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Nand Lal v. State Of Rajasthan
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The summary below is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion.
The writ petitions arise from termination orders dated 10th May, 1988 (Annex-12) by respondent No. 2 terminating the services of the petitioners with immediate effect. The petitioners contend that they were appointed on a regular basis (pay-scale Rs. 700-10-850-15-865) as Ward Boy/Class-IV employees following selection and interview under an order dated 29th April, 1988 and that their termination was arbitrary, unreasonable, in disregard of principles of natural justice and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
All writ petitions were admitted and notices issued. On a stay petition this Court stayed operation of the 10th May, 1988 order and permitted the petitioners to continue in post. Counsel appearances were recorded: Shri G.P. Sharma for respondent No. 2, an Additional Government Advocate for the State, and respondent No. 3 filed a reply. The petitions were disposed of at the stage of confirmation of the stay order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, before passing the order of termination dated 10th May, 1988, an opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) should have been given to the petitioners, even if the appointments under challenge might be illegal or void.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners asserted that they were appointed after a proper selection and interview under the order dated 29th April, 1988 and joined duties accordingly.
- They contended that the termination order dated 10th May, 1988 was issued in flagrant disregard of principles of natural justice because no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them.
- They further argued that the impugned termination was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India.
Respondent No. 2's Arguments (as presented)
- Respondent No. 2 (through Shri G.P. Sharma) contended that the appointments were in violation of the Rajasthan Class-IV Services (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules, 1963 because the selection board was not properly constituted and the then Chief Medical and Health Officer acted as Chairman and made appointments for extraneous considerations.
- It was submitted that appointments were not in accordance with rules 14, 17, 18 & 20 of the said Rules, that many candidates whose names were available were not considered or given opportunity to appear before the Selection Board, and that some district exchange lists were not available in the office of respondent No. 2.
- On that basis respondent No. 2 submitted that the appointments were void and could not confer any right to hold office.
Other Counsel / Reliance Placed by Parties
- Shri G.P. Sharma relied on several precedents (Sang Singh v. Municipal Board, Pokaran; Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar; Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan) to argue that if an appointment is void the principles of natural justice may be avoided.
- Another counsel (Shri Dhankar) relied on an unreported Division Bench judgment in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 408/87 (Bhairon Singh v. Sawai Madhopur Via Tonk Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd.) to contend that even where an appointment may be void the audi alteram partem principle should be observed before terminating services.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhairon Singh v. Sawai Madhopur Via Tonk Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd. (DB Civil Writ Petition No. 408/87) | Even if an order of appointment is illegal or void, before termination of services an opportunity of being heard should be given (audi alteram partem). | The Court treated this authority as clear and directly applicable, following its holding that termination without hearing is arbitrary and violative of natural justice; it applied that principle to quash the termination dated 10th May, 1988. |
| Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation | Statement of basic rules of natural justice: "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" and "hear the other side"; audi alteram partem requires informing the person of allegations and giving opportunity to explain. | The Court relied on this exposition to articulate the scope of audi alteram partem and to underpin the conclusion that prior hearing is generally required before termination. |
| Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel | Audi alteram partem may be excluded where prior notice would obstruct prompt action, the statutory scheme warrants exclusion, or urgency/need for promptitude requires it (quoting Menaka Gandhi). | The Court acknowledged this exception but held that the exceptional circumstances described in Tulsi Ram Patel were not present in the instant case, so the exception did not apply. |
| Sang Singh v. Municipal Board, Pokaran | Where an appointment is illegal, the Court exercising equitable jurisdiction would not compel respondents to continue a "usurper" in office as that would perpetuate illegality. | The Court examined and distinguished Sang Singh on facts, noting that in that case termination was not challenged as denial of natural justice and that the appointment was held illegal on the facts; thus Sang Singh did not control the present matter. |
| Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan | Where allowing the writ petition would result in restoring an illegal order, the High Court may refuse to interfere if there is no failure of justice. | The Court found this principle not applicable on the facts of the present case and therefore it did not bar interference here. |
| Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar | Where appointment letters are forged/fraudulent or petitioners lack basic qualifications, claims for mandamus for payment of salary may not be sustained; such claim must be pursued by ordinary civil remedy where appropriate. | The Court held that Rita Mishra was distinguishable on facts (ineligibility due to lack of basic qualifications) and did not assist the petitioners in the present proceedings. |
| Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India (as referenced) | Recognized principle that practical necessity or urgency can limit application of audi alteram partem (cited within Tulsi Ram Patel). | Used as part of the authority in Tulsi Ram Patel to describe exceptions; the Court concluded that the exceptions exemplified by Menaka Gandhi (via Tulsi Ram Patel) were not present here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified the core question as whether an opportunity of hearing should have been given to the petitioners before passing the termination order dated 10th May, 1988. The Court proceeded through the following steps, based only on the material in the opinion:
- It noted the competing contentions: petitioners asserted valid selection and that no hearing was afforded; respondent No. 2 pleaded illegality of appointments for breach of the Rajasthan Class-IV Rules, 1963 and argued that void appointments do not attract natural justice protections.
