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Polar Marmo Agglomerates Ltd. v. Union Of India & Other
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Agglomerated Marble Slabs/Tiles (VILLA NOVA)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner manufactures agglomerated marble slabs/tiles (marketed as "VILLA NOVA") by crushing natural marble lumps/chips, mixing pigments and binding agents (6–8%) with crushed marble (over 90%), pouring the mixture into moulds, applying pressure and using a vacuum vibration process to form agglomerated blocks, and subsequently sawing, trimming, polishing and cutting those blocks into slabs/tiles. The petitioner contends these products retain the characteristics of natural marble and do not involve a manufacturing process attracting excise duty.
The petitioner sought writ relief under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging: (a) a show cause notice dated 14-10-1991 and a demand notice dated 25-10-1991; (b) the vires of Item No. 2504 of Chapter 25 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as being ultra vires Sections 3 read with 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944; (c) a declaration that making agglomerated slabs/tiles is not manufacturing and hence not exigible to excise duty; and alternatively that, if exigible, classification should be under Items 2504.21/2504.31 and not under Item 68.07 (the opinion sometimes references 68.04/68.07 but uses Chapter 68 entries).
The Central Excise authorities required a licence and classification lists, disputed the petitioner's classification and issued notices seeking to classify the product under Chapter 68 relying on HSN explanatory notes. The petitioner replied and produced trade literature, technical certificates and test reports supporting its contention that the product is marble in commercial character.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the show cause notice dated 14-10-1991 and demand notice dated 25-10-1991 should be quashed.
- Whether Item No. 2504 of Chapter 25 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 is ultra vires Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (i.e., whether the charging provision applies to the petitioner's product).
- Whether the processes used to make agglomerated marble slabs/tiles amount to "manufacture" within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944 so as to attract excise duty.
- If found exigible, whether the correct classification is under Item Nos. 2504.21 and 2504.31 (Chapter 25) rather than under Chapter 68 (entry for "all other articles" of stone, plaster, cement, etc.).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner's process (agglomeration) does not produce a new and different article; the end-product retains the name, characteristics and use of natural marble, and therefore is not a "manufacture" attracting excise duty under Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944.
- Agglomerated blocks contain over 90% natural marble and only 6–8% pigments and binders; slabs/tiles produced from these blocks are materially indistinguishable from slabs/tiles cut from natural marble blocks.
- The petitioner relied on trade acceptance, technical certificates, test reports and an advertisement memo stating the product retains marble characteristics to support the commercial classification as marble.
- Classification submissions were made (including claiming exemption under Notification No. 16/90-C.E., dated 20-10-1990); the petitioner alleged denial of reasonable hearing and inconsistent treatment compared to another factory (M/s. Kedia Agglomerated Marble Ltd.) whose classification was approved under headings 2504.21 and 2504.31.
- They approached the High Court under Article 226 because the respondents purported to decide a question (vires of entries) beyond their jurisdiction.
Respondents' Arguments
- Preliminary objections: the petitioner had an alternate remedy (appeal) and disputed factual questions exist.
- The processes employed to make agglomerated marble blocks (crushing, mixing with pigments/binders, moulding, pressing) and subsequent sawing to produce slabs/tiles involve manufacturing.
- The petitioner's product is distinct from natural marble because it contains pigments and binders; it has different properties and is a new commercial commodity.
- The Collector did not issue instructions as alleged; the demand notice was issued to preserve limitation; the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to be heard.
