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Girwar Dan v. Ram Prasad
Factual and Procedural Background
This criminal revision was filed by Girwar Dan, Laxman Dan and Girdhar Singh (identified in the opinion as “the party No. 1”) against Ram Prasad (identified as “the party No. 2”). On 16 July 1982 the party No. 1 submitted an application under sections 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. alleging that Mst. Bhoori had sold agricultural land (29 Bighas 8 Biswas in village Rajpura Tak Tordi, Tehsil Malpura) in their favour and handed over actual possession, and that party No. 2 collusively sought to dispossess them and on 15 July 1982 tried to dispossess them by force, creating a danger of breach of peace. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) sent the complaint to the police. The Station House Officer reported imminent danger of breach of peace and recommended action under section 146 Cr.P.C. On 24 July 1982 the SDM passed an order attaching the land under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. and appointed the Tehsildar as receiver, after perusing the police report.
Party No. 2 challenged the SDM’s order by filing a revision before the Sessions Judge, Tonk. On 16 August 1982 the Sessions Judge allowed the revision and set aside the SDM’s attachment order, taking the view that the SDM had no jurisdiction to pass a composite order under section 145(1) as well as section 146(1) Cr.P.C.; the Sessions Judge did not decide the matter on merits and remitted the matter for fresh determination by the SDM. Party No. 1 then filed the present revision petition to the High Court challenging the Sessions Judge’s order insofar as it set aside the SDM’s order of attachment and appointment of receiver.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Magistrate may pass a composite order containing both the preliminary order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and an order under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. (attachment and/or appointment of receiver) in the same order/sitting.
- If a composite order is permissible, whether the order under section 146(1) must follow (i.e., come after) the order under section 145(1), and what procedural or substantive safeguards must be observed when making an order under section 146(1) (particularly in emergency/ex parte situations).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (Party No. 1) Arguments — Mr. D.K. Soral
- The SDM had validly drawn a preliminary order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. after being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed regarding the land.
- The SDM was also satisfied regarding emergency and lawfully attached the property under section 146(1) and appointed a receiver; there was nothing illegal if both orders were passed simultaneously in the same order.
- The crucial point is that the Magistrate should be satisfied on the material before him for both the preliminary order and for an order under section 146(1); it is immaterial whether the orders are contained in one document or in separate documents. Reliance was placed on Gaya Singh v. Collector Singh (Full Bench, Patna).
Non-petitioner (Party No. 2) Arguments — Mr. K.N. Tikku
- A composite order under sections 145(1) and 146(1) Cr.P.C. cannot be validly passed; after the 1973 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code an order under section 146(1) can be passed only after an order under section 145(1) has been made.
- The Magistrate assumes no jurisdiction to pass an order under section 146(1) until he has made an order under section 145(1); the Magistrate must apply his mind separately to the question of emergency and not mechanically attach property.
