- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Of Rajasthan v. M/S. Jamna Das Gangadas And Co. And Etc. Etc.
Structured Summary of the Court Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a consolidated disposition of 15 appeals filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, because they raise a common question of limitation under Section 20 of the Act. Writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were filed by the respondents. On interim stay applications the respondents were ordered to deliver 65% of sugar stock held by them as on the commencement of the Sugar (Retention and Sale by Recognised Dealers) Order, 1979, for a price of Rs. 323 per quintal. The respondents failed to deliver the sugar despite intimations by the State Government as required by the interim orders.
The State of Rajasthan moved applications under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act seeking initiation of contempt proceedings; notices were ordered to be issued to the alleged contemners. The initial contempt applications were filed within one year from the date of the alleged contempt, but the actual orders directing issuance of notices were made after the expiry of one year from the date of the alleged contempt. The State sought amendments to treat the applications alternatively as proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution and/or Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A, C.P.C.; some amendments were allowed and some not. The learned single Judge dismissed the contempt applications by a common order dated February 7, 1983, holding that proceedings had been initiated beyond the period of limitation. These appeals challenge that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the limitation period under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 bars initiation of contempt proceedings where notices or initiation occur after one year from the date of the alleged contempt.
- Whether the High Court's inherent power under Article 215 of the Constitution (as a court of record) to punish for contempt is unaffected by the limitation prescribed in Section 20 of the Act — i.e., can Article 215 operate to permit initiation of contempt proceedings beyond the one-year period specified in Section 20?
- Whether, for purposes of limitation, proceedings treated as arising under Article 215 or under civil procedure rules (Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A, C.P.C.) escape the applicability of Section 20.
Arguments of the Parties
Learned Government Advocate / State's Arguments
- The High Court, being a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution, has inherent powers to punish for contempt; those inherent powers cannot be curtailed by the limitation in Section 20 of the Act.
- Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act (1971) demonstrates that the Act codifies existing law on contempt and does not oust the High Court's inherent Article 215 power; therefore, limitation under Section 20 should not operate as a bar to action under Article 215.
- Accordingly, the contempt applications were wrongly dismissed by the learned single Judge on grounds of limitation.
Respondents' Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baradakanta v. Mishra C.J., Orissa H.C, AIR 1974 SC 2255 (1975 Cri LJ 1) | Definition of "initiate any proceedings": initiation means the Court assuming jurisdiction to proceed for contempt; the limitation period starts when the Court initiates proceedings (terminus a quo). | The court relied on this precedent to hold that "initiation" is the assumption of jurisdiction by the Court and that the one-year limitation of Section 20 runs up to the date on which the Court initiates the contempt proceeding. |
| Girlabsingh v. Sri Ramji, AIR 1975 All 366 | Where the Court fails to initiate proceedings within limitation, the petitioner cannot complain merely because of the Court's delay; the petitioner has no right to insist that the respondent be punished for contempt. | Used to support the proposition that a private party cannot claim redress for the Court's mistake in failing to initiate proceedings within the statutory period. |
| State of Rajasthan v. M.R. Mitruka, 1978 Raj LW 224 (1978 Cri LJ 1440) | Procedure after the Contempt of Courts Act: criminal contempt procedures under Section 15, notice under Section 17, bench composition under Section 8; matter should be placed before Chief Justice and an appropriate Bench if initiation is considered expedient. | Relied upon to show that, even for civil contempt under Section 12, proceedings must be initiated by the Court and limitation runs to the date of such initiation; illustrates procedural control by the Court in initiating contempt proceedings. |
| G.N. Verma v. Har Govind Dayal, AIR 1975 All 52 | Noted in the context of process for initiating contempt; referenced for procedural context. | Noted by the court as one of the authorities supporting procedural aspects of initiating contempt proceedings. |