- The respondents relied on HSN explanatory notes (Chapter 68) to support classification under Chapter 68 rather than Chapter 25.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Kutty Flush Doors and Furniture Co. (P) Ltd., 1988 (35) E.L.T. 6 (SC) | Excise duty is chargeable only when a new and different article emerges having a distinct name, character and use. | The court cited and relied on this principle to emphasise that mere processing does not attract excise unless transformation yields a distinct commodity. |
| Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, 1963 (1) Suppl. SCR 586 | Principle that manufacture requires emergence of a new and different article with a distinct name, character or use. | Used as foundational authority for the test of "manufacture" applied to the petitioner's product. |
| South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., 1968 3 SCR 21 | Supports the same principle on what constitutes manufacture for fiscal purposes. | Cited to reinforce the requirement of transformation leading to a new article before excise can be levied. |
| Allenburry Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Ramakrishna Dalmia and Ors., 1978 2 SCR 257 | Use of the expression 'manufacture' and principles governing its interpretation. | Referenced as part of the jurisprudential background explaining meaning of "manufacture". |
| State of Orissa v. The Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr., 1985 3 SCR 26 | Considered similar questions in the context of the Orissa Sales Tax Act (whether planks sawed from logs are distinct). | Referred to illustrate factual inquiry into whether cutting/sawing changes the commercial identity of goods. |
| Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packer, 46 STC 63 (SC) | Manufacture implies change but not every change is manufacture; there must be transformation to a new and different article. | Quoted to support the conclusion that retention of substantial identity through processing negates manufacture for excise. |
| Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States (U.S. authority) | Quoted for the proposition that manufacture requires more than mere processing; a new and different article must emerge. | Used via citation in Pio Food Packer to reinforce the "transformation" test. |
| Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India, 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1566 (SC) | Meaning in fiscal statutes must align with trade and popular acceptation; trade usage is relevant in classification. | Cited to justify treating the product as marble if it is so known and traded in the market. |
| State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1132 | Commercial interpretation of terms used for goods; ordinary commercial sense governs. | Applied to support interpreting "marble" in the commercial/trade sense rather than technical sense. |
| Punjab Industries v. Collector of Central Excise, 1989 (43) E.L.T. 314 (Tribunal) | Conversion of coal dust into briquettes by mixing molasses did not produce a new commodity. | Relied upon by the court to draw analogy that conversion need not create a new commodity for excise purposes. |
| Bharat Forge & Press Industries (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1990 (45) E.L.T. 525 (SC) | Merely having a different commercial name or being a different commercial commodity after processing does not change excise classification if goods remain of same species and have no change in physical properties and uses. | Used to support the conclusion that agglomerated marble blocks are not a distinct commodity from excavated marble blocks. |
| Multiple writ and tribunal decisions concerning marble (Amrutsheele; M/s. Jain Marbles; Kasat Enterprises; M/s. J.S. Marbles; Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Fine Marble and Minerals; Sangmermer India; Associated Stone Industries) | Held that conversion of marble blocks into slabs/tiles by sawing does not involve a manufacturing process. | The court relied on these decisions to hold that sawing/agglomerated-block-to-slab conversion also does not amount to manufacture for excise. |
| Chjay Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India; Randip Shipping and Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs; S.T.P. v. Collector of Central Excise (Tribunal) | HSN (Harmonized System) has not been completely adopted for all items in the Schedule, and cannot be invoked where not adopted. | Applied to reject the respondents' reliance on HSN explanatory notes for Chapters 25 and 26 when classifying the petitioner's goods. |
| Beharilal Shyamsundar v. Sales Tax Officer, 60 ITR 260 | Referenced in the context of jurisdictional limits on authorities (implicit support for High Court's power). | Referred to in support of the proposition that the High Court can decide the vires question in a writ petition. |
| Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur, AIR 1973 SC 1362 | The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided is open for examination by the High Court under Article 226. | Invoked to show that the court can examine whether the respondents had jurisdiction to proceed on the assumption that manufacture occurred. |
| A.C.T.O. v. Ramesh Leather Stores, 1982 (49) STC 79; Kota Steel Rolling Ltd. v. C.T.O., 49 STC 80; N.B. Sanjana v. E.S.W. Mills, AIR 1971 SC 2039 | Classification questions are questions of law; parties can approach the High Court even at the stage of show cause notice. | Used to support maintainability of the writ petition and that the classification issue is justiciable in the High Court at this stage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court anchored its analysis on the principle that the taxable event under the Act of 1944 is "manufacture." The court examined Section 2(f) (definition of "manufacture") and observed that this definition is inclusive and that mere description of processes is insufficient; instead, there must be emergence of a new and different article with a distinct name, character or use (i.e., a transformation with loss of original identity).
