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Hastimal v. State Of Rajasthan

Rajasthan High Court
Feb 7, 1973
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant claimed ownership of House No. 27 in Ward No. 6, Jodhpur. The State published a notification in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 30 June 1965 notifying its intention to acquire 2,074 sq. yards of land (including the appellant's house) under the "Sojati Gate -- Girdi Kot scheme." The appellant was served with a notice under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (the Improvement Act) inviting objections. Despite objections, the State proceeded. The Collector issued a notice on 16 March 1966 for determination of compensation, and on 26 September 1967 a compromise between mortgagor and mortgagee authorised the appellant (as mortgagee) to receive the compensation.

The appellant filed a writ petition on 25 July 1968 under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking (inter alia) declarations that Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act were void as discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 31(2), a writ of prohibition against the Additional Collector, quashing of acquisition proceedings, and restoration of possession. The learned single Judge dismissed the petition on 13 May 1971, holding that Sections 52 and 53 were not violative of Article 14 and that the appellant had been guilty of delay (laches). The appellant filed this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance challenging that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Sections 52 and 53 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 are discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (and relatedly Article 31(2)), when compared with the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act (e.g., absence of solatium, compensation for severance, different method of calculation, and forum differences).
  2. Whether the petition under Article 226 was barred by delay (laches) and, if so, whether such delay disentitles the appellant from relief in the exercise of the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the appellant was entitled to a writ of prohibition restraining the Additional Collector from proceeding with determination of compensation, to quash acquisition proceedings, and to an order restoring possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Hasti Mal)

  • Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act are interconnected (acquisition and compensation) and discriminatory when compared with the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act because they do not provide: (a) solatium; (b) compensation for severance; and (c) the method of calculation of compensation differs.
  • Under the Acquisition Act a part of property could not be taken without consent, whereas no such protection existed in the Improvement Act.
  • The forum for determination of compensation under the Improvement Act differs from that under the Acquisition Act, creating discrimination.
  • On delay: once a petition is admitted and adjudicated on merits the question of delay (laches) should be of no consequence. The appellant relied on precedents (e.g., P. B. Roy) and argued that absence of a reply/return by respondents meant they could not raise the plea of delay later.
  • Estoppel cannot prevent a challenge to a statute which is void for contravening a fundamental right.
  • One of appellant's prayers sought restoration of possession; because a suit for possession was not time-barred on the date of petition, the Article 226 petition could not be held barred by time. Primary concern was compensation which had not been determined.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. S. K. Mal Lodha for Urban Improvement Trust)

