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J.P Sharma And Sons v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Rajasthan, Jaipur
Factual and Procedural Background
The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Jaipur Bench, by its order dated June 30, 1973, referred two questions to the High Court for opinion. The factual matrix in the opinion is as follows:
The assessee is a registered firm. Its return of income for assessment year 1959-60 was due on January 20, 1960 under Section 22(2) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. The firm did not file the return within time, but filed a belated return on December 30, 1961, declaring a loss of Rs. 26,276. The assessment was completed on March 10, 1964. At the time of completion of assessment the Income Tax Officer (ITO) issued notices under Sections 271(1)(a) and 273 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, calling upon the firm to show cause why penalties should not be levied for failure to file the return within time, failure to furnish an estimate, and failure to pay advance tax in accordance with section 18A of the 1922 Act.
The assessee replied on March 23, 1964, stating that it had filed an appeal against the assessment order and requesting that penalty proceedings be kept in abeyance until the appeal was decided. Because of limitation concerns under Section 275 of the 1961 Act (penalty proceedings would become barred by March 10, 1966), the ITO issued fresh notices on September 8, 1965 (returned unserved) and again on October 20, 1965 (sent under certificate of posting). The assessee did not appear and the ITO imposed penalties by orders dated March 5, 1966: Rs. 48,574 under Section 271(1)(a) and Rs. 8,450 under Section 273(b).
The assessee appealed against the penalty orders; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) allowed the appeals on July 8, 1969, holding that the ITO's penalty orders were vitiated for non-observance of Section 274(1) of the 1961 Act and remanded the matter to the ITO to complete penalty proceedings after giving an adequate opportunity of hearing.
The ITO appealed the AAC's order to the ITAT on the ground that the AAC lacked jurisdiction to set aside the penalty orders. The assessee filed cross-objections contending that, because the AAC had held the penalties illegal for failure to afford reasonable opportunity, the penalties should have been cancelled rather than remanded for fresh inquiry and disposal. The ITAT, by order dated October 30, 1971, concluded that the initial notices had been duly served (March 19, 1964), but directed that the AAC should hear the assessee afresh on the merits and the question of reasonable cause for defaults. The assessee then applied for a statement of case and the ITAT referred the two legal questions to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the notices issued to the assessee under Sections 273 and 271(1)(a) at the time of assessment whose further proceedings were stayed on the request of the assessee were valid notices when no subsequent opportunity was allowed to the assessee of being heard before imposition of the penalties?
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (ITO)'s Arguments
- The ITO (A-Ward, Sri Ganganagar) appealed the AAC's order to the ITAT contending that the AAC had no jurisdiction to set aside the order imposing penalties upon the assessee.
Assessee's Arguments
- The assessee cross‑objected before the ITAT that once the AAC had held the levy of penalties by the ITO to be illegal for failure to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing, the AAC should have cancelled the penalty orders rather than setting them aside and remanding the matter for a fresh enquiry and disposal to the ITO.
- The assessee earlier had requested by letter dated March 23, 1964 that penalty proceedings be kept in abeyance pending the appeal against assessment, which the assessee relied upon in arguing it was not afforded further opportunity before penalties were imposed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| CIT v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535 (Supreme Court) | Held that the principle that a fiscal statute should be construed strictly applies only to charging provisions or provisions imposing penalty, and not to machinery provisions; clarified conflict among High Courts on operation of Section 275. | The Court relied on this decision to conclude that the limitation in Section 275 applies only to the initial assessment order and not to orders passed pursuant to directions by higher authorities; the decision "set the conflict at rest" and underpinned the Court's conclusion on Section 275. |
| CIT v. Kishoresinh Kalyansinh Solanki [1960] 39 ITR 522 (Bombay High Court) | The Bombay High Court view concerning construction of fiscal/machinery provisions which was later approved by the Supreme Court in National Taj Traders. | The Supreme Court approved this view; the High Court cited that approval as supporting the proposition that Section 275's time-bar applies only to the first order. |
| Vasani and Co. v. CIT [1978] 112 ITR 819 (Gujarat High Court) | Decision following the Bombay High Court view on the relevant statutory construction. | Referred to as one of the decisions that followed the Bombay High Court view and which are consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in National Taj Traders. |
| Bhagirathi Devi Jalan v. CIT [1978] 112 ITR 534 (Calcutta High Court) | Decision following the Bombay High Court view. | Cited as another High Court decision consistent with the view approved by the Supreme Court. |
| Mohd. Shaft Khan v. CWT [1983] 144 ITR 489 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) | Decision that followed the Bombay High Court view. | Listed among the decisions that followed the Bombay High Court approach, consistent with Supreme Court authority. |
