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M/S Krishna Oil Mills & Ors. v. Firm Shriniwas & Co And Ors.(62)
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Israni, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Civil Special Appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance read with Order 43 Rule 1(t) C.P.C. was filed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dated January 15, 1986, in S.B. Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 61/1986 (defect side), which had dismissed the appellants' application under Order 41 Rules 19 read with Section 151 C.P.C. for re‑admission of S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 8/1975.
Procedural and factual chronology stated in the opinion:
- The appellants had filed a first appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Alwar, dated November 30, 1974.
- The first appeal was dismissed in default of appearance of both parties on February 7, 1985.
- A restoration application by the appellants was dismissed by the Single Judge on January 15, 1986; one of the principal grounds was that the restoration application was time‑barred by 258 days.
- At the time relevant to the appeal, the appellants had engaged advocates at different times: initially Mr. N.M. Kasliwal (later elevated to the Bench), thereafter Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal (engaged after 1978), and Shri Dilip Singh appeared as junior along with others.
- Execution proceedings were moved in the trial court (record shows an execution application was moved on November 16, 1985). A clerk named Ramesh (of Shri K.N. Bhargava, Advocate) came to know of those execution proceedings and, according to the appellants' account, contacted appellant Ramavtar to inform him about the dismissal and the execution application.
- Following that information, a certified copy of the dismissal order was obtained on November 22, 1985, and a restoration application was filed on November 25, 1985.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the restoration application for re‑admission of S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 8/1975 should be allowed notwithstanding the delay of 258 days — i.e., whether the appellants were prevented by "sufficient cause" from appearing and thus whether the delay should be condoned.
- Whether the dismissal of the appeal in default of both parties on February 7, 1985 was a circumstance that precluded the respondents from opposing restoration, and what evidentiary material (affidavits) was necessary to establish the appellants' case for restoration.
- How established legal principles (as cited in the opinion) regarding a litigant's reliance on counsel and the principles for condonation of delay apply to the facts of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (as presented through Shri R.M. Lodha, counsel)
- The appellants had engaged Mr. N.M. Kasliwal as advocate at the relevant time (who later became a judge); after his elevation in 1978, Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal was engaged; Shri Dilip Singh appeared alongside as junior.
- Although the appeal was dismissed on February 7, 1985, an execution application was filed only on November 16, 1985; a clerk (Ramesh) discovered the execution proceedings and informed appellant Ramavtar (contact said to have occurred on "February (Sic) 20, 1985" in the record), after which steps were taken to obtain the certified copy and file restoration (certified copy dated November 22, 1985; restoration filed November 25, 1985).
- The appellants did not delay in filing the restoration application after becoming aware of dismissal; therefore delay should be excused.
- On the date of dismissal none of the parties were present in court; thus respondents have no stronger right to be heard on restoration on that basis.
- The Single Judge's remark that appellants did not inquire about the case for about five years after engaging certain advocates was uncalled for.
- Although an affidavit was filed by appellant Ramavtar in support of restoration, the Single Judge required additional affidavits (Shri Dilip Singh, Shri Ramesh) and a specific date of death for Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal; appellants contend these requirements were unnecessary or unduly rigid.
- The cause list for February 7, 1985 incorrectly printed the title of the appeal; this contributed to the appellants' inability to know their appeal was listed.
- After admission of the appeal the appellants complied with a stay order by depositing Rs. 30,000/‑, which the respondents later withdrew.
Respondents' Arguments (as presented through Shri R.S. Kejriwal, counsel)
- The appellants should have filed affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh (Advocate) and Shri Ramesh (clerk of Shri K.N. Bhargava) in support of the restoration application; failure to do so was material.
- It was asserted that the late Shri R.V. Agarwal had not been engaged by the appellants as their lawyer but had been given power to appear on behalf of the appellants by Shri Dilip Singh Advocate.
- The restoration application was delayed by 258 days; the Single Judge rightly rejected it as time‑barred and no interference with that order was warranted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rafiq v. Munshi Lal, (1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400 | Principle that a litigant who engages a lawyer may reasonably rely on that lawyer to look after his interests; the personal appearance of the party at appeal hearing is not required and an innocent party should not suffer for the inaction or misconduct of his counsel. | The Court relied on this precedent to emphasize that appellants who had engaged counsel were entitled to rely on their advocates and were not required to act as a "watch dog" over counsel's appearance; this supported finding that appellants should not be penalized for non‑appearance caused by counsel‑related circumstances. |
| Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 | Principles for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act — six guiding principles for considering whether delay should be condoned, including preference for substantial justice over technicalities, demand for reasonable explanation for each day's delay, and presumption against deliberate delay. | The Court applied the Katiji principles to assess whether appellants had "sufficient cause" to excuse their delay; the Court favored allowing the matter to be decided on merits in light of those principles and the surrounding facts (e.g., reliance on counsel, incorrect cause list title, deposit/withdrawal of stay amount). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded by first reviewing the procedural record for the appeal and the restoration application and then applying the legal principles from the precedents cited.