- The Court reviewed relevant authorities. It treated Bhairon Singh (DB Civil Writ Petition No. 408/87) as a controlling authority holding that even if an appointment is illegal or void, termination of services ordinarily requires prior opportunity of being heard. The Court accepted this proposition as a "clear authority" covering the present case.
- It drew on Olga Tellis to articulate the core elements of natural justice (no man shall be a judge in his own cause; hear the other side) and the content of the audi alteram partem rule—being informed of allegations and given a chance to explain.
- The Court acknowledged the exception articulated in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel (that audi alteram partem may be excluded where prior notice would obstruct prompt action or statutory scheme/urgency demands) and noted Menaka Gandhi as an authority on urgency. However, applying those criteria to the facts before it, the Court found that the exceptional circumstances did not exist: respondents had "sufficient time" to serve a show cause notice and to afford hearing before terminating the petitioners.
- The Court emphasized that whether an appointment was in breach of procedure and thus void could be decided after an inquiry that included opportunity to be heard; in a writ jurisdiction with seriously disputed facts, the Court considered it inappropriate to decide on the legality of appointments without affording the petitioners a hearing.
- The Court examined and distinguished the authorities relied upon by respondent No. 2 and others (Sang Singh, Jagan Singh, Rita Mishra), explaining that those cases were factually distinguishable or did not raise a denial-of-hearing contention of the same character as in the present matter.
- The Court rejected contentions that no notice need be given because there would be "no effective answer" to the allegations, remarking that such a contention misunderstands the rule of hearing which is an important element of natural justice and cannot be founded on presumed impregnability of the proposed action.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned order dated 10th May, 1988 is quashed. The Court confirmed its earlier stay order (order dated 21-5-1988) permitting the petitioners to continue in their posts.
Direct Consequences and Directions
- The petitioners are permitted to continue in their posts until their services are terminated in accordance with law (i.e., after observance of fair procedure).
- The petitioners are not entitled to arrears of salary from 10-6-1987 until they rejoined services in pursuance of the Court's order dated 21-5-1988.
- If, after a fair procedure (and after arriving at a conclusion that any appointment was illegal and obtained by fraudulent means) the respondents terminate service in accordance with law, the respondents are entitled to recover the amount of salary paid to the petitioners with effect from the date of joining pursuant to the Court's order dated 21-5-1988.
- If any petitioner voluntarily tenders his resignation within one month of this order, no action shall be taken against him.
- Given the allegations against the then Chief Medical and Health Officer, Jhunjhunu, the State Government is directed to investigate the matter and, based on the investigation report, take appropriate action against the officers concerned and the petitioners (as the report may warrant).
- Each party is to bear its own costs.
Broader Implications
The opinion applies existing natural justice principles (as articulated in cited authorities) to the facts and does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying established principles to the facts of these petitions. The decision's observable effect is to require prior hearing before termination in the circumstances of this case and to quash the specific termination order; the Court did not claim to create a new rule of law.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P.C Jain, J.:— All these writ petitions involved similar questions of facts and law and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a common order.
2. The petitioners in all these writ petitions have challenged the order dated 10th May, 1988 (Annex-12) whereby their services were terminated with immediate effect by respondent No. 2.
