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Asgarali Shabab And Etc. v. State Of Rajasthan And Another
Summary of the Opinion — Reference on Composite Orders under Ss.145 & 146 Cr.P.C.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a reference by the Hon'ble Chief Justice to a Larger Bench after a question was referred by the learned Single Judge, Hon'ble Sharma, J. The specific question referred was whether a composite order of attachment under S.146 Cr.P.C. can be passed by a Magistrate while passing the preliminary order under S.145(1) Cr.P.C.
The issue originated in a revision petition against an order of the Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu, who had partly quashed the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Jhunjhunu dated December 20, 1982, insofar as the attachment of property and appointment of a receiver were concerned. The SDM had issued a composite order in two parts: first drawing a preliminary order under S.145(1) Cr.P.C., and second attaching the disputed property and appointing a receiver under S.146(1) Cr.P.C.
The Sessions Judge reversed that composite order to the extent it operated as an order under S.146(1), relying on Kishan Bihari Birla v. Prem Kumari Bhati (1984 Raj Cri C 161). A revision to this Court was heard by Hon'ble Sharma, J., who (having taken a view against composite orders in an earlier decision) referred the question to the Larger Bench for resolution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a composite order of attachment of disputed property under S.146(1) Cr.P.C. can be validly passed by the Magistrate at the time of passing the preliminary order under S.145(1) Cr.P.C., and if so, under what conditions.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Applicant's) Arguments — represented by Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar
- There is no bar to passing a simultaneous or composite order under Ss.145(1) and 146(1) Cr.P.C.; the only legal requirement is that the Magistrate should apply his mind separately to each section and this separate application of mind should be apparent from the order.
- Relied on precedents including Syed Ahmad v. Rais Ahmed (1977 Cri LJ 450), Theophil Xess v. Chuyan Ekka (1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 192), and observations in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal ((1979) 4 SCC 665; AIR 1980 SC 242), to support the permissibility of composite orders provided the Magistrate satisfies conditions required by both sections.
Non-Petitioner's (Respondent's) Arguments — represented by Shri M.M. Ranjan
- Supported the view taken by Hon'ble Sharma, J. that composite orders are not permissible; the phrase “at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of S.145 Cr.P.C.” would be rendered redundant by permitting composite orders.
- Relied on Mahendra Tiwary v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi (1982 Cri LJ 17) (Patna) and Mavunni v. State of Kerala (1982 Cri LJ 468) (Kerala), and earlier Lilly Franklin v. Wilson (1977 Ker LT 871), to argue that the order under S.145(1) must be separately signed and only thereafter can the Magistrate exercise jurisdiction under S.146(1); absence of separate signature renders the 145 order incomplete and defeats jurisdiction to pass a 146 order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kishan Bihari Birla v. Prem Kumari Bhati, 1984 Raj Cri C 161 | Relied upon by the Sessions Judge in reversing the SDM's composite order. | Cited as a decision relied upon by the Sessions Judge; the Larger Bench did not adopt that decision as controlling and treated it as part of the authorities considered. |
| Ram Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 Raj LR 751 : (1984 Cri LJ NOC 130) | Held by Hon'ble Byas, J. that simultaneous orders of attachment can be passed and there is no illegality. | The Court noted Hon'ble Byas, J.'s view and regarded the word "simultaneously" as imprecise; the Bench accepted the substance that two orders may follow one another and that there is no inherent illegality. |
| Girwar Dan v. Ram Prasad, 1984 Raj LR 602 : (1985 Cri LJ 2) | Hon'ble Kasliwal, J. held that a composite order may validly be passed though two separate orders are appropriate; 145(1) must precede 146(1) and it must be clear both conditions are separately satisfied. | The Court expressly agreed with Kasliwal, J.'s conclusions and adopted the view that composite orders are valid subject to specified safeguards. |
| Syed Ahmad v. Rais Ahmed, 1977 Cri LJ 450 (Allahabad HC) | Relied upon by petitioner's counsel to support permissibility of composite orders. | Recognized as part of authorities cited in support; the Court listed it among precedents supporting permissibility but did not expound its facts or reasoning further. |
