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New India Assurance Company Ltd. And Another v. Gauri Shanker Sharma And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a claim for compensation following a motor vehicle accident on the midnight of 29/30th March, 1979, near Soyala village. The claimant, Gaurishanker, owner of truck No. RSZ 248, alleged that his truck, which had broken down and was stationary on the roadside, was collided with by truck No. RJX 1898 driven rashly and negligently by Tulsiram. The accident caused damage to the claimant’s truck. A police complaint was lodged and subsequently a claim petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tonk. The Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 14,841/- against a claim of Rs. 26,650/-. Both the owner and insurer of truck No. RJX 1898 were held liable. The appeal challenges the Tribunal’s award and raises questions regarding the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to entertain claims for property damage alone, especially in light of amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain claims for compensation solely for damage to property caused by a motor vehicle accident, particularly after the amendments to section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
- Whether the statutory limits on compensation amounts restrict the Claims Tribunal’s award for property damage claims exceeding those limits.
- Whether the liability of the insurance company is limited to statutory minimums or extends to the amount agreed upon in the insurance policy.
- Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was excessive given the evidence, including disbelieved receipts.
- Whether interest should be awarded on the compensation amount from the date of application till realization.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The insurer and owner contended that under the amended section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Claims Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain claims by the owner solely for property damage.
- It was argued that for claims exceeding Rs. 2,000/-, the claimant has the option to approach the civil court, indicating the Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction over such claims.
- The appellant relied on the Madras High Court decision in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannathan which held that the Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to claims involving bodily injury or death, not property damage alone.
- The appellant further argued that the compensation awarded was excessive, especially since some receipts submitted were disbelieved.
Respondent's Arguments
- The claimant argued that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain claims for property damage alone, as supported by decisions from Punjab and Haryana High Court and Karnataka High Court.
- It was contended that the amendment to section 110(1) expressly authorizes the Tribunal to adjudicate claims involving damage to property, whether standalone or composite.
- The claimant also argued that the liability of the insurance company is contractual and not limited by statutory minimums, referencing the Bombay High Court decision in Sharda Prasad Singh v. Maharashtra State Road Trans. Copn.
- Regarding the compensation amount, the claimant maintained that the Tribunal’s award was a reasonable appreciation of evidence and that strict rules of evidence applicable in civil or criminal cases do not bind the Tribunal.
- The claimant sought interest on the awarded amount from the date of application till realization.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R. Selvaraj v. Jagannathan, 1969 ACJ 1 (Madras) | Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction limited to death or bodily injury claims; no jurisdiction over property damage claims alone. | Discussed and contrasted; Court did not accept this restrictive view of jurisdiction. |
| Om Prakash v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 MP 19 | Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction over composite claims involving injury and property damage. | Referenced as part of conflicting views; Gujarat High Court followed this view. |
| Yaswant Raj v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1984 Raj 144 | Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction over composite claims. | Decision incomplete; court declined to rely heavily on it. |
| Haryana State v. Pusa Ram, 1979 ACJ 12 (P & H) | Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to award compensation for property damage alone. | Supported the Court’s acceptance of Tribunal’s jurisdiction over property damage claims. |
