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State v. Sahachari Udhyog Mandir(39)

Rajasthan High Court
Apr 9, 1984
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Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These are five connected references under section 15(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, referred by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer. Two specific legal questions were referred to the Court concerning whether the process of cutting and stitching umbrella cloth into umbrella covers converts the cloth into a different commodity not eligible for exemption as "textile fabrics", and whether assessments in three of the referenced cases invoking section 12 (reassessment for escaped turnover) were in conformity with that provision.

Procedurally, three of the matters involved reassessment proceedings under s. 12 of the Act and two involved assessments under s. 10. The assessee (dealer) dealt in cloth, umbrella parts and umbrellas, and prepared umbrella covers by cutting and stitching umbrella cloth — operating what the authorities described as an umbrella processing or umbrella industry.

The Assessing Authority held that the dealer ran an umbrella processing industry and, under rule 42(3) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, should have maintained stock-books for raw materials and finished goods (which were not maintained). The Assessing Authority treated sales of umbrella covers as taxable and allowed deductions for sales of cloth only.

On appeal, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) held that umbrella covers are articles meant for a definite use (attachment to ribs and handle of an umbrella) and lose the characteristics of umbrella cloth because they are stitched pieces intended solely for use as covers; he therefore sustained the Assessing Authority's order. Revisions were filed to the Board of Revenue, which concluded that umbrella covers fall within the definition of textile fabrics and are exempt from sales tax, and set aside the Deputy Commissioner's orders insofar as they taxed umbrella covers. The Board referred the questions of law noted above to this Court for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the cutting and stitching of umbrella cloth so as to make umbrella covers is a process which converts the said cloth into a different commodity and it ceases to come within the definition of textile fabrics and to be eligible for exemption from tax?
  2. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case Nos. 16, 17 and 19, the orders of the Assessing Authority taxing the turnover as escaped turnover are in conformity with the provisions of section 12 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee (Dealer)'s Arguments

  • The dealer contended that even after cutting and stitching, the umbrella cover does not become a different commodity; it retains the character of umbrella cloth and therefore remains within the article "textile fabrics" and is eligible for exemption from sales tax.
  • The dealer relied on authorities (for example L. Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. and Jaipur Hosiery Mills P. Ltd.) to support the contention that processed cloth items may still retain the character of the underlying cloth for exemption/tax classification purposes.

Revenue / Department's Arguments

  • The Department argued that once umbrella cloth is cut and stitched into an umbrella cover, a different commodity comes into existence (an article specifically shaped and used only as an umbrella cover) and the exemption available to textile fabrics should not apply.
  • The Commercial Taxes Officer treated the dealer's operation as an umbrella processing/industry and, relying on rule 42(3) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, noted the absence of required stock-books; he held sales of umbrella covers taxable and allowed deductions only for sale of cloth.

Administrative Decisions (Assessing Officer, Deputy Commissioner, Board)

