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Hiralal v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Rajasthan.

Rajasthan High Court
Sep 7, 1979
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference was made to the Court under s. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Delhi Bench-B) at the request of the assessee, Messrs. Hiralal Maliram, a joint Hindu family firm (the "assessee"). The relevant assessment year was 1956–57 and the assessee derived income from mica mines.

The karta of the HUF, Shri Hiralal, died on 4 September 1968 and his son Maliram was substituted. Because of non-compliance with notices under ss. 22(2), 22(4) and 23(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the assessee was assessed ex parte under s. 23(4) on 28 January 1958 and assessed to a total income of Rs. 2,50,000. An application under s. 27 for reopening the assessment was dismissed by the ITO on 1 August 1958.

The assessee appealed against the ITO's orders. The AAC rejected the appeal arising from the s. 27 order, but partly allowed the appeal arising from the s. 23(4) order, reducing the total income to Rs. 1,50,000 and allowing earlier-year losses of Rs. 23,207. The assessee took second appeals to the Tribunal, which dismissed the s. 27 appeal but further reduced the total income to Rs. 1,25,000 (subject to the loss allowance) by order dated 9 March 1961.

Thereafter the ITO initiated proceedings under s. 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee had purchased a house in the name of his wife, Smt. Rukmani Devi, and that the amount invested and rental income from that property had escaped assessment. The assessee filed returns (initially Rs. 41,572 subject to depreciation, later revised to Rs. 30,640). The ITO, after examining accounts, assessed total income at Rs. 1,35,510, including an addition of Rs. 10,510 to the business income determined by the Tribunal's 9 March 1961 order.

The assessee appealed; the AAC rejected the contention that the Rs. 10,000 addition (treated as income from other sources) was unjustified. On further appeal the Tribunal held that reassessment under s. 147 was confined to income which had escaped assessment and did not extend to reopening the entire assessment. The Tribunal also concluded that the property did not belong to the HUF and therefore deleted the Rs. 10,510 addition by its order dated 13 August 1969, restoring the Tribunal's earlier (9 March 1961) figure of total income.

The assessee sought a reference of a question of law to this Court; the reference was allowed. The referred question asked whether, on the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the ITO's jurisdiction under s. 147 was confined to assessment of such income as had escaped assessment and did not extend to revising or re-opening the whole original assessment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was confined to the assessment of such income as had escaped assessment and did not extend to revising or re-opening the whole original assessment?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee contended that the addition of approximately Rs. 10,000 (treated as income from other sources by the ITO) was not justified.
  • Implicitly, the assessee relied on the contention that the property and the amounts invested in it (and rental income) should not be treated as income of the HUF where the property did not belong to the HUF.

Revenue/Income-tax Officer's Contentions

  • The ITO treated the purchase of the house in the name of the assessee's wife and the amounts invested and rental income therefrom as income that had escaped assessment and therefore initiated reassessment proceedings under s. 147(a).
  • By reassessment the ITO added Rs. 10,510 to the business income determined earlier by the Tribunal (effectively seeking to bring that amount into assessment).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kevaldas Ranchhodas v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City I., [1968] 68 ITR 842 (Bom) In reassessment under s. 34(1)(a) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, the ITO has no jurisdiction to reopen the entire assessment; the power is to "recompute the loss" and does not permit a general recomputation of income, profits or gains. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that reassessment powers are confined to the specific escaped items (loss or escaped income) and do not empower a general re-opening of the whole assessment.
Sir Shadi Lal and Sons v. CIT, [1973] 92 ITR 453 (All) On reassessment the entire assessment is not opened; matters not relevant to the income that had escaped assessment (for example, claims for expenditure previously disallowed) cannot be re-agitated generally on reassessment. The Court cited this case to reinforce the limitation that reassessment must be confined to matters relevant to the escaped income rather than becoming a re-hearing of the whole assessment.
V. Jaganmohan Rao v. CIT/EPT, [1970] 75 ITR 373 (SC) Once assessment is validly reopened under the relevant provision (s. 34 in that Act), the ITO could proceed to assess or reassess such income and had the duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment; the ITO could deal with all items that fell within the escaped income even if not specifically mentioned in the notice. The Court used this authority to clarify that while reassessment is confined to escaped income, "such income" is to be read as the entire escaped income — and an ITO who validly initiates reassessment can address all escaped income items even if some were not specified in the notice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began its analysis by examining the language of s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It quoted the provision which empowers the Income-tax Officer, where he has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment (by omission or failure to make a return or by information in his possession), to assess or reassess "such income" or recompute loss or depreciation for the relevant year.

