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Rooda Ram v. Rattu Ram
Factual and Procedural Background
The litigation concerns a field identified as Geld Khasra No. 35 measuring 43 bighas and 14 bis located in village Gudawadi, Tehsil Sujarigarh, District Ghuru. The field originally belonged to Kashiram. His son was Ghisa Ram (defendant), and his grandson Rattu Ram was from another son, Phusa Ram. Phusa Ram sold the field to defendant appellants Rooda Ram, Gidha Ram, and Natharam. At the time of sale, Rattu Ram was a minor, and a suit was brought on his behalf by his grandmother Smt. Mohari as next friend, seeking cancellation of the sale deed executed by Ghisa Ram in favor of the defendant appellants, alleging Ghisa Ram had no right to sell the field.
The defendants contested the suit, claiming that after Phusa Ram's death, his wife had a union with Rekharam, and that Rattu Ram was born of that union, not of Phusa Ram. They contended Ghisa Ram was the sole owner and had validly sold the field.
The trial court framed several issues including the civil court's jurisdiction to try the suit, ultimately granting a decree in favor of the plaintiffs cancelling the sale deed dated 4-6-62. On appeal, the District Judge held that Ghisa Ram and Rattu Ram each had half share in the field, partially upholding the sale to defendants for Ghisa Ram’s half share and cancelling the sale only regarding Rattu Ram’s half share. The defendants then filed a second appeal before this court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit for cancellation of the sale deed concerning the disputed field.
- Whether a suit for cancellation of a sale deed can be maintained without seeking consequential relief of possession.
- Whether the cause of action underlying the suit falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue court under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The field belonged to Kashiram and passed to Rattu Ram by mutation after the death of his father and grandfather.
- Ghisa Ram had no right or title over the field and thus could not validly sell it.
- The sale deed executed by Ghisa Ram in favor of defendants was void and should be cancelled.
Defendant-Appellants' Arguments
- Rattu Ram was not the son of Phusa Ram but born of a subsequent union of Phusa Ram’s widow with Rekharam.
- Ghisa Ram was the sole owner of the field and had validly sold it to the defendants.
- The civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit, and the suit was maintainable without seeking possession relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandanmal v. Dawar | Principles for determining jurisdiction between civil and revenue courts; jurisdiction depends on the substance and allegations in the plaint. | Used to emphasize that jurisdiction must be determined by the cause of action and the true nature of the suit, not merely its form. |
| Asala v. Narain | Jurisdiction of revenue courts is exclusive for suits of the nature specified in the tenancy legislation; civil courts barred if cause of action falls within revenue court jurisdiction. | Reinforced that suits “of the nature” specified in the Third Schedule to the Tenancy Act must be tried by revenue courts exclusively. |
| Shankerlal v. Dhulilal | Reaffirmation of the principles regarding jurisdiction between civil and revenue courts under tenancy law. | Supported the conclusion that suits based on tenancy rights fall within exclusive revenue court jurisdiction. |
| Shankar Lal v. Saroop Lal (ILR 34 Allahabad 140) | Requirement of seeking possession relief when seeking cancellation of sale deed. | Distinguished and held not applicable to the facts of the instant case because the transferor sought cancellation and the claim was not genuine. |
| Mst. Laxmi Bai v. Lalchand Chelaram (AIR 1952 Vindhya Pradesh 69) | Requirement of possession relief for cancellation of sale deed claims. | Distinguished on facts; not applicable because the plaintiff was not the transferor and the suit was maintainable without possession relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the jurisdictional question under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, which mandates exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts over suits and applications “of the nature specified” in the Third Schedule. The court emphasized that the decisive factor is the cause of action and the true nature of the suit as revealed by the plaint's allegations, not merely the relief sought or the form of the suit.
After analyzing the plaint, the court identified the core cause of action as the plaintiff’s claim of Khatedari (ownership) rights over the field, asserting that Ghisa Ram had no right to sell it. The suit essentially sought vindication of tenancy rights, which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue courts.
The court noted that while the defendants and the lower courts held the civil court had jurisdiction and that cancellation could be sought without possession relief, the learned District Judge’s reasoning was flawed and mixed issues of possession relief with jurisdiction. The court clarified that even if the relief sought is broader than what the revenue court could grant, jurisdiction depends on the cause of action.
Relying on binding precedents, the court held that the suit was triable only by the revenue court and that the civil courts erred in assuming jurisdiction. Consequently, the judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside, and the plaint was ordered to be returned with directions to present it before the competent revenue court.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed.
The court set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower civil courts on the ground that they lacked jurisdiction to try the suit, which was exclusively triable by a revenue court under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The plaint is to be returned to the plaintiff with instructions to file it before the appropriate revenue court.
The parties are to bear their own costs. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing jurisdictional principles under tenancy law. The direct effect is that the civil courts’ prior decisions on the merits are nullified due to lack of jurisdiction, and the matter will proceed in the revenue court system.
