- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Balu v. Birda
Judgment Summary — G.M. Lodha, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants are Harijans (members of a Scheduled Caste in Rajasthan) who asserted khatedari (tenant/occupancy) rights in agricultural land identified by Khasra Nos. 69 and 71 in village Jalpali. There were earlier proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the land was attached by the S.D.M.; subsequently two suits (one by the plaintiff and one by defendant Birda) in the Assistant Collector's court were consolidated. During those consolidated proceedings compromises were recorded on 19th and 28th August 1958 that resulted in transfer of portions of the land to non-Scheduled Caste persons.
The plaintiffs alleged that one compromise was procured by fraud (Birda's compromise allegedly lacked Birda's thumb impression and this fact was concealed) and that as a result they were deprived of part of their land and suffered crop loss. The plaintiffs sued to have the compromise-based decrees set aside, claimed restoration of possession and damages. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit; the first appellate court dismissed the appeal. This is the plaintiffs' second appeal.
Before this Court, the plaintiffs sought permission to amend the plaint to plead that the compromises and resulting decrees amounted to transfers violative of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (which, by its proviso, restricts transfers by Khatedar tenants who are members of Scheduled Castes to non-members).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the protective prohibition in Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (and its proviso) — which prevents members of Scheduled Castes/Tribes from transferring their khatedari interest to persons outside the same community — can be nullified by compromises or compromise decrees that result in the land passing to non-Scheduled Caste persons.
- Whether a compromise recorded in civil/revenue proceedings that results in the agricultural land of a Scheduled Caste Khatedar being given to a non-Scheduled Caste person amounts to a "transfer" within the meaning of Section 42 (and therefore is void).
- Whether the trial and first appellate courts erred in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to amend their plaint to plead that the decrees based on compromise were violative of Section 42 and therefore void.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments
- The plaintiffs (Harijans and claimed khatedars) alleged that compromises recorded in the consolidated suits resulted in dispossession of their land (Khasra No. 69 and part of No. 71) and that one compromise was procured by fraud (absence of Birda's thumb impression concealed from plaintiff's mukhtiar).
- They sought to amend the plaint in the first appellate court to add the ground that the compromises and resulting decrees amounted to transfers in favour of non-Scheduled Caste persons and therefore contravened Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (making those transfers void).
- Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Hanuman Choudhary) specifically argued that under the earlier provisions and proviso to Section 42 no Khatedar tenant who is a member of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe could transfer his interest to a non-member, hence the compromise-based transfer must be treated as void as falling within Section 42's prohibition.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- Defendant Nos. 1–3 admitted consolidation and said a legal compromise was reached between the plaintiff and certain defendants; they denied any concealment or fraud and produced the compromise in court.
- They contended that the plaintiff was not kept in ignorance by their mukhtiar and that at the time of compromise the lands were in possession of the Receiver, so plaintiff was not entitled to damages for possession being handed over.
- They raised procedural/legal objections in the trial court: improper court-fees, necessity of Government of Rajasthan as a party, limitation bar and misjoinder of parties.
- Before this Court, opposing counsel (Mr. Tibrewal) asserted, inter alia, that the plaintiff was not a khatedar at all.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the statutory protection in Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, including its proviso (which, since 22nd September 1956, expressly prohibited a Khatedar tenant who is a member of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe from transferring his interest in whole or part of his holding to a person who is not a member of the same Scheduled Caste/Tribe).
The Court analysed the object and background of Section 42, characterising it as socio-economic legislation enacted to protect weaker, depressed and economically/educationally disadvantaged classes (Scheduled Castes/Tribes) from exploitation by the more affluent. Given this protective purpose, the Court concluded that a broad and liberal interpretation of the word "transfer" in the proviso is required so as to capture all direct and indirect modes of transferring property which would defeat the legislative intent.
Applying that interpretive approach, the Court held that compromises recorded in civil or revenue suits which operate to give agricultural land in khatedari of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe person to a non-member should be treated as "transfers" within the mischief of Section 42 and therefore fall within the prohibition. The Court also stated that even a contested decree resulting in transfer would be covered by Section 42's protective umbrella.
The Court recognised, however, that the present case raised intricate factual questions — for example, whether the plaintiff actually had khatedari rights in Khasra No. 69 — and that those factual disputes required evidence. Because the Court was sitting in a second appeal (and because both parties had not had the opportunity to lead evidence on the newly raised ground), the Court found it inappropriate to decide the factual controversy on the record before it.
