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Radha Krishna v. State Of Rajasthan
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sen, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This special appeal concerns an order of J. P. Jain, J., dated 28-9-1973. The appellants had earlier filed writ petition No. 1384 of 1971 challenging notifications issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Sections 4 and 6 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 dated 17-10-1963 and 7-1-1971 for acquisition of village Rampura Roopa for the Jainpir Improvement Trust for the planned development of Jaipur City under the Lal Kothi Scheme.
The earlier petition was heard (with other petitions) before Tyagi, J., and on the date fixed for dictation of judgment the appellants' counsel sought to withdraw the petition with liberty to file a fresh petition, stating that new facts had come to light. The Deputy Government Advocate opposed that prayer. Tyagi, J. ordered that the question whether a fresh petition could be filed would be examined when such a petition was filed, and allowed the writ petition to be withdrawn; the petition was therefore "dismissed as withdrawn."
After a lapse of about one and a half years (on 13-9-1973) the appellants filed a fresh writ petition on identically the same facts, challenging the same notifications on substantially the same grounds but adding a ground based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1973 SC 1150). The learned single Judge (J. P. Jain, J.) dismissed the later petition as not maintainable on the grounds that it was barred by constructive res judicata and by inordinate delay and laches. This appeal questions those conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned single Judge was correct in holding that the fresh writ petition was barred by the rule of constructive res judicata.
- Whether the learned single Judge was correct in holding that the fresh writ petition could not be entertained because of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the appellants.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The order of Tyagi, J. permitting withdrawal should be construed as granting leave to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh petition (i.e., permission under Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C., could be implied from the order and the application).
- Proceedings under Article 226 being "civil proceedings" under Section 141, the Code of Civil Procedure principles (including the power to allow withdrawal with liberty under Order 23, Rule 1) govern and any withdrawal should be treated under those conditions.
- The fresh petition relied upon a new ground based on the Supreme Court's decision in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1973 SC 1150), and that decision constituted new facts or grounds justifying a fresh petition.
Respondent / State (as represented in the record)
- On the earlier occasion the learned Deputy Government Advocate opposed the appellants' prayer to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh petition.
- The State contested leave to withdraw with liberty and, implicitly, opposed a fresh petition based on the same subject-matter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Munshi Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150 | The decision addressed the vagueness of the stated public purpose in notifications; relied upon by appellants as a new ground. | The court observed that Munshi Singh came after the withdrawal and therefore could not constitute facts known at the time of withdrawal; it did not qualify as the "new facts" claimed by appellants to justify a fresh petition. |
| Arati Ray Choudhury v. Union of India (AIR 1974 SC 532) | Authority for the proposition that withdrawal of a writ petition means there was no decision on the merits and constructive res judicata may not apply. | The court relied on this to conclude that the single Judge was not right in holding the second petition barred by constructive res judicata, because the earlier petition had been withdrawn and there was no merits decision. |
| Sukhain v. Liquidator, Co-operative Society, Pondisimaria, ILR (1944) Nag 458 = (AIR 1944 Nag 183) | Interpretation that the words "other sufficient grounds" must be read ejusdem generis with "formal defects." | Used to support the court's construction that Clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) (Order 23, Rule 1 CPC) must be read ejusdem generis with formal defects, and therefore did not justify granting liberty where no analogous formal defect existed. |
| Mahant Biharidasji v. Parshotamdas Ramdas (ILR (1908) 32 Bom 345) | Illustrative authority on the limits of allowing withdrawal with liberty and on judicial approach to such applications. | Included among authorities demonstrating that a court should not split an application under Sub-rule (2) into parts (allowing withdrawal but refusing liberty to file a fresh suit) and that proper form of order must be observed. |
| Kamini Kumar Roy v. Rajendra Nath Roy (AIR 1926 Cal 233) | One of a series of authorities explaining the proper exercise of the court's power to permit withdrawal with liberty. | Relied on as part of the jurisprudence showing courts cannot improperly fragment Sub-rule (2) applications; cited to support refusal to imply leave to refile where not properly granted. |
| Jotirmoy Goswamy v. Guru Gobinda Goswami (AIR 1928 Cal 273) | Authority in the line of cases setting out limits on withdrawal-with-liberty practice. | Cited with other cases to show historical practice that leaves to withdraw with liberty must be correctly and expressly granted and not implied where unjustified. |
| Marudachala v. Chinna Muthu (AIR 1932 Mad 155) | Part of the body of case law on withdrawal and liberty to sue afresh. | Used as supporting authority for the principle that withdrawal-with-liberty must conform to the conditions of the relevant procedural rule. |