| Theophil Xess v. Chuyan Ekka, 1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 192 (Orissa HC) | Observed that a Magistrate may pass orders under S.145(1) and S.146(1) in the same sitting, the S.146(1) order following the S.145(1) order. | The Court said the decision provided little assistance (facts and legal discussion not set out) but agreed with the conclusion reached for similar reasons stated in the judgment. |
| Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal, (1979) 4 SCC 665 : AIR 1980 SC 242 : (1980 Cri LJ 1) | Supreme Court observations that there is no express stipulation that Magistrate's jurisdiction ends with attachment; Magistrate has obligation to proceed with enquiry under S.145(4); an emergency basis of attachment does not negate existence of dispute likely to cause breach of the peace. | The Court relied on these Supreme Court observations as foundational to interpreting relationship between Ss.145 and 146; it noted the Supreme Court did not decide whether simultaneous/composite orders were permissible. |
| Mahendra Tiwary v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi, 1982 Cri LJ 17 (Patna HC) | Division Bench observed an order of attachment cannot be passed "simultaneously" with initiation under S.145; attachment must be subsequent to initiation of proceedings under S.145. | The Court respectfully disagreed with the Patna Division Bench's restrictive conclusion and found no support in the Supreme Court decisions for such a strict bar. |
| Kottarathil Mavunni's case / Mavunni v. State of Kerala, 1982 Cri LJ 468 (Kerala HC) | Kerala HC held a composite order cannot be passed; emphasized that the S.145(1) preliminary order must be complete (signed) before S.146(1) attachment is made. | The Court reviewed this authority, described its emphasis on signature, and expressly disagreed with the strict requirement that a separate signed order is legally necessary. |
| Lily Franklin v. Wilson, 1977 Ker LT 871 (Janki Amma, J.) | Observed that a composite order initiating S.145(1) proceedings and attaching property in the same order is not warranted and emphasized completion (including signature) of the preliminary order first. | The Court quoted this view and rejected the narrow formalistic requirement (signature) as an unnecessary technicality inconsistent with legislative intent. |
| Ramavtar v. Dhanraj, 1977 Raj LW 47 | Cited in Ram Prasad's case and relied upon by Hon'ble Byas, J. in support of permissibility of passing orders consecutively. | Noted as part of the chain of authorities relied upon by judges who favoured allowing composite/consecutive orders; Court considered its effect in that context. |
| Chandu Naik's case, 1978 Cri LJ 356 | Referenced as one of the cases considered by the Supreme Court in Mathuralal. | The Court observed that Mathuralal considered Chandu Naik among other cases and relied on Mathuralal's broader observations in assessing Ss.145 and 146. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by reproducing S.146(1) Cr.P.C. and treating S.146(1) as a corollary of S.145(1): S.145(1) is the jurisdictional foundation for proceedings where a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace arises, and S.146(1) empowers the Magistrate to attach property and appoint a receiver subject to the conditions in S.146(1).
The Court accepted as not controverted that an order under S.145(1) must precede an order under S.146(1); the central controversy was whether the Magistrate may pass a composite order in which the preliminary S.145(1) order is immediately followed by an attachment under S.146(1).
The Court reviewed conflicting authorities:
- The Kerala decisions (Mavunni and Lily Franklin) treated a composite order as impermissible and emphasised a formal requirement of a separately signed completed S.145(1) order prior to S.146 action.
- The Patna Division Bench (Mahendra Tiwary) read Supreme Court observations as implying that simultaneous orders are impermissible.
- Other authorities (Byas J. in Ram Prasad; Kasliwal J. in Girwar Dan; Theophil Xess) permitted the two orders to follow one another in the same sitting or recognized the validity of composite/consecutive orders provided the conditions for each section were satisfied.
On the specific point of whether the preliminary S.145(1) order must be separately signed before S.146(1) can be made, the Court rejected the strict formalistic reading. It held that requiring separate signatures is an unnecessary technicality and "reading into" S.146(1) a signature requirement is illegitimate. The Court emphasised substance over form: what matters is that the S.145(1) order precedes the S.146(1) order in point of time and that both orders, whether contained in a composite document or in separate documents, separately satisfy the statutory conditions for drawing orders under the respective sections.
