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State Of Rajasthan v. Gangadhar

Rajasthan High Court
Mar 21, 1966
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Zorawarmal was murdered in his house in Churu during the night between December 13 and 14, 1948. He had no issue and lived alone. The police sealed all his property and, concluding that he had died heirless, prepared a detailed inventory (Ex. 2) of many articles (including jewellery and utensils) on January 23–25, 1949; these were placed in four locked and sealed rooms and the keys kept in the police "malkhana". A Sub‑Inspector submitted a report (Ex. A.2) on March 1, 1949, to the Tahsildar requesting that the escheated property be taken over.

Rival claimants were directed by the Tahsildar to seek adjudication in a civil court. The Civil Judge of Churu on March 27, 1952, held that Gangadhar (the present plaintiff) was entitled to inherit Zorawarmal's property; that judgment was upheld by this Court on November 1, 1954. The Collector of Churu ordered delivery of the property to Gangadhar on March 16, 1955; the police handed over most items but withheld certain gold and silver ornaments and utensils.

Gangadhar repeatedly sought the remaining items; failing to obtain them, he sued the State of Rajasthan on November 19, 1955, claiming Rs. 2,399/1/- (Rs. 2,396/9/- for the articles plus Rs. 2/8/- incidental expenses). The defendant admitted the basic facts but pleaded that the articles were not worth that amount and that they had been stolen despite due care. The trial court (Civil Judge of Churu) decreed the claim on February 5, 1958. The District Judge of Bikaner upheld the findings. The State appealed to this Court (second appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's remedy against the State for the withheld and unreturned chattels is appropriately characterized as an action in detinue (and, if so, whether the plaintiff proved entitlement to immediate possession and detention by the State).
  2. Whether the defence that the goods were stolen without the State's default (i.e., loss without fault) was established by the defendant.
  3. Whether the State of Rajasthan enjoyed immunity from tort liability because the seizure and custody of the property were in the exercise of sovereign functions (i.e., whether the maxim respondeat superior or sovereign immunity applied).
  4. Whether the relationship between the State and the seized property constituted a bailment (bringing into play Contract Act provisions) and, if so, whether the State's liability was limited accordingly.
  5. Whether procedural or evidentiary contentions (for example, non-production of a witness, Prabhusingh) could be raised for the first time in this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant (Mr. R. A. Gupta)

  • Initially sought to characterize the situation as a bailment under Section 148 of the Contract Act, invoking Sections 151 and 152 to limit the State's liability because the State allegedly exercised care and the goods were stolen despite such care.
  • Conceded the lack of a contractual relationship once it was recognised that the plaintiff was not party to the delivery and that the articles were seized under municipal law; therefore proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff's claim was in tort.
  • Contended that the concurrent factual finding that the goods were not lost by theft was incorrect and pointed to the registration of First Information Report Ex. A.1 as indicative of theft.
  • Sought to rely on a sovereign‑function immunity argument (citing Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram v. State of U.P.) to suggest the State should not be vicariously liable for acts in purported exercise of statutory powers.
  • Argued (later in the appeal) that seizure was under Section 23 of the Bikaner Police Act, 1922 (police duty to take charge of unclaimed property and act under Nazim's orders), to contend that responsibility and liability should be considered in light of statutory scheme and delegation.
  • Suggested the need to examine a witness, Prabhusingh, to show seals were broken at time of delivery, implying loss after custody change or improper handling at time of handover.

Plaintiff-Respondent (Mr. Bhandari)

