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Cotton Corporation And Others v. Union Of India And Others

Rajasthan High Court
Sep 18, 1992
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion: Employees' Provident Fund (Third Amendment) Scheme, 1990

Factual and Procedural Background

These writ petitions raised common questions of law and were therefore disposed of by a single, common judgment. For convenience, the court adopted the facts as set out in the case of The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Union of India. The petitioner in the present petitions is a corporation tasked with regulating purchase and sale, storage and transportation of raw and processed cotton. The petitioner challenged Annexures 2 and 3 and sought to have provisions of Section 5 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 struck down.

The core statutory background is that Section 5 of the Act authorises the Central Government to frame Employees' Provident Fund Schemes, and Schedule II contains matters for a scheme, including a proforma. The challenged instrument is the Employees' Provident Funds (Third Amendment) Scheme, 1990 (the "Scheme of 1990"), and specifically the substitution in paragraph 26 by Clause 2(ii) which made every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a covered establishment, other than an excluded employee, entitled and required to become a member of the Fund from the day the paragraph comes into force. The petitioners' grievance was that this amendment would require even short-duration or casual workers to be enrolled and have contributions deducted, causing hardship in operation of the Scheme.

The petitions proceeded on arguments about (a) the validity of Section 5 of the Act (which the petitioners raised but ultimately did not press as invalid) and (b) whether the Scheme of 1990, and in particular the substituted paragraph 26, was ultra vires the Act by bringing casual or temporary employees within its scope.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 5 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 is constitutionally or legislatively invalid as contended by the petitioners.
  2. Whether the Employees' Provident Funds (Third Amendment) Scheme, 1990 (specifically Clause 2(ii) substituting paragraph 26) is ultra vires the Act by extending membership to casual or short-duration employees.
  3. If the Scheme is validly framed, whether casual employees are to be regarded as covered by the Scheme or excluded, and how the factual question of casual versus regular employment is to be determined.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The substituted paragraph 26 of the Scheme of 1990 makes every employee "employed in or in connection with the work of a factory or other establishment" (other than an excluded employee) entitled and required to become a member of the Fund from the date of coming into force, which would include casual and short-duration workers.
  • This inclusion of casual workers will cause operational hardship to employers because even a worker employed for a short duration would be required to be made a member and contributions would have to be collected and paid.
  • Reference was made to the Objects and Reasons of the Act and to Section 1(3)(b) to support the contention that casual labour should not be covered and that the Scheme conflicts with the intended scope of the Act.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents relied on authorities such as P.M. Patel & Sons v. Union of India to contend that the expression 'employee' is wide enough to include persons employed through contractors and persons employed "in connection with" the work of a factory, thus supporting a broad application of the Scheme.
  • Respondents did not accept that Section 5 was invalid; they implicitly supported the view that the Central Government had authority to frame Schemes under Section 5.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Union of India (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1935 of 1991) Used as factual background for the set of writ petitions before the court. The court adopted the facts given in that case for convenient disposal of the present writ petitions.
Nazeena Traders (P) Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Hyderabad (1966-II-LLJ-334) Held that casual labour falls outside the scope of Section 1(3); establishments whose employees do not reach twenty excluding casual labourers do not fall within the Act's purview. The court noted this authority but recorded that it was explained by the Supreme Court in T.S. Hariharan; used to contextualise the debate about casual labour.
Provident Fund Inspector, Guntur v. T.S. Hariharan (1971-I-LLJ-416) Interpreted 'employment' in Section 1(3)(b) to mean employment in the regular course of business; short-term emergency employment does not come within the definition; factual determination required per case. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision as the controlling interpretation: casual or temporary employees are not covered ordinarily and the question is fact-specific.
Eastern Arts Corporation v. S.P. Mehrotra (1986 Lab IC 1402) Held that a driver engaged to fill a temporary leave vacancy of a regular worker was not covered under Section 1(3)(b). The court cited this decision as consistent with the interpretation in T.S. Hariharan that temporary or leave-covering workers need not be covered.
Bikaner Cold Storage Company v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees' Provident Fund, Rajasthan (1981-I-LLJ-181) Held that labourers employed for repairs of a factory building are not employed for the normal business and so are not to be treated as labourers of the establishment for the Act's purposes. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that some workers connected with intermittent repair work are not in the regular employment contemplated by the Act.
P.M. Patel & Sons v. Union of India (1986-I-LLJ-88) Held the expression 'employee' is wide and includes persons employed through contractors and persons employed 'in connection with' the work of a factory (e.g., home workers rolling beedies). The respondents relied on this case to argue for a broad meaning of 'employee'; the court distinguished this authority as addressing a different issue (coverage of home workers engaged in the manufacturing process) rather than the casual/temporary employee question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following legal analysis, applying statutory text, the Objects and Reasons of the Act, and judicial precedents:

