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Shyamlal And Another v. Upbhokta Sahakari Samiti, Jodhpur Non-Petitioner.
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision against order dated 17-2-1981
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (landlords) instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant from shops on the ground of default on 14-4-1975. Summons were served and the defendant appeared on 4-8-1975 and filed an application under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. On 11-8-1975 the defendant filed an application under Section 13(7). The plaintiffs replied on 19-8-1975. The trial court framed an issue limited to costs and interest and adjourned for written statement and evidence. The defendant filed a written statement on 16-9-1975 and the suit proceeded to trial.
The learned Munsif decreed the plaintiff's suit on 25-9-1976. The defendant appealed and the first appellate court allowed the appeal on 2-1-1977, setting aside the decree and dismissing the plaintiff's suit for eviction; plaintiffs were allowed to withdraw amounts deposited by the defendant. The plaintiffs then preferred a second appeal which was allowed on 11-8-1980, remanding the case to the trial court with directions to proceed in accordance with the observations in that judgment.
After remand, the defendant sought to have his application under S.13(7) heard first (drawing the trial court's attention to observations in the second appeal). The trial court framed an issue on whether the defendant was a defaulter and then posted the case for hearing of the S.13(7) application. The learned Munsif dismissed the application under S.13(7). The defendant appealed to the Additional Civil Judge, who allowed the appeal and directed that the suit proceed only relating to costs. The present revision challenges that order dated 17-2-1981 of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur which allowed the S.13(7) application and directed the suit to proceed only in regard to costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs can proceed with trial of a suit for eviction on the ground of default despite the defendant having deposited arrears of rent and interest on the first date of hearing under Section 13(4) of the Act and having moved an application under Section 13(7) seeking dismissal of the suit.
- Whether a defendant who, after depositing rent and interest under S.13(4), subsequently requests the court to proceed with the suit (for example, by framing issues and filing a written statement) thereby waives the benefit conferred by S.13(4) (including the protection under S.13(7))—and if failure to continue monthly deposits thereafter disentitles the defendant to S.13(7) protection.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-petitioners' Arguments (represented by Shri J.R. Tatia)
- The defendant had an obligation under S.13(4) to deposit/pay rent month by month by the fifteenth of each succeeding month after making the initial deposit; this continuous obligation was not complied with.
- Because of non-compliance with the ongoing monthly payment requirement in sub‑sec. (4), the defendant is not entitled to take the benefit under sub‑sec. (7); failure to comply permits striking out the defence under S.13(6) and requires the court to proceed with the hearing of the suit on the ground of default.
- Reliance was placed on Division Bench decisions and single Bench decisions of this Court (Shambhooram v. Mangal Singh; Moti Ram v. Parma Nand; Gorulal v. Gopichand; Pyare Lal v. Halka Singh) to support the proposition that a defendant who expresses intention to contest on the first day is disentitled to the benefit of sub‑sec. (4).
Defendant-non-petitioner’s Arguments (represented by Shri K.N. Joshi)
- The suit for eviction was solely based on the ground of default; the defendant deposited the arrears of rent together with interest as required by S.13(4) and thus was entitled to rely on S.13(7) for dismissal of the suit on that ground.
- Even if the defendant wished remaining controversies to be decided, with respect to eviction the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed because the defendant complied with S.13(4) by depositing arrears and interest within the time fixed by the court.