| CIT v. Sabitri Devi Agarwalla [1970] 77 ITR 934 (Assam High Court) | An earlier contrary view on the operation of Section 275. | Noted as having been overruled by the Supreme Court in National Taj Traders. |
| Addl. CIT v. Panicker [1974] 97 ITR 525 (Kerala High Court) | An earlier decision inconsistent with the Supreme Court's later ruling. | Stated by the Court to be no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in National Taj Traders. |
| CIT v. Ram Baran Ram Nath [1976] 104 ITR 691 (Allahabad High Court) | An earlier High Court decision on the point now inconsistent with Supreme Court authority. | Identified as no longer good law after the Supreme Court's decision. |
| CIT v. Bhudar Singk & Sons [1983] 143 ITR 322 (Allahabad High Court) | An earlier decision inconsistent with the Supreme Court's later ruling. | Also stated to be no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court authority. |
| Addl. CIT v. N.V. Ganapathi Rao [1978] 115 ITR 277 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) | An earlier decision inconsistent with the Supreme Court's later ruling. | Noted as no longer good law given the Supreme Court decision in National Taj Traders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court heard learned counsels and proceeded on the following analytical path (as reflected in the opinion):
- The Tribunal had already directed that the AAC should afford the assessee full opportunity to be heard and to consider all contentions regarding the reasonableness or sufficiency of cause for failure to file the return and for not filing the estimate under section 18A(3) of the 1922 Act. Given that direction, the High Court regarded it as unnecessary to answer the referred questions.
- The Court observed there was no dispute that the notices issued by the ITO under Sections 273 and 271(1)(a) at the time of assessment had been duly served on the assessee, a fact evidenced by the assessee's reply dated March 23, 1964.
- The Court noted that after receiving the assessee's letter of March 23, 1964, the ITO did not proceed with penalty proceedings and by his conduct appeared to have acceded to the assessee's request to keep proceedings in abeyance. The Court emphasized that if subsequently the ITO wished to proceed further with penalty proceedings, in view of the time limit in Section 275 he ought to have informed the assessee of the date of hearing.
- The Court reiterated the statutory requirement under Section 274(1) that an assessee should be given a hearing or at least a reasonable opportunity of hearing before an order imposing penalty is passed. However, since the ITAT had already ensured that the AAC would afford a reasonable opportunity and hear the assessee on the merits, the question whether the ITO failed to give full opportunity became merely academic in the present circumstances.
- On the question of limitation under Section 275, the Court reviewed conflicting High Court authorities and noted that the Supreme Court in CIT v. National Taj Traders had resolved the conflict. The Court explained that it is now established that the bar created by Section 275 refers only to the initial order and does not apply where an order of assessment is passed under directions of a higher authority in appeal or revision or on account of an answer given in a reference by a High Court or an order of a High Court under Article 226.
- Given (a) the ITAT's specific directions to the AAC to hear the assessee on the merits, and (b) the authoritative clarification by the Supreme Court on the limited operation of Section 275, the High Court found it unnecessary to frame answers to the questions referred by the ITAT and instead directed compliance with the ITAT's order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court declined to answer the referred questions as unnecessary in view of the ITAT's direction that the AAC afford the assessee a full and reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Court ordered that the matter be sent back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, so that the Tribunal's order dated October 30, 1971 may be complied with.
Implications:
- The immediate practical effect is that the AAC must hear the assessee afresh on the merits of the contentions regarding reasonable or sufficient cause for the defaults for which penalties are sought to be imposed; the assessee will be entitled to present facts and circumstances that prevented timely filing and filing of the estimate under section 18A(3) of the 1922 Act.
- The Court observed that, in light of the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. National Taj Traders, the limitation in Section 275 of the 1961 Act applies only to the first order and does not apply to orders passed pursuant to directions by higher authorities. The opinion records that earlier conflicting High Court decisions are no longer good law in view of that Supreme Court decision.
- The Court's disposition did not announce a new precedent of its own on the referred questions; rather, it applied and relied upon the Supreme Court's pronouncement to resolve the legal uncertainty and to direct further proceedings consistent with that authority.
1. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, has referred the following two questions to this court for its opinion, by its order dated June 30, 1973 :
" 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the notices issued to the assessee under sections 273 and 271(1)(a) at the time of assessment whose further proceedings were stayed on the request of the assessee were valid notices when no subsequent opportunity was allowed to the assessee of being heard before imposition of the penalties ?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ?"