The Court interpreted the phrase "at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of S.145" to mean that the attachment under S.146(1) may follow immediately or at any later time after the preliminary order — including within the same sitting — and that the words would be rendered redundant by an interpretation that required a separate signed document as a precondition.
Weighing the authorities, the Court expressed agreement with Hon'ble Kasliwal, J.'s approach in Girwar Dan (that composite orders can be valid) and with the substance of Byas J.'s position while cautioning against the phrase "simultaneously" as imprecise. The Court disapproved of the Patna and Kerala High Courts' categorical insistence on a separate signed preliminary order as a jurisdictional precondition.
From this reasoning the Bench distilled the necessary conditions that must be satisfied for a composite order to be valid (see Holding below).
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): The reference is answered in the affirmative: a Magistrate can pass a composite order of attachment under S.146(1) while passing the preliminary order under S.145(1) Cr.P.C., subject to specific conditions.
Conditions required for validity (as stated by the Court):
- The order under S.145(1) should be separately drawn from the order under S.146(1) (i.e., the two parts must be identifiable as distinct orders).
- The order under S.145(1) must precede the order under S.146(1) in point of time.
- It must be apparent from both parts that each separately satisfies the statutory conditions for drawing such orders under the respective sections.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties before this Court: the court resolved the referred question in favour of permitting composite orders, subject to the safeguards above; the reference is answered accordingly.
- On precedent and practice: the Court rejected a rigid formality (requirement of separate signatures as jurisdictional) urged by some High Court decisions and endorsed a substance-focused approach. It adopted the view that a composite document is permissible so long as the statutory prerequisites for each order are separately satisfied and the S.145(1) part precedes the S.146(1) part.
- The opinion does not purport to create any broader departure from the statutory scheme; it clarifies permissible form and limits a formalistic insistence on separate signed documents. The direct practical consequence is that magistrates may, in a single composite instrument, effect a preliminary order and attachment provided the three conditions enumerated by the Court are met.
Reference answered accordingly.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dave, J.:— This is a reference made to us by the Hon'ble Chief Justice for answering the question referred to Division Bench by the learned single Judge, Hon'ble Sharma, J. The question referred is: whether a composite order of attachment of disputed property under S. 146 Cr. P.C can be passed by the Magistrate while passing the preliminary order under S: 145(1) Cr. P.C?
2. The aforesaid question arose in a revision petition filed against the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu, whereby he had partly quashed the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jhunjhunu, dt. Dec. 20, 1982 so far as the attachment of the property and appointment of receiver was made. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate had passed one composite order which was in two parts. In first part he had drawn a preliminary order as required by S. 145(1) Cr. P.C and in the second part he had passed an order of attachment and appointed a receiver to manage the property. The learned Sessions Judge while reversing the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the extent of it being one under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in Kishan Bihari Birla v. Prem Kumari Bhati, 1984 Raj Cri C 161. A revision was filed before this Court which come up for hearing before Hon'ble Sharma, J. His attention was drawn to the decision of Hon'ble Byas, J. in Ram Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 Raj LR 751 : (1984 Cri LJ NOC 130) and of Hon'ble Kasliwal, J. in Girwar Dan v. Ram Prasad, 1984 Raj LR 602 : (1985 Cri LJ 2). Hon'ble Sharma, J. had, already, in an earlier case cited above taken the view that a composite order under Ss. 145(1) and 146(1) Cr. P.C is illegal and it was this judgment which was relied on by the Sessions Judge. Since Hon'ble Byas, J. had taken the view that simultaneous order of attachment can be passed and there is no illegality in it so as to call for interference in revision petition and Hon'ble Kasliwal, J. had taken the view that a composite order may validly be passed though it is appropriate if the Magistrate passes two separate orders and also that order under S. 45(1) Cr. P.C must precede order under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C and further it must be clearly borne out from composite order that the Magistrate was satisfied separately with regard to existence of conditions for drawing orders under the two sections, therefore, Hon'ble Sharma, J. in the instant case made a reference to the Larger Bench. This is how this reference has come up before us for answering. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar, while supporting the view taken by Hon'bte Byas, J. and Hon'ble Kasliwal, J. submitted that there is no bar in passing simultaneous or composite order and the only requirement of law is that the Magistrate should apply his mind twice and it should be apparent from the order. He placed reliance on the decision of Allahabad High Court in Syed Ahmad v. Rais Ahmed, 1977 Cri LJ 450. He also placed reliance on Theophil Xess v. Chuyan Ekka, 1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 192 (Orissa), a judgment from the Orissa High Court. He also placed reliance on the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal, (1979) 4 SCC 665 : AIR 1980 SC 242 : (1980 Cri LJ 1).