- In the present case the SDM had not completed the formalities of section 145(1) before considering emergency and attaching the land; consequent attachment was illegal and without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on several authorities including Laxman Bhikaji Pawar v. Bahimkhan Balekhan Dalwai, Narainram v. Shanker Lal, Chhagan Singh v. State of Raj, Kottarthil Mavunni v. State of Kerala and Mahendra Tiwari v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thoophil Xess's case (Orissa High Court) | Held that a Magistrate who wants to pass an order under section 146(1) must first pass an order under section 145(1); however nothing prevents passing the two orders in the same strain and in the same sitting. | The court cited this case to support the proposition that passing both orders in same sitting is not precluded by the Code. |
| Tejsingh's case (Division Bench of this Court) | Where material exists before the Magistrate showing emergency, the Magistrate has wide discretion and revisional interference is not proper merely because another court might reach a different conclusion. | The court relied on this authority to emphasize the wide discretion of the Magistrate in emergency situations, while noting that that decision pre-dated the 1973 amendment and did not settle the composite-order controversy. |
| Mahant Bhagwandas v. Suggan | Recognized that there may be cases of emergency where it is dangerous to wait for formal service of the preliminary order before issuing an order of attachment; a Magistrate can issue an order of attachment along with the preliminary order without prior service, but must indicate reasons showing why ex parte attachment was necessary. | The court observed this authority but noted it pre-dated the 1973 amendment and did not conclusively resolve the present controversy about composite orders after amendment. |
| Gaya Singh v. Collector Singh (Full Bench, Patna High Court) | Held that an order of attachment without hearing parties was permissible; observed that while initiating section 145 proceedings a Magistrate may attach the subject matter in dispute without hearing the other side where emergency exists, and attachment continues until proceedings under section 145 are decided. | The court relied on the Full Bench’s observations to show that attachment without hearing can be permissible, but concluded those observations did not decide the precise controversy about composite orders in the present context. |
| Mathura Lal v. Bhanwarilal (Supra) | Held that in a case of emergency a Magistrate may attach property at any time after making the preliminary order under section 145(1); emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of section 146(1). | The court cited this Supreme Court authority to support the proposition that attachment may be ordered in emergencies after a preliminary order, and noted that Supreme Court cases had not directly addressed composite-orders issue. |
| Chandu Naik v. Sita Ram B. Naik | The opinion references this Supreme Court case among authorities considered in earlier decisions (specific rule as stated in this opinion is not detailed). | The court noted that Chandu Naik was taken into consideration in prior Patna Division Bench reasoning (Mahendra Tiwari), but the opinion does not state more specific application beyond that context. |
| Laxman Bhikaji Pawar v. Bahimkhan Balekhan Dalwai (Bombay High Court) | Held section 146(1) postulates making an order under section 145(1) first and thereafter giving directions such as attachment; to make out emergency there must be material on record and not merely the Magistrate's personal impressions; criticized composite orders made without statutory safeguards. | The court cited this case as representing the view that composite orders may be improper if attachment is done without proper material and separate application of mind. |
| Lilly Frankin v. Wilson (Kerala) | Held that the order under section 145(1) becomes complete only when the Magistrate signs it; only after signature should the Magistrate consider whether attachment under section 146(1) is required. | The court referenced this case as part of the Kerala High Court line of decisions critical of composite orders, noting Kerala’s position that the two orders should be separate and sequential. |
| Kottarthil Mavunni v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court) | Held that a composite order under section 145(1) and section 146(1) cannot be passed; an order of attachment under section 146(1) can be passed only after the preliminary order under section 145(1) has been made. | The court cited this to demonstrate divergence among High Courts and to explain the Kerala High Court’s strict position against composite orders. |
| Amrit Singh v. Gyandeo Sharma | The opinion references this single-judge decision; the opinion reports that the judgment observed an order of attachment must indicate circumstances and that mere statement "breach of the peace might take place" was not sufficient. | The court referred to this decision in discussing the need for an order under section 146(1) to indicate the emergency circumstances; the court observed that in the present case additional materials existed which justified not interfering with an order in another case, but this authority did not decide the composite-order controversy. |
| Mahendra Tiwari v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi (Patna High Court — Division Bench) | Observed that if the court is satisfied there is likelihood of breach of peace it can pass an order of attachment but only after making an order under section 145(1); both orders cannot be passed simultaneously. | The present court discussed this Patna Division Bench view as one of the authorities taking the strict position that the attachment must be subsequent to the preliminary order; the opinion contrasted this with other authorities. |
| Narainram v. Shanker Lal; Chhagan Singh v. State of Raj | These authorities were cited by counsel in support of the position that composite orders are impermissible; the opinion does not set out detailed rules from these cases. | The court listed these cases among the authorities relied upon by the non-petitioner but the opinion does not elaborate their specific holdings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the divergent authorities and the language of sections 145(1) and 146(1) Cr.P.C., and proceeded step-by-step as follows:
- Reviewed authorities from various High Courts and the Supreme Court showing a divergence of opinion on whether a composite order under sections 145(1) and 146(1) is permissible after the 1973 amendment to the Cr.P.C. The court noted that some decisions (e.g., Kerala and Patna Division Bench in Mahendra Tiwari) disallow composite orders, while other decisions (e.g., Thoophil Xess, Gaya Singh, Mahant Bhagwandas) permit attachment in emergency and, in some formulations, allow attachment to follow closely upon the preliminary order and in exceptional circumstances even ex parte.