- It was incumbent on the trial court, upon such deposit under S.13(4), to dismiss the eviction claim under clause (a) of sub‑sec. (1) and the only matter remaining might be costs; striking out the defence under S.13(6) was an alternative course but that course was not adopted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shambhooram v. Mangal Singh (1958 Raj LW 574; AIR 1959 Raj 59) | Authority for the proposition that where a defendant expresses intention to contest on the first day of hearing, he is disentitled to the benefit of S.13(4); a defendant disputing liability to pay rent or disputing default is to be treated as contesting. | The Court noted this authority but observed that earlier decisions dealt with earlier formulations of sub‑secs. (4) and (5). The court held that these decisions do not assist the petitioner because in the present case the defendant did not waive the S.13(4) benefit and in fact had deposited rent and interest and filed an application under S.13(7). |
| Moti Ram v. Parma Nand (ILR (1960) 10 Raj 625) | Similar Division Bench authority cited for the same proposition regarding disentitlement where a defendant expresses intention to contest on the first hearing. | The Court treated this authority as part of the body of earlier decisions but concluded it did not help the petitioner for reasons stated (amendments and the defendant's conduct in depositing rent and making a S.13(7) application). |
| Gorulal v. Gopichand (AIR 1963 Raj 149) | Single Bench decision cited in support of the proposition that expressing intention to contest on the first hearing disentitles a defendant from S.13(4) benefit. | The Court acknowledged the decision but found it not decisive for the present facts because the defendant had deposited arrears and interest and had not effectively waived S.13(4). |
| Pyare Lal v. Halka Singh (1964 Raj LW 489) | Single Bench decision cited on comparable points concerning contesting on the first day and entitlement under S.13(4). | The Court considered it among the earlier authorities but concluded these did not change the outcome here, given the defendant's deposit and application under S.13(7). |
| Kedar Nath Gupta v. Bishan Das (1979 Raj LW 458) | Authority (in the context of S.13-A) stating that where tenant deposits rent after determination, proceedings must be treated as if the tenant had not committed any default; when the ground of eviction falls through there is no question of complying with S.13(4) or S.13(5). | The Court relied on the reasoning of this decision to support the proposition that once the tenant deposits the amount of rent and interest as required, the ground of eviction based on default falls through and there is no necessity to try the issue of default thereafter; the Court applied this reasoning to the present statutory scheme. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by closely examining the text and scheme of Section 13 (sub‑secs. (1), (4), (5), (6) and (7)) of the Act as they stood at the relevant time. It identified that clause (a) of sub‑sec. (1) makes default in payment of rent for six months a ground for eviction, while sub‑sec. (4) permits a tenant, in such a suit, to deposit arrears of rent and interest on the first day of hearing (or within time fixed by the court) and then to continue monthly payments thereafter. Sub‑sec. (7) provides that if a tenant makes the deposit/payment required by sub‑sec. (4) or (5), no decree for eviction on the default ground shall be passed, though the court may award costs to the landlord.
The Court noted competing contentions: the petitioners argued that since the defendant did not continue to make monthly payments by the fifteenth as required by sub‑sec. (4), he is disentitled to the protection of sub‑sec. (7) and the defence could properly be struck out under sub‑sec. (6). The defendant contended that having deposited arrears and interest within time under sub‑sec. (4) and having moved for dismissal under sub‑sec. (7), the trial court was obliged to dismiss the eviction claim on that ground.
The Court considered earlier decisions cited by the petitioners that had held a defendant who expresses intention to contest on the first day of hearing is disentitled to the benefit of sub‑sec. (4). The Court observed that those decisions applied earlier versions of sub‑secs. (4) and (5), and that they do not govern the present situation where the defendant actually deposited rent and interest and filed an application under S.13(7).
The Court reasoned that the first part of sub‑sec. (4) operates to extinguish the ground of default when the tenant deposits the arrears and interest within the time allowed; in that event "no trial on the ground of default thereafter is contemplated." The proviso to sub‑sec. (7) was noted as a limitation preventing repetition of this benefit after a second default. The Court emphasized the distinction between a tenant who affirmatively waives the benefit of sub‑sec. (4) and one who deposits as required and applies under sub‑sec. (7). Merely stating that the suit may proceed after framing issues did not, in the Court's view, constitute an unequivocal waiver of the statutory benefit.
The Court further observed that the trial court ought, if the tenant truly intended to waive S.13(4), to have specifically elicited that waiver; in the absence of an express waiver and in light of the deposit and the S.13(7) application, the benefit remained available to the defendant. The Court relied in part on the reasoning in Kedar Nath Gupta v. Bishan Das to underscore that once the ground of eviction falls through by deposit, proceedings must be treated as if there had been no default.