The court reviewed the processes used by the petitioner (crushing, mixing with pigments and binders in small proportion, moulding, pressing) and noted the petitioner's evidence (advertisement memo, trade certificates, technical certificate, test reports) asserting that the agglomerated product retains the physical characteristics, appearance, strength and end-use of natural marble. The respondents admitted that the product contains marble characteristics but contended the presence of other substances differentiates it.
The court applied Rule 2(b) of the Rules for interpretation of Excise Tariff which provides that references to a material include mixtures and goods consisting wholly or partly of such material; classification of composite goods follows Rule 3. The court highlighted Rule 3(a)'s preference for the heading giving the more specific description in case of composite materials.
Using precedent authority, the court reiterated the test that not every change is manufacture: there must be transformation into a distinct commodity. It relied on decisions holding that conversion of marble blocks into slabs/tiles by sawing is not manufacture and on authorities that a change of commercial name or processing that does not change physical properties or uses does not alter excise classification.
The court examined the respondents' reliance on HSN (Harmonized System) explanatory notes and concluded that HSN had not been uniformly adopted for Chapters 25 and 26; hence HSN explanatory notes could not be invoked to reinterpret the Schedule entries for these chapters. The court also noted that Chapter 68 expressly does not cover goods of Chapter 25 and that a specific entry (Chapter 25, Heading 25.04) should be preferred to a more general one (Chapter 68). Given that the petitioner's goods contain over 90% marble and are sold/traded as marble, classification under Chapter 25 was deemed appropriate.
On the respondents' objections regarding maintainability and alternate remedy, the court held that the petitioner had challenged the vires of specific Schedule entries (a question of law beyond the competence of the Revenue to decide) and that the High Court could examine jurisdictional facts under Article 226. The court observed that the respondents had not introduced expert reports or contrary material to rebut the petitioner's documentary evidence, and that the respondents had proceeded on the assumption that manufacture had occurred.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed. It is held that the petitioner's product, Agglomerated Marble Slabs/Tiles (VILLA NOVA), is not exigible to tax under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The show cause notice (Annexure 5) and demand-cum-show cause notice (Annexure 7) were quashed. No order as to costs was made.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the petitioner is relieved from the challenged demands and notices and its product is to be treated as not exigible to excise duty under the facts and materials before the court. The opinion does not pronounce a definitive decision on the broader constitutional vires of Item No. 2504 of Chapter 25 (the court expressly stated it was not necessary to decide that question), and the opinion does not state that it has set a new legal precedent beyond its factual determination. Therefore, the holding operates as the decision in this matter between the parties on the facts and law presented.
Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the show cause notice dated October 14,1991 (Annexure 5) and demand notice dated October 25, 1991 (Annexure 7), for declaring that Item No. 2504 of Chapter 25 of the Schedule appended to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (In short 'Act of 1985') is ultra vires of the charging Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (In short 'Act of 1944') and for holding that preparation of agglomerated marble slabs/tiles do not involve manufacturing process and no excise duty is leviable on them and, in the alternative, for holding that agglomerated marble slabs and tiles are exigible to excise duty under Item No. 2504.21 and 2504.31 and not under Item No. 68.04 of the said Schedule.
