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Radhey Shyam v. Sita Ram
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (appellant in the present special appeal) obtained a decree for Rs. 26,277.43 on 5 October 1979 from the court of Additional District Judge No. 4, Jaipur City. The defendant filed a first appeal in the High Court and, along with that appeal, moved for a stay of execution of the decree under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. The learned single Judge heard the stay application and ordered (18 December 1979) that the appellant pay Rs. 12,000 to the respondent and submit a solvent surety for the balance; the respondent must also give a solvent surety for restitution while withdrawing the Rs. 12,000; three months were allowed for payment.
Aggrieved by that order, the plaintiff filed a special appeal to the Division Bench under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. The office of the Court raised a preliminary objection that a special appeal under Section 18 does not lie against the impugned interlocutory order made on a stay application under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. The Division Bench heard the appellant's counsel on this objection and reserved its decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lies to the Division Bench under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 against an order of a single Judge made on a stay application filed under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C.
- Whether an order made on an application under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. amounts to a "judgment" within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Ordinance, thereby making it appealable to the Division Bench.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Patodia)
- Contended that an appeal lies to the Division Bench under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Ordinance against a judgment of a single Judge, and that the impugned order falls within the meaning of the word "judgment".
- Relied on the decisions Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb (AIR 1953 SC 198) and K. G. Rangaswami Chettiar and Co. v. Eswaramurthy Goundar (AIR 1954 Mad 1053, Full Bench) to support the contention that the order is a judgment.
- Asserted that existing Division Bench decisions relied upon by the Court were distinguishable from the present facts.
Office / Respondent Objection
- The office raised the objection that a special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance does not lie against the impugned order of the single Judge passed on a stay application under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb, AIR 1953 SC 198 | Authoritative exposition of the meaning of "judgment" — that a judgment is a final adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of parties (distinguishing final judgments from interlocutory orders). | Used by the Court as an authoritative source for the test of whether an order is a "judgment" for the purposes of Section 18(1) of the Ordinance. |
| K. G. Rangaswami Chettiar and Co. v. Eswaramurthy Goundar, AIR 1954 Mad 1053 (FB) | Cited by appellant in support of treating certain orders as "judgments" (Full Bench Madras authority was relied upon by counsel). | Cited by the appellant; the Court noted the reliance but did not adopt this authority in preferring earlier Division Bench decisions of the Rajasthan High Court. |
| Rajputana Cold Storage and Refrigeration Co. Ltd v. Rani Ajit-kunverha, ILR (1955) 5 Raj 418 | Division Bench interpretation of "judgment" under Section 18(1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance — held that orders deferring decision or interlocutory orders are not "judgments". | Followed by the Court as a controlling Division Bench precedent holding that an order which does not finally determine the proceeding is not a "judgment" under Section 18(1). |
| Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Company, (1872) 8 Beng LR 433 | Early authority examined in Asrumati Debi regarding whether every judicial pronouncement is a "judgment" and the requirement that a judgment be a final pronouncement. | Referred to within the Rajputana Cold Storage discussion (via Asrumati Debi) to illustrate the principle that not every judicial pronouncement amounts to a "judgment". |
| Tuljaram v. Alagappa, (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1 (FB) | Full Bench Madras authority explaining that one must look to the effect of the order upon the proceeding to determine whether it is a "judgment". | Referred to in the Court's discussion (via Rajputana Cold Storage) as part of the doctrinal history on the meaning of "judgment". |
| State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills, 1973 Raj LW 633 (AIR 1974 Raj 110) | Division Bench decision applying the test that a "judgment" must finally determine rights; held interim orders in writ petitions (Article 226) were interlocutory and not appealable under Section 18. | Followed by the Court. The Court adopted the reasoning that the impugned interim order was interlocutory and therefore not appealable under Section 18(1). |
| Southern Roadways (P) Ltd. v. P. Mathurai Veeraswami, AIR 1964 Mad 194 (FB) | Discussed the true import of the word "judgment" and proposed tests (determination of right and liability; final adjudication of matters in issue). | Referred to by the Court (through State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills) for the articulation of the tests by which a judicial order can be regarded as a "judgment". |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- It began by noting that Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Ordinance (which creates a special route for some appellate judgments) did not apply; the only question was whether Sub-section (1) permitted an appeal against the impugned order.
