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M/S Ram Lal Jawahar Lal v. Leela Bai And Others
Case Summary — Employer's Appeal under Section 30, Workmen's Compensation Act (R.D. Gattani, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The deceased, Mr. Srikishan, was employed as a munim by the appellant firm Rato Lal Jawaharlal at Ujjain. In May 1960 he was sent by his employers to realise outstandings in District Kota. He performed work at the village Soyat on 20 and 21 May 1960 and on 22 May went to Peedawa. After work in Peedawa he intended to return to Soyat and, on the advice of head constable Dhan Singh, boarded a bus. Shortly thereafter he developed perspiration and vomited twice; his condition worsened. A doctor was not available when summoned; the S.H.O. arranged for him to be sent to Sunel dispensary, but he died en route.
The respondents (dependants) claimed compensation before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, Kota. The Commissioner awarded Rs. 3,500 against the appellant. The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The principal ground urged in the appeal was that there is nothing on the record to show that the death "arose out of" the deceased's employment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the death of Mr. Srikishan "arose out of" and was caused by an accident attributable to his employment within the meaning of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended that nothing on the record establishes that the death of Srikishan arose out of his employment; in other words, there is no causal relation between his employment and the pneumonia which caused his death.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents, through their claim and before the Commissioner, relied on facts and witness statements (including that of the head constable and the widow) suggesting that exposure while moving between places, the absence of timely medical attendance, and the "jerks" suffered while being taken in the bus contributed to or caused the death.
- Respondents' counsel relied on authorities said to be supportive, specifically: The Indian News Chronicle Ltd. v. Mrs. Luis Lazarus; Mrs. Santan Fernandas v. B.P. (India) Ltd.; and R.B. Moondra and Co. v. Mst. Bhanwari.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Indian News Chronicle Ltd. v. Mrs. Luis Lazarus (A.I.R. 1951 Punj. 102) | Where a workman as part of his duties frequently moves between a heated area and a cooling plant, the resulting exposure to sudden temperature change can constitute a "locality risk" and pneumonia may be held to arise out of employment. | The court examined the facts and concluded the present case lacks a comparable "locality risk" (there was no duty requiring frequent movement between extreme temperature areas), so the precedent was not helpful to the respondents. |
| Mrs. Santan Fernandas v. B.P. (India) Ltd. | Recognition of a "locality risk" where the nature of the employment required alternating visits between cold and hot areas (e.g., cold room and kitchen), making exposure to sudden temperature variation a risk incident to employment. | The court found no analogous locality risk in the present facts and therefore held the authority to be of no assistance to the respondents. |
| R.B. Moondra and Co. v. Mst. Bhanwari | Where a workman was required by employment to undertake a dangerous act (entering a tank) and suffered fatal consequences (fire after lighting a match), the accident was held to arise out of employment; even rash or negligent acts in that context did not necessarily bar compensation. | The court determined the facts of that case were totally different from the present facts and therefore the principle did not assist the respondents here. |
| Smt. Mariambai v. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd. | Exposure to severe weather conditions, without evidence that any condition, obligation or incidence of employment placed the workman within a zone of special danger, does not by itself make a resulting injury (or death) one that "arose out of" employment. | The court regarded this case as very near to the present facts and relied on it to show that even where an injury occurred in the course of employment, it may not have arisen out of employment absent a causal connection; this authority supported denying compensation in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by stating the governing test under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act: compensation is payable only if a personal injury is caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of" employment. The court noted that while "accident" is not defined in the Act, it may be understood as an unexpected event causing injury or death; however, to "arise out of" employment an accident must have a causal relation to the employment and be due to a risk incident to the nature of that employment.
The court examined the evidence on the cause of death. PW1 (Dr. Shyam Manohar Tiwari) conducted the post-mortem and produced certificate Ex. P-1 stating death from asphyxia caused by lobar pneumonia. The underlying post-mortem report, which the witness said was the primary document, was not placed on record. On cross-examination the doctor admitted that pneumonia can result from sudden exposure or climatic change but could not specify the particular cause in this case and did not link the alleged extra strain on the bus journey to death. Two other witnesses (head constable Dhan Singh and PW4, the widow) attributed death to "jerks" in the bus; the court said these statements could be "very easily ignored" for establishing cause.
The court proceeded on the assumption, for present purposes, that death was due to pneumonia, and asked whether pneumonia in the circumstances "arose out of" the deceased's employment. It applied the legal standard: was there some specific connection between the employment and the cause of death, i.e., did the nature or incidence of employment place the deceased within a zone of special danger or involve a distinctive risk that led to pneumonia?
Relevant factual points considered by the court included:
- The incident occurred in May (summer).
- Srikishan had travelled from Ujjain to Kota District; nothing on record showed any significant climatic difference between Ujjain and Kota.
- There was no evidence that his employment required acts or movements that would expose him to a special risk of pneumonia analogous to the "locality risks" in the cited authorities (for example frequent movements between very hot and very cold areas).
- The medical evidence did not establish a specific causal link between the duties performed or the transit and the pneumonia; the primary post-mortem report was absent; the examining doctor's testimony was non-specific.