- Examined the text of section 145(1): it requires the Executive Magistrate, upon being satisfied from police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists, to make a written preliminary order stating grounds and requiring parties to attend and file written statements concerning possession.
- Examined the text of section 146(1): it permits the Magistrate, at any time after making the order under section 145(1), to attach the subject of dispute and appoint a receiver if he considers the case one of emergency, or if he decides none of the parties is then in possession, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which party was in possession.
- From the statutory language, the court concluded that an order under section 146(1) can only be validly passed after the making of an order under section 145(1); the statute says "at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145." However, the court found no textual bar preventing the Magistrate from passing both orders in the same document or sitting provided that the section 146(1) part does not precede the section 145(1) part and that the Magistrate has applied his mind separately to the emergency question.
- The court emphasized that the order under section 146(1) must follow and not precede the order under section 145(1) and that there is no prescribed time limit for passing the section 146(1) order so long as it is after the preliminary order. The court also stressed that the Magistrate must not act mechanically; he must indicate in the order the circumstances showing emergency such that service or hearing would endanger the peace, particularly where attachment and appointment of a receiver remove a person from possession.
- Applying these principles to the present case, the court examined the SDM’s order of 24 July 1982. It found that the SDM first considered the police report and concluded there was a serious tension and possibility of breach of peace, and drew a preliminary order under section 145(1) directing notice and evidence. The SDM, in the same order, then proceeded to consider emergency and appointed a receiver under section 146(1). The court found that the SDM’s single-sentence treatment of the section 146(1) question did not specify the circumstances relied on to justify ex parte attachment and appointment of a receiver.
- Consequently, although the court held that composite orders are not per se illegal where the Magistrate has in fact applied his mind separately to both the preliminary and emergency conditions and has indicated the factual basis for emergency, the SDM’s order in this case failed to spell out the circumstances showing such an emergency. The court therefore upheld the Sessions Judge’s decision insofar as the attachment and appointment of receiver were set aside and remitted those questions to the SDM for fresh consideration according to the court’s observations.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that a Magistrate may, in appropriate circumstances, pass an order under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. in the same order or sitting in which a preliminary order under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. is made, provided that the order under section 146(1) follows (and does not precede) the order under section 145(1) and the Magistrate has applied his mind independently to the question of emergency and adequately recorded the circumstances justifying attachment or appointment of a receiver.
Result in the present case: The Sessions Judge’s order remanding the matter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tonk, is maintained so far as the attachment of the land and appointment of receiver is concerned. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate is directed to consider the question of attachment and appointment of receiver afresh in accordance with the observations made by the High Court and to pass a fresh order according to law.
Implications: The court clarified that while composite orders are not automatically void, they must clearly indicate (a) that the preliminary order under section 145(1) was made and (b) the separate factual basis on which the Magistrate concluded that an emergency existed for the purposes of section 146(1). The court warned against routine or mechanical use of section 146(1) without articulation of emergency facts, because attachment and appointment of receiver remove persons from possession and affect substantive interests. The direct consequence for the parties is that the SDM must re-examine the emergency question and, if appropriate, reissue an attachment/receiver order in terms that demonstrate independent application of mind and the factual bases relied upon.