  • Assessing Authority: Treated the dealer as conducting an umbrella processing industry; required records under r.42(3); taxed sales of umbrella covers as taxable turnover.
  • Deputy Commissioner (Appeals): Agreed with Assessing Authority, reasoning that umbrella covers are made of different pieces and stitched solely for the purpose of being attached to an umbrella frame and thus lose the character of umbrella cloth.
  • Board of Revenue: Contrary to the Deputy Commissioner, held that umbrella covers come within the definition of textile fabrics and are exempt from sales tax; accepted the revision petitions and set aside the orders of the Deputy Commissioner insofar as they related to taxing umbrella covers, prompting the reference to this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramavatar Budhai Prasad v. Asstt. Sales Tax Officer (1961) 12 S.T.C. 286 Authority for construing an everyday expression (such as "umbrella cover") in its popular/common sense. The Court referred to this case to support the approach that "umbrella cover" should be understood in its popular sense by those conversant with the subject matter.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Wasudeo (1955) 6 S.T.C. 30 Discusses when shaping raw material (trees into logs/rafters) constitutes a change in commercial character; held the shaped logs/rafters did not constitute a distinct taxable manufactured good in that instance. Used to illustrate the contours of "manufacture" and to examine whether conversion changes the commercial identity of goods.
Kulkarni v. The State (1957) 8 S.T.C. 294 Principle that the essence of manufacture is changing one object into another for the purpose of making it marketable (example: breaking stones into gitti). Relied upon to support the proposition that shaping or processing that changes commercial character can amount to manufacture.
Shaw Bros. and Co. v. The State of West Bengal (1963) 14 S.T.C. 879 Held that sawing planks from logs produces a different commodity (planks) from raw logs; plank is a new kind of commodity. Adopted as an authority that a relatively simple physical process (sawing) may create a new commercial commodity.
Bachha Tewari v. Divisional Forest Officer (1963) 14 S.T.C. 1067 Holds that a manufacturing process brings into being commercial articles for sale in the business in which a dealer is engaged; chopping timber into firewood can fall within "manufacturing process". Used to show that simple processes which create commercially saleable articles can amount to manufacture.
L. Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer (1962) 13 S.T.C. 1031 Discussed difference between "cloth" and "clothes": where cloth is further worked into articles adapted for particular uses, it may cease to be "cloth simpliciter". Cited by the dealer to argue continuity of character; the Court found this and related cases distinguishable and of no assistance for the question at hand.
Jaipur Hosiery Mills P. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (1967) 19 S.T.C. 416 Held that specific items ("Banians" and "Chaddies") were included within "hosiery products" for the relevant notification. Cited by the dealer but the Court regarded it as distinguishable and not helpful to the present issue.
Firm Jaswant Rai Jai Narain v. Sales Tax Officer (1955) 6 S.T.C. 386 Referenced in the context of distinctions drawn in L. Cotton Mills case; specific principle not set out in detail in the opinion. Mentioned by way of distinction in the oral reasoning of cited authorities; the opinion does not elaborate further.
Commissioner Of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1978) 41 S.T.C. 471 States that for activity to amount to manufacture it must result in a different commercial article or commodity (i.e., not commercially the same as before the activity). Adopted and cited for the proposition that a process must produce a commercially different article to constitute manufacture; the Court used this as a guiding test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by stating that "umbrella cover" is an everyday expression and must be construed in its popular sense, a principle supported by reference to Ramavatar Budhai Prasad. The Court then focused on the central inquiry: whether cutting and stitching of umbrella cloth produces a different commercial commodity (an umbrella cover) such that it ceases to be "textile fabrics" for the purposes of exemption.

To answer this, the Court reviewed authorities on the meaning of "manufacture" and on when shaping or processing raw material results in a new commercial article. The Court cited multiple precedents (Wasudeo; Kulkarni; Shaw Bros.; Bachha Tewari; Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.) establishing that the essence of manufacture is a change resulting in a commercially different or marketable article — even where the process is simple or manual — and that the test is whether the post-process article is commercially the same as the pre-process material.

The Court examined the Board's reasoning accepting the dealer's position and noted that the Board had looked at instances where processes did not alter essential nature (examples given by the Board included re-rolling scrap, iron re-vetting into steel, waxing of cloth, cutting cloth for choli bits and sarees, printing designs on cloth, sugar moulding, etc.). The Court rejected the Board's test (that exemption should continue merely because the "essential nature" had not changed) as not being the correct test for the question at hand.

Instead, the Court articulated the pertinent test: whether, after cutting and stitching and giving the umbrella cloth a particular shape for attachment to ribs and handle, the product can be used like the cloth was before processing. The Court observed that umbrella covers, after being cut and stitched, can only be used as covers fastened over an umbrella frame and cannot be used for any other purpose like the original cloth. They are made for a specific utility, have commercial value as such, and therefore amount to an altogether different commercial commodity.

Applying the cited authorities and this test, the Court concluded that the umbrella covers are not simply the original "textile fabrics" in their commercial character but are distinct, marketable commodities produced by cutting and stitching. Consequently, the exemption applicable to "textile fabrics" does not extend to umbrella covers so produced.