The court reviewed the precedents relied upon by the respondents and explained why the facts of those cases did not make them applicable: the first two authorities involved a clear locality risk created by the nature of employment (repeated exposure to abrupt temperature changes as part of duty), and the third involved an inherently hazardous act ordered by the employer. By contrast, the facts here did not demonstrate that the employment placed the deceased within a comparable zone of special danger. The court noted that the decision in Smt. Mariambai — where exposure to climate alone did not give rise to entitlement — was particularly instructive and analogous.
On the basis of this factual and legal analysis, the court concluded there was no adequate evidence of the requisite causal connection between employment and the pneumonia that caused death; accordingly, the death could not properly be held to have "arisen out of" employment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed and the award of the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Kota dated 27-3-1968 is SET ASIDE.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The compensation award of Rs. 3,500 to the respondents is vacated.
- The court ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs.
- The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying established causation principles under Section 3; the decision turns on the particular facts and the absence of evidence showing a special risk or causal link between employment and the fatal pneumonia.
R.D Gattani, J.:— This is an employer's appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and arises out of the following circumstances:
2. During the relevant period deceased Mr. Srikishan was a Munim of the appellant firm Rato Lal Jawaharlal at Ujjain. In the month of May, 1960 he was sent by his employers to realise the outstandings against various firms carrying on their business in District Kota. Deceased Mr. Srikishan did his work on 20th and 21st May, 1960 at village Soyat. On 22-5-1960 he went to Peedawa. After doing his work there also he in the afternoon intended to return to Soyat and for that purpose inquired from the head constable Dhan Singh about the bus for Soyat. The latter pointed him that bus. Mr. Srikishan boarded that bus, but before it started for Soyat, Srikishan got perspiration and had two vomitings. His condition grew serious. The head constable on seeing that condition of Srikishan called for the doctor, but he was not available. Eventually the S.H.O came there and Srikishan was sent to Sunel dispensary for treatment, but on the way he expired. The respondents who are his dependants filed a claim for compensation before the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Kota. That Commissioner has awarded a sum of Rs. 3,500 as compensation to be paid by the appellant. Hence this appeal.
3. Though the claim was contested by the appellant-firm before the Commissioner on various grounds, the only point that has been urged in this appeal is that there is nothing on the record to show that it was arising out of his employment that the death of Srikishan was caused. The law on the point no doubt is that not only the accident causing injury or death should take place in the course of the employment of the workman, but it must also arise out of the employment. The finding of the learned Commissioner in this respect is that Mr. Srikishan had to encounter exposure by reason of his having to move from one place to another and due to this exposure the lungs of the deceased were affected and there was no timely medical attendance and the deceased was put to extra strain while he was taken in the bus to Sunel. In these circumstances, he held that the death of Srikishan was caused out of the course of the employment. This finding has been challenged in this appeal.
4. As regards the cause of the death of deceased Srikishan there is the statement of P.W 1 Dr. Shyam Manohar Tiwari, then in charge Government dispensary, Sunel who had conducted the post-mortem of the corpse of the deceased. He has deposed that the death was caused due to pneumonia and proved his certificate Ex. P-1, which states that Srikishan died of asphiysia caused by lobor pneumonia on 22-5-1960. This certificate Ex. P-1, according to the witness, was prepared upon the basis of the post-mortem report. This means that the primary document in this connection was the post-mortem report. Unfortunately that has not been brought on record. In cross-examination this witness has deposed that pneumonia can be due to sudden exposure and sudden change in environment, specially climatic changes, and there might be many other reasons for pneumonia. When cross-examined further, the witness admitted that he could not give any specific reason which led the deceased to suffer from pneumonia. He has, however, nowhere deposed that the supposed extra strain while Srikishan was taken to Sunel from Peedawa could also be a cause of his death. Besides this statement there are two other statements reflecting upon the cause of the death of Srikishan. One is that of head constable Dhan Singh and according to him the death was caused due to the jerks Srikishan received while he was taken to Sunel. The other witness is PW-4 Mrs. Leela Bai, widow of the deceased Srikishan, who has also given the cause of the death as the jerks received by the deceased in the bus. Apparently the latter two statements can be very easily ignored for arriving at the cause of the death of Srikishan.
5. Though the respondents did not produce the post-mortem report of the body of the deceased, which would have very satisfactorily proved the cause of the death, for the time it will be assumed that the death of Srikishan occurred due to pneumonia. So the question is whether in the circumstances of the case it can be said that suffering from pneumonia arose out of the employment of Srikishan. The relevant provisions of section 3 of the Act read as follows
“3. Employer's liability for compensation—
(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that the employer shall not be so liable—
(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days;
(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to—
(i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or
(ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or
(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen.
(4) Save as provided by sub-sections (2), (2-A) and (3), no compensation shall be payable to a workman in respect of any disease unless the disease is directly attributable to a specific injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.”
(As the sub-sections (2), (2A) and (3) are not applicable to the facts of the case, they are not given here).
