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Raj. State Road Transport Corporation v. Habib Khan & Ors.(108)
Factual and Procedural Background
This special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 was filed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (the appellant) against an order of a learned Single Judge dated 17.1.92, which dismissed the appellant's writ petition and upheld the Labour Court (Industrial Tribunal), Udaipur's order dated 26.9.89.
Relevant facts (as stated in the opinion): Respondent No.1 was employed as a driver by the Corporation. On 25.4.84, while on duty as driver of Bus No. 6024, he demanded Rs. 10 from conductor Nathu Singh; upon refusal he abused and assaulted the conductor, causing simple and grievous injuries. The respondent was medically examined and found to be intoxicated. He was charge-sheeted; an enquiry found him guilty. The Corporation terminated his services on 6.11.84 and an internal appeal was dismissed on 10.1.85. Conciliation failed and the State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal on 9.11.87. Respondent No.1 filed a claim petition on 20.4.88; the Corporation filed its reply on 11.5.88. The Tribunal found no illegality in the enquiry but ordered reinstatement without back wages on 26.9.89. The Corporation's subsequent writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge on 17.1.92, leading to this special appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in modifying the punishment and ordering reinstatement of the respondent when the enquiry had found him guilty of serious misconduct.
- Whether, in light of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and relevant precedent, a Tribunal may substitute a termination/dismissal with a lesser punishment, and under what circumstances such substitution is permissible.
- Whether the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition and upholding the Tribunal's order of reinstatement in the facts of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Bhati)
- The Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition against the Tribunal's order.
- Since the Tribunal itself held that the misconduct charged against respondent No.1 was proved, the punishment (termination) imposed by management should not have been interfered with.
- Given the gravity of the misconduct, the punishment awarded does not indicate victimisation; therefore, the Tribunal's order of reinstatement contravenes settled principles of law.
- Relied upon decisions including Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management (1973 1 SCC 813), Aditya Milles Ltd. v. Ram Dayal (1974 Lab. I.C. 25) and Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad v. Hussainmiya Chandmiya (1987 LLN 152).
Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Rajvanshy)
- The Tribunal's award of a lesser punishment (reinstatement without back wages) is within its competence under Section 11A and the High Court should not interfere.
- The learned Single Judge rightly exercised his discretion and his order is supported by Jitendra Singh Rathore v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (1984 3 SCC 5).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management, 1973 1 SCC 813 | Held that Section 11A deals with procedural matters and operates retrospectively; Tribunal cannot act as an appellate body and interferes only where findings are perverse or management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or malafide. Paragraphs (3) and (9) emphasized. | The Court relied on these principles to explain the limited circumstances in which a Tribunal may interfere with management's disciplinary action, while recognizing Section 11A's power to substitute punishment when termination is not justified. |
| Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130 | Observed that the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice etc. on the part of the management. | The Court cited this case to reiterate the traditional limitation on a Tribunal's power to substitute management decisions, and then noted that Section 11A (after its insertion) expanded Tribunal powers to substitute sentences in certain circumstances. |
| Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad v. Hussainmiya Chandmiya, 1987 LLN 152 | Under Section 11A the Labour Court can exercise jurisdiction only if termination is found to be "not justified"; substitution by lesser punishment cannot be based on misplaced sympathy. | The Court invoked this authority to criticize the Tribunal's reinstatement rationale (which referred to unemployment and giving the respondent a chance) as misplaced sympathy not warranting substitution of punishment. |
| Jaswant Singh v. Pepsu Roadways Transport Corp. (reported in the opinion) | When a driver was found drunk on duty and reinstated without back wages, the Supreme Court, considering the gravity of misconduct, imposed further punishment (withholding increments) while permitting reinstatement. | The Court referred to this case to show that for grave misconduct the Supreme Court has sanctioned additional punitive measures and not unqualified reinstatement, supporting stricter treatment where misconduct is grave. |
| Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Ram Dayal, 1974 Lab. I.C. 25 | Relied upon observations (from National Tobacco) on the meaning of "victimisation"; the decision discussed when leniency or reinstatement may be inappropriate. | The Court used Aditya Mills (and its reliance on National Tobacco) to frame the concept of victimisation and to hold that punishment disproportionate to the offence may amount to victimisation; here, no victimisation was shown. |