3. In all these writ petitions, the case of the petitioners is that they came to be appointed after due selection on regular basis in the pay-scale of Rs. 700-10-850-15-865 on the post of Ward Boy/Class-IV employee by non-petitioner No. 2 under the order dated 29th April, 1988. The petitioners have further averred that their selection was made in a proper manner and they were duly interviewed. After their section they joined their duties. The grievance of the petitioners is that their services have been illegally terminated vide order dated 10th May, 1988 passed by respondent No. 2. Their contention is that the order of termination dated 10th May, 1988 is in flagrant disregard of the principles of natural justice in as much as no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them. They have further contended in the writ petitions that the impugned order dated 10th May, 1988 is arbitrary and unreasonable and is also violative of Articles 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India. All the writ petitions were admitted and notices were issued to the respondents. On stay petition this Court stayed the operation of the order (Annex-2) dated 10th May, 1988 and allowed the petitioners to continue on the post. Shri G.P Sharma, Advocate appeared for respondent No. 2 and the State was represented by Additional Government Advocate. Respondent No. 3 has filed reply.
4. Learned counsel for both the parties have agreed that the writ petitions may be disposed of at the stage of confirmation of the stay order as such, all the writ petitions are being disposed of opportunity of being heard to the petitioners.
5. Shri G.P Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 vehemently submitted that the appointment given to the petitioners was in violation of the rules as the then Chief Medical and Health Officer gave the appointment without following the procedure laid down in the Rajasthan Class-IV Services (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules 1963. In fact the Board was not properly constituted. The then Chief Medical and Health Officer, Jhunjhunu became the Chairman of the Board and appointed the petitioner for extraneous considerations. He has further contended that the appointment of the petitioners is not in accordance with rules 14, 17, 18 & 20 of the said Rules. He has further submitted that all the candidates whose names were available in the office of respondent No. 2 were neither considered nor they were given opportunity to appear in the Selection Board. Although more than 77 candidates were available as per list sent by the Joint Director, Samaj Kalyan and Sainik Welfare Board, Jhunjhunu. The list of the candidates from the District Regional Employment Exchange, Jhunjhunu was not available in the office of the respondent No. 2. Shri G.P Sharma has thus, submitted that such an appointment cannot be held to be valid in the eye of law and can only be held to be void appointment which does not confer any right to hold office.
6. Shri G.P Sharma has placed reliance on Sang Singh v. Municipal Board, Pokaran (1), Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar (2) and Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rajasthan (3) to substantiate his contention that if the order of appointment under challenge is void then observations of the principles of natural justice may be avoided.
7. Shri Dhankar has placed reliance on un-reported judgment of this Court in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 408/87 Bhairon Singh v. Sawai Madhopur Via Tonk Zila Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd. connected appeals decided on 23rd March, 1987 to substantiate his contention that even if the order under challenge may be void still the principle of audi-alteram partem being basic concept of principles of natural justice should be observed.
8. Thus, a short question which is involved in this writ petition is whether before passing the order of termination dated 10th May, 1988 an opportunity of hearing should have been given to the petitioners in Bhairon Singh v. Sawai Madhopur Via Tonk Zilla Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd. (supra) this question was dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court and it has been laid down that even if the order of appointment be illegal or void in law still before termination of services an opportunity of being heard should be given to the employee. In that case, certain appointment were given to the petitioners and the appointment was challenged on the ground that the appointment was unauthorised and without authority of the Board and that the petitioners were not qualified to be appointed. The termination of the services of the petitioners in that case was challenged and the Court observed as follows:
“Regarding the submission of Shri Singhvi that the appointment was unauthorised or without any authority of the Board, or that the petitioners were not qualified to be appointed are the subject-matter which could be decided after giving an opportunity to the petitioners of being heard. Therefore we are of the opinion that the impugned order of termination dated 31st January, 1987 was arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and was, thus, void.”
9. While expressing the opinion, this Court had placed reliance on Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (4), wherein it was observed that first rule of natural justice is “no man shall be a judge in his own cause” and second rule is “hear the other side” and a corollary has been deducted from the above two rules and that is ‘justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seem to be done’. The audi alteram partem rule made in its full amplitude means that a person be informed of the allegations against him, he be given an opportunity to submit his explanation.