Key points in the Court's step-by-step reasoning:

  • The phrase "such income" in s. 147 was read in context and the Court concluded that it refers to the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment.
  • On this textual basis the Court held that when reassessment is made under s. 147, the ITO's jurisdiction is confined to the income that has escaped assessment; it does not extend to revising, reopening or reconsidering the whole original assessment.
  • The Court reconciled this interpretation with prior authorities:
    • Kevaldas Ranchhodas: supported the limited scope (recomputation limited to the specified subject-matter — e.g., loss — and not a general recomputation of income).
    • Sir Shadi Lal and Sons: reinforced that reassessment controversies are confined to matters relevant to the income that had not been brought to tax; previously disallowed claims cannot be re-agitated generally on reassessment.
    • V. Jaganmohan Rao (Supreme Court): the Court acknowledged language in that case showing that once proceedings are validly initiated the ITO may assess the escaped income and, in that context, may deal with all items of escaped income even if not specifically mentioned in the notice. The present Court explained that this should be read as permitting the ITO to address all escaped items, but still within the class of "such income" that escaped assessment — not as a licence to reopen the entire assessment irrespective of relevance to escaped income.
  • Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the Tribunal's holding — that the ITO's jurisdiction under s. 147 is confined to assessing such escaped income and does not extend to reopening the whole assessment — was correct.
  • The Court noted that as a matter of fact the referred question was somewhat academic in the present case because the alleged escaped income had not been brought to charge by the Tribunal's order; nevertheless, the Court answered the question because it was likely to arise frequently.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative: it held that the Tribunal was correct in observing that the Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction under s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is confined to assessment of such income as had escaped assessment and does not extend to revising or re-opening the whole original assessment.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The decision confines reassessment proceedings under s. 147 to the specific income which the ITO has reason to believe has escaped assessment; it does not permit a general reopening or reconsideration of the entire previous assessment.
  • The Court reconciled this limitation with the principle (from Jaganmohan Rao) that where reassessment is validly initiated in respect of escaped income, the ITO may deal with all items that constitute escaped income even if not specifically itemized in the notice; but that jurisdiction remains limited to "such income" that escaped assessment.
  • In the particular factual matrix of this case, the Tribunal's deletion of the Rs. 10,510 addition (and restoration of the Tribunal's earlier income determination) stands consistent with the Court's interpretation. The Court made no order as to costs.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond what the opinion contains.

Show all summary ...

Lodha, C.J:— This is a reference under s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”), by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench-B, at the request of the assessee, Messrs. Hiralal Maliram, a joint Hindu family firm (which will hereinafter be referred to as “the assessee”).

2. The relevant assessment year is 1956–57. The assessee derived income from mica mines. The karta of the HUF, Shri Hiralal, died on September 4, 1968, and his son, Maliram, has been substituted in his place. On account of non-compliance of notices under ss. 22(2), 22(4) and 23(2) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1922”), the assessee was assessed ex parte under s. 23(4) on January 28, 1958, and his total income was assessed at Rs. 2,50,000. He filed an application under s. 27 for reopening the assessment but the same was dismissed by the ITO on August 1, 1958. The assessee preferred appeals against the orders of the ITO dated January 28, 1958, and August 12, 1958. The AAC rejected the appeal arising out of the ITO's order under s. 27 of the Act of 1922, but allowed the appeal arising out of the order under s. 23(4) in part, and reduced the total income from Rs. 2,50,000 to Rs. 1,50,000 and also allowed loss of earlier years amounting to Rs. 23,207. Dissatisfied with the orders of the AAC, the assessee preferred second appeals before the Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal arising out of the order under s. 27 of the Act of 1922, but reduced the quantum of total income in the other appeal from Rs. 1,50,000 to Rs. 1,25,000 subject to allowance of loss of Rs. 23,207 by its order dated March 9, 1961.

3. Subsequently, the ITO initiated proceedings under s. 147(a) of the Act of 1961 on the ground that the assessee had purchased a house in the name of his wife, Smt. Rukmani Devi, and the amount invested in the property as also the rental income therefrom, had escaped assessment. In response to the notice issued by the ITO in this respect, the assessee submitted a return of his income of Rs. 41,572 subject to depreciation. Later on, he submitted a revised return showing income of Rs. 30,640. The ITO, after examining the account books and the relevant material, assessed the total income at Rs. 1,35,510. It will be noticed that he had added Rs. 10,510 to the business income finally determined by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by its order dated March 9, 1961. The assessee preferred an appeal against the order of the ITO and contended that the addition of Rs. 10,000 as income from other sources was not justified. This contention was rejected by the AAC. The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal from the order of the AAC. The Tribunal held that where a reassessment is made in respect of an income which had escaped assessment, the jurisdiction of the ITO under s. 147 was confined to such income which had escaped assessment and did not extend to revising or reopening the whole assessment. However, it further held that, after considering the facts of the case in regard to the addition of Rs. 10,000 particularly the fact that the property did not belong to the assessee's HUF, there was no justification for treating the amount invested in purchasing the house for the assessee's wife as income of the HUF and, as a necessary consequence, the rental income therefrom should also be excluded from the assessment. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 10,510 by its order dated August 13, 1969, thereby restoring the total income determined by it in its order dated March 9, 1961. The assessee then made an application requiring the Tribunal to refer certain questions of law to this court arising out of the Tribunal's order dated August 13, 1969. That application was allowed and the following question of law has been referred to us:

“Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was confined to the assessment of such income as had escaped assessment and did not extend to revising or re-opening the whole original assessment?”

4. We may observe straightaway that so far as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned, the question is purely academic. The alleged escaped income has not been brought to charge by the order of the Tribunal, but since the question has been referred to us and is likely to arise quite often, we deem it proper to return our answer to it.

5. In our opinion, the language of s. 147 itself furnishes an answer. We may read the relevant portion of s. 147, here, for ready reference:

“147. Income escaping assessment.— If—

(a) the Income tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year)….”

(The underlining* is ours).

6. The words “such income” clearly refer to the income which is chargeable to tax but has escaped assessment. Thus, it is clear that where a reassessment is made under this section in respect of income which has escaped tax, the ITO's jurisdiction under this section is confined to such income which has escaped tax and does not extend to revising, re-opening or reconsidering the whole assessment.

7. In Kevaldas Ranchhodas v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City I.*, [1968] 68 ITR 842 (Bom), it was held that in reassessment proceedings initiated under s. 34(1)(a) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, on the ground that loss had been over-estimated in the original assessment, the ITO has no jurisdiction to reopen the entire assessment originally made, and determine afresh the assessable profits or to correct errors and omissions made by the assessee in the matter of computation of total income. The power conferred upon the ITO in respect of loss is to “recompute the loss” and when the legislation speaks of recomputing the loss, it means only the loss and not the income, profits or gains; s. 34(1)(a) does not empower a general recomputation of the income, profits or gains. It was further held that recomptutation under s. 34(1)(a) can only take place with a view to garnering in the income escaping assessment under the first clause. It is clear from the provisions of s. 34 itself that it was not intended for the benefit of the assessee but only for the benefit of the revenue.

8. In Sir Shadi Lal and Sons v. CIT, [1973] 92 ITR 453 (All), it was held that on reassessment, the entire assessment is not opened. A claim for expenditure which has been disallowed during the original assessment cannot be reagitated on the assessment being reopened for bringing to tax income which has escaped assessment. The controversy on reassessment is confined to matters which are relevant in respect of the income which had not been brought to tax during the course of the original assessment. The question came up for consideration, though in somewhat different circumstances, before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in V. Jaganmohan Rao v. CIT/EPT, [1970] 75 ITR 373. Their Lordships observed as follows (p. 380):

“Section 34 in terms states that once the Income-tax Officer decides to reopen the assessment, he could do so within the period prescribed by serving on the person liable to pay tax a notice containing all or any of the requirements, which may be included in a notice under section 22(2) and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains. It is, therefore, manifest that once assessment is reopened by issuing a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, the previous under-assessment is set aside and the whole assessment proceedings start afresh. When once valid proceedings are started under section 34(1)(b), the Income-tax Officer had not only the jurisdiction but it was his duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment during that year.”

9. We may, here, clarify that in that case, the contention raised on behalf of the assessee was that in any case the ITO could have legitimately assessed one-third share of the income which was due to the assessee according to the judgment of the Madras High Court and there was escapement only to the extent of two-thirds share of the income. This argument was repelled by the court with the observation that once proceedings under s. 34 are taken up validly or initiated with regard to two-thirds share of the income, the jurisdiction of the ITO cannot be confined only to that portion of the income. In other words, what their Lordships meant to lay down was that the power of the ITO to assess is not limited to items which escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, but extends to taxing all amounts that had escaped assessment. In other words, where the ITO validly initiates reassessment proceedings under s. 147(a) in respect of a particular item, he can, during the reassessment proceedings, deal with all items falling under cl. (a) or cl. (b) though they may not have been dealt with specifically in the notice, that is to say, his jurisdiction is not limited only to the items in respect of which the notice was issued. As we have already observed above, the term “such income” in s. 147 refers only to the entire escaped income.

10. We are, therefore, of opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the jurisdiction of the ITO under s. 147 of the I.T Act, 1961, was confined to the assessment of such income as had escaped assessment and did not extend to revising or reopening the whole assessment.

11. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, but there will be no order as to costs.