- The central inquiry was whether the order of the learned single Judge made on the stay application under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C. amounted to a "judgment" within the meaning of Section 18(1).
- The Court reviewed controlling Rajasthan Division Bench authorities (Rajputana Cold Storage and State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills) which interpret "judgment" by reference to the Supreme Court's exposition in Asrumati Debi. The consistent test adopted was that a "judgment" must be a final pronouncement which conclusively determines the rights of the parties in the proceeding.
- The Court explained that orders which merely defer decision, impose interlocutory conditions, or otherwise do not finally determine the controversy are interlocutory orders and not "judgments" for Section 18(1) purposes. The Rajputana Cold Storage case was cited in which an order deferring decision until the determination of a foreign suit was held not to be a "judgment".
- Similarly, in State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills the Division Bench treated interim orders made in Article 226 petitions as interlocutory because they left the fundamental questions (such as the validity of the impugned notification) to be decided later; such interim orders were held not appealable under Section 18.
- The Court rejected the appellant's attempt to treat orders under Order 41, Rule 5 as subject to a different meaning of "judgment". It observed that an order on an O.41 R.5 application is not a decree and is clearly an order under the C.P.C.; such orders are not made appealable under Order 43 of the C.P.C. The statutory scheme shows that such interlocutory orders were not intended to be routinely appealable.
- The Court noted that where an order on an interlocutory application in a suit or appeal finally and conclusively determines rights, it may in substance be a "judgment", but an order on a stay application under O.41 R.5 typically does not have that final character. If such interlocutory orders were to be appealable under Section 18(1), that would frustrate the legislative intent to avoid overburdening higher courts with interlocutory litigation.
- On this basis the office objection was sustained: the present special appeal was not maintainable under Section 18(1) because the impugned order was interlocutory and not a "judgment".
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance is not maintainable; the present special appeal is dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The order of the learned single Judge dated 18 December 1979 (the stay order containing the payment and surety conditions) stands; the Division Bench will not entertain an appeal under Section 18(1) against such an interlocutory order made on a stay application under Order 41, Rule 5, C.P.C.
- Broader effect: The Court applied and followed existing Division Bench and Supreme Court authorities on the meaning of "judgment" and the limited scope of appeals under Section 18(1). The decision upholds the established principle that interlocutory orders which do not finally determine the rights of the parties are not "judgments" for the purpose of Section 18(1). The opinion does not purport to create a new rule of law beyond those authorities; it sustains the office objection and dismisses the appeal accordingly.
1. This is a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance'), against the order of the learned single Judge dated 18th December, 1979 made on a Civil Miscellaneous Stay petition filed under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C. in a civil first appeal.
2. The plaintiff appellant obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 26,277/43 p, on fifth October, 1979 from the court of Additional District No. 4, Jaipur City. Aggrieved against the aforesaid decree the defendant filed a first appeal in this court and filed a stay application under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C. along with the appeal for staying the execution of the decree passed by the trial Court. Learned single Judge heard the parties on the stay application and passed the following order:
"Heard learned counsel for the parties. Out of the decretal amount, appellant would pay an amount of Rs. 12,000/- to the respondent and for the rest of the amount would submit a solvent surety to the satisfaction of the Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Respondent would submit a solvent surety for restitution while withdrawing the amount of Rs. 12,000/-. The period of three months is allowed for making payment,"
3. Aggrieved against the, aforesaid order the plaintiff has now filed the pre sent appeal before the Division Bench under Section 18 of the Ordinance. The Office raised an objection that special appeal does not lie under Section 18 of the Ordinance against the impugned order of the learned single Judge passed on a stay application filed under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C. In these circumstances the case has been listed before the Court and we have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on the objection rais ed by the office.
4. Mr. Patodia, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellant has contended that an appeal lies to the Division Bench against a judgment passed by the learned single Judge under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Ordinance. It is contended that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge falls within the meaning of word 'judgment'. Reliance in this connection is placed on Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb, AIR 1953 SC 198 and K. G. Rangaswami Chettiar and Co. v. K. r; Eswaramurthy Goundar, AIR 1954 Mad 1053 (FB).
5. Learned counsel also submitted that though there are two decisions of this Court in Rajputana Cold Storage and Refrigeration Co. Ltd v. Rani Ajit-kunverha, It Rule (1955) 5 Raj 418 and State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills, 1973 Raj LW 633: (AIR 1974 Raj 110), these two cases are distinguishable.
