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Hemsingh v. The Collector Barmer

Rajasthan High Court
Mar 8, 1976
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Lodha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenge a common order dated 7 February 1973 made by the Collector, Barmer exercising review powers under section 40A of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 ("the Act").

In brief factual background stated in the opinion:

  • Deputy Collector, Jagir, Barmer, by an order dated 2-9-1966, allotted 110 bighas in village Chohatan and 340 bighas in village Jesar to Chimansingh (father of petitioner Hemsingh) for Khudkasht (writ S.B. Civil Writ No. 661 of 1973).
  • By another order dated 5-12-1966, the Deputy Collector allotted 270 bighas and 11 biswas in village Chohatan, 376 bighas in village Intada and 322 bighas in village Jesar for Khudkasht to Ugamsingh (Ex-Jagirdar Chohatan) (writ No. 662 of 1973).
  • A group of villagers applied to the Sub-Divisional Officer (S.D.O.), Barmer to declare part of the land in Khasra No. 110 in village Jesar as "Gochar"; the S.D.O. by order dated 30-8-1968 declared that part of the land as Gochar.
  • Review applications to set aside the allotments were later moved (circa July 1972), and the Collector, Barmer, by the impugned order, set aside the earlier allotments and reopened the cases.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Collector had jurisdiction to review the allotment orders after the expiry of the three-month period mentioned in section 40A of the Act (i.e., whether the three-month limitation applies to suo moto review by the authority).
  2. Whether the Collector's review was permissible on the grounds available under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the defects alleged amounted to "errors apparent on the face of the record" or other recognized grounds for review).
  3. Whether the Collector could review orders originally passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir (i.e., whether the Collector had jurisdiction to review a predecessor officer's order).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Collector lacked jurisdiction to review the allotment orders after a period of more than three months, as section 40A prescribes a three-month period for review applications.
  • There were no valid grounds to permit review; consequently the Collector's order setting aside the allotments was bad.
  • The Collector had no jurisdiction to review an order originally passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir.
  • Regarding the S.D.O. order dated 30-8-1968 declaring part of the land "Gochar", petitioners contended that that order was a nullity (non est) because it was dated before the date fixed in the case (i.e., decided on 30-8-1968 though the date in the case was 2-9-1968).

Respondents' / State's Arguments

  • The petitions were opposed by the Collector and by persons who sought the review; the State and respondents contested the writ petitions in opposition.
  • The Collector acted within jurisdiction in exercising review powers; there were grounds for review including errors apparent on the face of the record, omission to make the State a party, the declaration of part of the land as Gochar, and alleged violations of ceiling limits.
  • The State alleged that petitioners had tampered with records in relation to the S.D.O. order.
  • Additional factual point pressed by respondents (Mr. G.S. Singhvi): the petitioners on 29-11-1966 filed applications seeking Khudkasht allotment in village Jesar (a different prayer than in the original application), and the Deputy Collector apparently allotted the Khasra No. 110 land without holding the further enquiry contemplated by section 14 of the Act and the Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion does not cite any judicial precedents (case law). It refers to statutory provisions and rules only.

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in structured steps closely tied to the statutory text and the facts placed on record:

  1. Statutory provision considered: The court reproduced section 40A of the Act, which permits the Board or the Commissioners (Jagir Commissioner or Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands) to review an order either on an application made "within three months of the 18th January, 1958, or of the date of order, whichever is later" or suo moto; sub-section (2) makes review permissible only on grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Interpretation of the three-month limitation:
    • The court interpreted the three-month limitation as applying to applications for review filed by interested private parties, not to actions taken suo moto by the authorities. The language of sub-section (1) was read as distinguishing between "an application made within three months" and the separate power to act suo moto.
    • The court rejected the petitioners' contention that the three-month period restricts the authority's power to act suo moto, giving two primary reasons:
      1. Textual: the provision separates the private right to apply (subject to limitation) from the authority's suo moto power, so the latter is not governed by the three-month limitation.
      2. Practical: requiring the authority to act within three months could defeat review where procedural steps (notice, service) are delayed by factors such as evasion of service; allowing suo moto review later preserves effective enforcement of statutory controls.
  3. Limitation Act (Article 124) inapplicable:
    • The petitioners relied on Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (thirty-day period for review). The court rejected its applicability on two grounds:
      1. Section 47 of the Act provides that, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, the provisions of the Act and rules thereunder have effect notwithstanding inconsistency with any other law; therefore the Limitation Act's prescription did not override the Act's specific provision.
      2. Article 124 pertains to review of judgments by courts; the Jagir Commissioner/Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands are not necessarily invested with all trappings of a court such that Article 124 would govern their review power.
  4. Whether grounds for review existed (Order 47 Rule 1 CPC):
    • Sub-section (2) of section 40A limits review to the grounds in Order 47 Rule 1, CPC. The court examined the Collector's stated reasons and found them to be within those grounds: errors apparent on the face of the record, omission to make the State a party, subsequent declaration of part of the land as Gochar, and apparent violation of ceiling limits.
    • The court addressed the petitioners' attack on the S.D.O. order (30-8-1968) that declared part of the land Gochar. Petitioners contended that the S.D.O. order was a nullity because of a date discrepancy; the State alleged record tampering. The court declined to decide that factual dispute on the record before it but observed that the S.D.O. order as placed on record (Ex. R/1) showed no objection had been filed and, importantly, the S.D.O. order had not been set aside. Therefore the Collector's observation that part of the land was declared Gochar was not erroneous.
    • The court also noted an additional point raised by respondents: the petitioners' 29-11-1966 applications sought Khudkasht allotment in Jesar (a change from original prayers) and the Deputy Collector allegedly made the allocation without further enquiry under section 14 and the Rules. The Collector did not advert to this point in his order, but the court found the point had some force and left it to be decided afresh. Nevertheless, the court concluded the Collector's reasons were not perverse or extraneous and fell within Order 47 Rule 1.
  5. Delegation / jurisdiction to review predecessor's order:
    • The court rejected the contention that the Collector could not review an order originally passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir. It reasoned that if the Collector was exercising the functions of the Deputy Collector at the relevant time, he would be deemed to stand in the predecessor's shoes. Further, section 40A itself empowers the Commissioners to review orders of their predecessors in office. The State's position that the Deputy Collector post had been abolished and his functions were being performed by the Collector supported the Collector's jurisdiction to review the earlier orders.
  6. Conclusion of analysis:
    • On the statutory interpretation and the facts on record, the court found no ground to quash the Collector's impugned order of review. The three-month limitation did not strip the Collector of suo moto review power; the grounds relied upon by the Collector fell within Order 47 Rule 1, CPC; and the Collector had jurisdiction to review orders of the Deputy Collector where he was exercising those functions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court upheld the Collector's power to review the earlier allotment orders and declined to quash the impugned order of 7 February 1973.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Collector's review order stands and the petitions challenging that order fail; the matter is to proceed in accordance with the reopening of the cases by the Collector (the opinion does not specify further administrative steps).
  • The court expressly found no basis to interfere on the grounds argued by petitioners: the three-month limitation does not constrain the authority's suo moto review power under section 40A, the Collector's stated reasons are within Order 47 Rule 1, and the Collector had jurisdiction to review the Deputy Collector's earlier order.
  • The opinion does not claim to lay down a broader new precedent beyond the statutory interpretation and its application to the facts; it resolves the petitions on the statutory construction and fact-specific analysis contained in the record. No order as to costs was made.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the opinion text provided and does not add information beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Lodha, J.:— These two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are directed against the common order passed by the Collector, Barmer on February 7, 1973 in exercise of his powers of review under section 40A of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (which will hereinafter be refened to as ‘the Act’).

2. The facts of the two cases, stated in brief, are that the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Barmer vide his order dated November 2-9-1966 allotted 110 bighas of land in village Chohatan and 340 bighas of land in village Jesar to Chimansingh, father of the petitioner Hemsingh for Khudkast (petitioner in S.B Civil Writ No. 661 of 1973). By another order dated December 5, 1966, he allotted 270 bighas and 11 biswas of land in village Chohatan, 376 bighas in village Intada and 322 bighas in village Jesar for Khudkast to Ugamsingh, Ex. Jagirdar Chohatan (petitioner in civil writ petition No. 662 of 1973).