Kan Singh, J.:— This is a defendant's second appeal. The subject matter of the litigation is a Geld Khasra No. 35 measuring 43 bighas and 14 bis was situated in village Gudawadi, Tehsil Sujarigarh, District Ghuru. The field originally belonged to one Kashiram. Ghisaram defendant was his son and Raturam his grandson from another son Phusaram. Phusaram sold this field to Rooda Ram, Gidha Ram and Natharam defendant appellants. Rattu Ram was a minor at the time. Consequently a suit was brought on his behalf by his grand-mother Smt. Mohari as his next friend for cancellation of the sale deed executed by Ghisaram in favour of the defendant-appellants. It was averred that Ghisa Ram had no right to sell the field. The defendant appellants contested the suit. They alleged that Kashi Ram had two sons Ghisa Ram and Pbusa Ram, but after Phusa Ram's death his wife performed Nata with one Rekharam resident of Pipli. Rattu Ram was born of that union. In other words, according to the defendant-appellants, Rattu Ram was not the son of Phusa Ram. They took the stand that Ghisa Ram being the sole owner of the field had sold it to them and had thus passed as a complete title.
2. The learned Civil Judge, Ratangarh, in whose court the suit was filed, framed a number of issues. As the defendants had inter alia taken the plea that the suit was not triable by the civil court, the learned trial Judge framed issue No. 5 regarding the same. I need not advert to the other issues on account of the conclusion that I have reached regarding the competence of the civil court to try the suit. Both the courts held that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial court eventually granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for cancellation of the sale deed dated 4-6-62 in favour of the defendant appellants by Ghisa Ram. The defendants then went up in appeal to the court of the learned District Judge at Bikaner. The learned District Judge reached the conclusion that Ghisa Ram and Rattu Ram had half share each in the field in dispute. Accordingly, he up held the sale in favour of the defendants to the extent of half share of Ghisa Ram in the field in question. In the result, he partially accepted the appeal and declared that the sale executed by Ghisa Ram in favour of the defendant-appellants shall stand concelled and be ineffective qua the half share of Rattu Ram in the field. The trial court's decree was thus ordered to be modified in this regard.
3. It is in these circumstances that the defendants have come up in further appeal to this court.
4. Regarding the question of civil court's jurisdiction the learned District Judge has observed thus:
“Even if the plaintiff, had sued for possession of the field in question and the civil court had passed a decree for possession of the field being given to Ratturam, that decree could not have been executed by the civil court. The plaintiff had to go to the Revenue Court to seek the relief of possession. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon two cases, Indian Law Reports 34 Allahabad series page 140—Shankar Lal (defendants) v. Saroop Lal, plaintiffs, and A.I.R 1952 Vindhey Pradesh p. 69 Mst. Laxmi Bai, defendants appellants v. Lalchand Chelaram, plaintiffs respondents, to contend that without seeking the relief of possession, the plaintiff could not be granted a decree for cancellation of the sade deed. I have carefully gone through these rulings and have to say that they do not apply to the facts of the instant case. In the referred ruling the transferor himself wanted to get the deed cancelled and the claim of the transfer to the land was also not held to be genuine. In the instant case, as I would discuss here after, Ghisaram had no right to dispose of the share of Raturam in the field in question. Raturam is not the transferor of the field also. Raturam is also not living in the guardianship of the transferor Ghisaram. In these circumstances the referred rulings have no application to the facts of the instant case. To my mind, the suit of Raturam for cancellation of the sale deed of the field executed by Ghisaram, so far as it affects his right in the field, is maintainable without asking for the consequential relief of possession. There is no insuperable barrier in the way of Raturam in filing the present suit for cancellation of the document, as he himself was not the transferor of the field. Therefore, the first argument of the learned counsel for the appellant fails.”
5. This is the only discussion regarding the competence of the civil court to entertain the suit, though in this the learned Judge has also mixed up the question whether a mere declaration for cancellation of the also deed could be asked for the consequential relief of possession. Be that as it may, I am not happy over the way the question has been approached by the court below. Sec. 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, which lays down what suits and applications are exclusively triable by a revenue court reads.
“S. 207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only.— (1) All suits and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.
(2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.
Explanation— If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with, that which revenue court could have granted.”