2. The case of the petitioner is thus. It is engaged in the business of manufacturing marble agglomerated slabs/tiles. They are made from lumps/chips of naturally excavated marble which are purchased from market. They are crushed and pigments and binding agents are mixed with it. The mixture is poured into moulds. Thereafter, pressure is applied to the mixture and it is subjected to vacuum vibral process. Marble agglomerated blocks are formed and therefrom slabs are prepared by sawing them. The slabs are trimmed, polished and finally cut into slabs/tiles of the required sizes. Marble agglomerated blocks contain more than 90% natural marble and 6 to 8% pigments and binding agents. They have all the characteristic qualities of natural marble. There is no difference in between marble slabs and tiles obtained from excavated marble blocks and marble slabs and tiles obtained from agglomerated marble blocks, except that the latter contains pigments and binding agents. According to Section 3 of the Act of 1944, duty of excise is on manufacture and production of goods specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1985. No duty is exigible where process of manufacture is not involved in the making of goods. Manufacture must bring into existence a new commercial commodity having distinct name, characteristics and use. Making of slabs/tiles from agglomerated marble blocks does not involve any process of manufacturing. Marble blocks, slabs and tiles have been specifically classified under Heading 25.04 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1985. No extended definition has been given in the Notes of Chapter 25 of the said schedule. Despite this, the Central Excise Authorities insisted upon the petitioner to obtain Central Excise Licence and also to submit classification list. Classification List was submitted, classifying the said products under sub-heading 2504.90 and claimed exemption from duty under Notification No. 16/90-C.E., dated October 20,1990. The Superintendent, Central Excise, Range II, Udaipur (Respondent No. 4) directed the petitioner to submit revised classification list classifying marble slabs and tiles under Heading 2504.21 and 2504.31 respectively. The petitioner did so under. protest but it was not formally approved by the Assistant Collector. On the instructions of the Collector. Central Excise (Respondent No. 2), the Assistant Collector (Respondent No. 3) issued notices Annexure 5 to the petitioner to show cause as to why its product may not be classified under Heading 68.07 of the Act of 1985 relying upon Explanatory Note given under Chapter 68 of HSN. Thereafter, demand-cum-show cause notice Annexure 7 was issued. Reply was filed, seriously opposing the said notices. M/s. Kedia Agglomerated Marble Ltd., Halol (Gujarat) is the only other factory engaged in making similar marble agglomerated slabs/tiles. The Assistant Collector approved their classification under Headings 2504.21 and 2504.31. Reasonable opportunity of hearing is not being given by the Central Excise Authorities. The petitioner has no alternative but to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. In their reply, the respondents have taken two preliminary objections, namely, that the petitioner has alternate remedy and disputed questions of fact are involved. They have averred that manufacturing process is involved in the preparation of agglomerated marble blocks from the marble chips and lumps and also in sawing the agglomerated marble blocks for obtaining agglomerated marble slabs and tiles. The petitioner's products are distinct from marble slabs and tiles. Their properties are different. Addition of pigments and binders differentiate its product from the natural marble. The petitioner's product is a new commercial commodity. The Collector, Central Excise did not issue any instructions. Demand notice Annexure 7 was served to save limitation. Reasonable opportunity of hearing was duly given to the petitioner.
4. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties have been heard and their written arguments have been perused.
5. Taxable event under the Act of 1944 is manufacture. The question for consideration is whether the aforesaid processes amount to manufacture? The definition of the word 'Manufacture' given in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944 is inclusive in nature. It itself does not give the meaning of "Manufacture". It may be mentioned here that in the Notes given in Chapter 25 of the Schedule of the Act of 1985, extended meaning of manufacture has not been given as has been given in other chapters, namely, 13,24,33 and 52. As such amendment made in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944 by Act No. 5 of 1986 has not changed the position. Mere change is insufficient. A new and different product should emerge having distinctive name, character and use. There must be transformation and there should be loss of original identity. The fact that the produce has undergone a degree of processing is irrelevant if the original commodity continues to possess its original identity.
6. It has been observed in Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Kutty Flush Doors and Furniture Co. (P) Ltd., 1988 (35) E.L.T. 6 (SC) paras 4 and 5, as follows :-
"It is well-settled that excise-duty becomes chargeable only when a new and different article emerges having a distinct name, character and use. See in this connection the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills 1963(1) Suppl. SCR 586 and South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. etc. v. Union of India and Ors. 1968 3 SCR 21. This principle is well settled. This is a question of facts depending upon the relevant material whether as a result of activity, a new and different article emerges having a distinct name, character and use. The use of expression 'manufacture as explained in the case of Allenburry Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Ramakrishna Dalmia and Ors. 1978 2 SCR 257. In State of Orissa and Ors. v. The Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr. 1985 3 SCR 26 which was a decision on the Orissa Sales Tax Act, this question was considered in the back ground of the fact whether planks, cut into sizes, etc., sawed out of logs, are different from logs in its nascent state.