On these grounds the Court concluded that the defendant had not waived the protection of S.13(4) and S.13(7) and that the trial court should not have proceeded to try the default ground as if the deposit had not been made. Therefore the revision lacked merit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the revision petition. The Court ordered that the plaintiff's suit for eviction be dismissed (as the defendant had deposited arrears of rent and interest and thereby deprived the eviction claim on the ground of default), and directed that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
Core Ruling: Revision dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's eviction suit was dismissed because the defendant had complied with the deposit requirement of S.13(4) (and had sought relief under S.13(7)); the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
- No broader precedent beyond the application of the statutory scheme in this case was announced; the Court distinguished earlier authorities and applied statutory interpretation to the amended provisions of S.13. The opinion explained that where a tenant deposits the arrears and interest within time as required by sub‑sec. (4), the ground of eviction under clause (a) of sub‑sec. (1) falls through and need not be tried, unless the tenant expressly and unequivocally waives that benefit.
Revision dismissed.
1. This revision is directed against the order dated 17-2-1981, passed by the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, whereby he allowed the application under S. 13(7) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), reversing the order of the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur City, dated 23-10-1980, whereby the learned Munsif rejected the defendant's application under S. 13(7) of the Act. The learned Civil Judge further directed that the suit shall proceed only relating to costs.
2. I may briefly narrate the facts and circumstances leading to the present revision petition. The petitioners instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant from the shops on the ground of default. The suit was instituted on 14-4-1975. Summons were issued to the defendant. Thereupon the defendant appeared on 4-8-1975 and submitted an application under S. 13(4) of the Act. The case was then adjourned to 11-8-1975. On 11-8-1975 the defendant submitted an application under S. 13(7) of the Act. On 19-8-1975 the plaintiffs submitted reply to the application. The court considered that the only controversy between the parties relates to costs and interest so an issue to that effect was framed. However, the case was posted for filing of the written statement and evidence on that issue, to 26-8-1975. On 26-8-1975, counsel for the defendant expressed that the defendant wants to proceed with the suit after framing all issues on filing of the written statement. Thereupon, the counsel for the plaintiffs expressed that the plaintiffs have no objection. The case was then posted for filing of the written statement. The written statement was filed on 16-9-1975. The Court thereafter proceeded to try the suit. After trial, the learned Munsif decreed the plaintiff's suit on 25-9-1976. The defendant preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif, which was allowed on 2-1-1977 and the decree passed by the trial court, was set aside and the plaintiff's suit for eviction was dismissed. However, the plaintiffs were allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by the defendant from the court. The plaintiffs then preferred second appeal, which was allowed on 11-8-1980 and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court were set aside and the case was remanded to the trial court with a direction to proceed with the suit in the light of the observations made in the judgment in accordance with law. After the remand of the case, on behalf of the defendant, a prayer was made that the defendant's application under S. 13(7) of the Act may be first heard and decided and attention was invited to the observations made by this Court at page 15. However, the court framed an issue to the effect as to whether the defendant is a defaulter and then posted the case for hearing the arguments on the defendant's application under S. 13(7) of the Act. The application under S. 13(7) of the Act was to the effect that the defendant has paid the amount of rent and interest thereon on the first date of hearing, so the plaintiffs' suit is liable to be dismissed and as such the same may be dismissed. The learned Munsif, after hearing the arguments on the application, dismissed the application. The defendant went in appeal against the order dated 11-8-1975 and the learned Additional Civil Judge allowed the appeal, as stated above. Hence, this revision petition.
3. I have heard Shri J.R Tatia, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioners and Shri K.N Joshi, learned counsel for the defendant-non-petitioner.
4. In this revision petition an important question of law arises for consideration. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiffs can proceed with the trial of the suit for eviction despite the fact that the defendant deposited the amount of rent together with interest thereon on the first date of hearing under S. 13(4) of the Act, even when it is disputed by the defendant that it is the defaulter and that it is not liable for payment of costs? In the present case it is not in dispute that on the first date of hearing, the defendant deposited the amount of rent and interest and after having done so, he moved an application under S. 13(7) of the Act with the prayer that the suit may be dismissed.