- Record review and facts:
- The appeal was put up on February 4, 1985 (no one appeared for either party) and adjourned to February 5, 1985 (respondents' counsel appeared), then to February 6, 1985 (respondents' counsel appeared, appellants did not), and finally to February 7, 1985 when none of the parties appeared and the appeal was dismissed in default of both parties.
- Affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh (Advocate) and Shri Ramesh (clerk to Shri K.N. Bhargava) were subsequently filed, stating the date of death of Shri R.V. Agarwal as January 1, 1984, and asserting the circumstances that prevented notice to the appellants.
- There was no counter‑affidavit filed by the respondents in reply to the restoration application at the time the court considered the matter (the record later shows a reply had been filed).
- After the appeal was admitted for hearing on restoration, a stay order was passed and the appellants deposited Rs. 30,000/‑ in compliance; the respondents later withdrew that amount.
- Application of legal principles:
- The court invoked Rafiq v. Munshi Lal to underscore that a litigant who has engaged, briefed and paid an advocate may reasonably rely on that advocate and should not be penalized for the advocate's omission or misconduct; therefore appellants who had engaged counsel could be regarded as having done what was expected of them.
- The court invoked and summarized the six guiding principles from Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji concerning condonation of delay, stressing the preference for deciding substantial justice over technical dismissals and that each day's delay must be reasonably explained but not with pedantic strictness.
- Evaluation and conclusion:
- Given that the appellants did not know of the death of their counsel (Shri R.V. Agarwal), and given the reliance on counsel, the court found it unreasonable to expect the appellants to continually inquire about the cause list or hearing dates over several years.
- The court also noted the incorrect printing of the appeal title in the cause list as an additional factor that contributed to the appellants' inability to know their matter was listed.
- Considering the deposit of Rs. 30,000/‑ (complied with the stay) and the lack of early counter‑affidavit from respondents, the court held that the appellants were prevented by "sufficient cause" from appearing when the appeal was called for hearing.
- On these bases, and applying the cited principles favoring substantial justice, the court concluded that restoration should be allowed and that the appeal should be restored to be heard on merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court allowed the Civil Special Appeal. In particular, the Court set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated January 15, 1986; ordered that S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 8/1975, which had been dismissed in default on February 7, 1985, be RESTORED and directed that it "shall be heard and decided on merits in accordance with law."
Consequences and implications:
- Direct effect: The appellants' restoration application is effectively allowed by this appellate decision — the previously dismissed first appeal is reinstated and must proceed to hearing on substantive merits.
- Costs: The Court ordered No order as to costs.
- Precedential scope: The Court applied existing Supreme Court principles (Rafiq; Katiji) to the facts; the opinion resolved the restoration question in this case but did not purport to lay down a new legal rule beyond applying and following the cited authorities and established principles on sufficient cause and condonation of delay.
Note: This summary is restricted to and faithful to the material contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or holdings have been added that are not present in the opinion text.
Israni, J.:— This Civil Special Appeal under Section 18 of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance read with Order 43 Rule 1(t) C.P.C has been filed against the judgment of learned Single Judge, dated Jan. 15, 1986. in S.B Civil Misc. Restoration Application No. 61/1986 (defect side), whereby the application filed by the appellants under Order 41 Rules 19 read with Section 151 C.P.C for re-admission of hearing of S.B Civil First Appeal No. 8/1975 was dismissed in default.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the appellants filed first appeal against the judgment and decree of learned Additional District Judge Alwar, passed on November 30, 1974, which was dismissed in default of appear ance of both parties on Feb. 7, 1985. A restoration application was filed by the appellants, which was dismissed on January 15, 1986.
3. The main ground, alongwith some other grounds on which the application for restoration was dismissed was that it was time barred by 258 days.