6. Before considering the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant it would be proper to reproduce Section 18 of the Ordinance:
"Section 18-- Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court-
(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.
(2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal."
7. There is no controversy that Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Ordinance does not apply in the present case. Thus, we have to determine whether an appeal lies to the Division Bench against the impugned order of the learned single Judge under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 and whether such order amounts to a judgment.
8. We need not dilate much on the Full Bench ruling of the Madras High Court cited by the learned counsel for the appellant when two cases decided by the Division Bench of this Court are available on the controversy raised before us. In Rajputana Cold Storage and Refrigeration Co. Ltd.'s case (ILR (1955) 5 Raj 418) (supra) a Division Bench of this Court interpreted the meaning of word 'judgment' under Section 18 (1) of the Ordinance. A learned single Judge of this Court while dealing with the petition under the Indian Companies Act. 1913 passed an order that the petition need not be dismissed as objected to by the opposite party but directed that the disposal of the petition be stayed during the pendency of a suit filed in Bombay. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order the Company filed an appeal before Division Bench and a preliminary objection was taken by the respondent that an appeal was not competent Bapna, J., who delivered the judgment observed as under with regard to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asrumati Debi's case (AIR 1953 SC 198) (supra) :
"The question was examined by the Supreme Court in Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb, AIR 1953 SC 198, where the various conflicting decisions on the interpretation of the word 'judgment' have been examined, and while refraining from expressing any definite opinion, the two earliest cases, viz.. Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Company, (1872) 8 Beng LR 433 and Tuljaram v. Alagappa, (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1 (FB) were explained as follows:
"It cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Couch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be regarded as a 'judgment', for in that case there would be any number of judgments in the course of a suit or proceeding each one of which could be challenged by way of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court dealing with it is concerned. It involves the determination of some right or liability, though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the merits. (Justices of the Peace for Calcutta's case (18721 8 Beng LR 433). This view, which is implied in the observation of Sir Richard Couch, C. J., quoted above, has been really made the basis of the definition of 'judgment' by Sir Arnold White, C. J., in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court to which reference has been made, vide (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1 (FB). According to White, C. J., to find out whether an order is a 'judgment' or not, we have to look to its effect upon the particular suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect is to terminate the suit proceeding, the decision would be a 'judgment' but not otherwise. As this definition covers not only decisions in suit or actions but 'orders' in other proceedings as well which start with applications, it may be said that any final order passed on an application in the course of a suit, e.g., granting or refusing a party's prayer for adjournment of a suit or for examination of a witness, would also come within the definition. This seems to be the reason why the learned Chief Justice qualifies the general proposition laid down above by stating that "an adjudication on an application, which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, is not a judgment within the meaning of "Letters Patent."
9. Bapna, J., then considered the facts of the case before them and observed as under:
"The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb, AIR 1953 SC 198, do not leave any room for doubt that the judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court dealing with it is concerned. In the present case, the learned Judge did not give any decision, but only deferred giving decision. He even deferred the making of an enquiry into the claims of Maharaj Digvijai Singh and Rani Niranjan Kumari. There has thus been no decision whatsoever in the case except that so far as the claim of Rani Ajitkunverba is concerned, it was held to be the subject of a bona fide dispute. The learned Judge did not express any opinion with regard to the claims of Maharaj Digvijai Singh and Rani Niranjan Kumari. The matter really in dispute was whether the application for winding up should be thrown out or accepted and the decision depended on a finding on the question whether the Company was unable to pay its debts. The learned single Judge did not decide the question but deferred his decision till the decision in the Bombay suit In our opinion, the appeal was not competent under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance inasmuch as the order passed by the learned single Judge was not a judgment within the meaning of Section 18 of the Ordinance."