| National Tobacco Co. India Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1960 Cal. 249 | Provided a definition and discussion of "victimisation" — distinguishing between punishment for improper motives and punishment disproportionate to the offence. | The Court cited the National Tobacco observations (via Aditya Mills) to analyze whether the respondent's reinstatement could be justified or whether there was any victimisation; it concluded there was none. |
| Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., 1984 3 SCC 5 | Supreme Court held that the High Court's vacation of reinstatement (in a case of a librarian dismissed for loss of confidence) was not justified; the job of a librarian did not involve special confidence warranting non-reinstatement. | The Court held that the Single Judge erred in relying upon this authority because its ratio did not apply to the present facts (a driver who assaulted a colleague while intoxicated), distinguishing the present case from Rathor. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a structured application of precedent and statutory provisions:
- The Court recalled Indian Iron & Steel (AIR 1958 SC 130) to state the general rule: a Tribunal should not substitute its judgment for that of management in disciplinary matters except where there is lack of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice or perversity in findings.
- The Court observed that Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act (inserted on December 15, 1971) authorizes Labour Courts and Tribunals to substitute a sentence of discharge or dismissal with a lesser punishment if satisfied that the order of discharge/dismissal was not justified. The Court therefore acknowledged the expanded remedial power of Tribunals under S.11A.
- Firestone was used to clarify limits on Tribunal interference: where a proper enquiry has been held and the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion from the evidence, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to act as an appellate body; interference is only justified where findings are perverse or there is victimisation, unfair labour practice or malafides. The Court specifically quoted Firestone's para (3) and (9).
- The Municipal Corporation decision was invoked to emphasize that Section 11A permits substitution only when termination is "not justified" and that substitution cannot rest on misplaced sympathy (for example, unemployment considerations).
- The Court examined the facts: respondent demanded Rs. 10 from a colleague, assaulted him causing grievous injuries while intoxicated; medical evidence proved intoxication and grievous injuries; respondent had a prior punishment (withholding of three increments) for abusing a Time-keeper. Thus the misconduct was grave and the enquiry findings were not perverse.
- The Tribunal's stated reason for substituting punishment — that due to widespread unemployment the respondent should be given another chance — was characterized by the Court as misplaced sympathy and an improper basis for modifying punishment. The Court found that modification of punishment in these facts was "totally uncalled for" and an overreach of the Tribunal's authority.
- The Court considered and rejected the Single Judge's reliance on Jitendra Singh Rathor, holding that the ratio in Rathor (involving a librarian and loss of confidence) was inapplicable to the present facts of violent, drunken misconduct. The Court emphasized that where misconduct is gross, victimisation cannot be pleaded.
- Concluding from the authorities and the facts, the Court found no suggestion of victimisation, lack of bonafides, or unfair practice by the Corporation; the Tribunal had therefore erred in substituting the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The special appeal is allowed. The Court set aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 26.9.89 and the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.1.92, and restored the punishment previously imposed on the respondent by the disciplinary authority.
Consequences and practical effects:
- The Tribunal's order of reinstatement without back wages and the Single Judge's confirmation of that order have been set aside; the respondent's termination is restored as the operative disciplinary action.
- However, during the period for which the petitioner (respondent No.1) had been permitted to join the Corporation under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, no recoveries shall be effected from the respondent in respect of wages for that period (i.e., the Court specifically directed that no recoveries be made for that period).
- The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond the application of existing authorities (the Court limited itself to applying settled law and did not state that it was establishing novel precedent).
This summary is based exclusively on information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those stated therein.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Jain, J.:— This special appeal u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 has been filed against the order of learned Single Judge of this Court dt. 17.1.92 whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed and the order dt. 26.9.89 passed by the Labour Court (Tribunal), Udaipur has been upheld.