Consequently, the Court exercised its appellate discretion to allow the plaintiffs to amend their plaint in the first appellate court to raise the Section 42 objection (i.e., that the compromise-based decrees were violative of Section 42). The Court directed that after amendment the defendants should be permitted to file written statements, take legal objections, issues should be framed, both parties should lead evidence on that question and the trial court should decide the matter afresh.
The Court also addressed costs: because the appellants are poor Harijans, no costs were allowed to the defendants for this amendment; parties were ordered to bear their own costs of this appeal and the first appeal.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED; AMENDMENT PERMITTED AND CASE REMANDED
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The findings of both lower courts are set aside.
- The plaintiffs are permitted to amend their plaint to take the ground that the decrees passed on the basis of compromise were violative of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
- After amendment the defendants may file written statements, raise legal objections, and both parties shall be allowed to lead evidence on the Section 42 issue and other framed issues; the trial court shall decide the case afresh after framing issues, recording evidence and hearing the parties.
- No costs are awarded to defendants for the amendment; the parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal and the first appellate proceedings.
Broader legal implication stated by the Court (as set out in the opinion):
- The term "transfer" in the proviso to Section 42 should be given a comprehensive construction to include not only express sale, gift or bequest but also compromises and other direct or indirect methods by which agricultural land in khatedari of Scheduled Caste/Tribe persons may be made to pass to non-members. Such transfers are within the mischief of the prohibition and would be void under Section 42.
The Court did not decide the factual questions determinative of this case (for example, whether the plaintiff was the khatedar of the disputed land); those questions were remitted to the trial court for fresh adjudication after amendment and evidence.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.M Lodha, J.:— Can the protective umbrella of Section 42 Rajasthan Tenancy Act, aimed to implement the socioeconomic uplift of Scheduled Caste Sheduled Tribes, by prohibiting transfer of land by them, so that they retain land, be nullified and set at naught by ingenious legal trickery of affluent and resourceful segment of society by obtaining compromise decrees, surrendering the land to non-scheduled caste? When a landless tiller Harijan or Girijan again becomes landless by compromise, would the law permit such economic suicide by Harijans, against legislative intent of Section 42, is the pivot of debate in this Harijan's litigations,
2. And now the traditional narration of facts.
3. This is plaintiff's second appeal after making attempt to get a decree in two lower courts.
4. The plaintiffs are Harijans and therefore, members of Scheduled Caste in Rajasthan. The plaintiffs are Khatedars of some agriculture land. There is a chequered history of the case in which in an earlier litigation a decree was passed by which the plaintiffs were deprived of some land in Khasra No. 69 on the basis of some compromise.
5. In order to understand to the case in a little details, it would be better to mention the facts in details as mentioned by the first appellate court, which are as under:—
6. The plaintiff's case is that there is a Kothi Bhan Singh in village Jalpali. There is a well on this land and its No. is 70. The land is split in two parts and their Nos. are 69 and 71 each measuring 7 bighas and one biswa. The land Khasra No. 69 is called ‘Uguna Pana’ and land No. 71 is called ‘Athoona Pana.’ Between the parties there were proceedings under S. 145 Cr. P.C in the court of S.D.M Neem Ka Thana. On 11th July 1956 the learned S.D.M attached the land under S. 146 Cr. P.C, and directed the parties to get their rights decided by a competent court. On 11th August, 1957 Birda defendant No. 1 filed a suits in the court of Assistant Collector, Neem Ka Thana for declaration about Khasra No. 71. Another suit was brought by the plaintiff for declaration of Khasra No. 69 in the said court. On the application of the parties both the suits were consolidated. The suit by the present plaintiff was against Birda, Sheobux and Nand Singh. Since Sukhsingh. Narainsingh were the Khatedar they were made proforma defendants. The suit by Birda was against Sukhsingh etc. During the proceedings of these suits which were consolidated on 4th Aug., 1958 a compromise was arrived at between the plaintiff and defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 at Shrimadhopur. As per the compromise the plaintiff was given two bighas 7 biswas of land in both these Khasras and in these terms the compromise was filed in the court. In the suit filed by the plaintiff the compromise was filed but in the case filed by Birda the compromise was filed but Birda did not put his thumb impression on it. This fact was kept concealed from the plaintiff's AM Muktiar and the Mukhtiar was told that the compromise is in terms of the Settlement arrived at between the parties and it is on behalf of Birda also. On 28th Aug. 1958 Birda filed another compromise according to which Birda was given two bighas and 7 biswas of land and the rest was given to Nandsingh. The plaintiff came to know of this mischief by the defendant Birda when the Girdawar of Tehsil Shrimadhopur on 27th September, 1959 came there and banded over the possession of two bighas and 7 biswas of land on which the plaintiff's crop was standing to the defendant. Later on the plaintiff went to Tehsil, inspected the file and came to know about the fraud played by the defendant on him. He also averred that due to this handing over possession to the defendant of the land he sustained a loss of Rs. 200/-. He, therefore, prayed that both the decrees given on the basis of the compromise in the case filed by the plaintiff and defendant Birda be set aside, as they were obtained by fraud. He also prayed that it be declared that the decrees are not binding on him, that he be declared the Khatedar Kastkar of two bighas and 7 biswas of Khasra No. 71 - and that he be put in possession of it, that he be awarded damages at the rate of Rs. 138/- per annum for the loss of the crops. In the alternative, he pleaded that he be declared the full-fledged khatedar Kashtkar of the whole of Khasra No. 69.
7. Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 put in their written-statements. It was admitted that there were proceedings under Sec. 145 pertaings to these lands and that the lands were attached and the parties were directed to get their rights decided by the competent Civil Court They also averred that the suits were consolidated on the application of Sheo Buxa, that a legal compromise was arrived at between the plaintiff and Sheobuxa and the suit against Birda was withdrawn. No compromise was arrived at Shrimadhopur. Whatever compromise was entered between the parties was produced in the court. No facts were withheld from the plaintiff or his Am Mukihtar. At the time of the compromise the lands were in possession of the Receiver and no possession was given to the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages. The plaintiff has not put in proper court-fees; Government of Rajasthan is a necessary party; the suit is time barred.
8. Rest of the defendants did not contest the suit. Following issues were framed:—
(1) Whether on the request of the parties on 10th March, 1958 both the suits pending in the Court of Asstt. Collector, Neem-Ka-Thana were consolidated? (Plff.)
(2) Whether in both the suits, the dispute was between Murli, Birda, Sheobu, Nand Singh and that Sukh Singh and Narain Singh were made proforma defendants being the owners of the land and what is its effect on the suit? (B.O Plff).
(3) Whether previously Murli plaintiff was cultivating whole of Khasra No. 69 and was entitled to it? (B.O Plff).
(4) Whether during the proceedings of these suits on 4.8.58 there was a compromise between Murli and defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 at Shri Madhopur and that according to which the plaintiff was given two bighas and 7 biswas of land in both Khasra Nos. 69 and 71 and that it was agreed that compromise would be produced in the court to this effect? (B.O Plff.)
(5) Whether as per terms of the compromise the plaintiff filed his compromise in the suit titled ‘Murli v. Birdu’ and that in the suit titled Birda v. Sukhsingh etc.’ the compromise was filed which did not bear Birda's thumb impression which fact withheld from the plaintiff Am Mukhtar Balu?
(6) Whether in suit Birda v. Sukhsingh, defendant Birda put in a compromise on 28th August 1958 and played fraud with the plaintiff as detailed in para No. 10 of the plaint and did not allow the plaintiff to have knowledge about it? (B.O Plff.)
(7) Whether the decree dated 19th August 1958 and 28th August, 1958 were obtained from the court of Asstt. Collector, Neem Ka Thana by fraud and, therefore, illegal, void and inoperative and that the plaintiff is not bound by them? (B.O Plff.)
(8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of Khasra No. 71 and entitled to mesne profits of Rs. 200/- per Sialu harvest right from Samvat 2016 till the day of possession and damages at the rate of Rs. 138/- per harvest? (B.O Plff.)
(9) Whether the Govt. of Rajasthan is necessary party?
(10) Whether the Court fees filed by the plaintiff is deficit? (B.O Plff.)
(11) Whether the suit is within limitation? (Plff.)
(12) Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties? (B.O Defts.)
(13) Relief?
9. Issue No. 10 was decided on 24th May, 1965 and the plaintiff was ordered to pay Rs. 72,75 as deficit court fees and the plaintiff complied with it. After recording the evidence of the parties the plaintiff's suit was dismissed against which the appeal was preferred.
10. The appeal was also dismissed.
11. In appeal, an amendment was sought on the ground that the compromises were entered into between Scheduled caste and Non-Scheduled caste persons and therefore, they are violative of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
12. Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act reads as under:—
“42 General restrictions on sale, gift & bequest—
The sale, gift or bequest by a Khatedar tenant of his interest in the whole or part of his holding shall be void, if—
(a) it is not of a survey number except when the area of the survey number so sold, gifts or bequeathed is in excess of the minimum area prescribed for the purpose of sub-section (1) of section 53 in which case also the area not transferred shall not be fragment:
Provided that this restriction shall not apply if the area so transferred becomes merged into a contiguous survey number;
Provided further that this restriction shall not apply if the sale gift or bequest is of the entire interest of a tenant in the survey number;
Provided also that the State Government or any authority or officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may exempt by general or special order and subject to such conditions as may be specified, the sale, gift or bequest for industrial residential or commercial purposes, from these restrictions.