The Court's analysis was confined to the facts and reasoning presented in the opinion; it declined to adopt the Board's broader test of "essential nature" and relied on authorities emphasizing change in commercial character as determinative.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): Answered the first referred question in the affirmative in favour of the Department and against the assessee (dealer): after cutting and stitching umbrella cloth so as to make umbrella covers, a different commodity (umbrella cover) comes into existence and it ceases to be "textile fabrics" eligible for exemption from tax.

Consequential holding on the second question: Answered in the affirmative in favour of the Department and against the assessee: because umbrella covers are not textile fabrics exempt from tax, the Assessing Authority was justified in taxing the escaped turnover and invoking the provisions of section 12 of the Act in the reassessment cases.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The dealer's umbrella covers are taxable and not entitled to the exemption afforded to textile fabrics.
  • The orders of the Assessing Authority taxing escaped turnover under s. 12 are upheld by implication of the Court's answers.
  • The Court made no order as to costs of the references.
  • The Court directed that further action be taken in accordance with section 15(5) of the Act.

Broader implications:
The opinion applies and emphasizes the principle that a process must produce a commercially different article to deprive an item of its previous classification for exemption; the Court expressly rejected a test based solely on whether the "essential nature" remained unchanged. The opinion does not state that it is creating a new precedent beyond applying and synthesizing existing authorities to the facts of these references.

Show all summary ...

Lodha, J.:— These are five connected references under s. 15(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (No. XXXIX of 1954) (for short “the Act”) and the Board of Revenue, Ajmer (“the Board” herein) has referred the following questions of law for our decision:

(1) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the cutting and stitching of umbrella cloth so as to make umbrella covers is a process which converts the said cloth into different commodity and it ceases to come within the definition of textile fabrics and to be eligible from exemption from tax?

(2) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case Nos. 16, 17 and 19 the orders of the Assessing Authority taxing the turnover as escaped turnover are in conformity with the provisions of s. 12 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act?

2. It is not necessary to state the facts for the reasons that learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that in the three cases proceedings for reassessment under s. 12 of the Act were initiated and orders were passed. So far as the other two cases are concerned the assessment was made under s. 10 of the Act. The assessee-respondent (dealer) deals in cloth, umbrella parts and umbrellas and prepares umbrella covers from umbrella cloth after cutting and stitching the same. The assessee (dealer) ran an umbrella processing or umbrella industry. The contention of the assessee (dealer) is that even after the process of cutting and stitching the umbrella cloth, the umbrella cover so made is not a different commodity and it falls within the article textile fabrics and, therefore, it is eligible for exemption from tax; whereas the argument of the Department is that after cutting and stitching of umbrella cloth, when it is converted into an umbrella cover; a different commodity comes into existence and the exemption available to the textile fabrics is not available. The commercial-taxes Officer was of the opinion that the assessee-(dealer) ran an umbrella processing or umbrella industry and as such in accordance with r. 42(3) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, he ought to have maintained stock-book regarding raw-materials of finished goods, which was not done. He also found that the sales of umbrella covers were taxable in the assessee's hands and he, therefore allowed deductions for the sale of cloth only. On appeal the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) Commercial Taxes Udaipur found that umbrella covers are articles meant for a definite use, if attached with the ribs and handle of the umbrella and that they cannot be used for any other purpose as they are made of different pieces of cloth and are stitched for no other use except umbrella cover. Thus according to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) the characterstics of being an umbrella cloth were lost. He, therefore, maintained the order of the Assessing Authority. Revisions were filed and the Board opined that umbrella covers come within the definition of textile fabrics and are exempt from sales-tax. The. Board, therefore, accepted the revision petitions and set aside the orders of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) in so far as they relate to the taxing of umbrella covers. In these circumstances the aforesaid questions have been referred to us for decision.