| Naru v. Mst. Noji (AIR 1959 Raj 53) | Authority on procedural limits to withdrawal and refiling. | Included in the list of cases relied upon for the principle that courts should not permit withdrawal-with-liberty except under the correct conditions. |
| T. W. Ranganathan v. T. K. Subramanian (AIR 1971 Mad 477) | Another authority confirming the established approach to withdrawal-with-liberty applications. | Grouped with other precedents to demonstrate consistent judicial approach to Sub-rule (2) matters. |
| Hulas Rai v. K. B. Bass & Co., AIR 1968 SC 111 | Rule that where a plaintiff withdraws without the court's permission he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit on the same subject-matter against the same defendant (Sub-rule (3)). | The court invoked this to underline that withdrawal without permission carries the risk of preclusion from refiling; the appellants had effectively withdrawn and could therefore be barred from a fresh petition. |
| Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1969 Raj LW 130 = (AIR 1969 Raj 41) | Applied Rule 382 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules and the principle of Order 9, Rule 9 CPC to bar successive applications on same facts. | The court relied on this decision to hold that Rule 382 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules (prohibiting a second application on the same facts where an application has been rejected) bars the present petition; the Division Bench applied Order 9, Rule 9 CPC principles to writ proceedings. |
| D. N. Bandopadhyay v. Union of India (Special Appeal No. 1 of 1971 (Raj), dated 9-3-1971) | Principle that successive petitions do not lie; a party cannot be vexed twice on the same matter. | Cited to reinforce the salutary principle that successive writ petitions on the same facts are not permissible and to support application of Rule 382 in the present case. |
| I. C. N. Sahakari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 2085 | Authority cited in relation to laches and the discretionary nature of relief under Article 226. | Relied on by the court to support the conclusion that the exercise of extraordinary relief under Article 226 is discretionary and that laches/inordinate delay can justify refusal of relief; the present petition failed on that ground. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, adhering strictly to the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:
- Constructive res judicata: The court observed that because the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn, there was no decision on the merits. It therefore accepted the principle (citing Arati Ray Choudhury) that the single Judge was not correct to dismiss the later petition on the basis of constructive res judicata alone.
- Whether Tyagi, J.'s order granted liberty to refile: The court examined whether the order allowing withdrawal should be construed as an implied grant of leave to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh petition under Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C. It held that leave need not be expressed in formulaic terms, but must be capable of being implied from the order read with the application. The court rejected the appellants' claim that implied liberty was present.
- Interpretation of "other sufficient grounds": The court read Clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) ejusdem generis with "formal defects" (relying on Sukhain), so "other sufficient grounds" meant grounds analogous to a formal defect. Since the petition before Tyagi, J. did not suffer such defects, Tyagi was right in not granting liberty to file a fresh petition.
- Applicability of CPC to Article 226 proceedings: The court noted that Article 226 proceedings are not, in terms, governed by the CPC; they are ordinarily governed by the High Court's rules under Article 225. Principles of the CPC can be applied only so far as they are consonant with the court's rules or where those rules are silent.
- The "new facts" contention and timing of Munshi Singh: The appellants had represented that new facts had come to their notice to justify withdrawal and refiling; the court found that representation false. The later reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Munshi Singh could not retrospectively be treated as facts known at the date of withdrawal because the decision came later.
- Application of Rule 382 (Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952): The court concluded that the present petition was clearly barred by Rule 382 ("where an application has been rejected, it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts"). It relied on Ram Singh (AIR 1969 Raj 41) where a Division Bench applied the principle of Order 9, Rule 9 C.P.C. to writ proceedings to hold that successive petitions on the same facts are not maintainable.
- Discretionary relief and laches: Independently of Rule 382, the court held that relief under Article 226 is discretionary. Given that the appellants had withdrawn their earlier petition on 16-3-1972 and then remained inactive for about one and a half years without satisfactory explanation, the delay was inordinate and amounted to laches. The court therefore declined to exercise its discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction in the appellants' favour. The Supreme Court decision (Munshi Singh) did not, in the court's view, validate the fresh petition or explain the delay.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court held that the later writ petition was not maintainable and must fail. Specifically:
- The learned single Judge was incorrect to dismiss the petition on the ground of constructive res judicata alone (because the earlier petition had been withdrawn and there was no merits decision).