(9) Mahendra Tiwari v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi (1982 Cri. L.J 17)(10
) Mahant Bhagwandas v. Suggan (1965 RLW 1)
(11) Chandu Naik v. Sita Ram B. Naik ((1978) 1 SCC 210 : AIR 1978 SC 333)
(12) Amrit Singh v. Gyandeo Sharma (1978 Cr. L.J 671)
(13) Lilly Frankin v. Wilson (1977 Kerala LT 871)
D.K Soral, for Petitioners;
K.N Tikku, for Non-petitioner
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
N.M Kasliwal, J.:— This criminal revision has been filed by Girwar Dan, Laxman Dan and Girdhar Singh (hereinafter referred to as “the party No. 1”) against non-petitioner Ram Prasad (hereinafter referred to as ‘the party No. 2’) challenging the order of learned Sessions Judge, Tonk dated 16th August, 1982, whereby he set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Malpura dated 24th July, 1982.
2. Brief facts leading to this revision are that the party No. 1 submitted an application under sec. 145 and 146 Cr. P.C against party No. 2 on 16th July, 1982, on the allegations that one Mst. Bhoori had sold agricultural land measuring 29 Bighas 8 Biswas in village Rajpura Tak Tordi Tehsil Malpura in favour of the party No. 1 and also handed over actual possession over the land in question. Subsequently party No. 2 and Mst. Bhoori collusively wanted to dispossess the party No. 1. On July 15, 1982, they tried to dispossess the party No. 1 by force and on that account there was a danger as to breach of peace. It was therefore, prayed that possession of party No. 1 be declared over the land in question and the same be attached and a receiver be appointed so that peace may not be disturbed. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate sent the complaint to the police for investigation. The Station House Officer Police Station, Malpura, recorded statement of the witnesses of both the parties and sent a report that there was imminent danger of breach of peace and life of both the parties was in danger and the Station House Officer prayed that it was a case of emergency and action should be taken under section 146 Cr. P.C The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate after perusing the report of the police passed an order on 24th July, 1982 attaching the land in dispute under section 146(1) Cr. P.C The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate appointed Tehsildar, Malpura, as receiver to take immediate possession of the land in question.
3. The opposite party No. 2 aggrieved against the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate filed a revision in the court of Sessions Judge, Tonk. The learned Sessions Judge, by his order dated 16th August, 1982 allowed the revision and set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate attaching the property under section 146(1) Cr. P.C The learned Sessions Judge took the view that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass a composite order under section 145(1) as well as section 146(1) Cr. P.C The learned Sessions Judge did not consider the matter on merits and left it for fresh determination by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
4. In these circumstances the party No. 1 has filed the present revision. It was contended by Mr. Soral, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate in his order had arrived at the conclusion that there was dispute regarding immovable property and there was danger as to breach of peace and had passed the preliminary order as contemplated under section 145(1) Cr. P.C The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate was also satisfied regarding emergency and it was considered necessary to attach the property and there was nothing wrong or illegal on the part of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, if both the above orders were passed simultaneously in the same order. It was contended by Mr. Soral that the main crux of the matter is that the Magistrate should be satisfied on the material placed before him for drawing the preliminary order as well as an order under section 145(1) and it is immaterial whether these two orders are passed separately or contained in the same order. Reliance in this regard is placed on 1. Gaya Singh v. 2. Collector Singh (4).
5. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Tikku, learned counsel for the non-petitioner, opposite party No. 2, that a composite order cannot be passed with regard to section 145(1) & 146(1) Cr. P.C It is submitted by Mr. Tikku that in the scheme of section 145 and 146 after the amendment in the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973, an order u/s. 146(1) can only be passed after making an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 Cr. P.C It is contended that the Magistrate assumes no jurisdiction to pass any order under section 146(1) till he has made any order under sub-section (1) of section 145 Cr. P.C It is further submitted that the Magistrate should not pass an order of attachment considering the case to be one of emergency in a mechanical manner and he must apply his mind separately and after making an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 Cr. P.C he should consider the case to be one of emergency. It is pointed out that in the present case the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not pass an order under section 145(1) Cr. P.C and before completing the same he started considering the question of emergency and passed an order under section 146(1) and subsequently he gave a direction to register the case and called upon the party No. 2 to appear before him on August 11, 1982. It is contended that such an order is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction and the learned Sessions Judge was right in setting aside such order and in giving a fresh direction to the learned Magistrate to pass an appropriate order on merits. Reliance in support of his contention is placed on Laxman Bhikaji Pawar v. Bahimkhan Balekhan Dalwai (5), Narainram v. Shanker Lal (6), Chhagan Singh v. State of Raj. (7), Kottarthil Mavunni v. State of Kerala (8) and Mahendra Tiwari v. Mt. Lal Pari Devi(9).
6. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have thoroughly perused the record.
7. The Orissa High Court in Thoophil Xess's case (supra) held that a Magistrate who wants to pass an order under section 146(1) had first to pass an order under section 145(1) Cr. P.C In order to assume jurisdiction to attach the property under section 146(1) Cr. P.C There is nothing in the said two sections or in the Criminal Procedure Code to prevent a Magistrate to pass the said two orders in the same strain and in the same sitting. The order under section 146(1) just following the order under section 145(1) of the Code.
8. In Tejsingh's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that if there is some material before the Magistrate, and if on the basis of that material he has come to the decision about the existence of the state of emergency then the law gives him very wide discretion and it would not be proper for a revisional court to interfere only because another court can arrive at a different finding on the same material.
9. The above case was before the amendment made in the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973. That apart, the controversy now sought to be raised in the present case was neither considered nor determined. It was no where decided in the above case whether an order under section 145(1) & 146(1), can be made in a composite manner or separately.
10. In Mahant Bhagwandas v. Suggan (10) it was observed as under:
“There may conceivably be cases of emergency where it may be dangerous to wait for the formality of servnig the preliminary order on the parties before issuing an order of attachment. In such cases a Magistrate is competent to issue an order of attachment along with the preliminary order without being first served on the parties. A magistrate while passing an order of attachment should clearly indicate how he considers a case of emergency and how he considers the emergency of such a nature that an exparte attachment should be ordered without giving an opportunity to the other side whose interests are likely to be affected.” In my opinion the above case is also prior to the amendment in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and does not give any assistance in deciding the pointed controversy raised in the case before me.
11. A full bench decision of the Patna High Court in Gaya Singh's case (supra) held that an order of attachment without hearing parties was permissible. Even Mr. Tikku, learned counsel for the party No. 2 has not made any argument that any order of attachment could not have been by the Magistrate without hearing parties if he considered that it was necessary to attach the property as emergency existed. His only contention is that a composite order cannot be passed and in any case the order under section 146(1) should follow and not precede the order under section 145(1). Mr. Soral, learned counsel for the party No. 1 laid emphasis on the following observations made by the full Bench of the Patna High Court:—
“In view of this pronouncement, it has to be held that even under the new Code it is open to the Magistrate while initiating a proceeding under section 145 to attach the subject matter in dispute without hearing the other side and this attachment is to last till the proceeding under S. 145 is decided in favour of one party or the other. After that, the attachment has to be withdrawn in accordance with the aforesaid proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146 of the new Code, because after the decision there would be no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The attachment, according to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, is to continue till the matter is decided by a competent court only under two contingencies, i.e (i) when the Magistrate decides that none of parties were in possession of the disputed property, or (ii) he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was in such possession of the subject in dispute.
12. In my view the above observations do not decide the precise controversy raised in the case before me and as such assistance cannot be sought from the above observations made by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court.
13. In Mathura Lal's case (supra) it was held that in a case of emergency a Magistrate may attach the property at any time after making the preliminary order under section 145(1). There is no express stipulation in section 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment, nor has it implied, far from it. The obligation to proceed with the inquiry as prescribed by Section 145(4) is against such implication. The only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in S. 145(5) and it can be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of S. 146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace.