  1. Section 5 analysis: The court asked counsel what invalidity was alleged in Section 5. No counsel advanced any argument that Section 5 was invalid. The court held that Section 5 merely authorises the Central Government to frame a Scheme (the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme) and that conferring this power on the Central Government did not render Section 5 ultra vires the Act or Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, Section 5 was upheld as valid.
  2. Objects and statutory scope: The court examined the Objects and Reasons of the Act and Section 1(3)(b), concluding that the primary object is creation of a fund for the welfare of workmen and their families. Framing a Scheme under Section 5 for the welfare of employees does not contravene the Objects and Reasons or Section 1(3)(b), which allows the Central Government to extend the Scheme to establishments employing fewer than twenty persons by prior notice.
  3. Construction of Clause 2(ii) / paragraph 26 in Scheme of 1990: Clause 2(ii) substituted paragraph 26 to require every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a covered establishment (other than an excluded employee) to be a member from the date it comes into force. The petitioners contended this would include casual or very short-duration employees.
  4. Precedential guidance on 'employment' and 'casual' workers: The court reviewed authorities, most importantly the Supreme Court's decision in T.S. Hariharan, which interpreted 'employment' in Section 1(3)(b) to mean employment in the regular course of business and excluded employment of a few persons for short periods on account of emergencies or temporary contingencies. The court also noted related high court decisions (including Eastern Arts and Bikaner Cold Storage) consistent with that approach.
  5. Distinguishing P.M. Patel & Sons: The court acknowledged P.M. Patel & Sons for its broad definition of 'employee' (including contractors and persons employed in connection with factory work), but observed that that case addressed whether home workers engaged in the manufacturing process were employees for the Scheme, not the distinct question whether casual/temporary employees are to be covered.
  6. Resulting interpretive conclusion: The court held that the expression 'employee' in the Scheme must be read in the context of the main Act and the authoritative interpretation in T.S. Hariharan: Clause 2(ii) of the Scheme should be construed so that it does not apply to casual labourers. Whether a specific worker is a casual or regular employee is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
  7. Role of Central Government / Section 19A: The court observed that Section 19A provides a mechanism for such factual determinations by the Central Government. The court therefore held that the Scheme is not ultra vires the Act, but it will not apply to casual employees; the Central Government can clarify or determine the status of particular employees under Section 19A.
  8. Administrative guidance left open: While the court recognised the potential for genuine difficulty and confusion about criteria for treating a worker as casual, it left it to the Central Government to lay down parameters. In the interim, aggrieved parties could approach the Central Government under Section 19A for determination.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF

Holding (core ruling):

  • The writ petitions were disposed of in the terms indicated in the judgment.
  • The court held that Section 5 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 is not invalid; the Central Government validly has power to frame Schemes under Section 5.
  • The Employees' Provident Funds (Third Amendment) Scheme, 1990 is not ultra vires the Act; however, the Scheme must be read in the light of the Act and controlling precedent so that casual or very short-duration employees are not brought within its ambit merely by the amending paragraph.

Immediate implications and practical effect:

  • The direct effect is that all the writ petitions before the court are disposed of as stated in the judgment.
  • The Scheme of 1990 remains in force and is not struck down, but it should not be applied to casual employees whose employment is in the nature of short-term or emergency engagement; whether a particular employee is casual is a question of fact.
  • Determination of casual versus regular employment is to be made by the Central Government under Section 19A of the Act; the court left it to the Central Government to clarify parameters to remove confusion.
  • The court did not purport to lay down exhaustive criteria itself; it instead directed that parties may seek clarification/determination from the Central Government under Section 19A if grievances arise.

The opinion does not announce any novel legal doctrine beyond applying established precedent (most notably T.S. Hariharan) to the construction of the Scheme; it resolves the petitions by upholding Section 5 and limiting the Scheme's reach to exclude casual employees as a matter of interpretation and fact-specific determination.

Show all summary ...