10. In view of the clear authority of this Court in Bhairon Singh's case (supra) the submission made by Shri G.P Sharma are without any substance. The principles of audi alteram partem is a basic principle of natural justice No one should be condemned without hearing is the essence of justice and the Courts of Law apply this principle to ensure a fair play and justice in judicial and quasi-judicial matters. It is also true that there may be certain circumstances in which hearing cannot be possible as pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel (5) in the following words:
“So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England and in India, it is well established that where a right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Menka Gandhi's case (1978 (2) SCR 621)”.
11. But those exceptional circumstances as pointed out by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel (supra) are not present in this case. The respondents had sufficient time to serve a show cause and for giving an opportunity of being heard before terminating the services of the petitioners. The question whether the appointment was in breach of the procedure provided in the Rules and was void, could be decided in an inquiry after giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. In the writ jurisdiction where facts are seriously disputed it is not possible to arrive at a finding whether the appointment was illegal or void as contended by the respondents.
12. Before parting with the judgment we would also like to discuss the authorities referred to by Shri Sharma learned counsel of the respondent No. 3. In Sang Singh v. Municipal Board, Pokaran (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that if the order of appointment is illegal, the Court while exercising equitable jurisdiction would not compel the respondents to continue a ‘usurper’ in office in future as it would amount perpetuating illegality. We have gone through the judgment and we do not find that in that case plea was raised that termination of the service was in flagrant disregard of the principles of natural justice. The case before the Court was that the termination amounted to retrenchment and as the conditions of retrenchment having not been complied with the termination was illegal, and the Court held that even if the termination was violative of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, yet the fundamental and basic question for consideration was whether when the appointment of an ex-service man as U.D.C was per se illegal, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should issue such directions which would result in perpetuating illegality and compelling the respondents to continue the illegality in future also and the Court answered it in negative. In that case on facts it was held that the appointment was illegal. Thus, this case is easily distinguishable. In Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan (supra) the proposition of law laid down by this Court was that where allowing the writ petition would result in restoring the illegal order, the High Court would refuse to interfere if there is no failure of justice. Thus, this case is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Coming to the case of Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar, (supra) on which much stress has been laid, we are of the opinion that this authority also does not support the petitioners. It was a case where the public servants filed a writ of mandamus for payment of salary for the work done despite the fact that their letter of appointment was forged, fraudulent or an illegal one. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court after elaborate discussions held that the claim for mandamus on behalf of the petitioners for salary alone cannot possibly be sustained and the petitioners were directed to avail the ordinary remedy by way of civil suit if so advised. In that case the Court on facts held that none of the petitioners was eligible for appointment as the basic qualifications for appointment as teacher was trained Matric/Graduate/IA but none of the petitioners was trained Consequently, the Court observed that the petitioners were ineligible for not possessing the basic qualifications for the post. Thus the case of Rita Mishra stands on its own facts and in no way it helps the petitioners.
13. While repelling the contentions of Shri Singhvi that no notice need be given because there was no effective answer to it. In Bhairon Singh's case, this Court observed that such a contention stands on mis-understanding of rule of hearing which is an important element of principles of natural justice and observed that the decision to dispense with notice cannot be founded upon a presumed impregnability of the proposed action. In our opinion this case is fully covered by the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Bhairon Singh's case.
14. In the pursuance of aforesaid facts we allow the writ petitions and quash the impugned order dated 10th May, 1988. The petitioners have been allowed to continue on the post by order of this Court dated 21-5-1988 and we hereby confirm it. These petitioners will be allowed to continue on the post till their sendees are terminated in accordance with law. However, they would not be entitled to arrears of salary from 10-6-1987 till they have joined services in pursuance of the order of this court dated 21-5-1988. In case the termination order is passed in accordance with fair procedure, after arriving at the conclusion that appointments were illegal and obtained by fraudulent means, the respondents shall be entitled to recover the amount of salary paid to the petitioners with effect from the date of joining after the order of this Court dated 21-5-1988. In case, any one of the petitioners voluntarily tenders his resignation within one month of this order, no action shall be taken against him. Looking to the allegations made in the case against the then Chief Medical and Health Officer Jhunj-hunu we direct that the State Government shall get the matter investigated and, on the basis of the report shall take appropriate action against the officers concerned and the petitioners. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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