14. In the above cases before their Lordships of the Supreme Court there was no controversy regarding a composite order passed under section 145(1) and 146(1).
15. The Bombay High Court in Laxman Bhikaji Pawar's case (supra) observed that:
“Section 146(1) is quite explicit. It postulates the making of an order under S. 145(1) in the first instance and thereafter giving directions such as attachment of property or appointment of a receiver. The stage to determine the factum of possession can arise only after the parties have filed their written statements on due service of notice. No doubt the Magistrate is armed with a power to attach the property in cases of emergency; but to make out a case for emergency there must be some material before the Magistrate coming forth on the record from the statements of parties, documents produced by them or such other evidence as they may choose to adduce, and not upon the personal impressions carried by the Magistrate.”
16. In the above case the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate had passed a composite order on 24the June, 1975. The first part referred to the making of the order under section 145(1) directing both the parties to remain present at 11 a.m on 27th June, 1975 with their written statement and evidence as regards their possession. The latter part of the order has been produced in the above report as under which was severly attacked—
“In view of the facts that now being the season of transplanation operations of rice and as both parties are going in the field and therefore there being likelihood of riots and breach of peace, I order, under section 146(1) of the Cr. P. Code that I have attached the lands in dispute and given them in possession of Circle Inspector, Chiplun, and I am appointing the said Circle Inspector as the Receiver. I have given this order under the seal and my signature.”
17. While dealing with the above point it was observed as under:—
“This brings me to the turning point in the entire case as to whether a composite order made by the learned Magistrate, without observance of the statutory requirement, could be sustained. As noted above, under the old code, third proviso of sub-section (4), the Magistrate is empowered to make an order of attachment, but even, then it proceeded with the expression, than, which means after the compliance of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 145 of the old Cr. P.C sub-section (1) of Section 146 of the New Code is quite explicit. It postulates the making of an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 in the first instance and thereafter given direction such as attachment of property or appointment of a receiver. The stage to determine the factum of possession can arise only after the parties have filed their written statements on due service of notice. No doubt, both under the old Code and the new Code the Magistrate is armed with a power to attach the property in cases of emergency, but to make out a case for emergency there must be some material before the learned Magistrate coming forth on the record from the statements of the parties, document's produced by them or such other evidence as they may choose to adduce and not upon the personal impressions carried by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate on lending his ears to those who are present in the village Chavdi during the course of his visit. The powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 146 cannot be so enlarged by the learned Magistrate as to do away with the statutory safeguards which are quite salutory.”
18. In Mahendra Tiwari's case the Division Bench of the Patna High Court observed as under:—
“In case of a dispute concerning the land if the Court is satisfied that there is likelihood of a breach of peace, the Court can pass an order of attachment but only after making an order under section 145(1) for the concerning parties to file their written statement. Both the orders cannot be passed simultaneously.”