1. These writ petitions involve common question of law and, therefore, they are disposed of by this common judgment.

2. For the convenient disposal of all these writ petitions, the facts given in the case of The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Union of India (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1935 of 1991) are taken into consideration.

3. The petitioner is a Corporation established with a view to regulate the purchase and sale of raw and processed cotton, their storage and transportation. The petitioner by this writ petition has prayed that the orders Annexures 2 and 3 may be quashed and the provisions of Section 5 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (referred to hereinafter as 'the Act of 1952') may be struck down.

4. In order to appreciate the controversy, which has been raised in this writ petition and the other similar writ petitions, it will be necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act of 1952. Sub-section (3) of S.I. lays down that subject to the provisions contained in Section 16 of the Act of 1952, it applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed and to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. It is further provided that while covering the provisions of this Act to any establishment employing such number of persons less than twenty by notification in the Official Gazette, the Central Government shall give not less than two month's notice of its intention so to do. Section 2A lays down that the establishment shall include all departments and branches. Section 4 provides a power to the Central Government to amend Schedule I from time to time. Section 5 provides that the Schemes have to be framed by the Central Government. Section 5 which is relevant to our purpose reads as under:-

"5. Employees' Provident Fund Schemes.,- (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame a Scheme to be called the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme for the establishment of provident funds under this Act for employees or for any class of employees and specify the establishments or class of establishments to which the said Scheme shall apply and there shall be established as soon as may be after the framing of the Scheme, a Fund in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Scheme.

(1A) The fund shall vest in, and be administered by the Central Board constituted under Section 5A.

(1B) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Scheme framed under Sub-section (1) may provide for all or any of the matters specified in Schedule II.

(2) A Scheme framed under Sub-section (1) may provide that any of its provisions shall take effect either prospectively or retrospectively on such date as may be specified in this behalf in the Scheme."

5, According to Section 5, the Central Government has to frame a Scheme for providing funds for the welfare of the employees or any class of employees and specify the establishments or class of establishments to which the said Scheme shall apply. The Fund shall be administered by the Central Board constituted under Section 5A of the Act of 1952. It further provides that subject to the provisions of this Act the Scheme shall be framed under Sub-section (1) which shall provide for all or any of the matters specified in Scheduled II. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 further says that a Scheme framed under Sub-section (1) can be given effect either prospectively or retrospectively on such date as may be specified in this behalf in the Scheme. A proforma of the Scheme has been given in Schedule II. It is postulated that the Scheme should necessarily contain all those factors given in Schedule II. In the purported exercise of the powers conferred by the provisions of the Act of 1952 the Schemes were framed by the Central Government from time to time and the Scheme which is under challenge is the Scheme of 1990. This is known as The 'Employees' Provident Funds (Third Amendment ) Scheme, 1990. It is not necessary to refer to whole of the Scheme but suffice it to reproduce here the provisions of the Scheme which are relevant for deciding the controversy in issue before us. Clause 2(ii) which is relevant for our present purpose reads as under:-

"2(ii) For paragraph 26, the following paragraph shall be substituted, namely:-

26. Class of employees entitled and required to become member of the Fund. - (1)

(a) Every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies, other than an excluded employee, shall be entitled and required to become a member of the Fund from the day this paragraph comes into force in such factory or other establishment.

(b). Every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies, other than an excluded employee, shall also be entitled and required to become a member of the Fund from the day this paragraph comes into force in such factory or other establishment if on the date of such coming into force, such employee is a subscriber to a provident fund maintained in respect of the factory or other establishment or in respect of any other factory or establishment (to which the Act applies) under the same employer.

Provided that where the Scheme applies to a factory or other establishment on the expiry or cancellation of an order of exemption under Section 17 of the Act, every employee who but for the exemption would have become and continued as a member of the Fund, shall become member of the Fund forthwith."

By this clause it has become imperative that every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies other than an excluded employee shall be entitled and required to become a member of the Fund from the day this paragraph comes into force. But the effect of this clause having come into force is that every member already employed or is being employed for any work shall be entitled to the benefit of the Scheme, the grievance of the petitioners is that by virtue of this amendment in the Scheme of 1990 the effect will be that if any incumbent is employed even for a short duration then too he will become a member of the Employees Provident Fund and his contribution towards the Provident Fund shall be deducted and likewise the contribution will have to be made by the employer. Therefore, the main grievance is that even a casual worker who is employed in connection with the work of the factory or any other establishment shall become a member of the Provident Fund and this is likely to cause hardship in the operation of the Scheme.