5. Mr. J.R Tatia, learned counsel for the petition, strenuously contended that there was an obligation of the defendant to deposit or make payment of rent under S. 13(4), month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, after depositing the amount of rent and interest calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the payability of the amount, up to the date of deposit. Thus, there was non-compliance of this provision of sub-sec. (4) of S. 13. As such, the defendant is not entitled to take any benefit under sub-sec. (7) of S. 13. On the contrary, if there is non-compliance in depositing or payment of amount referred to in sub-sec. (4), on the date or within the time specified in sub-sec. (4), the defence against eviction is liable to be struck out and the court is required to proceed with the hearing of the suit after striking out the defence.
6. Mr. K.N Joshi, learned counsel for the defendant-non-petitioner, on the other hand urged that the suit for eviction is solely based on the ground of default. The defendant wanted to take the benefit of sub-sec. (4) and so he deposited the amount of rent together with interest thereon and it is on that basis that he submitted an application for dismissal of the suit for eviction under Section 13(7) of the Act. He submitted that it is true that the defendant wanted to get the remaining controversy decided in the suit, but so far as the question of eviction is concerned, the plaintiff's suit was to be dismissed in view of the fact that the defendant complied with the provision of sub-sec. (4) of S. 13 inasmuch as he deposited the arrears of rent together with interest thereon within the time fixed by the Court.
7. For proper appreciation and adjudication of the controversy it would be proper to reproduce the relevant provisions of S. 13 as they stood at the relevant time:—
“Section 13. Eviction of tenants— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied.—
(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent duo from him for six months;
(4) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1), with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the tenant shall, on the first day of hearing or on or before such date as the court may, on an application made to it, fix in this behalf, or within such time, not exceeding two months, as may be extended by the court, deposit in court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable up to the date of deposit and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at the rate.
(5) If in any suit referred to in sub-sec. (4), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the court shall determine, having regard to the provisions of this Act, the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant, within fifteen days from the date of such order, in accordance with the provision of sub-sec. (4).
(6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-sec. (4) or sub-sec. (5), on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.
(7) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-sec. (4) or sub-sec. (5), no decree for eviction on the ground specified in cl. (a), of sub-sec. (1) shall be passed by the court but the court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord.
Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section if having obtained such benefit or benefit under S. 13-A in respect of any such accommodation, if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months.
8. A perusal of the above provisions of S. 13 of the Act will make it clear that one of the grounds for eviction is that the tenant has defaulted in payment of rent for a period of six months, that is, a suit for eviction would lie against the tenant, if the tenant has neither paid, nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. However, sub-sec. (4) of S. 13 is enacted for the benefit of the tenants and it is provided under sub-sec. (4) that in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 13 of the Act, with or without any other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the tenant is required to deposit the arrears of rent together with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum on the first date of hearing or within the time allowed by the court. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 13 of the Act further provides that the tenant shall continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. Sub-section (7) of S. 13 of the Act provides that if a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-sec. (4) or sub-section (5), no decree for eviction on the ground specified in cl. (a), of sub-sec. (1) shall be passed by the court, but the court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord. The proviso to sub-sec. (7) lays down that the tenant would not he entitled to the protection of S. 13, in case such benefit has once been obtained by the tenant, that is, if the tenant makes a second default in the payment of rent for six months, then the benefit of the provision contained in S. 13 is not available to the tenant.
9. The emphasis of Shri Tatia is that the suit did not come to an end and was not dismissed by the trial court on the defendant's application under S. 13(7). Rather, the defendant asked the court to proceed with the suit. When such was the stand taken by the defendant, it was obligatory for him to have continued to deposit or make payment of rent by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, which he admittedly failed to do, so it should be taken that the defendant in fact has not taken the benefit or sub-sec. (4) of S. 13 and in case it is found that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent, the plaintiffs' suit would deserve to be decreed on the ground specified in cl. (a), of sub-sec. (1), of S. 13, Shri Tatia placed reliance in support of his contention on the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Shambhooram v. Mangal Singh (1958 Raj LW 574) : (AIR 1959 Raj 59) and Moti Ram v. Parma Nand (ILR (1960) 10 Raj 625) and single Bench decisions in Gorulal v. Gopichand (AIR 1963 Raj 149) and Pyare Lal v. Halka Singh (1964 Raj LW 489).