In the above case the two Supreme Court cases reported in Chandu Naik v. Sita Ram B. Naik (11) and Mathura Lal v. Bhanwarilal (supra) were taken into consideration. After considering these cases it was observed as under:—
“From discussion of the above cases this much is clear that an order of attachment cannot be passed simultaneously in the sense that a Magistrate, while initiating a proceeding under section 145 of the Code cannot, at the same time also make an order of attachment. An order of attachment has got to be made subsequent to the initiation of the proceedings in the circumstances mentioned in Section 146(1) of the Code. Sufficient support can be derived for this view from the second case of the Supreme Court mentioned above. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, sought to seek support from the decision of a learned single judge of this Court in the case of Amrit Singh v. Gyandeo Sharma(12) where it was observed that the order of attachment must indicate circumstances, why the magistrate thought, it so, otherwise the order cannot be sustained. The learned Judge himself in the judgment has observed that, it may be that even in such cases where the Magistrate does not say that the case is one of emergency but if the circumstances are such that the superior courts thinks that the case was one of emergency, then that court may not interfere. In the case before the learned Single Judge Magistrate had merely said that “breach of the peace might take place any time.” In as much apprehension of the breach of the peace was jurisdictional fact and condition precedent initiation of the proceedings, if I may say the learned Judge rightly thought that mere observation in the order of attachment was not sufficient for passing the order of attachment as no indication of emergency was indicated the case before us I had already referred to additional and subsequent materials which were brought on the record by the first party to press upon the learned Magistrate that a grave situation might arise in case no order of attachment was passed. Therefore, although the impugned order is not explicit in disclosing those facts in details as the ground for passing an order of attachment, having examined the material on the records. I do not find any reasonable ground for interfering with the order of the learned Magistrate. I do not find any substance in the other arguments of the learned counsel, which was directed towards the observation made in the impugned order that the learned Magistrate was unable to decide the possession of the parties on account of legal difficulties. That was a casual observation and this position could arise only when the final order was to be passed at the close of the proceeding. The order of attachment apparently was based upon the allegations, which are made by the first party as already indicated above. Therefore, nothing would turn upon the validity of the order with reference to this further observation in the impugned order.”
19. In Kottarthil Mavunni's case (supra), the Kerala High Court has observed as under:—
“A composite order under sub-section (1) of section 145 and under sub-section (1) of Section 146 cannot be passed an order of attachment under sub-section (i) of section 146 can be passed only after the preliminary order under sub-section (1) of section 145 had already been passed by the Magistrate.
Where the Magistrate made a preliminary order under section 145 and stated that he was satisfied that there were sufficient grounds for taking proceedings as there exists serious likelihood of breach of peace concerning the disputed property and further by the later part of the decree he placed the disputed property under attachment under section 146(1), his order regarding later part would be without jurisdiction.”
In the above case an earlier case of the same Court Lilly Frankin v. Wilson (13) was considered in which it was held that the order under section 145(1) becomes complete only when the Magistrate puts his signature therein. It is only thereafter that he is expected to consider whether it is a case of emergency requiring attachment of property.
20. A perusal of the above authorities show that there is some divergences of opinion between the different High Courts on the question in controversy raised in the present case. A bare perusal of Section 145(1) and 146(1) Cr. P.C shows that the ambit and scope of the two sections is entirely different. Section 145(1) requires that whenever an executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of the police officer or upon other information that the dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend the court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statement of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. This provision shows that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction for proceeding in the matter only after drawing a preliminary order contained in Section 145(1) matter only after drawing a preliminary order contained in section 145(1) Cr. P.C In this regard he must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof within his local jurisdiction. Section 146 then deals with the powers of the Magistrate to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver. Under section 146(1) if the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute he may attach the subject in dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute.
21. The language of above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that an order under section 146(1) can only be passed after making an order under sub-section () of section 145. There is no restriction with regard to the period or time for passing such order as the language used it that any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 such order can be passed under section 145(1). In my view there is no restriction on the power of Magistrate that he cannot pass any order simultaneously under section 146(1) with the order under section 145(1). The only restriction is that the order under section 146(1) should follow and not precede the order under section 145(1) Cr. P.C It is also necessary on the part of the learned Magistrate to apply his mind independently to the question of emergency and should not pass an order as a matter of routine alongwith an order under section 145(1) Cr. P.C It would depend upon the fact and circumstances of each case whether the emergency was such that attachment of the property was required alongwith the preliminary order passed under section 145(1). The Magistrate should apply his mind to the fact whether it was a case of such emergency to attach the property and appoint a receiver that even the service upon the opposite party and the time to hear him would endanger the breach of the peace to such an extent that the opportunity of hearing could not be given.
