- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bherulal & Co. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
Opinion Summary: Kan Singh, J. — Motion for Contempt
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner had filed Writ Petition No. 557 of 1973 in the High Court challenging certain schemes said to be framed under sec. 6‑C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The petitioner also moved a stay application which was heard by a Single Judge (Jain, J.) on 16.4.1973. Jain, J. passed a detailed order granting stay in favour of the petitioner, restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned schemes and staying the hearing of certain objections by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer. The Single Judge fixed the matter, along with connected petitions, for hearing on 9.7.1973.
The respondents sought reconsideration of the stay order; that request was rejected by Jain, J. on 8.5.1973. On 4.7.1973 the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (represented by Shri Raghuvir Singh and Shri R.N. Munshi, Additional Advocate General) moved an application to the Chief Justice requesting that the writ petitions be placed before a Division Bench. The application alleged that Jain, J. had virtually decided the matter on the stay application and that it was unlikely he would decide otherwise at final hearing; it also emphasised the multiplicity and public‑interest nature of the petitions.
On 5.7.1973 the Corporation applied to Jain, J. requesting that he not hear the cases because they had applied to the Chief Justice. Jain, J. adjourned the hearing. The petitioner then filed the present contempt application on 20.7.1973, alleging that the application to the Chief Justice contained an aspersion on Jain, J.'s impartiality and therefore amounted to contempt of Court.
On 3.8.1973 the Chief Justice ordered constitution of a Division Bench (the Bench delivering this opinion) to hear the writ petitions and directed that notice be issued to the opposite parties to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statements contained in the 4.7.1973 application (asserting that Jain, J. had virtually decided the matter and would be unlikely to give any other decision at final hearing) amounted to contempt of Court by casting aspersions on the Judge's impartiality and thereby undermining the administration of justice.
- Whether it was proper for the opposite parties to approach the Chief Justice seeking re‑constitution of the Bench at the stage when the Single Judge (Jain, J.) had already fixed hearing dates and was seized of the matters.
- Whether the Chief Justice has the power, once a Bench is seized of a case pursuant to the allotment of business, to withdraw that case from the Bench and re‑allocate it to another Bench.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner alleged that the passage in the 4.7.1973 application created an impression that Jain, J. was pre‑disposed on the merits after disposing only of the stay application, and that such an allegation on the Judge's impartiality amounted to contempt of Court.
Opposite Parties' (Corporation's) Arguments
- The Corporation's application to the Chief Justice (dated 4.7.1973), as signed by Shri Raghuvir Singh and Shri R.N. Munshi, submitted that from a bare perusal of the Single Judge's order it was clear he had virtually decided the matter and held that the schemes could not be said to be the schemes of the Corporation. The application asserted that, given such a finding, it was difficult to conceive the Single Judge would give any other decision at final hearing.
- The Corporation further submitted that since a large number of writ petitions were involved, it was desirable that they be heard by a Division Bench for final resolution without further delay.
- The Corporation also contended that the matters were urgent and in the public interest and therefore should be decided finally by a Division Bench.
- Subsequently, both opposite parties tendered unqualified and unconditional apologies, stating they had acted under a wrong belief in moving the Chief Justice; they asserted bona fides and denied any improper intention to lower the dignity of the High Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (House of Lords) | Consolidated observations on the nature and public‑policy foundation of contempt of court; definition and scope of contempt as conduct undermining administration of justice. | The Court relied on the Law Lords' speeches in this decision to frame its consolidated observations on contempt: its public‑policy basis, purpose to protect administration of justice, and various forms contempt may take. |
| In re Sham Lal (Full Bench, Lahore High Court) | Authority that a litigant or counsel cannot demand reconstitution of the Bench; statements by counsel implying such demand may be construed as reflecting on the integrity of the Court. | The Court referred to the Full Bench's observations that counsel's comments seeking reconstitution can be capable of being construed as a reflection on the integrity of the Court and that litigants have no right to select or exclude Judges. |
| M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court (Supreme Court) | Counsel may be guilty of contempt if they sign contemptuous applications without reasonable grounds; members of the Bar cannot scandalize Judges or attempt to divert justice by tryng to move cases between Benches when adverse opinions appear. | The Court cited this precedent to support the proposition that counsel must satisfy themselves of adequate grounds before signing such applications and that counsel cannot be allowed to scandalize Judges or divert the course of justice by attempting to shift a case from one Bench to another when the Bench expresses opinions seemingly adverse to a client. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by explaining the legal foundation and purpose of contempt of court: it is grounded in public policy to protect the administration of justice and is not designed to protect private interests. The Court reasoned that contempt is conduct which undermines the administration of justice by interfering with citizens' access to impartial adjudication, with reliance on tribunals free from bias, or by usurpation of the court's function.