- Nevertheless, the present writ petition was barred under Rule 382 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, and was also properly rejected on the separate ground of inordinate delay and laches. The court therefore refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the appellants.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the appellants' later writ petition is dismissed / not maintainable. The court applied established procedural principles (including Rule 382 and the discretionary nature of Article 226 relief) to deny relief. The opinion does not assert that it is laying down any novel or broader precedent beyond the application of existing rules and authorities to the facts of this case.
Note: This summary is strictly limited to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences beyond the opinion have been introduced.
JUDGMENT Sen, J.
1. The short question which arises for determination in this special appeal against the order of J. P. Jain, J., dated 28-9-1973 is, whether the learned single Judge was right in holding that (1) the writ petition filed by the appellants barred by the rule of constructive res judicata and (2) it could not be entertained due to inordinate delay and laches on their part.
2. It is common ground that the appellants had previously filed writ petition No. 1384 of 1971 on identically the same facts, claiming the same reliefs viz. for quashing the notifications issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Sections 4 and 6 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 dated 17-10-1963 and 7-1-1971 for tine acquisition of village Rampura Roopa for the Jainpir Improvement Trust for public purpose i.e. for the planned development of Jaipur City under the Lal Kothi Scheme.
3. That petition of theirs was heard on merits along with Writ Petitions Nos. 538 and 546 of 1971 by Tyagi, J. on 23-2-1972. Tyagi, J. had, in the meanwhile, rejected 28 Writ Petitions challenging the aforesaid notifications on precisely similar grounds by the judgment in Writ Petition No. 112 of 1070 dated 31-3-1971. The order-sheet of 23-2-1972 reads:--
"23-2-1972 Hon'ble Tyagi J.
Mr. P. N. Dutt for the petitioners.
Mr. S. K. Tiwari, Dy. Govt. Advocate.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
On 14-3-1972, the prayer for further time was renewed. Tyagi, J. accordingly fixed the case for 16-3-1972 "for dictation of judgment". On that day, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, prayed for withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh one on the ground that certain facts had come to his notice. That prayer of his was opposed by the learned Deputy Government Advocate. Tyagi J. accordingly passed the following order:--
"This question whether the petitioner has a right to file a fresh petition shall be examined when the fresh petition is filed in this Court. Subject to the objection raised by the learned Deputy Government Advocate, the writ petition is allowed to be withdrawn. The writ petition is therefore dismissed as withdrawn."
It would thus appear that the appellants prevented the Court from dismissing the earlier writ petition by withdrawing tha same on the date of judgment.
4. On 13-9-1973. i.e. after a lapse of nearly 1 1/2 years, the appellants filed the present writ petition on identically the same facts, challenging the said notifications on precisely the same grounds except for the ground based on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150. The learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable for the grounds stated above.
5. The earlier writ petition having been withdrawn, there was no decision on merits and, therefore, the learned single Judge was not right in holding that the writ petition was barred by the rule of constructive res judicata: Arati Ray Choudhury v. Union of India (AIR 1974 SC 532). The question still is whether the second writ petition lies.
6. It is urged that the order of Tyagi J. should be construed as one granting leave to withdraw the earlier writ petition with liberty to bring a fresh petition. It is true that the permission mentioned in Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. need not be given in express terms. It is sufficient if it can be implied from the order read with the application on which the order was made. It is conceded that there was no 'formal defect' within the meaning of Clause (a) of Sub-rule (2), but it is said that there were 'other sufficient grounds' within Clause (b). There is no merit in the contention. The words 'other sufficient grounds' in Clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) must be read ejusdem generis with the words 'formal defects'; Sukhain v. Liquidator, Co-operative Society, Pondisimaria, ILR (1944) Nag 458 = (AIR 1944 Nag 183) i. e. on grounds analogous to a 'formal defect'. The writ petition before Tyagi J. did not suffer from any such defects and, therefore, he rightly did not grant leave to the appellants to withdraw the petition with liberty to bring a fresh petition.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants urges that the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are 'civil proceedings' under Section 141, and are, therefore, governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court has no power, it is said, apart from Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. to allow a suit to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh one, and the power should be exercised subject to the conditions prescribed therein. There can be no dispute with this proposition but the difficulty is as regards its application.