22. I see no bar under the provisions of section 146(1) that in case the Magistrate on the basis of the material available before him considers the case of such imminent urgency that even the service of notice on the opposite party would cause a serious danger as to the breach of peace, even then he had no jurisdiction to pass both the orders simultaneously. Neither there is any such bar in the language of section 146(1) nor it can be the intention of the legislature to debar a Magistrate to pass such an order if he considers the matter to be of such grave emergency. I see no valid objection in this regard that the Magistrate cannot pass a composite order even if he is satisfied that a grave and urgent emergency requires to attach the property and appoint receiver alongwith the preliminary order. I see no valid reason for the view taken by Kerala High Court in this regard that the order passed under section 145(1) should be signed and thereafter, a separate order should be drawn and signed under section 146(1). In my view such objection would be highly technical if an order passed by the Magistrate is held to be illegal merely on this account that he has passed both the orders under secs. 145(1) and 146(1) in the same order and thereafter he has put his signatures in the end. However, I do not want to lay down by this that the order under section 146(1) may be passed in a mere mechanical manner without applying the mind regarding emergency. It must be clearly borne out from the order of the Magistrate, if he passes a composite order that he was satisfied separately with regard to the conditions existing for the drawing the preliminary order and for order under section 146(1). It may be appropriate if the Magistrate passes the two orders separately so that it may be clearly indicated that he had applied his mind to the circumstances for passing an order under secs. 145(1) and 146(1), but in case the circumstances are spelt out separately in the same order, then the order cannot be declared illegal or without jurisdiction. The Magistrate while passing an order under section 146(1) should act with circumspection and apply his mind whether it was a case of such an emergency that even the notice to the opposite will defeat the ends of justice or will endanger a serious breach of peace. This is necessary because if property is attached and a receiver is appointed, then the person who is in actual possession of such property, is removed from possession and it goes in the hands of the receiver.
23. It is well settled that proceedings under section 145 and 146 do not decide the question of title relating to immovable property and the Magistrate on the spot is given powers to prevent breach of the peace relating to dispute of possession over an immovable property. The Magistrate on the spot can be satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any immovable property.
24. In the present case a perusal of the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 24th July, 1982, shows that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate first considered the conclusions as drawn by the police in its report. Thereafter, it has been observed that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate considered the record and the report of the police according to which both the parties were bent upon cultivating the land considering the same belonging to them. There was a serious tension between the parties and there was a possibility of the breach of the peace and happening of untoward incident with regard to cultivating the land. In these circumstances the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate observed that he was satisfied to draw a preliminary order as contemplated under section 145 Cr. P.C and gave a direction to issue notice to both the parties to produce oral and documentary evidence in support of their possession over the land. Thereafter, in the same order the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate considered the question regarding emergency and appointing receiver under section 146(1). In this regard the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the following order in one sentence:—
The above order cannot be considered fulfilling the requirement of section 146(1) that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was satisfied that the emergency was of such kind that even notice to the opposite parties could not have been given and even prior to that it was necessary to attach the land and appoint a receiver. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not pointed out any circumstances which were considered necessary by him to resort to an action under section 146(1). As already observed above such order should not be passed as a matter of routine and it must be indicated in the order by the Magistrate that he was considering the matter of such emergency that even the notice of short duration was not possible in a given case and in his view the land was required to be attached alongwith the preliminary order passed under section 145(1). Very often, it comes to the notice of this court that Magistrates pass an order of attaching the property and appointing a receiver alongwith the preliminary order passed under section 145 Cr. P.C in a routine manner. This is not the intention of the legislature in making a separate provision under section 146(1). The Magistrates are required to apply their mind separately with regard to existence of emergency and should pass an order with great circumspection under sec. 146(1). It must be clearly borne out from their order that such emergency exists in the facts and circumstances of that given case.
25. In the result, the order remanding the case to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Malpura, by the learned Sessions Judge is maintained so far as the attachment and appointment of receiver is concerned, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate shall consider the question in accordance with the observations made above and pass a fresh order according to law.
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