| Barada Kanta Mishra v. Registrar, Orissa H.C, AIR 1974 SC 710 (1974 Cri LJ 631) | Considered in relation to initiation and procedure for contempt proceedings. | Noted by the court as authority on when contempt jurisdiction is assumed and the procedural import of initiation. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad, 1978 Raj LW 186 | Proceedings are initiated when the Court orders issuance of notice; initiation after one year renders proceedings time-barred. | Cited to demonstrate that initiation by order for issue of notice after one year led to holding that proceedings were time-barred; applied analogously to these civil contempt matters. |
| Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta v. Dr. O.P. Chakravarty, (1975 Cri LJ 164 (All)) | Parliament can prescribe procedure for contempt; Article 215 confers power to punish but Parliament may legislate the procedure; procedural provisions (like limitation) enacted by Parliament are operative. | Relied on to conclude that Article 215 does not negate a statutory limitation period; Section 20 (a procedural provision) governs limitation even when actions are considered under Article 215. |
| Vegnanarayaniah (1974) 1 Mad LJ 155 : AIR 1974 Mad 313 | Article 215 recognizes inherent powers of High Court to punish for contempt; Article does not impose a limitation preventing suo motu action in civil contempt cases. | The court observed that this authority does not assist the State's contention that Article 215 displaces the statutory limitation under Section 20. |
| R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 858 (1972 Cri LJ 643) | Article 215 declares the High Court's power to punish contempt and such jurisdiction is special and not arising from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952; therefore not within Penal Code/CrPC purview for certain applications. | The court held this precedent irrelevant to the limitation question — it does not help the Government Advocate in overcoming the statutory limitation issue under Section 20. |
| Central Bank of India Delhi v. Current Transport Pvt., 1977 Cri LJ NOC 266 (Delhi) | On the facts of that case, notice was held to have been issued within time under Section 20. | Cited as a case where notices were considered within the one-year limit; noted but not directly controlling the appeals before the court. |
| Court v. Kasturilal, AIR 1980 Punj & Har 72 (1980 Cri LJ NOC 63) (Full Bench) | Section 18 does not prevent a single Judge of the High Court from initiating proceedings for criminal contempt; a single Judge may initiate such limited power. | Noted by the court but described as "beside the point" because that authority does not address the present limitation question under Section 20. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- Textual starting point — Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act: the court quoted Section 20 verbatim and explained that this provision prescribes a one-year limitation for initiating any proceedings for contempt, whether suo motu or otherwise.
- Meaning of "initiate" — The court relied on Baradakanta v. Mishra to interpret "initiate any proceedings" as the moment when the Court assumes jurisdiction to proceed for contempt; the limitation period runs to that date (terminus a quo).
- Application to facts — The court noted authorities (including State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad) holding that proceedings are initiated when the Court orders issuance of notice; where that occurs after one year, proceedings are time-barred. The court concluded that the notices in these matters were ordered after the expiry of one year and, therefore, initiation was beyond the statutory period.
- Article 215 contention — The court examined whether Article 215's conferment of inherent contempt power on the High Court displaces the statutory limitation. It analyzed precedent (notably Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta) and constitutional entries (Entry 14, List III and Entry 77, List I) to conclude that Parliament, under its legislative competence, may prescribe procedural rules (including limitation). The court held that Article 215 does not remove or curtail the procedural limitation enacted by Parliament in Section 20.
- Assessment of other authorities — The court considered cases cited by the State (Vegnanarayaniah, R.L. Kapur, Central Bank of India, Court v. Kasturilal) and explained their limited relevance: Vegnanarayaniah recognizes inherent power but does not negate limitation; R.L. Kapur confirms the special nature of contempt jurisdiction but does not assist on limitation; Central Bank was fact-specific where notice was timely; Court v. Kasturilal concerned a different question (single Judge initiating criminal contempt) and was not directly on point.
- Conclusion from analysis — Because Section 20 prescribes the limitation and initiation in these cases occurred after one year, the contempt applications were barred by limitation even if they were regarded as proceedings under Article 215 or under the alternative procedural heads.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeals were dismissed. The court held that the contempt proceedings were initiated beyond the one-year period prescribed by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and are therefore barred by limitation.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appeals against the learned single Judge's order are without merit and are dismissed; the contempt applications in the subject matters were time-barred and therefore could not be sustained.