6. We have pointedly asked the learned counsel as to what is the invalidity in Section 5 of the Act of 1952. But none of the learned counsel has made any grievance regarding the validity of Section 5 of the Act of 1952 and for obvious reason that it does not suffer from any vice. Section 5 of the Act of 1952 only authorises the Central Government to frame the Scheme which is known as the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme. Therefore, simply conferring a power on the Central Government for framing the Scheme, such delegation of power on the Central Government cannot be said to be ultra vires of any provisions of the Act. Therefore, such delegation of power under Section 5 of the Act of 1952 on the Central Government for framing the scheme cannot be said to be ultra vires of the Act or Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

7. But the grievance is that the Scheme which has been framed by the Central Government is ultra vires of certain provisions of the Act. In this connection, it is submitted that the Scheme is against the provisions of the Act and in this connection, learned counsel has made reference to the objects and reasons and also invited our attention to Section 1(3)(b) of the Act of 1952.

8. We have gone through the Objects and Reasons. The main object for enacting this Act was to create a fund for the welfare of the workmen so that it may provide a financial assistance to the workmen and their families. Therefore, so far as the framing of the scheme for the welfare of the workmen/employees is concerned, there is nothing to say that the scheme will be against the main object. The primary object is to create a fund for the welfare of the workmen and their families and to ensure their financial stability. Therefore, the framing of the Scheme under Section 5 cannot be said to be against the Objects and Reasons of the Act. Similarly Section 1(3)(b) also lays down that the Central Government can apply the Scheme to any establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf. If the Central Government feels that any other establishments require to be covered by the Scheme then it can cover the same by giving not less than two months' notice of its intention so to do by notification in the Official Gazette to such establishments even though they have employees less than twenty. Therefore, there is nothing which works against framing of the Scheme.

8A. Learned counsel has invited our attention to Nazeena Traders (P) Ltd. represented by its Director Masood Ali Khan v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Hyderabad, 1966-II-LLJ-334. In this case it was observed that a casual labour falls outside the scope of Section 1(3) and hence the establishments, whose employees do not come to twenty, excluding casual labourers, do not fall within the purview of Section 1(3) and the provisions of the Provident Fund Scheme cannot be applied to them. It was further observed that the causal labour is engaged by or through a contractor does not make any difference for the decision of the question, the only criterion being whether they were casual laborers or not. Against this very judgment a special leave petition was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained this judgment in The Provident Fund Inspector, Guntur v. T.S. Hariharan 1971-I-LLJ-416. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after examining the whole scheme of the Act and various provisions of the Act and considering the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh as well as the Madras High Courts struck a mean between the two and observed as under (p.421):-

"Considering the language of Section 1(3)(b) in the light of the foregoing discussion it appears to us that employment of a few persons on account of some emergency or for a very short period necessitated by some abnormal contingency which is not a regular feature of the business of the establishment and which does not reflect its business prosperity or its financial capacity and stability from which it can reasonably be concluded that the establishment can in the normal way bear the burden of contribution towards the provident fund under the Act would not be covered by this definition. The word "employment" must, therefore, be construed as employment in the regular course of business of the establishment; such employment obviously would not include employment of a few persons for a short period on account of some passing necessity or some temporary emergency beyond the control of the company. This must necessarily require determination of the question in each case on its own peculiar facts. The approach pointed out by us must be kept in view when determining the question of employment in a given case."

9. Learned counsel has also invited our attention to the decision of Eastern Arts Corporation v. S.P. Mehrotra (1986 Lab IC 1402). In this case a driver was engaged by the employer/establishment in a leave vacancy of regular worker. In that context, it was held that such worker will not be covered under the purview of Section 1(3)(b). In this connection, learned counsel relied upon the observations made in T.S. Hariharan's case (supra). In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted the word 'employment' and it was held that the word 'employment' means the employment in the regular course of business of an establishment. Such employment will not include employment of a few persons for a short period on account of some passing necessity or some temporary emergency beyond the control of the establishment.

9A. In Bikaner Cold Storage Company, Bikaner v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees' Provident Fund, Rajasthan, 1981-I-LLJ-181, it was held that the labourers who were employed connected with the repairs of factory building are not employed for normal business of establishment and cannot be treated as labourers of the establishment and the provisions of the Act shall not be made applicable.