10. It may be stated that so far as the aforesaid decisions of this Court are concerned, these decisions have taken into consideration the provisions of S. 13(4), (5), as were then existing. It is pertinent to note that under sub-sec. (5) of S. 13, as it stood then, it was open to the tenant to express his intention to contest the suit on the first date fixed for hearing of the suit. Section 13, sub-secs. (4) and (5) underwent amendments and it is the above amended provisions, which need to be construed in relation to the controversy raised in the present revision petition. In the decisions relied on by Mr. Tatia what has been laid down is that where and in so far as a suit for eviction is based on S. 13(1)(a) and a defendant expresses his intention to contest the same on the first day of hearing, he renders himself disentitled to the benefit of sub-sec. (4) of S. 13. It was also observed that the defendant must he deemed to have contested the suit if he disputes his liability to pay rent, which is claimed from him, or contests that he is a defaulter or raises any other dispute in that connection and this result would be avoidable only where the dispute may happen to be as to mere arithmetical error in the calculation of the rent due or a similar error in the calculation of interest or costs. These authorities, in my opinion, thus, do not in any way help the petitioner. It is true that the defendant did express that the suit may be proceeded with after framing of all issues on filing of the written statement, but from this it cannot be taken that the defendant in any way expressed that he does not want to avail the benefit of sub-sec. (4) of S. 13. The defendant wanted to avail the benefit of sub-sec. (4) of S. 13 is manifest from his conduct of depositing the rent together with interest thereon and it is further evident from the application submitted by him under S. 13(7) on 11-8-1975. The defendant categorically stated in this application that the plaintiffs have filed the suit for eviction on the basis of default and this is first suit. The amounts of rent and interest have been deposited, so the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs' suit be dismissed with costs. If the defendant did not want to avail the benefit of sub-sec. (4) of S. 13, he would not have deposited the amount of rent and interest. The controversy regarding interest ceased the very moment when interest was deposited by the defendant. I may here reproduce some of the observations made by this Court in its judgment of the second appeal. This Court observed as under:—
“It was also stated that the defendant submitted an application under S. 13(4) of the Act and deposited the rent inclusive of interest up to Aug. 13, 1975 within time. The fact that the defendant has committed default in payment of rent was denied. It is not in dispute before me that the suit for eviction was based under S. 13(1)(a) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the rent up to Aug. 13, 1975 and the interest @ 6% per annum were deposited. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that in view of S. 13(7) when the defendant had deposited the rent under S. 13(4) of the Act, decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 13 cannot be passed and the only alternative for the court was to allow such costs which it might have deemed fit to award to the plaintiffs. He urged that it was on account of this fact that issue No. 1 was framed on Aug. 15, 1975 to the effect whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the costs and interest from the defendant. The defendant had already deposited the amount of interest @ 6% per annum as required by S. 13(4) of the Act. Thus, there was no controversy whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest Mr. J.R Tatia, learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute that the claim of interest was wrongly included in issue No. 1. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the defendant failed to comply with the other condition of S. 13(4) of the Act, namely, that he did not continue to deposit or pay the rent month by month by the 15th of the each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at the rate it was last paid and for his failure to comply with the other condition of S. 13(4), he is liable to be evicted. This was strongly refuted by Mr. K.N Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent, on the ground that when the defendant had deposited the rent with interest as required by S. 13(4) of the Act after making the application, if was incumbent on the trial court to have dismissed the suit as besides the ground specified in cl. (a) of S. 13(1) of the Act, there were no other grounds taken by the plaintiffs for the purpose of ejectment. He further contends that even assuming without admitting that the defendant had failed to deposit or pay the amount as required by S. 13(4) of the Act on the date or within the time specified, it was open to the trial court to strike out its defence and to proceed with the hearing of the suit and this course was not adopted by the trial court. It may be recalled here that the learned Munsif has mentioned in the order that as the suit proceeded and the defendant had not taken advantage of S. 13(4) of the Act, the plaintiff is not entitled to interest but will get costs of the suit. I have already stated that the claim of interest is not in controversy. The appellate court decided both the points for determination framed by him against the defendant whereby holding that it was not necessary for the trial court to have dismissed the suit for ejectment on the filing of the application under S. 13(7) of the Act after depositing the rent under S. 13(4) of the Act. I am afraid on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the prayer that in view of the aforesaid findings of the learned Addl. Civil Judge, decree for eviction against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiffs cannot be passed.”