5. It may be worthwhile to note that 'manufacture' implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more was necessary and there must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge having a distinct name, character or use. See Union of India v. Delhi Cloth Mills (supra) at page 596 of the report. Having regard to the facts found in this case by the Tribunal, which ultimately is the final fact finding authority, we are of the opinion that regard being had to the principles for determining the questions which were correctly applied in the decision of the Tribunal, in the facts of this case, the conclusion of the Tribunal is unassailable."
7. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packer - 46 STC 63 (SC) at page 66, it has been observed as under :-
"Referring to Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States (52 L.Ed 336, 338), the Court said :
"Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary....There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, 'having a distinctive name, character or use."
And further:
"At some point processing and manufacturing will merge. But where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the processing stage we cannot say that it has been "manufactured."
8. Now, the question is whether marble agglomerated block is a new product. It is not in dispute that preparation of agglomerated marble blocks involve the following processes :
1. Crushing of lumps /chips of marble,
2. Mixing of pigments and binding agents i.e. Polyster, resin, white cement etc. (6% to 8%) with crushed marble (over 90%)
3. Pouring the mixture in the moulds; and
4. Application of pressure.
The petitioner has stated in para No. 4 of its rejoinder that the properties and characteristics of agglomerated marble remains the same as that of excavated marble, it remains as marble even after agglomeration process and all the characteristics of a marble as given in para No. 5 of the writ petition are present in the product of the petitioner. In their reply to these averments, the respondents have stated as follows :-
"That as regards para 4 of the rejoinder it is respectfully submitted that the fact that the characteristics of marble contained in the product manufactured by the petitioner is not denied but the product contains other substances also besides marble, therefore, it cannot be equated with the natural marble because of the process of manufacturing deployed by the petitioner firm."
9. Rule 2 (b) of the Rules for interpretation of Excise Tariff runs as under :-
"(b) Any reference in a heading to a material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to mixtures or combinations of that material or substance with other materials or substances. Any reference to goods of a given material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to goods consisting wholly or partly of such material or substance. The classification of goods consisting of more than one material or substance shall be according to the principles contained in Rule 3."
10. Admittedly, petitioner sells its product under the trade name of "VILLA NOVA". It has filed advertisement memo Annexure 19 (pages 181-182) along with an additional affidavit dated February 5,1993 (pages 176-178) of its Secretary. It would be best to quote here relevant portions of this advertisement-memo. They run as under :-
"WHAT IS VILLA NOVA?
VILLA NOVA is made from natural materials bounded together. Its original physical characteristics remain the same except for the resin used in the bonding process.
Being primarily made from natural stones, VILLA NOVA maintains all the basic characteristics of the natural product.
Abrasion and chemical resistance : These resistance factors are the same for VILLA NOVA AS FOR ANY other kind of marble.
Does the tile or slab tend to bend?
If not laid and exposed to direct sun light for long time, then, due to natural inherent properties of marble or granite it might slightly bend.
Can Villa Nova be used internally as well as externally?
One must keep in mind that with time all natural marble and granite under the sun and unsettled climatic conditions undergo aesthetic changes.
How can Villa Nova be cut?
Villa Nova can be easily cut with a normal hand cutting machine used for cutting natural marble or ceramic tiles.
About repolishing Yes VILLA NOVA can be repolished by the same machine as natural marble is polished to get back its luster after it becomes dull on prolonged use and improper maintenance. VILLA NOVA, because of its unique structure will look as new, even after repolishing.