| Jaswant Kaur v. Ratti Ram, 1971 ACJ 31 (P & H) | Jurisdiction and claims related to motor vehicle accidents. | Referred to support claimant’s position. |
| Farsubhai Altapbhai Saiyed v. Dullabhbhai Bhagabhai Patel, 1973 ACJ 149 (Gujarat) | Claims Tribunal jurisdiction and compensation principles. | Referred to support claimant’s position. |
| B.S Nat v. Bachan Singh, 1971 ACJ 37 (P & H) | Claims Tribunal jurisdiction over property damage. | Referred to support claimant’s position. |
| Nokes v. Don Caster Amalgamated Collieries, (1940) AC 1014 | General legal principles relevant to claims and liability. | Referenced by claimant’s counsel. |
| Ratan Singh Karsanbhai Nakum v. Isadkhan Gulamkhan, 1975 ACJ 455 (Gujarat) | Claims Tribunal jurisdiction and compensation. | Referred to support claimant’s position. |
| Shyambihari v. Shiv Singh, 1976 ACJ 95 (MP) | Claims Tribunal jurisdiction and related principles. | Referred to support claimant’s position. |
| Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. v. Jyoti Constructions, 1979 ACJ 426 (Karnataka) | Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction to award compensation for property damage alone. | Supported the Court’s view accepting Tribunal jurisdiction over property damage claims. |
| Sri Ranganathar Trans. (P.) Ltd. v. Tanjore Co-op. Marketing Federation, 1982 ACJ 199 (Madras) | Section 110-F bars civil court jurisdiction; Claims Tribunal exclusive forum. | Supported the Court’s conclusion that civil courts lack jurisdiction where Claims Tribunal is competent. |
| Sharda Prasad Singh v. Maharashtra State Road Trans. Copn., 1984 ACJ 240 (Bombay) | Insurance company’s liability governed by contractual terms, not limited by statutory minimums. | Adopted by the Court to hold that insurance liability is not capped by statutory limits if policy provides otherwise. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly sections 95, 96, 110, and 110-A, and the amendments therein. The Court noted that the 1978 amendment to section 110 inserted a clause expressly authorizing the Claims Tribunal to entertain claims for compensation by the owner of the property damaged in a motor accident, thereby removing prior ambiguities.
The Court analyzed conflicting judicial precedents, including the restrictive view of the Madras High Court in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannathan, which limited the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to claims involving death or bodily injury, and contrasting decisions from other High Courts that recognized jurisdiction over property damage claims alone. The Court favored the latter approach, emphasizing the plain language of the amended statute and the legislative intent to empower the Tribunal to adjudicate such claims.
Regarding the statutory limits on compensation, the Court held that these represent minimum compulsory insurance coverage and do not cap the insurer’s contractual liability, which depends on the terms of the insurance policy and premium paid. The Court condemned attempts by insurance companies to evade liability beyond statutory limits when they have contractually agreed to higher coverage.
On the evidentiary issue, the Court acknowledged that Claims Tribunals operate by summary procedures and are not bound by strict civil or criminal rules of evidence. The Tribunal’s award was deemed a fair and reasonable appreciation of the evidence, including the consideration of normal damages and repair expenses despite some receipts being disbelieved.
Finally, the Court allowed interest at 12% per annum on the awarded amount from the date of the claim application till realization, finding this a reasonable addition to the compensation.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, upholding the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’s award of Rs. 14,841/- for property damage caused by the accident, with the modification that interest at 12% per annum shall be paid on this amount from the date of application till realization.
The direct effect of this decision is to affirm the Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction to entertain claims solely for damage to property arising from motor vehicle accidents, including claims exceeding earlier statutory limits. The Court confirmed that insurance company liability is governed by contractual terms and not strictly limited by statutory minimums. No new precedent was set beyond the application of existing statutory interpretation and judicial authorities in this context.
Lodha, J.:— This appeal has been filed by the insurer and the owner of truck No. RJX 1898 jointly against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tonk, granting compensation of Rs. 14,841/- though the claim submitted was of Rs. 26,650/-, for an accident in which one truck dashed against another truck.