8. There can be no doubt as to the principles applicable to a suit. The court has undoubtedly no power apart from Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. to allow a suit to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh one, and the power has to be exercised subject to the conditions prescribed therein. When leave is granted to the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit, the order must not be one dismissing the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit, but one granting permission to the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Where leave is refused, the Court should simply dismiss the application. It should not make an order disposing of the suit on the assumption that the plaintiff would withdraw the suit under Sub-rule (1) if the application was refused. The Court cannot split up application under Sub-rule (2) of Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. into two parts, one for withdrawal of the suit, and the other for permission to file a fresh suit and allow the former, and refuse the latter (see Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure 13th Edn. Vol. 2 p. 1285; Mahant Biharidasji v Parshotamdas Ramdas (ILR (1908) 32 Bom 345); Kamini Kumar Roy v. Rajendra Nath Roy (AIR 1926 Cal 233); Jotirmoy Goswamy v. Guru Gobinda Goswami (AIR 1928 Cal 273 (1)); Marudachala v. Chinna Muthu, AIR 1932 Mad 155 (1); Naru v.
Mst. Noji (AIR 1959 Raj 53), and T. W. Ranganathan v. T. K. Subramanian (AIR 1971 Mad 477)).
9. Where the plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the permission of the Court he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter under Sub-rule (3) and against the same defendant: Hulas Rai v. K. B Bass & Co., AIR 1968 SC 111.
10. The Code of Civil Procedure does not in terms apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The practice and procedure under Article 226 of the Constitution is ordinarily governed by the rules framed by the Court under Article 225. The principles embodied by the Code of Civil Procedure can be made applicable only in so far as they are in consonance with the rules or where the rules are silent.
11. It is amply clear that the appellants withdraw the earlier writ petition at their own risk. They made a false representation seeking leave to withdraw the petition on the pretext that some new facts had come to their notice. The present petition is, as it is now accepted, based on identically the same facts. But it is said that it is based on a new ground, namely, on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1973 SC 1150) which according to the learned counsel, constitutes new facts, and therefore, a second petition was maintainable. The submission is wholly unwarranted. There were a series of petitions based on more or less similar grounds. They were also dismissed by Tyagi J. by his order in Writ Petition No. 112 of 1970 dated 31-3-1971. The decision of the Supreme Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India came much later, and that could not constitute new facts which had come to the knowledge of the appellants on the date of withdrawal of their earlier petition.
12. In our judgment, the present writ petition was clearly barred by Rule 382 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, which runs as follows:--
"382. where an application has been rejected, it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts."
In Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1969 Raj LW 130 = (AIR 1969 Raj 41), the earlier writ petition had been dismissed in default. The question before the Division Bench of Dave and Lodha, JJ. was whether a second petition on the same facts lies. The Division Bench held that the second petition was barred. Lodha, J. in delivering the judgment, observed:
"...... If the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner has a right to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution successively, unless the matter has been disposed of on merits, is driven to its logical conclusion, it would result in reducio ad absurdum. The result of acceptance of such a proposition would mean that even though a writ application may have remained pending for a few years and then it has been dismissed in default or may have been disposed of for any other reason except on merits, the petitioner would have a right to move such an application on the same facts again and again till it is disposed of on merits.
Looked at from another point of view, such a procedure would result in disregarding and circumventing the earlier orders of this Court. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the principle contained in Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. can be suitably applied to writ proceedings. As has already been stated above, the earlier writ application in this case based on the same facts was dismissed in default in the presence of the opposite party and the application for the restoration was dismissed on merits. Thus, applying the principle contained in Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. the present writ application is not maintainable."
In Special Appeal No. 1 of 1971 D. N. Bandopadhyay v. Union of India dated 9-3-1971 (Raj) Beri, C. J. and Joshi, J. observed that successive petitions do not lie on the principle that a party cannot be vexed twice. This is a salutary principle and there is no reason for us to depart from that principle in the present case. We must, accordingly, hold that the petition was barred under Rule 382 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules.
13. Even otherwise, the learned single Judge was, in our view, right in the circumstances of the present case in rejecting the writ petition. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. He was right in not exercising the inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the appellants. They must fail on account of inordinate delay and laches on their part. Their earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 16-3-1972. They sat quiet for a period of nearly 1 1/2 years. There was unreasonable delay on their part in moving the Court. The delay remains unexplained. Merely because the Supreme Court held in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1973 SC 1150) that the public purpose stated in notifications, viz. for planned development of Jaipur City was vague, that would not furnish a ground to them to file a fresh petition. The petition must, therefore, fail on the ground of laches: I. C. N. Sahakari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 2085.
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