedural and substantive position against being subjected to a successive proceeding instituted without disclosure; the Court refused relief that would have prejudiced respondents and allowed tactical evasion.
- On precedent/new law: The opinion applies established principles (clean hands, prevention of abuse of process, equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 and related Supreme Court authorities) to the facts. The judgment does not announce a novel legal doctrine beyond the application of those authorities and equitable principles to the particular factual matrix; it enforces existing limitations on successive writ petitions and abuse of process.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or legal holdings beyond those stated in the opinion have been added or inferred.
1. The petitioner has filed an application to withdraw the instant petition filed by her before the principal seat of this Court. The other side has raised serious objections and opposed the said application.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this application are that the petitioner, who is the Chair-person of Municipal Council, Bhilwara, had challenged the order of suspension passed by the State Government from the Chair-person ship and Membership of the Municipal Council. Bhilwara on various grounds. The writ petition was admitted by this Court vide order dated 1 -9-1998. However, this Court rejected the application for interim relief in spite of the fact that all possible arguments had been made on her behalf including the allegations of mala fide against Shri Ramrich Pal Nuval, respondent No. 2 presently the M.L. A. from Bhilwara Constituency and regarding the arbitrary exercise of power by the State Government. By a speaking and reasoned order, the prayer for grant of interim relief was rejected though the Court directed to list the matter for final hearing on 16-9-1998.
3. Petitioner preferred the present application for withdrawal of the instant writ petition on 17-9-98 on the ground that she had been advised to file a writ petition at Jaipur Bench of this Court challenging, inter alia, the validity of the provisions of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred as "the Act") and. also, the same impugned order of suspension and, thus, she prayed that she may be permitted to withdraw the instant writ petition with permission to pursue the writ petition already filed by her before the Jaipur Bench. As the application for withdrawal was not supported by an affidavit this Court, vide order dated 8-10-98 directed the petitioner to file an affidavit in support of the application and, also, to disclose whether she had disclosed the factum of pendency of the instant writ petition before the main seat while filing the writ petition before the Jaipur Bench. Petitioner filed an affidavit on 9-10-98 before this Court stating that the factum of pendency of the writ petition had not been disclosed in the writ petition filed at Jaipur Bench and it was not so disclosed as the petitioner was under the bona fide impression that it was not necessary as the validity of the provisions of Section 63(4) of the Act has been challenged therein. The State Govenment has filed reply to the said writ petition and taken a serious objection regarding suppression of the material fact before the Jaipur Bench and that writ petition is still pending for hearing.
4. Heard Mr. M. Section Singhvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rajesh Joshi, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Vineet Kothari, learned counsel for respondentNo. 2 Mr. Ramrich Pal Nuval, M.L.A.
5. It has been submitted on behalf of (he petitioner that petitioner's right to withdraw the writ petition is absolute and the Court cannot force a party to proceed with the case. The submission seems to be very innocuous and attractive but has no application in a case where petitioner prays for withdrawal with liberty to file a successive petition. In such a case the Court has to examine whether by seeking such permission for withdrawal, petitioner is trying to defeat the right/interest which has accrued in favour of the respondent(s) or trying to overreach the Court or his/her conduct tantamounts to abuse of process of the Court. The instant application is not for a mere withdrawal. The application has been made specifically to permit the petitioner to withdraw the petition with liberty to pursue the remedy before the Jaipur Bench. Petitioner approached this Court and could not succeed to get the interim order. Any matter challenging the impugned order or validity of a provision of any statute, can be filed before the principal seat of this Court. If petitioner wanted to challenge the validity of a statutory provision, there was no bar for her to amend the instant writ petition challenging the validity of the statutory provisons or to apply for permission to withdraw the instant writ petition and then to challenge the impugned order before this principal seat or before the Jaipur Bench of this Court. The prayer for interim relief has been rejected by this Bench by a speaking and reasoned order and petitioner filed the subsequent writ petition in Jaipur Bench without disclosing the factum of pendency of the instant writ petition, it amounts to abuse of process of the Court and once the petitioner has approached this Court first, taking any subsequent step, i.e., instituting the petition before the Jaipur Bench without discussing the fact-situation correctly, amounts to playing fraud upon this Bench. The application has been filed with ulterior motive. The petitioner lacks bonafide in applying for withdrawal of the instant writ petition. She has suppressed the material fact before the Jaipur Bench regarding pendency of the instant writ petition and she is guilty of further suppressing the material fact before this Court while moving this application by not disclosing that she had suppressed this material fact before the Jaipur Bench.