10. Again a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Beri, C. J. and Joshi. J., in State v. Hindo Open Sugar Mills (AIR 1974 Raj 110) (supra) considered a similar controversy arising in an appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance against an order of the learned single Judge passed in petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that case the learned single Judge by his order dated 17th January, 1373, ordered that it will be in the interest of justice if the operation of the Notification No. F. 2 (41) Ind/7l Vol. 1 dated 28-11-1972 is stayed subject to the condition that an Inspector if appointed by the Government, supervised the purchases of sugarcane by the petitioner at the place where the sugarcane was purchased and weighed. The petitioners were to comply with the conditions of purchasing only 300 quintals of sugarcane per day. It was expected that the Government shall issue permit to the petitioner to start functioning from day after tomorrow. Against this interim order the special appeals were preferred under Section 18 of the Ordinance. The office raised an objection that these appeals were not maintainable. In this manner the controversy came to be considered in that case and it was observed as under:
"The crucial word which calls for interpretation is the word 'judgment' employed in Section 18 (1). The word 'judgment' also occurs in clauses 15 and 39 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court which received a close and careful consideration of the five learned Judges of that Court in Southern Roadways (P) Ltd. v. P. Mathurai Veera-swami, AIR 1964 Mad 194 (FB). They observed that true import of the word judgment or the tests by which any judicial order can be regarded as a judgment is that it should be the determination of right and liability. The word 'determination' itself indicates that such right as has been adjudicated upon must have been so adjudicated finally, so far as the controversy between the parties in the court was concerned. In their opinion, the word 'judgment' employed in Article 133 of the Constitution has the same connotation as in clauses 15 and 39. In Asrumati Debi's case (AIR 1953 SC 198) it has been observed as:
"A final judgment is an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all matters in issue in the suit, whereas a preliminary or interlocutory judgment is a decree by which the right to the relief claimed in the suit is decided but under which further proceedings are necessary before a suit in its entirety can be disposed of Save and except final and preliminary judgments thus defined, all other decisions are 'orders' and they do not come within the description of 'judgments' under the relevant issue of the Letter Pat-tent."
It is not necessary to examine any other case for the simple reason that the basic ingredients of the word 'judgment' have been authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision The small question which arises for our consideration is whether the order passed by the learned single Judge on 17th January, 1973, is a judgment against which an appeal is competent under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Our answer to the question is plainly in the negative. Our reasons are that the order operates subject to the ultimate decision of the rights of the parties in regard to the validity of the notification of 28th November, 1972, Specific conditions have been imposed by the learned single Judge under which this order has been passed. All arguments against the advisability or otherwise of such an order are irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the question whether the order appealed against is a judgment or an interlocutory order. The grievance of the learned counsel which he more than once emphasised was that this order settled the fate of the 7 petitions in favour of the petitioners. The crucial question whether the notification is valid, and the fundamental rights of the petitioner violated or not remains to be decided. The operation of the impugned notification has been kept in abeyance until the basic questions were decided. In our opinion, it is a clear case of an interlocutory order being assailed in appeal under Section 18 of the High Court Ordinance which is not permissible. The order of 17-1-1973 is not a judgment and these seven appeals, therefore, are not maintainable. The office objection is upheld."
11. Mr. Patodia, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that a different meaning should be imported to the word 'judgment' with regard to the order passed on an application under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C. We are not impressed with the distinction sought, to be pointed out by the learned counsel. We agree with the view taken by the earlier 2 Division Benches of this Court. An order passed on an application under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C. does not conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in issue in the appeal.
12. . Even if we examine the matter from another angle, then admittedly an order passed on an application under Order 41, Rule 5 is not a decree. It is clearly an order and such order has not been made applicable under Order 43, C. P. C. Thus, it would be clear from the provisions of the C. P. C. itself that if any order is passed by a court on a petition under Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C., then the same is not appealable and at the most a party aggrieved may file a revision if it comes within the purview of Section 115, C. P. C. Then, if a District Judge hearing a first appeal against a judgment of the Munsif or Civil Judge passes an order on art application under Order 41, Rules 5, C. P. C. such an order cannot be challenged in appeal in the High Court and the intention of the legislature in not making such orders appealable seems to be that such orders are of not much consequence as they do not determine the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in issue in the suit, or in the appeal. That shows that the intention of the legislature is to put a sort of finality on such orders and not to burden the higher courts unnecessarily with such kind of litigation. Thus, it appears that it could never have been intended that under Section 18 of the Ordinance a Division Bench of the High Court might be allowed to hear appeals against orders of interlocutory nature passed by a learned single Judge on applications like Order 41, Rule 5, C. P. C. or other stay applications filed along with writ petitions under Article 226 or along with petitions under the Company Law unless those orders finally and conclusively determine the rights of the parties in those proceedings.
13. We, therefore, sustain the objection raised by the office and hold that the present appeal is not maintainable under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Ordinance.
14. In the result this appeal is dismissed.
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