3. The grievance of the petitioners is that a group of villagers became hostile to the petitioners for political considerations and made an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barmer for declaring as ‘Gochar’ a part of the land in Khasra No. 110 in village Jesar allotted to the petitioners and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barmer, by his order dated August 30, 1968, allowed the application and declared the land allotted to the petitioners as ‘Gochar’. Later on, they also moved review applications some time in July, 1972 before the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Barmer to set aside the allotment made in favour of the petitioners. As already stated above, the Collector, Barmer by the impugned order set aside the allotments and reopened their cases.

4. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Collector had no jurisdiction to review the orders of allotment after a period of more than three months as prescibed under section 40A of the Act. Another submission of the learned counsel is that there existed no grounds for the Collector to review the order and, therefore, the order is bad. Lastly it is submitted that the Collector had no jurisdiction to review the order passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir.

5. The petitions have been opposed on behalf of the Collector, Barmer as well as by the persons at whose instance the order of review was passed, and I have heard the Deputy Government Advocate and Mr. G.S Singhvi in opposition to the writ petitions.

6. In order to appraise the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, it would be proper to reproduce section 40A, here:—

“40a. Review.—(1) The Board, the Jagir Commissioner or the Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands may either on an application made, within three months of the 18th January, 1958, or of the date of order, whichever is later, by any interested party or suo moto, review an order passed by the Board or by such Commissioner himself or his predecessor-in-office and pass such order in relation thereto as it or he thinks fit. (2) No order passed by the Board or the Jagir Commissioner or the Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands shall be reviewed under sub-sec. (1) otherwise than on any of the grounds mentioned in Rule, Order 47 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), and the provisions of the said order shall apply.”

7. The period of limitation prescribed for an application for review of an order is undoubtedly three months either from 18th January, 1958 or from the date of the order whichever is later. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that this period of limitation is applicable even to orders of review passed suo moto by the authorities mentioned in the section. I am however, unable to accept this contention for two reasons. Firstly, from the language of the section it is clearly borne out that the application for review must be made within three months. The period of three months does not govern the action which may be taken by the authorities under this section suo moto. This clearly means that a private party has no right to make an application for review after the expiry of a period of three months from the date of the order or from 18th January, 1958 as the case may be. But there is no period of limitation prescribed for the authorities to act suo moto. Sub-sec. (1), when analysed, means that the Board, the Jagir Commissioner or the Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands may review an order passed by the Board or by such Commissioner himself or his predecessor-in-office either on an application made within three months of the 18th January, 1958 or of the date of the order or these authorities may suo moto review an order passed by them. The second clause is not governed by the limitation prescribed by the first clause.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that putting such a construction, as I am inclined to do, would lead to anamolous results inasmuch as what a person may not be able to do directly on account of expiry of limitation may indirectly be done by the authorities concerned after the expiry of the limitation. Undoubtedly that is possible, but for that reason, no anamoly arises. In case of reviewing a certain order suo moto, the authority is not to be governed by any private malice or vengeance and in appropriate circumstances it may act suo moto even after the expiry of three months of the date of the order. Another reason for not accepting the interpretation put by the learned counsel is that if the period of three months is attached to the action taken by the authorities concerned then it may lead to certain insurmountable difficulties. So far as an application for review is concerned, once it is made within the prescribed period, thereafter the order of review may be passed at any time. But in case the period of three months is made applicable for allowing the review, then the provisions may very well be defeated inasmuch as the authority concerned may issue notice to the party concerned why the order may not be reviewed. But the party may evade service or for certain other reasons, the service may not be effected for a period of three months and the authority concerned may not be able to make an order of review within the period of three months. In this view of the matter also I am of the opinion that the period of three months is prescribed only for an application and not to the action of review suo moto.