- On the broader legal question: The court held that Article 215 of the Constitution, while preserving the High Court's power to punish for contempt, does not displace or nullify the procedural limitation enacted by Parliament in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The court did not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities on procedure and limitation.
- No broader or novel principle was declared beyond the application of Section 20 to the facts; the decision enforces that procedural limitations prescribed by Parliament must be complied with even where the High Court exercises inherent powers under Article 215.
Disposition: Appeals dismissed.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.K Mal Lodha, J.:— This is a bunch of a 15 appeals before us under S. 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act (No. LXX of 1971) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). As common question of limitation under S. 20 of the Act is involved in all the appeals, we consider it convenient to dispose them of by a common order.
2. Writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution were filed by the respondents. On the stay applications, ad-interim orders were passed by which, the respondents were required to deliver 65% stock of sugar held by them on the date of the commencement of the Sugar (Retention and Sale by Recognised Dealers) Order, 1979. The price to be paid was Rs. 323/- per qntl. In spite of the intimation by the State Government, as envisaged by the interim orders, the respondents failed to deliver the sugar to the Government. Thereafter, the State of Rajasthan moved applications for initiating the contempt proceedings against the respondents under S. 12 of the Act. On these applications, the court ordered for issuance of notices to the contemners. The applications were filed within one year from the date of the commission of the contempt. It is, however, admitted that notices were ordered to be issued after the expiry of period of one year from the date of the commission of the contempt. The applications for amendment of the original applications for contempt were moved by the State Government. The amendment sought was to the effect that the applications may be treated as under Art. 215 of the Constitution and in the alternative under O. XXXIX, R. 2-A, C.P.C In some of the applications, the amendment was allowed whereas in some, the orders therein were not passed. The applications for taking action for contempt were disposed of assuming that they were not only under S. 12 of the Act, but were also the applications under Art. 215 of the Constitution as well as under O. XXXIX, R. 2A, C.P.C The learned single Judge, by a common order dated Feb. 7, 1983, dismissed the applications holding that the proceedings have been initiated beyond the period of limitation. Aggrieved, these appeals have been filed as aforesaid. It was contended that the view taken by the learned single Judge is erroneous as under Art. 215 of the Constitution, the High Court, being a court of record has all the powers of such a Court inclusive of the power to punish for contempt and, therefore, limitation provided under S. 20 of the Act cannot operate as a bar. In other words, it was submitted that the High Court has inherent powers to punish for its contempt. Learned Government Advocate further urged that S. 22 of the Act makes it clear that the Act merely codifies the existing law, relating to contempt of court in contempt matters and the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Art. 215, can punish for the contempt. It was, thus, submitted that the applications for contempt have been wrongly dismissed on the ground of limitation. We proceed to examine this contention.
3. Section 20 of the Act reads as under:—
“20. Limitations for actions for contempt—
No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
4. This section lays down the period of limitation for initiating the proceedings for contempt. It is clear from this section that the period is to be counted from the date when the court initiates the proceedings for contempt either suo motu or otherwise.
5. The expression “initiate any proceedings” was considered in Baradakanta v. Misra C.J, Orissa H.C, AIR 1974 SC 2255 : (1975 Cri LJ 1) wherein, it was observed in para 7, as follows:—
“The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference to decide, in exercise of its discretion whether or not to initiate, a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take connizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion, or reference may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court.”
(Emphasis supplied).
6. It is, thus, clear that the initiation means assumption of jurisdiction to proceed for contempt. This decision was noticed in Girlabsingh v. Sri Ramji, AIR 1975 All 366. In that case, the petitioner brought action for contempt to the notice of the High Court within one month. The High Court did not initiate the proceedings within the limitation of one year. A contention was raised that the petitioner ought not to suffer on account of the mistake of the Court. This was overruled, holding that the petitioner not having any right as such and none of his rights having been prejudiced if the respondent is not punished for contempt, he cannot be heard to say that he should not be allowed to suffer for the mistake of the Court.