About Shade variation Due to the basic raw material itself being non-uniform in nature, there may be a possibility of minor shade variations. However, accuracy in uniformity is achieved to an extent not found in nature.
About stains VILLA NOVA has, the same staining characteristics as marble. It is prone to the staining effect of the following substances."
11. Certificates of Gem Marbles, Royal Marble House and Sri Martidhari Stones have been filed to the effect that agglomerated marble is known in the trade market and is being sold as natural marble. Along with the affidavit dated July 27, 1993, the petitioner has also filed certificate (Annexure 29) of Technical Assistant R.S. Sharma dated October 12,1992. It states -
"It is certified that the natural marble blocks and agglomerated marble blocks (produced by using marble waste) are identical in physical characteristics just as appearance, strength etc. and its end-use. The slabs and tiles of natural and agglomerated marble are marketed as Marble slabs and Tiles only."Test reports Ex. 25,27 and 28 have also been filed; They also go to support the petitioner's case. The respondents have not filed report of any expert or any other documents except the prospectus Annexure R/1 of the petitioner mentioning that agglomerated blocks are obtained through manufacturing process. As already observed above, mere manufacturing process is not sufficient to attract duty but the product should have different characteristics and properties. Moreover, admission made in ignorance of correct position of law or facts are not binding upon a party. This prospectus does not show that the agglomerated marble blocks have different characteristics properties than the natural marble blocks.
12. It has been observed in Dunlop India Lid. v. Union of India, 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1566 (SC), as follows:-
"The meaning given to articles in a fiscal statute must be as people in the trade and commerce conversant with the subject generally treat and understand them in the usual course. But once an article is classified and put up, in a distinct entry, the basis of classification is not open to question. Technical and scientific tests offer guidance' only within limits. Once the articles are in circulation and come to be described and known in common parlance, there is no difficulty for statutory classification under a particular entry.... It is well established that in interpreting the meaning of words in a taxing statute, the acceptation of a particular word by the trade and its popular meaning should commend itself to the authority."
13. It has been observed in State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1132 at page 1133 para 3, as follows :-
"It is well settled that when we are dealing with the articles used for business purposes, the terms must be interpreted in a purely commercial sense. In Ramavtar Budhal Prasad etc. v. Assistant Sales-tax Officer, Akola 1962 ,(1) SCR 279 at P. 282 - [AIR 1961 (SC) 1325 at pp. 1326, 1327] this Court while construing the import of the word "vegetables", observed as follows :-
"But this word must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. It is to be construed as understood in common language."
14. The word Agglomeration is defined in W.K.V. Gale, the Iron and Steel Industry - A Dictionary of Terms, published by David and Charls, Newton Abbot at page 8 as under ;- -
"Agglomeration - Collecting together into lump form of fine iron ores, dust and other materials which could not otherwise be smelted, Sintering (qv) and pelletizing or balling (qv) are the common processes used today."
15. In Punjab Industries v. Collector of Central Excise, 1989 (43) E.L.T. 314 (Tribunal), it has been held that no new commodity emerges by conversion of coal dust into coal briquettes by mixing molasses. It has been held in Bharat Forge & Press Industries (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1990 (45) E.L.T. 525 (SC), that merely because goods after processing become different commercial commodity or have a distinctive name does not change Excise classification if they continue to be goods of same species and there is no change in physical properties and uses. It can, therefore, be held that marble agglomerated blocks prepared by the petitioner is not a different and distinct commodity from the excavated marble blocks.
16. It has been held in the following decisions of this Court that conversion of marble blocks into marble slabs/tiles by sawing does not involve any manufacturing process:
1. D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1654/82 - M/s. Amrutsheele and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., decided on 22-7-1987.
2. D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 869/92 - M/s. Jain Marbles and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors-, decided on 26-5-1988;?
3. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 133/83 - M/s. Kasat Enterprises and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., decided on 7-11-1990; and
4. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 479/85 - M/s. J.S. Marbles and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. decided on 19-7-1990.