2. Gaurishanker, the claimant-respondent No. 1, the owner of truck No. RSZ 248, claimed damages caused to his truck in the accident which took place on the midnight of 29/30th March, 1979, near Soyala village on the main road when his truck was standing as it had gone out of order. The cause of the accident, as alleged, was that while the said truck No. RSZ 248 was standing on one side of the main road and in the said truck, its driver and cleaner were sleeping, another truck No. RJX 1898, which was being driven by Tulsiram, respondent No. 2, came from the side of Jaipur going towards Tonk, at a very fast speed being driven rashly and negligently and, collided with the said truck RSZ 248 which was standing on one side of the road, with the result the said truck was smashed. A complaint was lodged in the police station and, thereafter, this claim petition was filed. After the filing of the reply, the issues were framed and the evidence of the parties was recorded. The Tribunal then, as mentioned above, awarded claim of Rs. 14,841/-. Both, the owner and the insurer of the truck No. RJX 1898, were made liable. Before this court, Mr. Bhargava has raised an important question of law regarding jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal in the matters of accident causing damage to the property. Mr. Bhargava pointed out that under section 110-A in the amended form, of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter, for short, referred to as ‘the Act’) there was no provision for filing a claim by the owner and this was introduced by an amendment in the year 1978. Mr. Bhargava further pointed out that for a claim of more than Rs. 2,000/-, an option was given to go to civil court and this again shows that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhargava relied upon the decision of Madras High Court in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannathan, 1969 ACJ 1 (Madras), wherein it has been observed as under:
“(3) But I am unable to share the view in Om Prakash v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 MP 19, that where the claim is a composite one, part of it relating to compensation for personal injury and the rest to loss of property, the Claims Tribunal will have jurisdiction over the entire matter. The principle that where in order to give a relief it will be necessary as an incidental matter to cover another subject otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of different forum is applicable only to civil courts and cannot, in my opinion, be extended to Tribunals. The reason is that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute and its jurisdiction is strictly limited by the terms of such statute. It cannot be allowed to exceed its limits on any general principle of law. The jurisdiction should be delimited strictly in terms of the statutory definition thereof. But that is not the case as to the jurisdiction of the civil courts of the land. The principle that will govern such courts will be that they will have jurisdiction to try all civil matters unless it is expressly or by necessary implication taken away from their purview by a competent legislation.
(4) As I said section 110 brought into being the Tribunal for a specific purpose, namely, to try claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of use of such motor vehicles. It is only in respect of such claims, the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded by terms of section 110-F. There is absolutely no indication in either of the sections or in any other provision of the Motor Vehicles Act to justify the proposition that Tribunal will have jurisdiction to try any claim other than that defined in section 110(1). It may be that this approach to the matter may involve trial of identical issue by different jurisdictions which may possibly lead to conflict of findings. But that in itself will not, in my opinion, make any difference to the limits of the jurisdiction of the statutory Tribunal set up by the terms of the legislation.”
3. A reading of the Editorial note contained in the decision of Madras High Court in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannaihan, 1969 ACJ 1 (Madras), would show that the Gujarat High Court, at that time in Zarin Rustomji Munshi v. Shantubhai Manibhai Patel, 1968 ACJ 327 (Gujarat), has also taken a contrary view and followed the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Om Prakash v. National Fire and General Ins. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 MP 19, wherein it was held that in such matters, the civil court will have no jurisdiction, but the Madras High Court in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannathan, 1969 ACJ 1 (Madras), expressed its inability to support this view. The Madras view is based on the ground that the Tribunal has been brought into for a specific purpose, namely to try claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of use of motor vehicles.
4. Mr. Bhargava also referred to the decision of this court in Yaswant Raj v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1984 Raj 144 : 1985 ACJ 23 (Rajasthan), which has been published in August volume and is incomplete. So far as this decision of this court is concerned, firstly, it is incomplete as to what is judgment as a whole though the judgment was given on 30th March, 1983 but, up to the dictation of judgment in court, the learned Members of the Bar could not produce the same. In the reporting, all that has been said is that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to try the composite claim in respect of bodily injury and damage to vehicle. Head note (A) shows that this court has dissented from the view taken in R. Selvaraj v. Jagannaihan, 1969 ACJ 1 (Madras). In the absence of full text of the judgment, it would not be safe to make any comment and, to understand its implications.