6. The Rajasthan High Court Rules mandatorily requires that every application filed before the Court must be supported by an affidavit. Petitioner did not file an affidavit in support of the application to withdraw the writ petition and she had subsequently filed the affidavit only in pursuance of the order of the Court dated 8-10-1998. This makes it abundantly clear that petitioner is trying to play hide and seek with the Court and has not approached this Court with clean hands. Every litigant, who approaches the Court, must come forward not only with clean hands but with clean mind, clean heart and with clean objective. (Vide Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 852; G. Narainswami Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 1726; and K. R. Srinivas v. R. M. Premchand 1994 (6) SCC 620).
7. The writ Court is under a solemn duty, as a custodian of the Constitution and law to maintain the social balance by interfering, where necessary, for the sake of justice and refusing the interference where it is against social interest and public good" as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481. In Andhra State Financial Corpration v. Gar Re - Rolling Mills, (1994) 2 SCC 647 : (AIR 1994 SC 2151), the Apex Court has observed as under :
"The Court of equity, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within (heir power. Equity is always known to prevent the law from crafty evasion and subtleties invented to evade law."
8. Similarly, in S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 : (AIR 1994 SC 853), the Supreme Court has observed that the Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties and one, who approaches the Court, must come with clean hands as
"unscrupulous persons from all walks of life, find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gain indefinitely."
9. A party cannot be permitted to file successive writ petitions for the same cause of action and that too without disclosing the pendency of the earlier writ petition as it amounts to sheer abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose or a spurious claim may, also, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and in such a case the Court must come with a very heavy hand on a litigant who has the audacity to abuse the process of the Court. (Vide K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi, 1998 (3) SCC 573 : (1998 AIR SCW 1166)).
10. In Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran, AIR 1996 SC 2687, the Apex Court has observed as under :--
"No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money 'in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a lincence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions."
11. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, allowing the petitioner to withdraw the petition and pursue the remedy before the Jaipur Bench would amount to allowing the petitioner to play fraud upon the Court and, therefore, the application is liable to be dismissed.
12. I find no force in the argument raised by Mr. Singhvi that on the analogy of principle enshrined in Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the writ petition and pursue the remedy before the Jaipur Bench. No rule of law can permit a person to play fraud upon the Court and i f it lacks bona fides, the Court must not have any hesitation in rejecting and disapporving such an action. If all the elaborate and technical rules of Court were to be imported from Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure into the writ proceedings, the very purpose is likely to be defeated by proceeding being delayed. Explanation to Section 141, CPC provides for non-application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in writ proceedings though the principle enshrined therein may be made applicable in an appropriate case. Court should not allow to withdraw a petition if it prejudices the defendant/respondent or merely because the petitioner does not want to proceed with the case and wants to achieve an ulterior goal by adopting an oblique method. It is not a kind of the cases where withdrawal is being prayed on the ground of formal defect in the forum. In fact it is to perpetrate the fraud already played upon the Court for the reason that the petitioner could not succeed to get the interim order from this Bench.
13. Petitioner has raised serious allegations of mala fides against the respondent No. 2 and he has filed the reply. He has not been arrayed as respondent/party in the petition filed before the Jaipur Bench. He is a member of the Legislative Assembly representing Bhilwara Constituency. Dragging him to the Court before the principal seal and not impleading him before the Jaipur Bench show the craftmanship of the petitioner to evade the process of the Court before the principal scat. Mr. Singhvi has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheikh Hussain v. M. G. Kannaiah, AIR 1981 SC 1725, wherein the Apex Court has held that the High Court could have considered the application for withdrawal to avoid public inconvenience. The facts of the said case were clearly distinguishable as the said case was only against the formal authority like the Regional Transport Authority. Here is a case where the petitioner is trying to settle her political rivalries by using this Court as a forum.
14. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not in the interest of justice to allow the petitioner to withdraw the petition and pursue the remedy before the Jaipur Bench.
Hence, the application is rejected.
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