3. On the strength of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court he submitted that there being no substantial change even after separately enacting S. 146(1) Cr. P.C the position of law remains the same and there is no legal bar if the Magistrate passes a composite order.
4. Shri M.M Ranjan appearing on behalf of the non-petitioner submitted that the view taken by Hon'ble Sharma, J. is a correct view and further that the words “at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145 Cr. P.C” will become redundant in case any other interpretation is given. He placed reliance on a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Mahendra Tiwary v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi, 1982 Cri LJ 17. He also relied on Mavunni v. State Of Kerala, 1982 Cri LJ 468 wherein the Kerala High Court relied on-one of its own earlier judgment in Lilly Franklin v. Wilson, 1977 Ker LT 871, delivered by Janki Amma, J. It is thus submitted by Shri Ranjan that order passed under S. 145 Cr. P.C should be separately signed and it is only thereafter that the Magistrate should apply his mind for the second time and pass a separate order under S. 145(146)(1) Cr. P.C If he has not signed the earlier order, it is submitted, then the order cannot be said to be an order in the eye of law and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C The words ‘at any time after making the order’ have no ambiguity and it is submitted that on a plain reading also intention of the legislature is apparent that two orders should be separately passed.
5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and have carefully perused the decisions cited before us.
6. Section 146(1) Cr. P.C reads as under:
“S. 146(1). If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in S. 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof:
Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute.”
7. This provision had been newly added in the Cr. P.C, 1973 and in fact is a corollary to S. 145 Cr. P.C It is S. 145(1), Cr. P.C wherefrom the Magistrate gets the jurisdiction to proceed with the case i.e drawing of a preliminary order is the basis of proceedings wherein a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace arises and it is this assumption of jurisdiction which further empowers the Magistrate under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C to pass an order regarding attachment of the property and appointment of receiver. If there is no dispute concerning the immovable property, there would be no jurisdiction in the Magistrate to proceed under Ss. 145 & 146 Cr. P.C The legality of order under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C depends on its having been preceded by lawful proceedings under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C and, therefore, it can be said that S. 146 Cr. P.C is in continuation of S. 145 Cr. P.C and passing a preliminary order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C is prior in point of time to an order under S. 146(1) Cr. P.C To this extent there is no controversy in either of the decisions cited by learned counsel for both the parties. The only dispute raised and which has been referred a whether a composite order can be passed. Hon'ble Sharma, J. while taking the view that a composite order under Ss. 145(1) and 146(1), Cr. P.C is without jurisdiction and against the spirit of S. 146(1), Cr. P.C placed reliance on the decision in Kottarathil Mavunni's case (1982 Cri LJ 468) (supra). Kerala High Court observed as under:
“A composite order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145 and under sub-sec. (1) of S. 146 cannot be passed as an order of attachment under sub-sec. (1) of S. 146 can be passed only after the preliminary order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145 had already been passed by the Magistrate.
Where the Magistrate made a preliminary order under S. 145 and stated that he was satisfied that there were sufficient grounds for taking proceedings as there exists serious likelihood of breach of peace concerning the disputed property and further by the later part of the decree he placed the disputed property under attachment under S. 146(1),. his order regarding later part would be without jurisdiction.”