  • Sections 52 and 53 are not discriminatory. The proviso to Section 23(2) of the Acquisition Act excludes solatium in certain circumstances; hence lack of solatium in the Improvement Act does not necessarily make it discriminatory.
  • Compensation for severance is implicitly covered by Section 53(6)(b) of the Improvement Act because compensation is for the value of the land on the date of notice.
  • Principles for determining market value in Section 23(3)(a) of the Acquisition Act are substantially similar to Section 53(6)(b) of the Improvement Act.
  • Payment from date of notice under Section 53(2) of the Improvement Act is similar to provisions in Sections 24, 28 and 34 of the Acquisition Act.
  • The difference between forums under the two statutes is largely nomenclature; the stages for determination of compensation are substantially the same, so there is no discrimination.
  • On delay: no reply was filed because respondents did not seek new facts; absence of a reply does not prevent the court from exercising judicial discretion to refuse extraordinary relief on grounds of laches. Delay in invoking extraordinary jurisdiction is a matter of judicial discretion and not a mere waiver by silence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (In W.P. No. 144 of 1963) The opinion records reliance by the appellant; no specific rule is extracted in the provided text. The case was cited by counsel for the appellant in support of the discrimination argument; the Court's analysis did not distill a separate principle from it in the opinion.
Most Rev. Dr. L. Mathias v. Spl. Dy. Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1017 Cited by appellant; the opinion does not articulate the precise principle from this case in the text provided. Presented in appellant's list of supporting authorities for constitutional challenge; the Court's decision does not separately analyze this case in the reasons recorded.
Dy. Commr. and Collector, Kamrup v. Durganath Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 394 Cited by appellant; the opinion does not specify the rule extracted from this case in the provided text. Relied upon by appellant; not separately analyzed in the Court's reasoning recorded in this opinion.
P. B. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 908 (1972 Serv LR 343) Cited by appellant to support the proposition that consideration on merits diminishes the force of a plea of delay. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on this case for that broad proposition, observing that mere reference is not equivalent to approval for the present purpose.
S. Gurmejsingh v. The Election Tribunal, Gurdaspur, 66 Pun LR 589 (= AIR 1964 Punj 337) (Full Bench) The Full Bench observed that if a petition is admitted and adjudicated on merits in favour of petitioner, that may weigh against refusing relief for delay. The Court noted the observation but held that adjudication on merits is not decisive; it may be a factor but does not preclude refusal for laches.
S. Mahadeva Iyer v. State, AIR 1954 Trav Co 469 (FB) Cited by appellant regarding consequences of absence of a counter-affidavit; the opinion distinguishes the facts of that case. The Court found the case distinguishable because in that case there was a counter affidavit (not pressed) and thus did not support the appellant's position here.
Pt. Gopi Nath Wali v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1958 J & K 11 (FB) Cited by appellant for proposition that delay must be considered on facts; the case involved representations and factual context. Noted as distinguishable on facts; the Court observed that each case depends on its facts and that earlier case facts differed from the present delay context.
Somnathmal v. The State of Rajasthan, 1954 Raj LW 43 (= AIR 1954 Raj 162) Cited by appellant for proposition that no estoppel can operate against a void statute violating fundamental rights. The Court stated that even where law was declared ultra vires in other cases, relief was denied for delay; thus estoppel argument did not overcome the laches objection in this case.
State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634 Cited by respondent to support that Improvement Act provisions were not discriminatory relative to Acquisition Act. Referenced by respondent in argument; the Court recorded the reliance but its final decision rested on laches rather than resolving the discrimination question.
Dalchand v. Delhi Improvement Trust (New Delhi Development Authority), AIR 1967 SC 87 Cited by respondent to show similarity between procedures/compensation provisions and to oppose discrimination argument. Noted in respondent's submissions; the Court did not adjudicate the discrimination point as it dismissed petition on delay grounds.
Roopsingh Devisingh v. Sanchalak Panchayat and Samaj Sewa, M. P. Indore, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 50 Cited by respondents on the discretionary nature of extraordinary jurisdiction and the propriety of refusing relief for delay. Used to support respondents' submission that absence of a reply does not prevent the Court from refusing relief on laches grounds; Court accepted that discretion exists.
Mohammad Habibullah Sahib v. Spl. Dy. Collector for Land Acquisition Madras, AIR 1967 Mad 118 Cited by respondents in support of the delay/laches principle and to show authorities on the point. One among several authorities invoked by respondents; the Court grouped these authorities in evaluating the laches question.
Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 470 Cited by respondents as an authority on delay and discretionary refusal of extraordinary relief. Referenced in the Court's broader survey of authorities on laches and discretion under Article 226.
Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC 769 Established and reiterated that relief under Article 226 is discretionary and that delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation is a ground for refusing relief. The Court relied on this authority as a primary precedent for refusing relief because of laches; it cited para 3 of that decision as controlling the discretion question.
Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 398 Examined the plea of laches closely; Hidayatullah C.J. emphasized that a party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence and that delay may disentitle a petitioner. The Court relied on the principles from this decision (delay defeats equity; need for expedition) to conclude that the appellant's delay was fatal to the petition.
Purshottamlal v. State of Rajasthan, 1972 WLN 702 Cited in the context of an authority where a challenge to a Land Acquisition Act notification after four years was held to disentitle the petitioner. The opinion refers to this decision (and a related single-judge confirmation and Supreme Court dismissal) to support the idea that long delay in challenging acquisition notifications can bar relief.
Kamini Kumar Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 2060 Cited among authorities dealing with delay and the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. Mentioned in the list of authorities addressing delay; the Court relied on the aggregate of authorities rather than singling out distinct rulings from this case for detailed application.
Narayani Devi Khaitan v. State of Bihar (Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1964, unreported decision of SC dated 22-9-1964) Quoted (via Gajendragadkar C.J.) for the proposition that the High Court's power under Article 226 is discretionary and that laches and relevant circumstances may justify refusal of relief. The Court reproduced the quoted passage to emphasise the discretionary nature of Article 226 and to support the conclusion that delay may preclude relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by addressing the question of delay (laches), treating it as dispositive. It canvassed authorities (notably Durga Prasad and the decision reported at AIR 1970 SC 398) establishing that:

  • Relief under Article 226 is discretionary; laches and other relevant circumstances may justify refusal to exercise that jurisdiction.
  • The party alleging breach of fundamental rights must move the Court promptly, before other rights (which may arise in consequence of delay) become fixed; courts must avoid prejudicing third parties whose rights arise during any delay.
  • No rigid time limit can be prescribed; each case must be decided on its facts, but avoidable delay that affects the merits may disentitle a petitioner to relief.