2. The assessee is a registered firm and its return of income for the assessment year 1959-60 was due on January 20, 1960, in accordance with a notice under Section 22(2) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the " 1922 Act "), which was in force at the relevant time. The assessee did not file its return of income for the aforesaid assessment year within time. But the return was filed on December 30, 1961, declaring a loss of Rs. 26,276 and the assessment was completed on March 10, 1964. At the time of completion of the assessment, the ITO issued notices under Sections 271(1)(a) and 273 of the I.T. Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the " 1961 Act"), calling upon the assessee-firm to show cause why penalty should not be levied upon it for its failure to file the return of income within time and failure to furnish an estimate of its income and to pay advance tax in accordance with the provisions of section 18a of the 1922 act. On receipt of the said notice, the assessee filed a reply on March 23, 1964, stating that the asses-see-firm was filing an appeal against the order of assessment and requesting the ITO to keep in abeyance the penalty proceedings until the decision of the appeal.
3. As according to the provisions of Section 275 of the 1961 Act, proceedings for imposition of penalty would have become barred by limitation by March 10, 1966, the ITO issued fresh notices to the assessee on September 8, 1965, calling upon it to explain why penalties under Sections 271(1)(a) and 273 be not imposed. But the notice, which was sent by registered post, was returned unserved with the remark "not known". Then, on October 20, 1965, the ITO again issued a notice to the assessee-firm. This time the notice was sent under a certificate of posting. On the failure of the assessee-firm to appear before the ITO, he proceeded to impose penalty upon the assessee-firm in the sum of Rs. 48,574 under Section 271(1)(a) and Rs. 8,450 under Section 273(b) of the 1961 Act, by orders dated March 5, 1966.
4. The assessee filed appeals against the orders imposing penalties upon it and the said appeals were allowed by the AAC by his order dated July 8, 1969, on the ground that the orders passed by the ITO imposing penalties were vitiated on account of non-observance of the provisions of Section 274(1) of the 1961 Act. The AAC remanded the matter to the ITO with a direction to complete the penalty proceedings after giving the assessee an adequate opportunity of hearing, so as to enable the assessee-firm to put forward the facts and circumstances leading to the defaults for which penalties were imposed and also to plead justification for such defaults.
5. The ITO, A-Ward, Sri Ganganagar, filed an appeal against the aforesaid order passed by the AAC before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur (hereinafter called "the Tribunal"), on the ground that the AAC had no jurisdiction' to set aside the order imposing penalty upon the assessee. The assessee-firm filed cross-objections on the ground that the AAC having held that the levy of penalties by the ITO was illegal as the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing by the ITO, the order imposing penalties should have been cancelled instead of being set aside and the case being remanded for fresh enquiry and disposal to the ITO.
6. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the notice given by the ITO under Section 274(1) at the time of completion of the assessment proceedings was duly served on March 19, 1964, but at that time the assessee-firm did not choose to offer any explanation regarding the defaults and merely prayed that the penalty proceedings be kept in abeyance until the decision of the appeal arising out of the assessment order. As such, it was held that the order imposing the penalties passed by the ITO was not vitiated for non-observance of the mandatory provisions of Section 274(1) of the 1961 Act. However, the Tribunal felt that a reasonable opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the assessee in respect of imposition of penalties and so while accepting the appeal and setting aside the order passed by the AAC and remanding the matter to him by its order dated October 30, 1971, the Tribunal gave the following directions :
" It is necessary that these contentions of the assessee are considered at the proper stage and for this purpose, we would restore the appeals to the file of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and direct him to dispose of them afresh, after hearing the assessee on the merits of the contentions with regard to the reasonable cause which prevented the assessee from filing the return within time and the sufficient cause for not filing the estimate under Section 18A(3)."(now Section 212).
7. The assessee-firm submitted a reference application before the Tribunal requiring it to draw up a statement of the case and refer questions of law arising out of its order dated October 30, 1971, to this court for its opinion and that is how the questions mentioned above have come up before us.
8. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, we are of the view that in the circumstances of this case when the Tribunal has directed the AAC to afford full opportunity of hearing to the assessee-firm and to consider all the contentions of the assessee with regard to the reasonableness or sufficiency of the cause which prevented the assessee from filing the return within time and for not filing the estimate under section 18a(3) of the 1922 act, it would be wholly unnecessary for us to answer the questions which have been referred to this court. There is no doubt and there cannot possibly be any dispute between the parties on the question that the notices issued by the ITO under Sections 273 and 271(1)(a) of the 1961 Act to the assessee at the time of completion of the assessment proceedings were duly served upon the assessee as is evident from the reply of the assessee dated March 23, 1964. However, the question would still remain that when the ITO did not proceed with the penalty proceedings after the receipt of the letter of the assessee dated March 23, 1964, and by his conduct he appears to have acceded to the request of the assessee to keep the penalty proceedings in abeyance, then it was incumbent upon him to inform the assessee about the date of hearing in case, subsequently, the ITO thought it proper to proceed further with the penalty proceedings, in view of the time-limit provided in Section 275. Section 274(1) requires that the assessee should be given a hearing or at least a reasonable opportunity of hearing before an order imposing penalty is passed. However, as in the present case, the Tribunal has given directions to the AAC to afford the assessee-firm full opportunity of hearing and to plead justification or sufficient cause for the defaults, it appears to be wholly unnecessary for us to go into the question whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the AAC. The purpose and intent of the provisions of Section 274(1) are that the assessee should have full opportunity of hearing before penalty is levied upon him. As the Tribunal has ensured that the assessee shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing by the AAC and has given specific directions to him in that respect, the requirement of Section 274(1) would be substantially fulfilled in the present case. In this view of the matter, the decision of the question as to whether full opportunity of hearing was not allowed to the assessee by the ITO while imposing a penalty has become merely academic, as now the assessee is going to be provided with a reasonable opportunity of hearing by the AAC in accordance with the directions given by the Tribunal by its order dated October 30, 1971. Thus, the assessee shall now be entitled to put forward the facts and circumstances which prevented it from filing the return within time and from filing the estimate under section 18a(3) of the 1922 act, as the AAC has been directed to hear the assessee on the merits of the contentions in respect of defaults, for which penalties are sought to be imposed upon it. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to answer the questions referred to us as the order passed by the Tribunal affords adequate relief to the assessee-firm.
9. The reference appears to have been sought for by the assessee in the present case on account of conflicting views expressed by the various High Courts regarding the question as to whether the provisions of section 275 would operate as a bar or not. But the conflict has now been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in CIT v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535 and it has been held that the principle that a fiscal statute should be construed strictly is applicable only to taxing provisions such as a charging provision or a provision imposing penalty and not to those parts of the statute which contain machinery provisions. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have approved the view taken by the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Kishoresinh Kalyansinh Solanki [1960] 39 ITR 522. That decision was followed by the Gujarat High Court in Vasani and Co. v. CIT [1978] 112 ITR 819 and by the Calcutta High Court in Bhagirathi Devi Jalan v. CIT [1978] 112 ITR 534 and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mohd. Shaft Khan v. CWT [1983] 144 ITR 489. On the other hand, the decision of the Assam High Court in CIT v. Sabitri Devi Agarwalla [1970] 77 ITR 934 has been overruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in National Taj Traders' case [ 1980] 121 ITR 535. The decision of the Kerala High Court in Addl. CIT v. Panicker [1974] 97 ITR 525 and of the Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Ram Baran Ram Nath [1976] 104 ITR 691 and CIT v. Bhudar Singk & Sons [1983] 143 ITR 322 and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Addl. CIT v. N.V. Ganapathi Rao [1978] 115 ITR 277 can no longer be held to be good law, in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in National Taj Traders' case [1980] 121 ITR 535.
10. Thus, it is now firmly established that the bar created by the provisions of Section 275 of the 1961 Act refers only to the initial order and if an order of assessment is passed on account of the direction by a higher authority in appeal or revision or on account of an answer given in a reference by the High Court or on account of the order of a High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, then the time-limit laid down in Section 275 will not apply. In view of the conflict of decisions of different High Courts prevailing at the time when the reference was made, it might have been thought that the bar of two years provided under Section 275 may be applicable to the present case as well. But now the legal position in this respect has been amply clarified and the conflict has been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in National Taj Traders' case [1980] 121 ITR 535, wherein the decision of Bombay High Court in Kishoresinh Kalyansinh Solanki's case [1960] 39 ITR 522 has been approved and now there can be no doubt that the limitation provided in Section 275 applies only to the first order and the said time-limit would not apply to orders passed under directions of higher authorities as mentioned above.
11. We, therefore, send the case back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, so that the order of the Tribunal dated October 30, 1971, may now be complied with.
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