4. The contention of Shri R.M Lodha, counsel for the appellants is that the appellants had engaged Mr. N.M Kasliwal, as an Advocate, at the relevant time and is now adorning to the Bench as Judge. After his elevation in 1978 Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal was engaged as Advocate. Shri Dilip Singh appeared alongwith Shri N.M Kasliwal and Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal as junior in the case. It is stated that even though the appeal was dismissed in default on February 7, 1985, an application for execution of decree was moved in trial court only on November 16, 1985. One Ramesh, clerk of Shri KN Bhargave Advocate came to know of these execution proceedings and he could contact Ramavtar appellant only on February (Sic) 20, 1985 and inform him regarding dismissal of the appeal and filing of the execution application. Immediately thereafter appellant Ramavtar contacted Shri R.N Lodha Advocate and after obtaining cartified copy of the order of dismissal of appeal on November 22, 1985, an application for restoration was filed on November 25, 1985. It is, therefore, asserted that the appellants did not delay in filing the restoration application, after they came to know about the fact of the dismissal of their appeal. It is also pointed out that on the date on which the appeal was dismissed, none of the parties were present in the Court and therefore, it is asserted that the respondents have no right to be heard regarding the restoration of the appeal. It is further pointed out that the remark of the learned single judge that the appellants did not care to ascertain about the progress of the case for about five years after engaging Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal and Shri Dilip Singh is uncalled for. It is also contended that even though an affidavit was filed in support of the restoration application by Ramavtar appellant, but still the learned single judge insisted that affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh Advocate and Shri Ramesh, dark of K.N Bhargava Advocate should have been filed and that specific date regarding the death of Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal should have been mentioned in the application. Shri Lodha also pointed out that in the cause list, dated February 7, 1985, the title of the appeal was wrongly printed and therefore, on this account also, it was not possible for the appellants to have come to know regarding listing of their appeal.
5. Shri R.S Kejriwal, counsel for the respondents on the other hand has asserted that it was necessary for the appellants to have filed affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh Advocate and Shri Ramesh, which was not done by the appellants. It is also asserted that late Shri R.V Agarwal was not engaged as lawyer by the appellants but was given power to appear on behalf of the appellants by Shri Dilip Singh Advocate.
6. It is also contended that the application for restoration was filed after delay of 258 days and that had been rightly rejected and no interference was called for.
7. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and have also perused the judgment of learned single judge. The proceedings of the appeal show that the case first of all came up for hearing on February 4, 1985, when no one appeared on behalf of both the parties. The matter was adjourned to February 5, 1985, when Shri R.S Kejriwal, counsel for the respondents appeared and the case was adjourned to February 6, 1985. On this date also Shri Kejriwal appeared on behalf of the respondents but no one appeared on behalf of the appellants. The case was thereafter put up on Feb. 7, 1985. when none of the parties appeared in the Court and the appeal was dismissed in default of both the parties. It is therefore, clear from the above proceedings that on the day, the appeal was dismissed no one appeared on behalf of either of the parties and the appeal was dismissed in default of both the parties. Affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh Advocate and Shri Ramesh, Clerk to Shri K.N Bhargava Advocate have now filed, in which date of the expiry of Shri R.V Agarwal has been mentioned as January 1, 1984. It is also mentioned that a reference was held in his memory Apart from the two affidavits filed, now it may be pointed out that no counter affidavit was filed by the respondents in reply to the restoration application. The respondents have now filed reply to the restoration application. It may also be pointed out that after admitting the appeal for hearing, a stay order was also passed by this Court, in compliance of which the appellants deposited amount of Rs. 30,000/- which has also been withdrawn by the respondents as given out by the learned counsel for the appellants.
8. In the case of Rafiq v. Munshi Lal, (1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400, it was observed by the Apex Court that “after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watch dog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. It was further pointed out that as per the present adversary legal system when a person selects his advocate, briefs him and pays his fees can supremely remain confident that his lawyer will look after his interest and such a innocent party who has done everything in his power and expected of him, should not suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his counsel.
9. In (2) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353, tbg Apex Court while considering an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, whether could condone or not to condone the delay, laid down following six principles, which may be kept in view while dealing with such matters.
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging all appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and its expected to do so.
10. In the present case the facts clearly reveal that the appellants did not come to know about the death of Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal and therefore, consequently also they did not come to know regarding listing of their case before this Court. It may be pointed out that when an appeal is put up for hearing in due course, it is not possible nor expected of the litigant to keep on inquiring from his lawyer regarding the date on which the same is likely to come up for hearing. In fact, what is expected is that when the case appears in monthly/weekly/daily cause list, the counsel has to inform his client regarding the same. Therefore it cannot be said that the appellants were careless not to have inquired regarding the appeal from their lawyer for number of years when it was to come for hearing in due course. The expression “sufficient cause” implied by the legislature is quite elastic, which enables the Court to comply the law in meaning ful manner to serve the ends of justice. This is very purpose for which the institution of courts exists. Apart from the above reasons, even the title of the appeal was not correctly printed in the cause list as has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. The appellant's in compliance of the order of this Court while granting stay, have already deposited an amount of Rs. 30,000/-, which has also been withdrawn by the respondents. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for hearing. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment passed by the learned single judge, dated January 15, 1986, under appeal is set aside, the S.B Civil First appeal No. 8/1975, dismissed in default on February 7, 1985, is restored and shall be heard and decided on merits in accordance with law.
11. No order as to costs.
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