3. “Umbrella cover” being an expression of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning “that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it”. It is to be understood in common parlance. Reference may usefully be made to (1) Ramavatar Budhai Prasad v. Asstt. Sales Tax Officer, (1961) 12 S.T.C 286. Before we decide the questions referred we shall refer to the authorities cited by the learned Additional Advocate General as well as learned counsel for the dealer-assessee.

4. In (2) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Wasudeo, (1955) 6 S.T.C 30, the dealer made the cut-trees into logs or rafters and sold them as such and the question was whether he was dealer, who manufactured or produced goods within the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of the C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (No. XXI of 1947). After considering the definition of the word ‘manufacture’ it was held by the learned Judge af the Nagpur High Court asunder:—

“It appears that logs or rafters into which the trees were shaped by the non-applicant had a definite commercial value. Without any work of art the trees were liable to be sold only as raw material, whether as fuel or timber, and would have naturally fetched a low price. As logs or rafters they were liable to be used as beams or further shaped into finer furniture. They had, therefore, assumed a different shape or form which made them fit for use either directly or, if necessary, by applying some more labour and skill. I am, therefore, inclined to agree that the logs or rafters were not any distinct advance from their original form and did not constitute taxable goods.”

5. The question of law in (3) Kulkarni v. The State, (1957) 8 S.T.C 294, was whether breaking boulders into metal (gitti) is “manufacture” within the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1947. The Division Bench consisting of Hidayatullah C.J (as he then was) and Chaturvedi J, observed as under:—

“………. After that stage is reached and the person who has won the stones attempts to break them, may be by manual labour into sizeable stones for sale as ‘gitti’, he is shaping the stone into an object of a different size. Now, the word “manufacture” has got various shapes of meaning. There may be manufacture of a complicated object like the super-constellation, or there might be manufacture of a simple object like a toy kite…………… The essence of manufacture is the changing of one object into another for the purposes of making it marketable. The stones which are won in the process of quarrying may be sold without fashioning them into something else. If they are sold, they would not be manufactured but merely delivered from the quarry-head. When they are broken into metal or ‘gitti’ there is some process, manual though it may be, for the purpose of shaping the stones into another marketable commodity.”

(Emphasis added).

6. Before a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in (4) Shaw Bros. and Co. v. The State of West Bengal, (1963) 14 S.T.C 879, the question arose whether sawing of planks from timber or sizing the same amounts to manufacture. It was held:—

“When planks are sawed out of logs, what is produced is a different thing from logs capable of being put to different uses. Therefore, when planks are made from logs or damaged wood, a new kind of commodity is manufactured because plank made out of timber is not timber in its noscent state.”

7. Before the same learned single Judge in (5) Bachha Tewari v. Divisional Forest Officer, (1963) 14 S.T.C 1067, the question which came up for examination was whether the imposition of a tax on timber and a tax on firewood manufactured from that timber amounts to double taxation. The learned Judge opined that manufacturing process means to bring into being a commercial articles for sale in the bussiness in which the dealer is engaged i.e article which by itself has a commercial value and which can be the subject-matter of sale for a price in course of the business of selling or supplying in which the dealer is engaged, and that there is no reason to exclude the chopping of timber into firewood from the ambit of manufacturing process.

8. On the other hand, Mr. M.L Kala, learned counsel for the dealer has cited (6) L. Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, (1962) 13 S.T.C 1031, and (7) Jaipur Hosiery Mills P. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1967) 19 S.T.C 416, in support of his contention that even after cutting and stitching, the umbrella cover retains the character of umbrella cloth, and so it is a textile fabric exempted from payment of sales-tax. Before a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in L. Cotton Mills Co. Ltd.'s case (6) the difference between “cloth and “clothes” was considered. In other words the question arose whether Dhotis. Saris, Chadars, towels, canvas, rags and fents are “cloth manufactured by mills.” The learned Judge opined that where after cloth has been manufactured, some thing more is done to it by some other agency which makes it into different kind of produce or makes it adaptable for a particular kind of use, it ceases to be a cloth simpliciter and will have to be described by a different name. It was held that dhotis, saris, chadars, towels, canvas, rags and fents sold by the assessees fell under the description of “cloth manufactured by mills” and were therefore taxable by six pies per rupee. The learned Judge distinguished (8) Firm Jaswant Rai Jai Narain v. Sales Tax Officer, (1955) 6. S.T.C 386. In Jaipur Hosiery Mills P. Ltd.'s case (7) the question was whether “Banians” and “chaddies” are included in the expression “hosiery products” within the meaning of the notification under challenge. The learned Judges held that “Banians” and “Chaddies” are included in the “hosiery products”. The cases cited by Mr. M.L Kala, in our opinion, are of no assistance for deciding the question with which we are concerned and they are distinguishable.