(b) such sale, gift or bequest is by a member of a Scheduled caste in favour of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled caste, or by a member of a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe.”
13. The first appellate court was of the view that the application for amendment cannot be allowed because plaintiffs surrendered their right in Khasra No. 69, which cannot be treated as sale or bequest and therefore, such a plea cannot be taken.
14. Before this court, several arguments were made, which centres around the question, whether the plaint have been allowed to be amended. Mr. Hanuman Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that so far as Khasra No. 69 is concerned, the plaintiff was the Khatedar and there was a specific prohibition for transfer of this land, according to earlier provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, (Section 42 and its proviso). The proviso to Section 42, is it existed from 22nd September, 1956, reads as under—
“Provided that no Khatedar tenant being a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, shall so transfer his interest in the whole or a part of his holding to any person who is not a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.”
15. The question which comes for consideration is whether by virtue of compromise, when a party concedes to a particular position, the result of which is that the agricultural land, which is alleged to be in Khatedari of that party is given to the other party, who is non-Scheduled caste, it tantamount to ‘transfer’ for the purposes of S. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
16. Undoubtedly, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs belonged to Scheduled Caste and the defendant-respondents are non-Scheduled Caste. Obviously, therefore, if there had been a transfer, as contemplated by Sec. 42, it was void and cannot be made effective.
17. The question still arises is whether such a transfer amounts to sell, bequest, gift or other conveyance of property as contemplated by the transfer of Property Act.
18. In my opinion, the provisions of Section 42 have been enacted for prohibiting transfer of agricultural land from Scheduled Caste to Non-Scheduled Caste on the ground that Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe are the weaker sections of Society and if protection it not given, the other affluent members of society would exploit them. This is Socio-Economic Legislation to ameliorate the condition of down trodden, depressed and suppressed segment of society, who are weaker financially, economically, socially and also in education.
19. It is, therefore, necessary that broad, liberal interpretation should be made to the word, ‘Transfer’ used in this proviso and all direct or indirect methods of transferring property should be considered to be hit by the prohibition, contained in Section 42. In that context and background, the sale or bequest would be void.
20. The parties manipulate compromises in civil suits and revenue suits and both the parties want to change the property from one person to other person. Can it not be said that it was a transfer for the purpose of Section 42, as surrender can only be made u/s. 55 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act?
21. Broadly speaking, I am of the opinion that the word, ‘transfer’ used in the proviso to Sec. 42 should be treated as comprehensive and even if an agricultural land in Khatedari of Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe is given to non-Scheduled Caste, non-Scheduled Tribe, by a compromise in a suit, then also it would come within the mischief of prohibited transfer under S. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenaney Act. Even a contested decree resulting in transfer would be covered by the protective umbrella of S. 42 of the Act.
22. What precisely happened in this case would still involve complicated questions of fact requiring evidence as Mr. Tibrewal submits that the plaintiff was not Khatedar at all and the appellant's counsel Shri Hanuman Choudhary submits that Khatedari rights were with the plaintiff for Khasra No. 69.
23. Sitting in second appeal, I cannot decide this controversy, more-so because both the patties has no opportunity to lead evidence on the vital aspect of the case. It would, therefore, be in the interest of justice to accept the prayer for amendment in the first appellate court and permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint as prayed, by taking the ground that the compromise was a transfer and this transfer was violative to S. 42 of the Transfer of Property Act.
24. The plaintiffs are permitted to take this ground in the plaint by amendment of the plaint and the defendants would be at liberty to file written statements. Both the parties then shall lead evidence after framing issues and then the case will be decided afresh by the trial court.
25. In view of the above, findings of both lower courts are set aside and the case is sent back to the trial court with direction that he will allow the plaintiffs to amend the plaint as per their application before the first appellate court to take the ground that the decrees passed on the basis of compromise were violative of S. 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
26. After the plaint is amended the defendant should be allowed opportunity to file written statement and take all legal objections. Both parties will be further allowed to lead evidence on this issue as well as the other issues which were framed in the case, since the case is being remanded. After recording the evidence and hearing the parties the trial court would decide the case afresh.
27. Since the appellants are members of Scheduled caste and they are poor Harijans, no costs are allowed to the defendants for this amendment. The parties would bear their own costs of this appeal, as well as in the first appellate court.
28. The appeal is, therefore, accepted as indicated above.
Alert