8. Justice Menon while taking the above view relied on the observations of Janki Amma, J. in Lily Franklin's case (1977 Ker LT 871) wherein it was observed as under:
‘The learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that in the instant case, the order of attachment does not conform to the requirements of S. 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The conclusion seems to be well-founded. The order of the Magistrate extracted above shows that it is a composite order initiating proceedings under S. 145(1), and at the same time attaching the subject of dispute on the ground that there is an emergency. In other words, the initiation of proceedings under S. 145(1) and the attachment of property are seen effected by the same order. This is not warranted by the provisions of S. 146(1). S. 146(1) begins with the words:
“If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145………”
9. The expression “after making the order” makes it clear that proceedings under S. 145(1) should precede the order attaching the property, S. 146(1) does not contemplate a simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction under Ss. 145(1) and S. 146(1). The order under S. 145(1) becomes complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein. It is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of property. Since the order attaching property in the instant case did not satisfy the above requirements, it was rightly set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge. Now that the preliminary order under S. 145(1) has been confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether a case of emergency exists and whether the property should be attached and if he is so satisfied it is so to him to issue fresh order of attachment followed by appointment of receiver.”
10. Thus Janki Amma, J. has laid emphasis on the Magistrate's putting signatures on the order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C In our opinion this is reading the provisions of S. 146, Cr. P.C in between lines. We are in respectful disagreement with the view taken in this case inasmuch as we do not find any restriction in any law that the order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C is complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein and it is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of the property. While interpreting the provisions of Ss. 145(1) and 146(1), Cr. P.C one has to look into the substance rather than the form and rules of technicality need not negative the intention of the legislature. The Magistrate, while passing the order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C has to do so in three cases viz. (1) if it is a case of emergency or (ii) if none of the parties was in possession, or (iii) if in no position it is possible to ascertain as to which party is in possession. Such an order if necessary can only follow preliminary order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C The words ‘at any time after making the order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145, Cr. P.C’ in our opinion have, been added so that the Magistrate without mixing up the two may draw the preliminary order first in terms of the S. 145(1), Cr. P.C and having fixed the date and place of hearing, thereafter consider the question of attachment and appointment of receiver. Therefore, only requirement is that order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C must precede the order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C It is not the requirement of law that order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C, should be passed only after notice to either side.
11. The words ‘at any time’ in our considered opinion mean that the order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C can be passed immediately after passing the order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C, it can be passed at a later hour on the same day, or on any date thereafter, may be after notice to the other side, or otherwise and cannot be restrained to mean that order should be separately drawn and signed twice. If such a restrictive meaning is given then the words ‘at any time’ would become redundant. The plaint meaning of the words ‘at any time’ after making the order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C only requires the precedence of order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C over order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C It need not be signed at two places. The putting of the separate signature is merely an idle formality and cannot negative the intention of the legislature. It may at best be an irregularity.
12. In Mahendra Tiwary's case (1982 Cri LJ 17) the Division Bench of Patna High Court observed as under:
“From discussion of the above cases this much is clear that an order of attachment cannot be passed simultaneously in the sense that a Magistrate while initiating a proceeding under S. 145 of the Code cannot, at the same time also make an order of attachment. An order of attachment has got to be made subsequent to the initiation of the proceedings in the circumstances mentioned in S. 146(1) of the Code.
13. In the aforesaid case reliance has been placed on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court:
“Now, in a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order. This is the first of the situations provided in S. 146(1) in which an attachment may be effected. There is no express stipulation in S. 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by S. 145, sub-sec. (4) is against any such implication. Suppose a Magistrate draws up a preliminary order under S. 145(1) and immediately follows it up with an attachment under S. 146(1), the whole exercise of stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements becomes futile if he is to have no further jurisdiction in the matter. And yet he cannot make an order of attachment under S. 146(1) on the ground of emergency without first making a preliminary order, in the manner prescribed by S. 145(1). There is no reason why we should adopt a construction which will lead to such inevitable contradictions. We mentioned a little earlier that the only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in S. 145(5) and it can only be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of S. 146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace.”