5. Contrary to it, Mr. Mathur appearing for the claimant, pointed out that the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Haryana State v. Pusa Ram, 1979 ACJ 12 (P & H), has held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to award compensation for damage to the property. In this case, these decisions were referred: Jaswant Kaur v. Ratti Ram, 1971 ACJ 31 (P & H); Farsubhai Altapbhai Saiyed v. Dullabhbhai Bhagabhai Patel, 1973 ACJ 149 (Gujarat); B.S Nat v. Bachan Singh, 1971 ACJ 37 (P & H); Nokes v. Don Caster Amalgamated Collieries, (1940) AC 1014; Ratan Singh Karsanbhai Nakum v. Isadkhan Gulamkhan, 1975 ACJ 455 (Gujarat); Shyambihari v. Shiv Singh, 1976 ACJ 95 (MP).
6. In para 5 of that decision, it has been observed as under:
“It was next contended that though the provisions of section 110(1) were amended so as to authorise the Tribunal to decide claims respecting damage to property yet no corresponding amendment was made in sub-section (1)(a) of section 110-A which necessarily implies that the Legislature intended to authorise the Tribunal to try only composite claims of bodily injury and damage to property and not the later claims simpliciter. We quite appreciate the ingenuity of the argument but find no substance in it. The bare reading of the amended section 110(1) would show that the Tribunal is now authorised to adjudicate upon claims for compensation involving the death of or bodily injury to persons or damage to any property or both. The claim for damage to property simpliciter is, therefore, within the cognizance of the Tribunal. The Legislature probably did not deem it necessary to make any corresponding amendment in section 110-A because the word injury is a word of very wide amplitude and includes both bodily injury and injury to property. According to dictionary meaning of the word ‘injury’ means ‘damage or hurt done or suffered by a person or thing’. As a general term, therefore, it means, hurt of any sort whether suffered by a person or a thing and the person whose property has been damaged in a motor accident would, therefore, be the person who has sustained the injury within the meaning of clause (1)(a) of section 110-A of the Act.”
7. Mr. Mathur further relied upon the decision of Karnataka High Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. v. Jyoti Constructions, Mangalore, 1979 ACJ 426 (Karnataka), wherein the view has been taken that the Accidents Claims Tribunal had got jurisdiction to award compensation for damage to property alone also. This decision also finds support from the Punjab view.
8. The view again finds support of the decision in Sri Ranganathar Trans. (P.) Ltd. v. Tanjore Co-op. Marketing Federation, 1982 ACJ 199 (Madras), wherein the question before the High Court was whether section 110-F bars the jurisdiction of civil court and, it was held that yes, it bars because the application will be entertained by the Claims Tribunal constituted for the purpose.
9. I have given a very thoughtful consideration to the rival controversy raised by the learned counsel for the parties and the arguments which were made quite at length at the bar in this respect. In my considered opinion, on a plain reading of section 110 and section 95 of the Act, it is obvious that a claim petition can be entertained for compensation to damage caused (sic. to property) alone even if the damage exceeds Rs. 2,000/-. It would not be necessary to repeat the entire discussion made in the above decisions but, I would like to mention that whatever might have been the controversy earlier but after the amendment of the Act particularly, section 110 by which clause (aa) of sub-section (1), namely, ‘by the owner of the property; or’, has been inserted in 1978; there remains no anomaly which could have been earlier. Section 95 of the Act provides for requirements of the policies and limit of the liability and, the damage to property is covered by clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act. It is true that earlier, it was Rs. 2,000/- before the amendment of 1982 and now it has been made Rs. 6,000/-.
10. However, all this goes to show that the damage to property in an accident by a motor vehicle is covered by the jurisdiction of the Accidents Claims Tribunal and no valid objection can be taken to entertainment of such a claim, all alone, even though it may not be a composite claim.
11. The next point urged by Mr. Bhargava was that the compensation could not have been for an amount of more than Rs. 2,000/- as the law stood earlier and Rs. 6,000/- as per the amendment of 1982 which according to Mr. Bhargva would not apply to the present case.