Drawing on the Law Lords' speeches in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., the Court consolidated observations defining contempt broadly as conduct which prejudices three essential requirements of due administration of justice:
- unhindered access to courts;
- reliance on impartial tribunals deciding matters on duly proved evidence and established procedure; and
- assurance that functions of the court will not be usurped by others.
The Court then examined the exact wording of the objectionable passage from the 4.7.1973 application. It held that the passage did create an impression that Jain, J. — who had only decided the stay application — was so pre‑disposed on the merits that it was difficult to conceive he would take any other view at final hearing. The Court found that this casts an aspersion on the Judge's impartiality and is likely to shake public confidence in the administration of justice at his hands.
The Court addressed the procedural rules: R. 54 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 vests in the Chief Justice the privilege to constitute Benches and allot business; R. 55 describes cases ordinarily heard by a Single Judge. The Court interpreted these rules to mean that once a case has been allotted to and is being heard by a Bench pursuant to the Chief Justice's allotment, that Bench is "seized of the case" as the High Court. In the Court's view, there is no provision in the Rules permitting the Chief Justice to withdraw a case from that Bench and re‑allocate it to another Bench; such power cannot be presumed in the absence of any rule or statutory provision (the Court contrasted this with sec. 24 of the C.P.C., applicable to subordinate courts).
Applying that reasoning to the facts, the Court concluded that when Jain, J. had fixed 9.7.1973 for final hearing and was regularly dealing with such matters, the opposite parties had no justification to approach the Chief Justice four days before the hearing to constitute another Bench. If the opposite parties considered the cases important, the Court suggested they should have moved Jain, J. directly to seek a reference to a larger Bench so that the Chief Justice could then constitutionally constitute a larger Bench.
The Court further relied on the cited authorities (In re Sham Lal and M.Y. Shareef) to reinforce that litigants and counsel are not entitled to select or exclude Judges, that statements or applications suggesting otherwise can reflect upon the integrity of the Court, and that counsel cannot sign or promote contemptuous applications without reasonable grounds.
Finally, the Court took into account that both opposite parties tendered an unqualified and unconditional apology, and the Court was satisfied of their bona fides and that there was no improper intention to lower the dignity of the High Court.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court accepted the opposite parties' unqualified and unconditional apology, found them to be acting bona fide without improper intention, and therefore discharged the notices issued for contempt and "closed the chapter." The Court also discharged the notice issued to Shri Mangal Behari because he had not signed the objectionable application.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: No punishment for contempt was imposed; the notices to show cause were discharged; the apology from the opposite parties was accepted; and Shri Mangal Behari was specifically discharged from notice because he had not signed the application.
- Procedural/administrative guidance by the Court: The Court expressed its view that, under the Rajasthan High Court Rules, once a Bench has been validly allotted and is seized of a case, the Chief Justice does not possess power to withdraw that case from the Bench and re‑allocate it to another Bench in the absence of any rule or statutory provision. The Court explained that a Bench so seized must itself decide whether to release a case; only after release could the Chief Justice re‑allot it.
- On precedent and future conduct: By invoking and applying the principles in the cited authorities, the Court reiterated that counsel must exercise care and have reasonable grounds before signing applications that could impugn a Judge's impartiality, and that litigants do not have a right to dictate which Judges hear their cases.
The Court did not impose sanctions; rather, it resolved the contempt proceeding by accepting apology and giving guidance on procedural propriety and the limits of approaching the Chief Justice once a Bench is seized of a case.