The Court then examined the factual timeline contained in the record:

  • Notice under Section 52(2) of the Improvement Act served on 6 November 1964; the appellant filed a reply on 21 November 1964.
  • Government notification of decision to acquire was published on 30 June 1965.
  • The Collector's notice for determination of compensation was dated 16 March 1966.
  • The writ petition under Article 226 was filed on 25 July 1968 — over three years after the notification of 30 June 1965.

The Court emphasised that the scheme of acquisition was clearly communicated to the appellant in November 1964 and the decision to acquire was conclusively declared by publication in June 1965. The appellant had also participated in the compensation proceedings and, according to the learned single Judge, the property had been demolished while proceedings were ongoing. On these facts the Court held that the appellant's conduct amounted to inexcusable delay.

The Court addressed specific arguments raised by the appellant concerning (a) the significance of the single Judge having considered the matter on merits, (b) the absence of a reply by respondents, and (c) estoppel against raising delay. The Court concluded:

  • Adjudication on merits is not decisive on the question of delay; it may be a factor but does not automatically negate the laches objection.
  • Absence of a reply does not preclude the Court from refusing to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction where the principles of prudence and discretion justify refusal on grounds of delay.
  • Even where a statute was held ultra vires in other cases, relief has been refused for delay; thus estoppel and the existence of a void law do not automatically entitle a delayed challenger to relief.

Given the above, the Court concluded that the appellant had been rightly held guilty of laches and that the petition was correctly dismissed on that ground. Because the Court disposed of the matter on delay, it expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the substantive contention of discrimination under Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court upheld the learned single Judge's dismissal of the appellant's writ petition on the ground of delay (laches) and awarded costs against the appellant.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the appellant's special appeal failed and the earlier dismissal of the Article 226 petition stands; the appellant was held disentitled to relief because of delay.
  • The Court expressly did not decide the substantive constitutional challenge (discrimination alleged under Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act versus the Acquisition Act). Therefore, no authoritative ruling was made on those substantive points in this opinion.
  • No new precedent on the substantive discrimination issue was established by this decision; the opinion reinforces existing principles that delay may bar relief under Article 226 even where fundamental rights are alleged.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to matters and statements appearing in the provided opinion. No facts, holdings, or interpretations have been added beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 13th May, 1971 whereby he dismissed the appellant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The facts which it is necessary to recall for the disposal of this appeal briefly stated are these : The appellant claims to be the owner of a house No. 27 in Ward No. 6 in the city of Jodhpur. In the Rajasthan Gazette of June 30, 1965 a notification was published whereby the Government notified its intention to acquire land measuring 2074 Sq. yards which belonged to the appellant and whereon the house of the appellant stood. The land and the house were sought to be acquired under the scheme popularly known as the 'Sojati Gate -- Girdi Kot scheme'. The notice was served on the appellant under Section 52 (2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (hereafter called 'the Improvement Act') inviting objections from the appellant against the proceedings for the acquisition of the appellant's property. Despite the objections filed by the appellant the State Government took further steps to acquire the land and the house. A notice was issued on March 16, 1966 by the Collector for the determination of the compensation and on September 26, 1967 a compromise was effected between the mortgagor and the mortgagee of the property in dispute whereby the appellant as the mortgagee was authorised to receive the entire compensation. A writ petition was presented on July 25, 1968 by the appellant in which it was prayed that the provisions contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act be declared void being discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution of India; that a writ of prohibition be issued against the Additional Collector restraining him from taking further proceedings in the matter of the determination of compensation and further the acquisition proceedings be quashed and the respondents be ordered to restore the possession of the petitioners' property to them. No reply was filed to this writ petition by any one of the three respondents but the petition was contested. The learned single Judge repelled the contention of the appellant that Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and held that the acquisition proceedings were not discriminatory. The learned single Judge also expressed the opinion that the appellant was guilty of delay in coming to the Court and he on that ground as well was not entitled to any relief. In the result he dismissed the petition. Dissatisfied the appellant has come up in appeal.

3. Mr. Hasti Mal learned counsel for the appellant urged that Sections 52 and 53 of the Improvement Act are inter-connected, the first relates to the acquisition and the second to the determination of compensation. When these two sections are compared with the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act (hereafter called 'the Acquisition Act') they are discriminatory because the Improvement Act does not provide (a) solatium; (b) compensation for severance and (c) the method of calculation of compensation is also different. It was further urged that under the Acquisition Act a part of the property could not be acquired without consent while no such provision existed in the Improvement Act. The learned counsel added that the forum of determination of compensation under the Acquisition Act was different from the one provided under the Improvement Act. He placed reliance on (1) P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (In W. P. No. 144 of 1963) 2. Most Rev. Dr. L. Mathias (In W. Ps. Nos. 227 and 228 of 1963) v. Spl. Dy. Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1017 and Dy. Commr. and Collector, Kamrup v. Durganath Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 394.