12. Here again, I am in agreement with Mr. Mathur that, as held by the Bombay High Court in Sharda Prasad Singh v. Maharashtra State Road Trans. Copn., 1984 ACJ 240 (Bombay), the liability of the insurance company would be according to the risk covered in the policy and it cannot be restricted to the statutory limit enshrined in sections 95(2) and 96(2) of the Act. In substance, it has been held that the contractual liability, if more than statutory limits, would prevail and, the statutory liability is only supplementary and would not, in any way, curtail the contractual liability.
13. In my considered opinion, the provisions regarding compulsory insurance introduced by sections 95 and 96 are provisions for providing the minimum insurance for social welfare and for providing contingency of payment of compensation in case of the accident in the present day of society, where the automobiles perform a very important part in transporting of man as well as property. However, they never intend to limit the liability of the insurance company if by mutual agreement in the form of policy the insurance company had on payment of premium taken upon themselves to pay the particular amount. The liability of the insurance company depends upon the premium which they take and the amount which they insure or assure, as the case may be. The contractual liability is to be respected by the Tribunals subject to any provisions of law to the contrary.
14. In my considered opinion, any of provisions of sections 95 and 96 of the Act, nowhere curtails the liability of the insurance company but provides the requirement of the minimum liability or normal liability which should be covered by the insurance policy. In substance, there is no limit or ceiling of the liability.
15. It would be a fraud on the insureds if the insurance company first insures the insured for a heavy amount by taking premium to that extent and, when the contingency of death or injury or damage to property happens, then comes with the jugglery or trickery of taking defence that though they have taken the premium of more amount or accepted the amount but the legislature has provided the limit of the liability and to commit this sort of trickery not to pay the compensation for which they have taken the premium. The legislature can never intend nor encourage much less protect and in no case provide shelter or limit to play such a tactics and trickery. In fact, the insurance company should not try to take such defence of jurisdiction before the Tribunal and they should volunteer to make payment by which a situation is created where insured persons get the amount of insurance sitting at their homes without being compelled or dragged to file claim petitions in the Tribunal and then undergo the ordeal for litigation for decades and decades, together. It would only add insult to injury to an injured person or a person or persons who have lost either his parents or whose property has been damaged, to enter into this litigation for long period and stand in the queue for knowing their fate of the trickery and jugglery after waiting decades together, when the price and value of the money goes too down and the spiral of the price index goes high making it virtually of no use.
16. Mr. Bhargava also argued that looking to the reasons given for the compensation for the damage caused, the amount awarded is excessive because where the receipts have been disbelieved, yet amount has been awarded. It is true to some extent that the Tribunal has taken hard facts, like normal damages which have been incurred in taking truck from one place to other place and making payments of repairs.
17. It should not be forgotten that the Tribunals have been created to adjudicate the compensation claims in such cases by summary enquiries and, strict rules of evidence as are required in civil cases need not be expected and followed though, by and large they may guide the Tribunal. Similarly, when the claim is required to be proved before the Tribunal, the doctrine of burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases, cannot be applied.
18. In this view of the matter, the claim allowed by the Tribunal is based on the proper appreciation of evidence and calls for no interference in this appeal.
19. Mr. Mathur wanted the amount to be increased but, I do not find any good ground to increase the amount. In my considered opinion, the adjudication and determination of compensation is fair, just and proper and reasonable and calls for no interference.
20. Mr. Mathur further prayed that the interest has not been allowed in the case by the Tribunal and he has filed cross-objection claiming interest. This request and prayer appears to be reasonable and the interest at the rate of 12% on the amount awarded, viz. Rs. 14,841/- is allowed from the date of the application till the date of realisation. The cross-objection filed by Mr. Mathur is allowed to the above extent only. In the result, this appeal fails and is, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs. The impugned award is modified to the extent that the claimant would get interest at the rate of 12% on the amount of Rs. 14,841/- from the date of application till the date of realisation. In all other respects, it is upheld.
21. Order accordingly.
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