Kan Singh, J.:— This is a motion for contempt of Court. The petitioner had filed a writ petition which was No. 557 of 1973 in this Court challenging certain schemes under sec. 6-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He also moved a stay application along with the writ petition. The stay application was heard on 16.4.73 by a Single Bench of this Court presided over by Jain, J. passed a detailed order granting stay in favour of the petitioner restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned schemes as also staying the hearing of certain objections by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer. Jain J further ordered that having regard to the urgency of the case the case along with connected writ petitions be listed for hearing on 9-7-73. Thereafter the respondents in the writ petition moved for reconsideration of the stay matter, but their prayer was rejected by Jain, J. on 8-5-73. On 4.7.73, an application was moved before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for and on behalf of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation for ordering that the writ petitions aforesaid be placed before a Division Bench for hearing. The application was signed on behalf of the Corporation by opposite party Shri Raghuvir Singh and Shri R.N Munshi, Additional Advocate General and counsel for the State Road Transport Corporation. We may read the grounds on which the matter was requested to be placed before a Division Bench:
“From a bare perusal of the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jain quoted above, it is clear that he has virtually decided the matter and has held that the schemes published under sec. 68-C of the Act in pursuance of the Corporation Resolution dated 27-5-69 cannot be said so be the schemes framed by the Corporation. Though the learned Judge, while making the aforesaid observation has said that he is prima facie of that view yet it is clear from the order passed by him that in his view since the draft scheme prepared by the Corporation in pursuance of its Resolution dated 27-5-69 was not placed before the Corporation so the schemes prepared in pursuance of that resolution could not be said to be the scheme of the Corporation. In face of such a finding, it is difficult to conceive that when these matters are to be heard finally he will give any other decision in the matter.
That the Corporation further Submits that when such a large number of Writ Petitions are involved it is eminently desirable that these matters should be heard by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court so that the dispute involved in these matters may be resolved without any further delay.
That beside this the Corporation further submits that questions raised in these Writ Petitions are of urgent nature and it will be in the public interest that question involved in these petitions are decided finally by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court.”
On 5-7-73, another application was moved before Jain, J. by and on behalf of the State Road Transport Corporation that as they had moved Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the cases to a larger Bench the cases be not heard by him. Jain, J. accordingly adjourned the hearing of the cases. On 20.7.73, the petitioner moved the present application for taking contempt proceedings against the opposite parties.
2. On 3-8-73, the matter came up before Hon'ble the Chief Justice who ordered that a Division Bench consisting of us be constituted for hearing the writ petitions. He further ordered that a notice be issued to the opposite parties to show cause why they be not punished for contempt.
3. The contempt is alleged to have been committed by the opposite parties when they alleged in the application dated 4.7.73 that Jain, J. had already formed his opinion in the matter and it was difficult to conceive that when these matters would be heard finally by him, he would be giving any other decision in the matter than what he had held in deciding the stay application.
4. The law on the subject of contempt of court is founded entirely on public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of parties to a litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and it should be limited to what is reasonably necessary for that purpose. In an ordered community courts are established for the specific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In the general interests of the community it is imperative that the authority of the courts should not be imperilled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. Various types of behaviour have been taken to constitute contempt. A study of decided cases is helpful for showing the attitude that the courts had at different times taken and a certain pattern emerges.
5. In any civilised society it is the function of the Government to maintain courts of law to which its citizens can have access for the impartial decision of disputes as to their legal rights and obligations towards one another individually and towards the State as representing society as a whole. The provision of such a system for the administration of justice by courts of law and the maintenance of public confidence in it are essential if citizens are to live together in peaceful association with one another.
6. ‘Contempt of Court’ is a generic term descriptive of conduct in relation to particular proceedings in a court or law which tends to undermine that system or to inhibit citizens from availing themselves of it for the settlement of their disputes. Contempt of court may thus take many forms. The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights or liabilities, secondly that they should be able to rely on obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against and party any whose decision will be based on those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law, and thirdly that once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely on there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.
7. The law of contempt of court is a body of rules which exists to safeguard another, quite different institution of civilised society. It is the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in due administration of justice i.e in the resolution of disputes, not by force or by private or public influence, but by independent adjudication in courts of law according to an objective code. The alternative is anarchy (including that feudalirtic anarchy which results from arrogation to determine disputes by others than those charged by society to do so in impartial arbitrament according to an abjective code.)
8. The term ‘Contempt of court’ means an interference with the administration of justice and it is unfortunate that the offence should continue to be known by a name which suggests to the modern mind that its essence is a supposed affront to the dignity of the court Nowadays when sympathy is readily accorded to any one who defies constituted authority the very name of the offence predisposes many people in favour of the alleged offender. Yet the due administration of justice is something which all citizens, whether on the left or the right or in the centre, should be anxious to safeguard.