10. Learned counsel tried to emphasise that the effect of the Scheme of 1990 will be that all the employees irrespective of the fact whether they are casual or permanent will be covered by the Scheme which is not the intention of the Act and the ratio laid in a series of decisions of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel submitted that the present substitution of para 26 in the Scheme of 1990 does not make any difference in the casual and regular employees. Therefore, it is going to cause serious hardship to the employer for collecting the contribution towards the Fund.

11. As against this Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents, has invited our attention to P.M. Patel & Sons v. Union of India 1986-I-LLJ-88. This was a case of beedies employees and in this case the definition of 'employee' came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court and their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the expression 'employee' is wide enough. It includes not only persons employed directly by the employer but also persons employed through a contractor. Moreover, they include not only persons employed in the factory but also persons employed in connection with the work of the factory. Accordingly, a home worker, by virtue of the fact that he rolls beedies, is involved in an activity connected with the work of the factory engaged in the task of rolling beedies. It was observed that the words 'in connection with' read with the definition of 'employee' cannot be confined to work performed in the factory itself as a part of the total process of the manufacture.

12. But the question before us is that whether such a casual employee can be covered by the Scheme of 1990 or not. So far as M/s. P.M. Patel & Son's case (supra) is concerned, the question in issue was not whether the casual employee is included in the extended definition of employee or not. In this case the question was whether an employee who is working in the process of rolling beedies at home can be covered by the Scheme or not. In that context their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that since he is employed in the activities of manufacturing of beedies, therefore, he will be treated to be an employee of the factory and will be covered by the Scheme. But the question before us is that whether such a casual labour/employee whose services are being engaged for certain job can be given the benefit of the Scheme or not. In this connection, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of T.S. Hariharan (supra) clearly laid down that such casual labour/ employee will not be covered. As mentioned above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has struck a mean that the question as to whether an employee is casual or permanent shall be dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. But the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that in order to determine as to whether an employee is casual or not one has to see the duration during which the employee has remained in service. In this connection, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has illustrated the situation by referring to an illustration that, suppose certain fire took place in the establishment and the establishment has to engage certain employees for extinguishing the accidental fire for couple of hours. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the scheme of the Act did not contemplate that such person should also be covered by the provisions of the Act. At the same time the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that, suppose an establishment which regularly employs for its general business the required number of persons for a major part of the year, to say for 360 days every year, merely because the employment of the required number does not extend to full one year. Therefore, the Apex Court did not propose to lay down such a sweeping proposition as both the extreme views do not conform to the object of the Act. Therefore, the ratio is that so far as the casual labourers are concerned, they are not governed by the provisions of the Act. If they are not covered by the Act, therefore, likewise they are not covered by the Scheme as well. The Scheme of 1990 does not specify as to whether it will exclude the casual employees or not. Therefore, the expression 'employee' occurring in the Scheme has to be read in the context of the main Act and the interpretation of the expression 'employee' given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.S. Hariharan (supra). Therefore, Clause 2 (ii) of the Scheme of 1990 should be construed to mean that the employee here should be taken to be an employee employed in the establishment other than those who are excluded in connection with the establishment should not be a casual labour/ employee. But the question as to whether the employee is a casual or not will again be a question of fact and this will depend upon each case. Section 19A lays down that such question can be determined by the Central Government. Therefore, we hold that the Scheme is not ultra vires of the Act but it will not be applicable to casual employees and where in a particular case an employee is casual or not which is essentially a question of fact that can only be clarified by the Central Government, under Section 19A of the Act of 1952.

13. Before parting with the case, we may observe that a genuine difficulty can arise in the matter like the present one, that such a causal labour who is employed for a particular purpose for a particular time should be covered by the Scheme or not. Therefore, certain parameters should be laid down as to what should be the criteria to treat a particular employee as a casual labour/employee so as to remove any confusion either in the mind of the employer or the authorities implementing the provisions of the Act of 1952. But we leave it to the Central Government to clarify this position. However, till it is clarified, if any grievance arises then the parties can approach the Central Government under Section 19A of the Act and the Central Government shall determine the issue as to whether in the given case the employee was a casual or regular employee to which the Scheme shall cover.

14. In the result, all these writ petitions are disposed of accordingly in the light of the observations made above.