7. Section 324 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules and Ss. 15, 17 and 18 of the Act came up for examination in State of Rajasthan v. M.R Mitruka, 1978 Raj LW 224 : (1978 Cri LJ 1440). In that case Gupta, J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed as follows (at pp. 1441-42):—
“Alter the coming into force of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) the procedure to be followed in cases of criminal contempt, as defined in Section 2 of the Act, has been prescribed in Section 15. According to the said provision, the Supreme Court or the High Court is empowered to take action in this regard either on its own motion or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent of the Advocate General or on a reference by a subordinate Court. Then under Sec. 17 of the Act, a notice of every proceeding under S. 15 has to be served personally on the person charged, except otherwise directed by the Court and such notice has to be accompanied by a copy of the motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded, where the proceedings in the case have commenced on a motion. S. 8 of the Act provides that every case of criminal contempt under S. 15 shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than 2 Judges. Reading the provisions of Rule 324 of the Rules or this Court together with those of Sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Act, the proper procedure to be followed in the case of criminal contempt appears to be that the matter should be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and if he considers it expedient that proceedings for the criminal contempt should be initiated, then, he should direct that the matter be placed before an appropriate Bench which, after applying its judicial mind to the facts, may take cognisance of the case”.
8. In that case G.N Verma v. Har Govind Dayal, AIR 1975 All 52 and Barada Kanta Mishra v. Registrar, Orissa High Court AIR 1974 SC 710 : (1974 Cri LJ 631) were noticed. It is also clear from State Of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad, 1978 Raj LW 186 that the proceedings can only be initiated against the contemner, when the Court orders for issuance of notice. In that case, contempt was committed on April 1, 1974 and July 15, 1974. Proceedings for contempt were initiated on September 25, 1975 by Hon'ble the Chief Justice Sharma, J., as he then was, held that the proceedings for contempt were initiated against the contemners beyond the period of one year from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been committed. In that view of the matter, the proceedings for contempt were held to be time barred and, therefore, notices were discharged. Though the aforesaid Rajasthan decisions were under S. 15 and the cases before us are under S. 12 of the Act relating to civil contempt, nevertheless, proceedings have to be initiated and they are to be initiated either on its own motion or otherwise. It is the court which initiates the proceedings and the period of limitation under S. 20 of the Act is to be reckoned up to the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt by the Court from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. S. 20 prescribes period of limitation. According to it, no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Sec. 20 thus, bars initiation of proceedings for contempt by the court after the expiry of one year from the date of commission of contempt.
9. Now, it has to be determined whether power of High Court to punish for contempt is not curtailed under Art. 215 of the Constitution.
10. Entry 14 of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution relates to contempt of Courts. It does not include contempt of the-Supreme Court. Entry 14 is in the concurrent list, whereas in relation to the contempt of Supreme Court, the Parliament can enact law under Entry 77 of List I of Schedule VII. The question relating to Art. 215 of the Constitution came to be examined in Dr. Janardan Prasad Gupta v. Dr. O.P Chakravarty, 1975 Cri LJ 164 (All) wherein, it was observed as follows (para 6):—
“At best, in order to reconcile Articles 129 and 215 with Article 246 and the entries aforesaid what can be said is that Parliament cannot take away the power to punish without a constitutional amendment, but it would be untenable to say that it cannot prescribe the procedure as to how a contempt matter has to be dealt with by the Supreme Court or a High Court. Cl. (2) of Art. 142 deals with the powers of the Supreme Court to prescribe its procedure. It, however, says that subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall as respects whole of the Territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for purposes of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any document, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. The power of the Supreme Court to prescribe its own procedure for the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself is there, but that power is subject to the overall power of Parliament to make a law in regard to this procedure. It cannot, therefore, be argued that Section 15 which is procedural militates against Art. 215 or Art. 142. The moment Parliament makes a law, the rules or procedure made by the Supreme Court shall yield to that legislation. Art. 225 says that subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court……including any power to make rules of court and to regulate the sitting of the Court shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The power to make rules that exists in