2. Briefly stated the facts of this case which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that the respondent No. 1 was working as a Driver with the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred as the Corporation). The respondent no. 1 while on duty on 25.4.84, as driver of Bus No. 6024 demanded Rs. 10/- from the conductor Nathu Singh and on refusal he abused and gave beating to him due to which Nathu Singh sustained simple and grievous injuries. The respondent No. 1 was medically examined and found in an intoxicated condition. Thereafter he was charge-sheeted and after due enquiry the Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the charges leveled against him. The Corporation after considering the matter agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and terminated the services of the respondent No. 1 on 6.11.84 The respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority of the Corporation but the same was dismissed vide order dt. 10.1.85 The Conciliation proceedings were initiated but when those proceedings failed, a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal, Udaipur for adjudication on 9.11.87 by the State Government. A claim petition was filed on 20.4.88 by the respondent No. 1. In pursuance to the notice issued by the learned Tribunal, the appellant Corporation also filed reply along with the relevant documents on 11.5.88 The learned Tribunal found that there was no illegality in the enquiry conducted by the E.O and ordered to reinstate the respondent without back wages vide order dt. 26.9.89 The appellant Corporation preferred a writ petition, but the same was dismissed on 17.1.92 Hence, this special appeal filed by the appellant Corporation. Mr. Bhati, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition filed against the order of learned Tribunal. When the Tribunal has held that the charge of misconduct levelled against the respondent No. 1 has been proved then the punishment meted out to him could not have been interfered. He has also submitted that looking to the gravity of misconduct committed by the respondent No. 1, the punishment awarded to him does not suggest of any victimisation. When the learned Tribunal itself has found the misconduct of the petitioner grave then the order of reinstatement passed by the learned Tribunal is against the settled principles of law. In this respect he has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management . 1973 1 SCC 813, Aditya Milles Ltd. v. Ram Dayal . 1974 Lab. I.C 25 and Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad v. Hussainmiya Chandmiya . 1987 LLN 152
3. Mr. Rajvanshy, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the award of lesser punishment is within the competence of the learned Tribunal and the High Court should not interfere. He has also submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly exercised his discretion after placing reliance on the decision rendered in Jitendra Singh Rathore v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. . 1984 3 SCC 5
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. In Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen . AIR 1958 SC 130, their lordships of the Supreme Court, while considering the Tribunal's power to interfere with the management's decision to dismiss, discharge or terminate the services of a workman, have observed that in a case of dismissal on account of misconduct, the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice etc. on the part of the management. But in view of the insertion of Sec. 11A in the Industrial Disputes Act on December 15, 1971 the Labour Court and Tribunals are empowered to substitute the sentence and discharge or dismissal by a lesser punishment, if it is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified.
6. In the Workman of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management (supra) it has been held that Sec. 11A deals only with procedural matter, therefore, it operates retrospectively. It has been further held in sub-para (3) and (9) of para 27 of the judgment as under:—
(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or malafide.
(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation.”
7. In Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad v. Hussainmiya Chandmiya (supra) it has been observed that under S. 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Labour Court can exercise jurisdiction only if the termination of service is found to be “not justified” but the order of termination cannot be substituted by a lesser punishment only on the basis of misplaced sympathy.
8. In Jaswant Singh v. Pepsu Roadways Transport Corp. (supra) the facts of the case were that a driver while on duty consumed liquor. The learned Labour Court held that the driver was drunk, instead of dismissing him he was reinstated being his first offence. However, he was denied back wages. The High Court confirmed the punishment of dismissal. Their lordships of the Supreme Court held that in view of the gravity of the misconduct, a further punishment of with-holding three increments for the next three years in the time scale in which the driver would be reinstated would be proper.