9. The question is whether after cutting and stitching of the umbrella cloth, it still remains “textile fabrics” and so no sales-tax is payable on it. We may here state that for an activity to amount to manufacture, it must result in a different commercial article or commodity. In other words, it must not be commodity which is commercially the same as it was before the activity was applied to it. This was so held in (9) Commissioner Of Sales Tax, M.P v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (1978) 41 S.T.C 471.

10. The word ‘manuafcture’ refers to products made by hands or machinery. It means “the making of articles of material by physical labour or mechanical power or to work up material into forms suitable for use. In the Oxford English Dictionary ‘manufacture’ has been defined as the action or process of making by hand or by mechanical device. In Webester Law of International Dictionary ‘manufacture’ has been defined as a process or operation of making wares or other material products by hand or by machinery specially when carried on systematically with division of labour. Here it may be mentioned that umbrella cloth & for that matter cloth can be used for various purposes inclusive of the use of wearing. But the precise question is that after the process of cutting and stitching, can it be put to any use except to the use for which it is specifically meant for and if the answer of this question is in the negative then the umbrella cover will be a different article from umbrella cloth. The umbrella cloth is cut and stitched and thereafter given a particular shape for the purpose of attaching it with the ribs and handle of the umbrella. In other words when umbrella cloth is cut into various sizes and stitched, the finished product is only used to be fastened over umbrella frame. The umbrella covers can only be used for the umbrellas and they cannot be used for any other purpose except for the purpose for which they are manufactured. After cutting and stitching umbrella cloth and giving it particular shape, a different commercial commodity comes into existence and it cannot be put to any other use except that for being used as an umbrella cover. The umbrella covers are marketable commodities and have commercial value. The Board appears to have been considerably influenced that by process of manufacture if the essential nature of the material has not changed, then the exemption which is originally available should be allowed to continue after that process. In that connection the Board has, inter alia, noticed the instances of re-rolling of scrap, iron revetting into steel etc., the waxing of cloth, the cutting of cloth in different sizes for choli bits and sarees, the printing of designs on cloth, sugar patasas and alchidana (small lumps of sugar) and the moulding of coal dust into cinders. In our opinion this is not the correct test for the simple reason as what one has to see is whether after the process of cutting and stitching of the umbrella cloth and giving it a shape, for attaching it to the ribs and handle, can it be used like a cloth which it could be prior to the aforesaid process which it had undergone. In other words, it is pertinent to consider whether by this process an altogether different commercial commodity for specific utility has come into existence. Applying these tests we are definitely of the opinion that the umbrella covers being made for being utilised as such are specific commodity and the exemption which is available to the textile fabrics is not available.

11. It is held that after cutting and stitching of umbrella cloth so as to make umbrella covers, a different commodity (umbrella cover) comes into existence and it ceases to be textile fabrics so as to eligible for exemption from tax. Our answer to the first question is in affirmative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee (dealer).

12. As we have answered the first question in favour of the Department and against the assessee (dealer) it necessarily follows that the assessing authority was right and justified in taxing the escaped turnover and, therefore, the provisions of s. 12 of the Act were rightly invoked. The answer to the second question is also in affirmative and in favour of the Department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs of these References.

13. Let further action be taken in accordance with s. 15(5) of the Act.