4. On the question of delay the learned counsel for the appellant urged that the petition having been admitted and adjudicated upon on merits the question of delay was of no consequence. He placed reliance on P.B Roy v. Union Of India., 1972 Serv LR 343 = (AIR 1972 SC 908) and S. Gurmejsingh v. The Election Tribunal, Gurdaspur, 66 Pun LR 589 - (AIR 1964 Punj 337) (FB). He also urged that no return having been filed and no objection regarding delay having been taken such a plea was not available to the respondents. Reliance was placed on S. Mahadeva Iyer v. State, AIR 1954 Trav Co 469 (FB) and Pt. Gopi Nath Wali v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1958 J & K 11 (FB). The learned counsel argued that when a statute was void for contravening a fundamental right nobody could be estopped from challenging actions thereunder because there could be no estoppel against the statute. He placed reliance on Somnathmal v. The State of Rajasthan, 1954 Raj LW 43 = (AIR 1954 Raj 162). Lastly, he urged that one of the prayers made by the petitioner appellant was in regard to the possession of the premises sought to be acquired and because a suit therefor on the date of the petition was not barred by time, it could not be said that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was barred by time. He also submitted that the primary concern of the appellant was compensation and that having not been determined it could not be said that the petition was delayed.

5. Mr. S. K. Mal Lodha learned counsel for the Urban Improvement Trust respondent No. 2 argued that Sections 52 and 53 are not discriminatory because the proviso to Section 23 (2) of the Acquisition Act did not allow solatium in certain circumstances. His contention was that the compensation for severance was by necessary implication contained in the language of Section 53 (6) (b) of the Improvement Act because what was to be compensated for was the value of the land on the date of the notice. On the question of the market value he urged that the principles contained in Section 23 (3) (a) of the Acquisition Act were almost similar to those contained in Section 53 (6) (b) of the Improvement Act. On the question of payment of compensation from the date of notice the provisions of Section 53 (2) were similar to those contained in Sections 24, 28 and 34 of the Acquisition Act. In regard to the question of forum his submission is that nobody has a right of a particular forum but on close examination it will be noticed that there is only a difference of nomenclature otherwise the stages of determination of compensation were almost the same and there was no discrimination. He placed reliance on State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634 and Dalchand v. Delhi Improvement Trust (New Delhi Development Authority), New Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 87.

6. On the question of return he urged that no reply was filed because no new facts were sought to be brought on record for defending the objection and it was clear from the petition itself that it was delayed. He urged that the doctrine of delay in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction was a matter of judicial discretion and not a matter between the parties and mere absence of an objection therefore cannot preclude a Court from refusing to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if the principles of prudence so required. Reliance was placed on Roopsingh Devisingh v. Sanchalak Panchayat and Samaj Sewa, M. P. Indore, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 50. On the question of delay the learned counsel relied on Mohammad Habibullah Sahib v. Spl. Dy. Collector for Land Acquisition Madras, AIR 1967 Mad 118; Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 470; Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC 769; Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 398; Purshottamlal v. State of Rajasthan, 1972 WLN 702 & Kamini Kumar Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 2060.

7. We propose to examine the question of delay first. It has been laid down in para 3 of Durga Prasad's case AIR 1970 SC 769 that the relief under Article 226 is discretionary and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is that the petitioner has filed the petition after delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. Sikri J. (as he then was) has extracted certain observations of Gajendragadkar C. J. from an un-reported decision in Smt. Narayani Devi Khaitan v. State of Bihar (Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1964, D/- 22-9-1964 (SC)) which deserve a recall. They read:

It is well settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ..... No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably.

The plea of laches came to be examined closely in AIR 1970 SC 398. Hidayatullah C. J. expressed the view that the party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of Courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court. In para 8 it is observed:

"The English and American practice has been outlined in Halsbury's Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum. It has been mentioned by my brethren in their opinions and I need not traverse the same ground again except to say this that Courts of Common Law in England were bound by the Law of Limitation but not the Court of Chancery. Even so the Chancery Courts insisted on expedition. It is trite learning to refer to the maxim "delay defeats equity" or the Latin of it that the Courts help those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. The Courts of Chancery, therefore, frequently applied to suits in equity the analogy of the law of Limitation applicable to actions at law and equally frequently put a special limitation of their own if they thought that the suit was unduly delayed............