Similar view has been taken in Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Fine Marble and Minerals Pvt. Ltd. Makrana, 1985 (22) E.L.T. 128, Sangmermer India Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise , 1989 (42) E.L.T. 725 (Tribunal), Associated Stone Industries (Rota) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1992 (60) E.L.T. 639. It is mentioned in Associated Stone Industries (Kota) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1992 (60) E.L.T. 639 para 3, that the Revenue filed appeal against the order given in Collector, Central Excise v. Fine Marbles, 1985 (2) E.L.T. 128 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed it. Similar will be the position for the conversion of agglomerated marble blocks into agglomerated marble slabs/tiles.
17. Great reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on HSN. HSN has not been followed in respect of Chapter Nos. 25 and 26 of the Act of 1985 and, therefore, it cannot be invoked for the purpose of interpreting the entries of these Chapters. It has been held in Chjay Industries Pvt. Ltd., Bombay v. Union of India and Ors, 1988 (34) E.L.T. 42 (Guj.), Randip Shipping and Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, 1989 (41) E.L.T. 392 (Bom.) and S.T.P. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1991 (54) E.L.T. 302 (Tribunal) that HSN has not been adopted completely in respect of all the items. Merely because some change has been made in the HSN method that would not necessarily mean that the classification under the Act can be made according to the change in the HSN.
18. There is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that goods prepared by the petitioner fall under the Entry 68.07,
"All other articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or similar materials not specifically mentioned or given in the first note of this Chapter (No. 68)."It is mentioned in Chapter 68 itself that it does not cover the goods of Chapter 25. It is well settled law that a more specific item should be preferred to one less so. The above quoted rule says that any reference to material or substance in a heading shall include reference to combination of that material or substance with other material or substance and that the classification of goods consisting of more than one material shall be as per Rule 3. Rule 3(a) says that in case of composite material the heading which provides more specific description shall be preferred. The petitioner's products are described as marble and, therefore, they can only fall under Heading 25.04. It is not in dispute that the petitioner's goods contain more than 90% excavated marble. As such it has to be classified under Chapter 25 and not under Chapter 68.
19. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had alternative remedy by way of filing appeal and secondly disputed questions of facts are involved in the writ petition. Admittedly, the petitioner has challenged the vires of the entries of 2504.21 and 2504.31 of Chapter 25 of the Schedule of the Act of 1985 and has sought declaration that they are ultra vires of the charging Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944. The respondent Nos. 2 to 4 have no power to decide this question. It has to be decided by this Court in the writ petition. Reference of Beharilal Shyamsundar v. Sales Tax Officer, CUI Circle, Cuttak and Anr., 60 ITR 260 may be made here. In view of the admission of the respondents in their reply to the rejoinder, quoted in para 8 supra, it cannot be said that disputed questions of fact are involved in this writ petition. Moreover, the respondents have not filed any report of expert or any other document in rebuttal of the aforesaid documents of the petitioners. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have proceeded in the case with the wrong assumption that manufacturing process is involved in the preparation of agglomerated marble slabs and tiles and had thus wrongly acquired jurisdiction in the matter. It has been held in Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur ., Kanpur, AIR 1973 SC 1362, that the question whether the jurisdictional fact has rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also well settled that the question as to whether certain goods fall within a particular entry or not is a question of law. Reference of A.C.T.O. v. Ramesh Leather Stores, 1982 (49) STC 79, Kota Steel Rolling Ltd. v. C.T.O., Kota, 49 STC 80 may be made here. Even at the stage of show cause notice, party can approach the High Court. Reference of N.B. Sanjana v. E.S.W. Mills, AIR 1971 SC 2039, may be made here.
20. In view of the aforesaid findings, it is not necessary to decide that Item No. 2504 of Chapter 25 of the Schedule of the Act of 1985 is ultra vires of Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944.
21. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. It is held that the petitioner's product Agglomerated Marble Slabs/Tiles (VILLA NOVA) is not exigible to tax under the Act of 1944. The notices Annexures 5 and 7 are quashed. No order as to costs.
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