9. In Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Ram Dayal (supra), a Division Bench of this Court while placing repliance on certain observations made in the decision rendered in National Tobaccoa Co. India Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal . AIR 1960 Cal. 249 wherein it has been observed as under:—
“Victimization means one of two things; the first is where the workman concerned is innocent and yet he is being punished because he has in some way displeased the employer, for example, by being an active member of an Union of workman who were acting prejudicialy to the employer's interest. The second case is where an employee has committed an offence but he is given a punishment quite out of proportion to the gravity of the offence, simply because he has incurred the displeasure of the employer in a similar manner as mentioned above. But where it is found that the employee is guilty of gross misconduct then there cannot be any question of victimization because it merits dismissal by itself.”
10. The Division bench after considering the said judgment it has been held that in our opinion victimisation consists in punishing an employee for any object other than the one of inflicting just and appropriate punishment of a proven lapse.
11. In Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (supra) wherein the appellant was working as librarian with the respondent and his services were terminated on the charge of loss of confidence. The Tribunal while directing the reinstatement withheld payment of half of the back wages keeping in view the proved misconduct of the employer. The High Court vacated the order of reinstatement and directed payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement and quantified the damages at Rs. 15,000/-. Their lordships of the Supreme Court has observed that High Court's order vacating reinstatement in service was not justified and erroneous. Undisputedly, the findings arrived at in the enquiry have not been challenged before the Tribunal. Rather the respondent No. 1 admitted his misconduct and the only question which required to be determined was that looking to the gravity of proved misconduct whether the Tribunal was right in reinstating the respondent No. 1 when there was no allegation of victimisation. As stated above the charge against the respondent No. 1 was that while on duty as driver of Bus No. 6024 he demanded Rs. 10/- from his colleague conductor Nathu Singh and on his refusal to oblige, he inflicted grievous injuries to him at Bijolia. Both the facts that he was in a drunken state and that the injured received grievous injuries have been proved by medical evidence. Earlier to this incident, the Corporation visited him with the punishment of withholding of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect after holding due enquiry. That punishment was meted out to him for abusing and misbehaving with the Time-keeper of the Corporation. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal while observing that there was no illegality in the enquiry conducted by the Corporation and the misconduct committed by the workman is not excusable. Learned Tribunal at the same time passed an order of reinstatement on the ground that these days there is a lot of unemployment and with a view to give him one more chance to improve has modified the order of punishment inflicted upon him by the Management. This act of modification of punishment by the Tribunal was totally uncalled for in the facts and circumstances of this case and actually the Tribunal has transgressed its authority in doing so as the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer are neither perverse nor the punishment awarded appears to be disproportionate with the gravity of misconduct nor it smacks of victimisation nor it appears to be harsh. The learned Single Judge has erred in relying on Jitendra Singh Rathore v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (supra) wherein services of a librarian were terminated on the charge of loss of confidence and the Supreme Court while observing that the job of a librarian does not involve the necessity of enjoyment of any special confidence of the employer and set aside the orders of the High Court. The ratio of that decision cannot apply to the facts of this case. It is indeed true that ordinarily we should be slow in interfering with an order of reinstatement passed u/s 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act and to substitute it by an order of dismissal or discharge that too in a special appeal but there are cases of this court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court where such an arbitrary exercise of discretion has not been countenanced because it tantamounts not only to an abuse of the discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the court by S. 11A of the Act but it results in spread of indiscipline in the organisation. A person who illegally demands a sum of Rs. 10/- from his colleague and on his refusal abuses him and causes grievous injuries to him deserves no sympathy and, therefore, the leniency shown to him by the Tribunal as also by the learned Single Judge is totally misplaced and cannot be sustained specially when there is no suggestion or even a wisper of victimisation, harassment or lack of bonafides against the appellants.
12. In the result, this special appeal is allowed. The award passed by the learned Tribunal dt. 26.9.89 as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge dt. 17.1.92 are set aside and punishment meted out to the respondent by the disciplinary authority is restored. However, for the period the petitioner has been allowed to join the Corporation on account of Sec. 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act no recoveries will be effected from the respondent.
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