6. Sub-clause (1) lays down what suits and applications shall be heard and determined by a revenue court. The use of the expression “nature specified” may be marked in this sub-sec. Sub-sec. (2) forbids courts other than a revenue court from taking cognizance of any suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application Therefore, the question that will arise for consideration here would be on what cause of action the suit is based and what relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. The explanation is suggestive and it provides that if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with that which the revenue court could have granted. The explanation, therefore, again emphasises that what is determinative of the jurisdiction of a revenue court in such matters is the cause of action. There are a number of cases of this Court in which the provisions of sec. 207 came to be examined. I may first refer to Chandanmal v. Dawar (1) wherein a similar provision in the Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, namely, sec. 7 came to be considered. Modi J. observed thus:
“I am of opinion that in order to determine whether a suit is triable by a revenue court or by a civil court, certain basic principles must be borne in mind. One such principle is that it should not be readily inferred that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred unless such an inference can be raised by an express provision of law or by necessary implication. Another thing which should be borne in mind is that the question of jurisdiction must be initially determined by the allegation made in the plaint. Thus, whether a suit for possession of land is cognizable by a civil court or not depends entirely upon the frame of the suit and the allegations contained in the plaint. A further principle which should be kept in view is what is the substance of the suit and what is its main object, or, in other words, what is the real contest between the parties. In order to determine this the principle is well settled that one must look to the substance of the plaint and not merely to its outward form If this is not done, it is obvious that it may be open to a party to evade the entire law as to exclusiveness of jurisdiction. It is of course to be remembered that care should be taken not to introduce anything into the plaint which may not really be found there or which may be foreign to its main purpose.”
7. The same learned Judge had again considered this question in Asala v. Narain (2). He observed:—
“Now, it has been laid down in a number of decisions of this Court to many of which I have been a party, that the question of jurisdiction namely, whether a suit is exclusively triable by a revenue court or the civil court can take cognizance of it, has to be decided on the allegations made in the plaint taken in their essence. The guiding test according to these decisions, put in a nutshell is, what is the true nature of the suit, or what is its object as disclosed by the allegations contained in the plaint? If the answer to these questions is that the plaintiff seeks the establishment of reliefs which essentially fall within the scope of the Tenancy Act, that is, the Act of 1955, with which we are concerned here, then the conclusion as to the proper jurisdiction of such a suit is and must be that it is one which is exclusively triable by a revenue court, and that the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try and dispose of such suits is wholly barred. That is the gist of sec. 207 of the said Act which lays down that all suits and applications “of the nature” specified in the Third Schedule thereof shall be heard and determined by a revenue court, and here I would underline the phrase “of the nature” occurring in this section if only to emphasize that the intention of the Legislature in using this phrase definitely seems to be that suits which not squarely fall within the four walls of the various items specified in the Third Schedule but also those which may not so fall but which may partake of the nature thereof can be heard and determined by a revenue court only. This section further enacts that no court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application, or of any suit or application, or which is based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application in a revenue court. Further there is an Explanation to the section which provides that where the cause of action is one in respect of which the relief can be granted by the revenue court, then the factor that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted would be of no consequence.”
8. The learned Judge has expressed himself almost in similar strain in Shankerlal v. Dhulilal (3).
9. Therefore, the point of importance is as to what is the cause of action and for that one has to examine with care the averments in the plaint. In para. 2 of the plaint it is averred that the field in question belonged to Kashi Ram who was the grand-father of the plaintiff Ratturam and father of defendant Ghisa Ram. In para 3 it is mentioned that after the death of the father and grand-father of the plaintiff there was mutation in favour of the plaintiff in revenue papers Then it is averred that the plaintiff was in possession of the field and defendant No. 1 had no right over it Thereafter it was averred that in order to deprive the plaintiff of his rights in the field the defendant Ghisa Ram had made a sale deed in favour of the other defendants and it was consequently void and of no effect against the plaintiff. In the result, prayer for cancellation of the sale deed was made. I am not here concerned with the maintainability of the suit on ocher grounds and this discussion is limited only to the question of competence of the civil court. A proper analysis of the averments in the plaint yields the following postulates:
(1) that the plaintiff is the Khatedar of the field in dispute;
(2) defendant Ghisa Ram had no right whatsoever over this field;
(3) Ghisa Ram could not have made any sale of the field;
(4) the sale made by Ghisa Ram in favour of the other defendants was in consequence null and void.
10. It will be thus evident that the real cause of action is to whom does the field in question belong. If it belonged to the plaintiff as he claimed, then the other reliefs that he might be claiming would follow as a matter of course. Therefore the crux of the matter is that the plaintiff is seeking vindication of his own Khatedari rights in the field by the present suit and the connected or collateral points that would arise for consideration would be about the validly of the sale made by Ghisaram. As observed by Modi J and as it appears to be the tenor of S. 207 one has to look to the substance of the matter. The reliefs that may be desired from a civil court need not be identical with the relief that could be granted or claimed from a revenue court but that is not a point of substance for determining the question as to whether the suit is triable exclusively by a revenue court or not. The burden of the section is the nature of the cause of action. I am, therefore, satisfied that the suit is of the nature triable by a revenue courts and is covered squarely by the provisions of sec. 207 Tenancy Act. The courts below were, therefore, in error in holding that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit.
11. For these reasons I am inclined to accept this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below. I order accordingly. The case shall go back to the Civil Judge, Ratangarth, who shall return the plaint to the plaintiff with the necessary endorsement directing him to present it before a competent revenue court. The parties shall bear their own cost of this appeal.
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