11. The above observations do throw light to some extent as to how the matter has to be viewed when the tenant has deposited the amount of rent and interest thereon under S. 13(4). By this conduct of the defendant that he requested the court to proceed with the suit after framing of issues and after entertaining his written statement, it cannot be taken that the defendant waived this benefit, then of course the question of default could have been gone into and in case the finding is recorded that the defendant has been a defaulter suit for eviction based on the ground of default could be decreed. If the scheme of sub-secs. (4), (5), (6) and (7) is examined, it would appear that the ground of default ceases to exist when the amount of rent and interest is deposited by the tenant, as provided under the first part of sub-sec. (4). No trial on the ground of default thereafter is contemplated. Whether the tenant has committed any default or not, need not be gone into in case the tenant conducts himself in the manner, as provided in the first part of sub-sec. (4) by depositing the amount of rent and interest within the time allowed by the court. The proviso to sub-sec. (7) would show that it is in the nature of the benefit, which has been given to the tenant and no such benefit can be claimed second time by the tenant, even if he has not committed any default, that is, even if he has been tendering the amount of rent regularly, but has not been accepted by the landlord, and, thus, as a matter of fact he may not be a defaulter, as he has been offering rent, but this controversy need not be tried by the court, if the tenant deposited the amount rent and interest on the first date of hearing or within the time allowed by the Court. It is true that if the suit is based on some other ground along with the ground of default and if the tenant does not deposit or pay rent by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, then his defence is liable to be struck out. In the present case striking out the defence would be of no consequence, because the ground of eviction ceases to exist on depositing the amount of rent and interest. I may here refer to a decision of this Court cited by Mr. Joshi. In Kedar Nath Gupta v. Bishan Das (1979 Raj LW 458), the Court was examining the question in the light of the provision contained in S. 13-A. In that case the tenant moved an application under S. 13-A of the Act and after determination of the amount of rent, the same was deposited by the tenant. It was observed that the proceedings have to be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default. It was further observed that when the ground of eviction on the basis of default under S. 13(1)(a) of the Act falls through there is no question of complying S. 13(4) or 13(5) of the Act. This case is not directly on the point, which has emerged for consideration in the present revision petition, but the question has to be viewed in the light of the scheme of the provisions and in the light of the scheme of the provision, as considered above. I am clearly of the opinion that the ground of S. 13(1)(a) falls through the moment the tenant deposits the amount of rent and interest on the first day of hearing or within the time allowed by the court. There would have been a different position had the defendant waived the benefit under sub-sec. (4) of S. 13. Merely by stating to the Court that the suit may be proceeded after framing all issues, does not mean that the tenant waived this benefit conferred on him under S. 13(4) of the Act. As a matter of fact the trial court should have expressly asked the defendant as to whether the defendant wants to waive the benefit under S. 13(4) and if the defendant had expressed to waive the benefit, the question of default would be determined in the case and the ground of default in that situation would continue to exist and on merits of the question of default, the decision of the suit would be based, but such is not the position in the present case. If the defendant did not want to avail the benefit of S. 13(4), there was no need for him to deposit the amount of rent and interest and there was no need for him to move the application under S. 13(7). The application under S. 13(7) was not disposed of by the Court. Had it been disposed of earlier, the present situation would not have arisen.
12. In the above view of the matter, in my opinion, this revision petition is devoid of any force, so it is hereby dismissed. The counsel for the defendant-petitioner does not want to contest the suit for costs. In view of this the plaintiff's suit for eviction is dismissed. The parties however, shall bear their own costs throughout.
Revision dismissed.
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