9. Learned counsel then referred to Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in which a period of thirty days is prescribed for review. In this connection, attention may be drawn to section 47 of the Act which provides that “save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act and of the Rules and Orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything therein contained being inconsistent with any existing Jagir law or any other law for the time being in force.” In view of this provision, the limitation prescribed for review under the law of limitation cannot apply. Apart from the Artical 124 speaks of review of judgment by a court and it is difficult to hold that the Jagir Commissioner or the Commissioner for Khudkasht Lands constituted under the Act possesses all the trappings of a court. I am, therefore of opinion that Art. 124 of the Limitation Act has no application to the present case.

10. From the foregoing discussion it follows that the impugned order by the Collector cannot be set aside on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to review the order as he did, after the expiry of period of three months from the date of the order sought to be reviewed.

11. As to the grounds on which review can be granted, there is a clear provision in sub-section (2) of section 40A of the Act that review can be granted only on the grounds mentioned in Rule 1, Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the only question is whether the case is covered by Order 47 Rule 1. The Collector has held that there were errors apparent on the face of the record in the orders sought to be reviewed and that there was sufficient reason for reviewing the orders. He has held that the orders in question had been passed without making the State a party and that a part of the land allotted to the petitioners was declared ‘Gochar’. Lastly he has held that the allotments made in favour of the petitioners offended against the provisions of the ceiling law inasmuch as they were granted land for Khudkasht far in excess of the permissible limits under the ceiling law.

12. As already stated above, the petitioners themselves have averred in their writ petitions that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barmer by his order dated 30th August, 1968 declared a part of the land covered by Khasra No. 110 and allotted to the petitioners as ‘Gocbar’. Learned counsel, however, urges that this order was non-est inasmuch as it was passed by the officer before the date fixed in the case. It is urged that 2nd September, 1968 was the date given in the case whereas before that, the Sub-Divisional Officer decided the case on 30th August, 1968. The reply of the State in this connection is that the petitioners had joined hands with the clerk concerned and got the record tampered with. However, I wish to make it clear that it is not possible for me to give any finding in this respect on the record as it stands. But the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 30-8-1968 which has been placed on the record and marked Ex. R/1 shows that no objection had been filed to the land in question being declared ‘Gochar’. Be that as it may, the order has not been set aside so far and I am unable to accede to the submission that the order is void and consequently a non-est. The matter is still to be enquired into but this fact is there that subsequent to the orders sought to be reviewed a part of the land allotted to the petitioners for Khudkasht has been declared ‘Gochar’. The Collector, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any error when he observed that a part of the land had been declared ‘Gochar’. Another observation made by the Collector that the lands alloted to the petitioners are in excess of the permissible limits under the ceiling law has not been successfully assailed before me.

13. In addition to what has been stated in the impugned order, Mr. Singhvi on behalf of the respondents No. 2(i), (ii) and (iii) has invited my attention to the applications moved by the petitioners on 29-11-1966 wherein it was prayed that land may be allotted to the petitioners for Khudkasht in village Jesar. This was not the prayer contained in the original application and it appears that on the same day the Deputy Collector, Jagir allotted the land in Khasra No. 110 in village Jesar without holding any further enquiry as contemplated by section 14 of the Act and the Rules on the subject. This point has not been adverted to by the Collector in his order but there does appear some force in it. I do not wish to give my opinion on it at this stage, as the matter is yet to be decided afresh. Suffice it to say, that the reasons given by the Collector in the impugned order for granting the review cannot be said to be perverse or extraneous. They are clearly covered by the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C and I am unable to quash the impugned order on the ground that the case is not covered by Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C

14. This brings me to the last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the original order was passed by the Deputy Collector, Jagir. It is urged that even though the powers of review had been delegated to the Collector, yet he could not have reviewed the order of the Deputy Collector. This argument also in my opinion, is devoid of substance, inasmuch as if the powers of the Deputy Collector, Jagir were being exercised by the Collector at the relevant time, then the Collector must be deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the Deputy Collector, Jagir who passed the original order. Apart from that, there is a specific provision in section 40A, itself which empowers both the said Commissioners to review orders of their predecessors in office respectively. It is submitted on behalf of the State that the post of the Deputy Collector, Jagir was abolished and his functions were being performed by the Collector at the relevant time. In these circumstances, the Collector had jurisdiction to review the earlier order of the Deputy Collector, Jagir.

15. The result is that this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.