6. The word ‘accident’ has not been defined in the Act, but we may take that any unexpected event happening without design and causing injury to or death to any person may be taken as an accident. But when we talk whether that accident arose out of the employment of the workman, we must bear in mind that accident must have some causal relation to the employment and must be due to the risk incident to the nature of employment. To put in other words it is to be seen whether Srikishan died due to pneumonia alone or from pneumonia and employment together, i.e, whether it can be said that there was some sort of connection between the employment and the cause of death.
7. It might be stated here that the accident took place in the month of May, 1960, i.e, in summer season. Srikishan came from Ujjain to Kota District. It cannot be said that there is vast climatic difference between Ujjain and Kota District, at least nothing has been brought on record in that connection. In these circumstances can it be said that when Srikishan came from Ujjain to Kota District and went to one or two villages, he had as a part of his employment to do any particular thing which resulted in his suffering from pneumonia or whether in coming from Ujjain to Kota District Srikishan could be said to have put himself to some risk which ultimately caused his death a risk which any other person in the similar circumstances must have let to face.
8. The learned counsel for the respondents in this connection relied upon the following authorities:
(1) The Indian News Chronicle Ltd. v. Mrs. Luis Lazarus . A.I.R 1951 Punj. 102.,
(2) Mrs. Santan Fernandas v. B.P (India) Ltd., and
(3) R.B Moondra and Co. v. Mst. Bhanwari.
9. I have gone through those rulings carefully and am of opinion that neither of these is of any help to the respondents. It might be stated here that a case of the present type has to be decided upon its own peculiar facts. In Indian News Chronicle Ltd. v. Mrs. Luis Lazarus, one L was employed as an electrician in the press of the Indian News Chronicle, and in the course of his duties he had frequently to go into a heating room and from there to a cooling plant where the temperature was kept considerably low. On 21-6-1948, at about 11.00 P.M he went into the cooling room and on the same night at 2.00 A.M he suddenly fell ill and was sent home. It was there noticed by his wife that he was very cold. At about 3.30 A.M a doctor was called who diagnosed the disease to be pneumonia. He died on 27-6-1948. In these circumstances it was held that the injury to L was caused out of and in the course of his employment. It is clear from the facts of this case that as a part of his duty L had frequently to go from heating room to a cooling plant and vice versa. If, therefore, he got pneumonia, it was rightly held that it arose out of his employment. Frequently going from a heating room to the cooling plant and vice versa itself suggests that a risk to the health of L was involved and, therefore, pneumonia from which L was attacked resulted out of the nature of his employment.
10. The case reported in Mrs. Santan Fernandas v. B.P (India) Ltd.,2 also, in my opinion, of no avail to the respondents because it was observed in that case as follows:
“The risk which the scullion had to encounter in the course of his employment viz., the risk of exposure to a sudden variation in temperature from a low temperature to a high temperature by reason of his having to move from a low temperature area to a high temperature area, could be appropriately termed ‘a locality risk’, and the fact that the risk itself might to a certain extent have arisen from the operation of a natural force, viz., the atmospheric temperaure of 101 degrees on that date, would be immaterial. It would also be unnecessary to prove special exposure to such risk.”
11. In that case the deceased had off and on had to visit the ice room, the kitchen and the pantry for taking the cold stuff from the cold storage to the kitchen or the pantry and the hot things from the kitchen to the pantry. At the conclusion of the meal, he had again to alternate his visits between the kitchen and the cold room for keeping in the cold storage the food which had been left over and had to be preserved for a subsequent meal. This was, therefore, held ‘a locality risk’ attached to the nature of the employment. Obviously there was no such ‘a locality risk’ in the present case.
12. The facts of the case reported in R.B Moondra and Co. v. Mst. Bhanwari,3 were also totally different. In that case the deceased was employed as a driver of the appellant's truck used for the purpose of carrying petrol in a tank. On the previous day he had reported to the appellant that the tank was leaking and so water was put in it for detecting the place from where it leaked. The deceased was asked by the appellant to enter the tank to see from where it leaked. Accordingly the deceased entered the tank which had no petrol in it, but had been partly filled with water, and for the purpose of detecting the place from where it leaked, he lighted a match stick, as a result of which it caught fire and the deceased received burns due to which he died. It was in these circumstances that this Court held that the accident arose out of the deceased's employment and the act of lighting the match stick, even if it be held as a rash or negligent act, would not debar his widow from claiming compensation.
13. A case very near to the facts of the present case can be found in Smt. Mariambai v. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt. Ltd.. It was held in that case that a workman is not entitled to compensation merely by reason of the fact that he is exposed to the severity of the weather conditions in the absence of anything to show that any condition or obligation or incidence of the employment brought him within the zone of special danger. In that case a person living in a temperate climate was recruited as a Deck Bhandari and was transported all of a sudden into conditions of high temperature or hot climate and he died there by heat exhaustion before even joining his duties. He was held not entitled to compensation because according to that authority although the heat exhaustion which led ultimately to the death of the workman was an injury by accident which occurred in the course of employment, it did not arise out of the employment. In the present case also the deceased might have died of pneumonia but it cannot be said that there was any causal relation between the nature of his employment and contracting the pneumonia by him.
14. The result, therefore, is that this appeal succeeds and it is hereby accepted. The award given by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Kota dated 27-3-1968 is hereby set aside. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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