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Shabbir Mohammad v. The State Of Rajasthan

Rajasthan High Court
Sep 5, 1995
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Shabbir Mohammad, was prosecuted in FIR No. 8/89, Police Station Peesangan, District Ajmer, for offences under Sections 302 and 120B IPC alleging that he, in conspiracy with others (who were since acquitted), caused fatal burn injuries to his wife Abida (deceased). He was tried in Sessions Case No. 124/89 before the Sessions Judge, Ajmer. Among the prosecution documents was the post-mortem report prepared by the doctor who examined the deceased. When called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the post-mortem report, the appellant did not dispute it; the report was admitted as Exhibit P.10 under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code). Consequently, the prosecution did not call the doctor as a witness. The Sessions Judge (judgment dated 23 October 1991) acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 120B IPC but convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed to this Court under Section 374 of the Code.

In the appeal the appellant's counsel argued that because the doctor who conducted the post-mortem was not examined, the post-mortem report, though admitted as Ex.P.10, could not be read as substantial evidence and could only be used for the limited purposes specified in Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance was placed on earlier Division Bench and High Court decisions (Mahaveer v. State of Rajasthan and Ganpat Raoji v. State of Maharashtra). The Division Bench hearing the appeal noted conflicting authorities and framed the question whether documents admitted as genuine under Section 294 (Cr. P.C.) can be read as substantive evidence under Section 294(3), and referred the question to the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench. This Reference is the subject of the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether documents produced in Court whose genuineness is admitted by the opposite party when called upon to admit or deny under Section 294(1) Cr. P.C. can be read as substantive evidence under Section 294(3) Cr. P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The post-mortem report, although admitted as Exhibit P.10 under Section 294, could not be read as substantial evidence because the doctor who conducted the post-mortem was not examined as a witness.
  • Such a report could be used only for the limited purposes specified in Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act (i.e., not as substantive evidence for deciding the issue before the Court).
  • Reliance was placed on prior decisions, including Mahaveer v. State of Rajasthan (1981 Raj Cri C 145) and Ganpat Raoji v. State of Maharashtra (1980 Cri LJ 853), which supported the limited-use view.

The opinion does not set out any detailed, opposing arguments by the State or other parties in comparable detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahaveer v. State of Rajasthan (1981 Raj Cri C 145) Held that documents admitted under Section 294 could be used only for limited purposes (Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act) and not as substantive evidence. The Court expressly disagreed with and specifically overruled the view taken in Mahaveer's case, finding that Section 294(3) permits such documents to be read as substantive evidence when genuineness is admitted.
Ganpat Raoji v. State of Maharashtra (1980 Cri LJ 853) Supported the limited-use approach to documents admitted without formal proof. The Court noted that the Bombay High Court's Division Bench view in Ganpat Raoji had later been overruled by a Full Bench (Shaikh Farid Hussinsab v. State of Maharashtra), and therefore declined to follow the limited-use approach of Ganpat Raoji.
Jagdeo Singh v. State (1979 Cri LJ 236) Aligned with the limited-use view (as noted by this Court), but later considered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The Court observed that the Division Bench view in Jagdeo Singh was subsequently overruled by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, diminishing Jagdeo Singh's precedential weight for the limited-use position.
Saddiq & Ors v. State (1981 Cri LJ 379 : AIR 1981 NOC-74) A Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court that took a contrary view to the earlier Division Bench in Jagdeo Singh. The Court relied on the fact of the Full Bench overruling Jagdeo Singh to support its conclusion rejecting the limited-use rule and to justify reading admitted documents as substantive evidence.
Shaikh Farid Hussinsab v. The State of Maharashtra (1983 Cri LJ 487) A Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court that overruled the Division Bench view in Ganpat Raoji. The Court noted that the Full Bench in Shaikh Farid Hussinsab overruled Ganpat Raoji, and treated that development as supporting its rejection of the limited-use approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the relevant statutory framework and the purpose of Section 294 of the Code against the background of the Evidence Act and related provisions:

  1. Statutory context: The Code was enacted to consolidate and regulate criminal procedure. Section 4 of the Code makes the Code generally applicable to offences under the IPC. Chapter XXIII of the Code (Sections 272–299) concerns evidence in inquiries and trials. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines "evidence" to include documents produced for inspection by the Court as documentary evidence.
  2. Proof of documents generally: Sections 67–71 of the Evidence Act prescribe the modes of proving documents; ordinarily, no document can be read unless its genuineness is proved in accordance with law.
  3. Special provisions in the Code: Sections 292 and 293 of the Code permit admission of certain official reports (e.g., Mint officers' reports, specified Government scientific experts' reports) without following the usual mode of proof. Section 294 is broader in scope: it requires that particulars of documents filed be listed and that the parties be called upon to admit or deny genuineness; where genuineness is not disputed, the document may be read in evidence under Section 294(3), subject to the Court's discretion to require signature proof.
  4. Purpose and legislative intent: Section 294 was introduced to remove avoidable delay and inconvenience occasioned by requiring formal proof of documents when the opposing party does not contest their genuineness. The Court considered the provision as facilitating speedy trial and rooted in the evidentiary rule (Section 58 of the Evidence Act) that facts admitted need not be proved.
  5. Interpretation of Section 294(3): The Court held that the plain language of Section 294(3) permits a document, whose genuineness is admitted, to be read in evidence "in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code" for the purposes of deciding the issue before the Court. To confine the use of such admitted documents only to the purposes listed in Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act would require reading limitations into Section 294 that are not textually present and would frustrate the statute's object.
  6. Precedential landscape: The Court examined prior decisions that adopted the limited-use approach (Division Bench decisions and some High Court judgments) but noted that subsequent Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts had taken contrary views. On this basis, and on textual and purposive grounds, the Court concluded that the limited-use interpretation was incorrect.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: The Court determined that when genuineness is admitted under Section 294(1), Section 294(3) allows the document to be read as substantive evidence with the same probative value it would have had if the genuineness had been contested and proven in the ordinary way.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference by holding that where the genuineness of any document produced by the prosecution or the accused is admitted by the opposite party when called upon under Sub-section (1) of Section 294 of the Code, then, in view of Sub-section (3) of Section 294, such a document can be read by the Court as a substantive piece of evidence for deciding the issue pending before it. Its probative value is the same as it would have had if the document had been proved in the ordinary manner after its genuineness had been disputed.

The Court specifically overruled the Division Bench decision in Mahaveer v. State of Rajasthan which had adopted the limited-use approach.

Implications and immediate effect:

  • The reference was answered in favour of permitting substantive use of documents admitted under Section 294(1) and (3) of the Code.
  • As a direct consequence in this proceeding, the matter is to be placed before the Division Bench so that the appeal on merits can be heard and decided in the light of this ruling.
  • The opinion alters the authoritative position of certain earlier Division Bench decisions (explicitly Mahaveer) by overruling them; the Court relied on later Full Bench decisions (e.g., Saddiq and Shaikh Farid Hussinsab) that took the contrary view to earlier Division Bench authorities.

No additional consequences beyond those stated in the opinion were discussed by the Court in the provided text.

Show all summary ...

1. The appellant-Shabbir Mohammad was prosecuted in case FIR No.8/89 of Police Station, Peesangan, District Ajmer for having committed offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120B IPC with the allegations that he, in' conspiracy with some others (since acquitted), had caused fatal burn injuries on the person of his wife Abida (deceased). He was tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer in Sessions Case No. 124/89. One of the documents filed by the prosecution in support of its case was the post mortem report prepared by the doctor, who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. The appellant was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the said post mortem report and, since he did not dispute the genuineness thereof, it was admitted in evidence as Ex.P. 10 under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) and, thereupon, the prosecution did not produce the doctor concerned as a witness in the Court. The learned Sessions Judge, vide his judgment dated 23rd October, 1991, acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 120B IPC, but convicted him under Section 302 IPC and, vide the order of the same date, sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached this Court by filing appeal under Section 374 of the Code. During the course of the arguments in the appeal, it was contended by his learned counsel that the doctor, who conducted the post mortem on the dead body of the deceased, having not been examined as a witness during trial, the post mortem report, though admitted in evidence as Ex.P. 10, could not be read as substantial evidence and could be used only for the purposes mentioned in Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act and that once the post mortem report went out of the consideration, the conviction could not be sustained. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in case "Mahaveer v. State of Rajasthan" reported as 1981 Raj Cri C 145 besides on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in case "Ganpat Raojiv. State of Maharashtra" reported as 1980 Cri LJ 853. The learned Judges, of the Division Bench hearing the appeal, noted that the view taken by this Court in Mahaveer's case (supra) and by the Bombay High Court in Ganpat Raoji's case (supra) had also been taken by the Allahabad High Court in case "Jagdeo Singh v. State" reported as 1979 Cri LJ 236, but, subsequently, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had taken a contrary view. The learned Judges, therefore, framed the following question and referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench for answering the same :-

"whether the documents which are produced in Court, regarding whom no formal proof is required and such documents are admitted to be genuine by the other party under Section 294 Cr. P.C. they can be read as substantive piece of evidence under Section 294(3) Cr. P.C."

2. This is how this Reference has been placed before us under the orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

4. The Code, as can be seen from the preamble thereof, was enacted by Parliament to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure. According to Section 4 of the Code, not only all offences under the Indian Penal Code have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code but such provisions would also govern the investigation, inquiry, trial etc. in regard to all other offences under any other law subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating such matters in regard to such offences under any other law. section 294 of the code finds mention in Chapter XXIII, which contains Section 272 to 299 and this Chapter deals with the evidence in inquiries and trials. According to Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the Evidence Act). "Evidence" means and includes all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; and all documents produced for the inspection of the Court; and the abovesaid statements are called 'oral evidence', whereas the abovesaid documents are called documentary evidence.