every High Court under Article 225, is subject to two conditions, namely that this power cannot be exercised if the Constitution provides otherwise or if a State law does so. It has been seen above that by Entry 14 of List III, Parliament has the power to legislate about contempt of Court. The language used in these two entries is of wide amplitude and it is well settled that the power to legislate on a subject covered by the entries, includes incidental matters also. When a Legislature gets a power to legislate on a particular subject, it cannot be said that it has no power to legislate as to the procedure or manner in which the particular legislation shall be regulated or implemented. The power to legislate regarding a Court must include the power to regulate the procedure of such a Court. We have no doubt, therefore, in our mind that Parliament had full power to legislate as to what is contempt, as to what can be the kinds of contempt, as to how cognisance of a contempt can be taken and as to the manner in which such an action should be heard and disposed of. It was argued by the learned counsel that S. 15 is a meaningless section; but, we do not think that it is so. There is clear public policy behind its enactment.” It was rightly not disputed before us that the period of limitation is a matter relating to procedure and not to regulate the exercise of power. The power to punish for contempt under Art. 215 of the Constitution is not taken away, but that power is required to be exercised within the time prescribed under S. 20 of the Act and as such even if, the applications are considered to be under Art. 215 of the Constitution, still, for the purpose of limitation, they will be governed by S. 20 of the Act and in this view of the matter also, the applications for taking action of the contempt were barred by limitation.
11. The learned Government Advocate invited our attention to Vegnanarayaniah in the matter of (1974) 1 Mad LJ 155 : (AIR 1974 Mad 313). In para 6 of the report, it is observed:
“Article 215 of the Constitution says that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is only in recognition of the inherent powers of the High Court as a Court of record to punish for contempt of itself. No limitation has been imposed in this Article that in cases of civil contempt the Court cannot take action suo motu. It is easy to conceive of a case where no party may care to come forward to move the Court for initiating proceedings for contempt, but where the Court may consider it necessary and expedient to initiate action suo motu. It is obviously necessary in such cases that the Court should have such a power.”
12. From the aforesaid observations it is clear that it is of no assistance to the learned Government Advocate.
13. Section 70, I.P.C, S. 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, S. 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Art. 215 of the Constitution came up for consideration in R.L Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 858 : (1972 Cri LJ 643). It was observed (para 5):
“The question is, does the power of the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, so that under Sec. 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Secs. 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure would apply? The answer to such a question is furnished by Art. 215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 themselves. Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and, therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Section 3 of that Act provides that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself. The only limitation to the power is as provided by sub-sec. (2), that it shall not take cognizance of a contempt committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code.”
14. This decision too is of no avail to the learned Government Advocate while examining the question of limitation. Reference was made to Central Bank of India Delhi v. Current Transport Pvt., 1977 Cri LJ NOC 266 (Delhi) Full report was made available to us by the learned Government Advocate. In that case on the facts and circumstances, notice was held to be within time under S. 20 of the Act.
15. Sections 18 and 23 of the Act were considered in Court V. Kasturilal AIR 1980 Punj and Har 72 : (1980 Cri LJ NOC 63) (FB). The question involved was whether in view of the provisions contained in S. 18 of the Act, the learned single Judge could initiate proceedings for criminal contempt and issue notice for the same. In that connection, Art. 215 of the Constitution was also considered. It was held that a single Judge of the High Court is in no way debarred from initiating proceedings for criminal contempt and S. 18 of the Act presents no impediment to the exercise of this limited power. The question referred to the Full Bench was answered in the affirmative. This decision is beside the point. The authorities relied on by the learned Government Advocate do not help, for, in none of the cases, the question with which we are concerned in these appeals arose.
16. It may be stated that the learned single Judge has also held that the provisions of O. XXXIX R. 2-A, C.P.C have no application to the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the contempt proceedings were the offshoots of the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This finding of the learned single Judge was not assailed before us.
17. No other point was pressed for our consideration. These appeals have no force and, therefore, they are dismissed summarily.
18. Appeals dismissed.
Alert