The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. In England a period of 6 months has been provided statutorily, but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the claim, this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction."

In 1972 WLN 702 Tyagi J., has examined a large number of cases on the question of delay and held that in a case under the Land Acquisition Act a challenge of the notification under Section 6 after four years of waiting disentitles the petitioner to any relief. This case came up before a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 265 ef 1972 (decided on 25-7-1972 (Raj)) and the decision of the learned single Judge was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed in limine. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court by Spl. Petn. No. 2250 of 1972 and the same was dismissed on 22-9-1972 (SC).

8. From the discussion of the aforesaid authorities it is clear that notwithstanding that violation of a fundamental right is alleged the delay disentitles a petitioner from seeking a relief in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. No rigid rule could be laid down but discretion will have to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the Improvement Act dated 6th November, 1964 (Ex. 2) was served on the appellant. A reply to this notice was filed on 21st November, 1964 vide Ex. 3 and then a notification was published in the Government Gazette under Section 52 (1) of the Improvement Act on 30th June, 1965 whereby the Government decided to acquire the land for the purpose of improvement and for establishment and construction of a market from overbridge outside Sojati Gate to Girdikot at Jodhpur. The Collector sent notice for determination of compensation on 16th March, 1966 and the petition was filed on 25th July 1968. So far as the scheme of acquisition is concerned it was clearly communicated to the appellant in November, 1964 and the decision to acquire the premises of the appellant was conclusively pronounced by the publication of notification on 30th June, 1965 and the petition was submitted after three years of this notification. The learned single Judge has expressed the view that the petitioner appellant fought for the compensation before the Acquisition Officer and while proceedings were going on the property had been demolished and the road was going to be constructed on the open land and the petitioner could not get the possession of the property as claimed by him from the respondents and in these circumstances the appellant was guilty of delay and was not entitled to the relief in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. This argument of the learned single Judge is assailed by Mr. Hasti Mal learned counsel on the ground that once the petition was disposed of on merits such considerations were not available for the rejection of the petition. It was not open to the learned single Judge to dismiss the petition on the ground of delay. The main case relied upon by the learned counsel is 66 Pun LR 589=(AIR 1964 Punj 337) (FB). In para 7 of the judgment the learned Judges have expressed the view which may be quoted in their own words:

"If, therefore, this Court after hearing the petitioner admits the writ petition and issues a rule nisi and at hearing after actually adjudicating upon the merits of the controversy comes to a positive conclusion in favour of the petitioner, that may also be a factor which, to some extent, may reasonably weigh against the refusal to exercise discretion in granting relief to the aggrieved party."

The consideration of a petition on merits therefore cannot be said to be decisive on the question of the plea regarding undue delay. The learned counsel adds that this observation of the Full Bench has received the approval of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in P. B. Roy's case, 1972 Serv LR 343=(AIR 1972 SC 908). We are afraid that this contention has no substance. I Mere reference is not the same as putting a seal of approval. The argument that in the absence of the reply the objection of delay cannot be considered is also without force. In AIR 1954 Trav. Co. 469, there was a counter affidavit where lack of diligence was pleaded but not pressed and the case is therefore distinguishable. So far as AIR 1958 J. & K. 11 (FB) is concerned all that the learned Judges of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court said was that in order to determine whether there has been a delay in a particular case the facts of each case have to be taken into consideration. In that case the petitioner had been making representations to the Government conveying his grievance but had been unsuccessful and the delay of one and a half years was not considered fatal to the petition. In the case before us the appellant amongst the contending rivals was to receive the compensation, participated in the compensation proceedings and has come up after more than three years to this Court for a relief. Against the arguments advanced on the doctrine of estoppel all that we may need say is that in AIR 1970 SC 398, the law under which money was recovered was declared to be ultra vires and yet the relief was declined to the petitioner on the ground of delay. The ground of delay is not merely a controversy between the parties inter se but as we have already observed it is an important factor which regulates the exercise of judicial discretion in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The line between these two approaches is subtle but it exists.

Another argument in this context is that the suit for possession is not barred by time. The Supreme Court in the cases already noticed above has categorically observed that the question of delay is not to be exactly measured by the period of limitation prescribed by law in every case. That is merely an equitable principle and not a decisive factor. If the argument of the learned counsel was accepted then we would be importing the Indian Limitation Act for determining exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction. We are therefore satisfied that the appellant in this case was rightly held guilty of laches in coming to the Court and his petition was correctly dismissed on the ground of delay. In this view of the matter we express no opinion on the point of discrimination urged by the learned counsel for the appellant.

9. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with, costs.