“The provisions of Ss. 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code are substantially the same as the corresponding provisions before the 1955 amendment. The only noticeable change is that the second proviso to S. 145(4) (as it stood before the 1955 amendment) has now been transposed to S. 146 but without the words “pending his decision under this Section” and with the words ‘at any time after making the order under S. 145(1)’ super-added. The change, clearly, is in the interests of convenient draftsmanship. All situations in which an attachment may be made are now mentioned together in S. 146. The words “pending his decision under this section” have apparently been omitted as unnecessary since S. 145 provides how the proceeding initiated by a preliminary order must proceed and end and therefore, an attachment made ‘at any time after making the order under S. 145(1)’ can only continue until the termination of the proceeding. At the termination of the proceeding, if he finds one of the parties was in possession as stipulated, the Magistrate must make an order as provided in S. 145(6) and withdraw the attachment as provided in S. 146(1) since there can be no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace once an order in terms of S. 145(6) is made.”
14. In Mathuralal's case (1980 Cri LJ 1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court after considering Chandu Naik's case, (1978 Cri LJ 356) held as under:
“There is no express stipulation in S. 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by S. 145, sub-sec. (4) is against any such implication. The only provision for stopping the proceeding and Cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in S. 145(5) and it can be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of S. 146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace.”
15. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court neither considered the question whether a simultaneous order or a composite order can be passed or not. Their Lordships only considered the Magistrate's jurisdiction under S. 146, Cr. P.C On a careful reading of this decision of the Supreme Court we are unable to come to the conclusion which has been arrived at by Patna High Court. In Patna High Court's case there is no mention as to on which observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court they had reached the conclusion that simultaneous orders under Ss. 145 and 146, Cr. P.C cannot be passed. We are in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the Hon'ble Judges of the Patna High Court.
16. We will now consider the cases cited by Shri Dhankhar. In Theophil Xess v. Chuyan Ekka, (1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 192) (supra) Orissa High Court has observed as under:
“A Magistrate who wants to pass an order under S. 146(1), has at first to pass an order under S. 145(1) in order to assume jurisdiction to attach the property under S. 146(1). There is nothing in the said two sections or in the Cr. P.C to prevent a Magistrate to pass the said two orders in the same strain and in the same sitting, the order under S. 146(1) just following the order under S. 145(1) of the Code.”
17. We do not get any assistance from this decision as neither the facts are mentioned nor there is discussion of law. However, we are in agreement with the conclusions arrived at for the reasons which we have mentioned in this judgment. Hon'ble Byas, J. in Ram Prasad's case (1984 Cri LJ (NOC) 130) (Raj), relying upon the observations made in Ramavtar v. Dhanraj, 1977 Raj LW 47 held that passing of the orders simultaneously both under Ss. 145 and 146, Cr. P.C is not illegal. In our opinion the word ‘simultaneously’ may not be proper phraseology which ought to have been used while deciding the scope as in our opinion the order under S. 145(1) must precede order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C and the two orders are separate one after another though they have been signed at the bottom and there is no illegality in doing so. Hon'ble Kasliwal, J. in Girwardan's case (1985 Cri LJ 2) (Raj) discussed several cases except the judgment of Hon'ble Byas, J. and that of Sharma, J. But after detailed discussions of the various decisions on either side held that composite order may validly be passed. He however held that it is appropriate if the Magistrate passes two separate orders.
18. We are thus in agreement with the view taken by Hon'ble Kasliwal, J. in Girwardan's case that a composite order signed at one place can be passed and the only requirements are that order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C must be separate than the one under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C
19. The order under S. 145(1) must precede the order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C Both the “orders must satisfy the conditions for drawing the orders under the two sections and if this is all done, then the order is a valid order.
20. We, therefore, conclude that the Magistrate can pass a composite order of attachment on disputed property under S. 146(1) while passing the preliminary order under S. 145(1), Cr. P.C But such an order is only valid in the following circumstances:
(a) The order under S. 145(1) should be separately drawn than the order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C
(b) That the order under S. 145(1) must precede order under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C
(c) It must be borne out from both the orders that they satisfy separately the existence of the conditions for drawing such orders under the two sections. The reference is answered accordingly.
21. Reference answered accordingly.
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