5. No document produced for the inspection of the Court can be admitted in evidence unless its genuineness is proved in accordance with law and no document, which has not been admitted in evidence, can be read by the Court for the purpose of deciding the issue before it. Sections 67 to 71 of the Evidence Act prescribe the mode of proof of the documents and sections 292 to 294 of the code permit the admission of certain documents into evidence without following the said mode. The abovesaid three sections of the Code read as under:-

"292. Evidence of officers of the Mint. - (1) Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of any such gazetted officer of the Mint or of the India Security Press (including the office of the Controller of Stamps and Stationery) as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination and report in the course of any proceedine under this Code, mav be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, although such officer is not called as a witness.

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any such officer as to be subject-matter of his report:

Provided that no such officer shall be summoned to produce any records on which the report is based.

(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), no such officer shall, except with the permission of the Master of the Mint or the India Security Press or the Controller of Stamps and Stationery, as the case may be, be permitted-

(a) to give any evidence derived from any unpublished official records on which the report is based; or

(b) to disclose the nature or particulars of any text applied by him in the course of the examination of the matter or thing.

293. Reports of certain Government scientific experts. -

(1) Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government scientific expert to whom this section applies, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code.

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any such expert as to the subject-matter of his report.

(3) Where any such expert is summoned by a Court and he is unable to attend personally, he may, unless the Court has expressly directed him to appear personally, depute any responsible officer working with him to attend the Court, if such officer is conversant with the facts of the case and can satisfactorily depose in Court on his behalf.

(4) This Section applies to the following Government scientific experts, namely :-

(a) any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government;

(b) the Chief Inspector of Explosive;

(c) the Director of the Einger Print Bureau;

(d) the Director, Haffkeine Institute, Bombay; (c) the Director, (Deputy Director or Assistant Director) of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory;

(f) the Serologist to the Government.

294. No formal proof of certain document.- (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admittor deny the genuineness of each such document.

(2) The list of documents shall be in such from as may be prescribed by the State Government.

(3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed :

Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved."

6. Bare reading of the abovesaid three Sections show that whereas the reports of the officers of the Mint and of certain Government scientific experts can be admitted in evidence in certain circumstances, without they being put to the opposite side, the documents other than the abovesaid reports can only be admitted in evidence if the opposite side admits the genuineness thereof.

7. section 294 of the code is a new provision having no corresponding provision in the Code of Criminal/Procedure, 1898 (the old Code), although its two preceding Sections namely : Sections 292 and 293 had the equivalent in section 510 of the old code. Prior to the enactment of the Code, an accused was supposed to be a silent spectator at the trial and could not be asked to admit or deny the documents on which the prosecution relied and it was for the prosecution to prove them by examining witnesses even when the accused was not interested in challenging the facts sought to be proved through them and this resulted into inconvenience and avoidable delay. By enacting section 294 of the code, the Legislature has empowered the Court to call upon the prosecution or the accused to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents filed by the opposite side and to read them in evidence only if the opposite side admits the genuineness thereof and under the proviso to Sub-section (3), the Court has been further empowered to require the signatures of the author of the document to be proved in spite of the fact that the genuineness thereof has been admitted by the party concerned. If, however, the genuineness of such a document is not admitted by the party concerned when called upon to do so under Sub-section (1) of Section 294 of the Code, the party relying on it will have to prove it in accordance with law and if the author thereof is examined as a witness in Court, the document may be used for the purposes mentioned in Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act.

8. The plain reading of section 294 of the code shows that on the genuineness of a document in question being admitted by the party concerned, it can be read in evidence for the purposes of deciding the issue pending before the Court in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings. It appears to us that section 294 of the code was introduced to dispense with the avoidable waste of time and to facilitate the removal of obstruction in the speedy trial and is based on the rule of evidence contained in Section 58 of the Evidence Act that the facts admitted need not be proved. If it is held that such a document can be used in evidence only for the purposes mentioned in Sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act, as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Mahaveer' s case (supra), it would amount to reading something in the Section which is not written therein and the very object of the Section itself would be frustrated.

9. With respect, therefore, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Mahaveer's case 1981 Raj Cri C 145 (supra) and specifically overrule it.

10. A Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in case "Saddiq and Ors v. State" 1981 Cri LJ 379 : (AIR 1981 NOC-74) having overruled the view taken by the Division Bench of the same Court in Jagdeo Singh's case (1979 Cri LJ 236) (supra) and a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in case "Shaikh Farid Hussinsab v. The State of Maharashtra" 1983 Cri LJ 487 having overruled the view taken by the Division Bench of the same court in Ganpat Raoji's case (1980 Cri LJ 853) (supra), the abovesaid Division Bench cases mentioned in the order of reference need not be discussed by us.

11. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that if the genuineness of any document produced by the prosecution or the accused is admitted by the opposite party, when called upon to do so under Sub- section (1) of Section 294 of the Code, in view of Sub-section (3) of Section 294 of the Code, it can be read by the Court as a substantive piece of evidence for deciding the issue pending before it with its probative value being the same as it would have had if it had been proved by the party concerned on its genuineness having been disputed by the opposite party when called upon to do so under Sub-section (1) of Section 294 of the Code. The reference is answered accordingly.

The case be now laid before the Division Bench for hearing the appeal and deciding it on merits.