9. We have drawn for the above consolidated observations on the learned speeches of the Law Lords in a very recent decision of the House of Lords reported as Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1).
10. Now we have set out in extenso the objectionable passage by which according to the petitioner, the opposite parties committed contempt of this Court. This passage unfortunately does create an impression that Jain, J. who had only disposed of the stay application was so much pre possessed of the merits that it was difficult to conceive that when the matters would be heard by him finally he would be able to take any other view. In our view, this casts an aspersion on the learned Judge on his impartiality and judicial bearing and is likely to shake public confidence in the administration of justice at his hands.
11. According to R. 54 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, it is the privilege of Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute Single or Division Benches from time to time and to allot business (cases) to them and the Judges of the Court shall sit to hear cases according to the arrangement made by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. R. 55 provides for the type of cases that shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting singly. The writ petitions that Jain, J. was hearing were covered by R. 55 of the Rules.
12. In our humble view, once a case goes before a Bench according to the allotment of business made by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and thereafter the Bench is seized of the case then, we are afraid, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has no power to withdraw that case from that Bench and to allot it to another Bench. It will be for that Bench who is seized of the case to think for itself whether it would like to hear that particular case or not. It is only when such Bench releases that case that Hon'ble the Chief Justice would be able to allot it to another Bench, but not otherwise. The Rules make no provision for transfer of such a case from one Bench to another, as we find in sec. 24 of C.P.C for subordinate Courts. When a Bench is seized of a case it is dealing with the case as the High Court and the judgment pronounced by that Bench is the judgment of High Court and in the absence of any provision to enable Hon'ble the Chief Justice to withdraw such a case from a Bench we cannot hold that such a power exists in Hon'ble the Chief Justice. In the circumstances when Jain, J. had already fixed 9-7-1973 for the hearing of these cases and such type of cases were being normally dealt with by Jain, J. at the relevant time the opposite parties had no justification whatsoever for approaching Hon'ble the Chief Justice, only four days before the hearing, to constitute another Bench for the hearing of these cases. If the opposite parties felt that the cases were of great importance then they should have made a move before Jain, J. himself so that, if the learned Judge were satisfied of the sufficient importance of the cases he would have himself made a reference to a larger Bench and then Hon'ble the Chief Justice could have constituted a larger Bench.
13. We may here refer to some of the decided cases. In re Sham Lal (2), a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court had to consider a case where a Senior Advocate of that Court had made the following submission—
“(a) I stated that I have been further instructed by my client Sukhdev Raj to state that he wanted to apply to the Chief Justice for the reconstitution of the Bench and that he did not want his case to be heard by the present Bench.
(b) I meant no disrespect or insult to the learned Judges constituting the Bench.
(c) The following circumstances under which I made this statement in question would go to show that I never meant to be disrespectful to the Court and wanted to convey a clients' request, there being no other way open to him to do so.
(d) It will be clear from the facts stated above that the statement was made by me in the performance of my duty as a counsel to my client, and there was no intention on my part to offer any insult to the Court. I believe that a litigant has a right to apply to the Chief Justice for the re-constitution of a Bench and has also got a right to submit that his case may not be heard by a particular Bench.”
The learned Judges of the Full Bench observed that there would be no doubt that the words used by the learned counsel (Shri Sham Lal) were capable of being construed as a reflection on the integrity of the Court. The learned Judges further emphasised that belief of the counsel was unwarranted and further that no litigant was entitled to have any say in the selection of the Judges who are to constitute any Bench.
14. In M.Y Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court (3), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that where counsel had signed certain applications or pleadings which were contemptuous without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie existence of adequate grounds with a view to prevent or delay the course of justice he was guilty of contempt of court and it was no duty of a counsel to his client to take any interest in such applications. Their Lordships went on to say that the members of the Bar, however, big or learned cannot be allowed to scandalize the Judges or to divert the course of justice by attempting to take a case out from one Bench to another Bench of the Court when they find that the Bench is expressing opinions seemingly adverse to their clients.
15. We are, however, happy to note that both the opposite parties have tendered unqualified and unconditional apology for the application that they had under a wrong belief moved before Hon'ble the Chief Justice. We are satisfied of their bona fides and that there was no improper intention on their part to lower the dignity of the High Court.
16. Consequently we hereby discharge the notices and close the chapter. We discharge the notice issued to Shri Mangal Behari as well, as he had not signed the objectionable application.
Alert