  • Conceded that the matter required consideration primarily on the tort/detinue aspect rather than as a contractual bailment.
  • Argued that the correct legal remedy is detinue because the plaintiff acquired title by decree and the State retained the property wrongfully after demand and after the Collector's order for delivery.
  • Contended that the evidence does not support the claim that the goods were stolen while in State custody, and that the First Information Report was filed only after the plaintiff had given Section 80 notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Coldman v. Hill, (1919) 1 KB 443 Principle that a defendant pleading loss of goods without default must prove that defence affirmatively. Used to state that the State's defence of theft (loss without default) required positive proof and, since such proof was absent, the defence failed.
Houghland v. R. R. Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd., (1962) 1 QB 694 Same rule as Coldman v. Hill concerning burden to prove loss without defendant's default. Reinforced the conclusion that the State failed to discharge the burden of proving loss without default; defence rejected.
Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 1039 Case discussing State immunity and liability in the context of a former British Indian Province (U.P.); used by appellant to support immunity argument. Court held the reference not material to the present case because that decision concerns the liability regime of a particular successor of a British Indian Province and the plea was not pleaded in the lower court; thus it did not avail the appellant.
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India‑in‑Council, (1868‑69) 5 Bom HC App 1 Distinction between acts referable to sovereign powers (giving immunity) and ordinary acts where the Secretary of State is liable like any employer for servants' negligence. Explained as the classical statement of the sovereign/non‑sovereign distinction; Court noted it governs Government of India liability under historic statutes but is not directly controlling for princely States which had different arrangements.
State of Rajasthan v. Rikhabchand Dhariwal, ILR (1960) 10 Raj 784 (AIR 1961 Raj 64) Applied to show that the State of Rajasthan was subject to civil suits and vicariously liable in tort under existing local enactments. Used to support the proposition that the Bikaner State (and its successor Rajasthan) had consented to suit and civil liability, so the sovereign‑immunity defence was unavailable to the appellant.
State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati, AIR 1962 SC 938 Supreme Court decision confirming that the rule applicable to Government of India liability was not attracted in respect of the State of Rajasthan; establishing vicarious liability of that State. Cited as authoritative precedent that Rajasthan is vicariously liable in tort in the absence of statutory immunity; Court relied on it to reject the appellant's immunity plea.
Ganapathi Bhatia v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 Mys 222 Authority that an argument raising mixed questions of law and fact requires appropriate pleading and opportunity for the other party to meet it. Applied to hold that the appellant's contention based on Section 23 of the Bikaner Police Act (a mixed question) could not be entertained when it was not pleaded or tried earlier.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, grounding its analysis strictly on the evidence and on legal principles as discussed in the record:

  1. Classification of the remedy: The Court examined the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and concluded that detinue was the appropriate action because:
    • The plaintiff's title to the property was established by a civil decree and collector's order for delivery dated March 16, 1955;
    • The State lawfully acquired possession when the police seized the effects, but thereafter retained them wrongfully (i.e., lawful acquisition followed by wrongful detention);
    • Detinue covers cases where possession is acquired lawfully but retained wrongfully, regardless of whether the defendant's default is wilful, negligent or wrongful disposition.
  2. Burden of proof in detinue: The plaintiff had to show (a) entitlement to possession (satisfied by decree and statutory procedure) and (b) that the defendant detained the goods after demand. The plaintiff proved both: title and that the State retained custody and failed to redeliver after demand.
  3. On the defendant's defence (the goods were stolen): The Court noted concurrent findings below that there was no evidence of theft. It emphasized established precedent that the defence of loss without default must be affirmatively proved by the defendant (Coldman v. Hill; Houghland v. R. R. Low). The State failed to discharge that burden; registration of a First Information Report (Ex. A.1) after the Section 80 notice did not establish theft given the timeline and was insufficient on the record.
  4. On procedural and evidentiary objections: The Court refused to entertain for the first time the contention regarding the non‑production of Prabhusingh (to show seals broken) because the issue had not been raised in the lower appellate court and was therefore waived.
  5. On sovereign immunity and respondeat superior: The appellant argued immunity based on the sovereign nature of the seizure and quoted precedents on State immunity. The Court distinguished between the position of the Government of India (where historical enactments produced a different liability regime) and that of princely or covenanting States. It analysed the relevant local law:
    • The Bikaner State Code of Civil Procedure, 1920 (Sections 71 & 72), showed that suits by/against the State were permitted (subject to two months' notice), indicating that the Bikaner State consented to civil liability.
    • The United State of Rajasthan continued existing laws by Section 3 of the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 1949, and Article 300 of the Constitution carried forward the liability on commencement of the Constitution.
    Hence the general immunity rule relied upon by the appellant (derived from colonial statutes and some decisions) did not avail the State of Rajasthan.
  6. On the argument that police action under Section 23 of the Bikaner Police Act, 1922 (duty to take charge of unclaimed property and act under Nazim's orders) insulated the State from vicarious liability: the Court held that this contention was a mixed question of law and fact, which had not been pleaded or tried earlier. Moreover, the factual record showed the police reported to the Tehsildar (not the Nazim) and the papers were not sent to the Nazim; the State had not pleaded facts necessary to establish that the seizure and any subsequent acts were taken in discharge of a statutory scheme that would attract immunity. Therefore the contention could not be entertained and, in any event, did not succeed on the facts.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Given the established title of the plaintiff, the proved detention by the State, the absence of proof that loss occurred without State default, and lack of any pleaded statutory immunity, the State was liable in detinue to return the goods or to pay their value.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed and the decree in favour of the plaintiff is affirmed; the State of Rajasthan is liable in detinue to return the chattels or to pay their value (the plaintiff opted for a decree for value). The appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's decree for the value of the withheld articles is upheld against the State; the State must satisfy that decree and pay costs as ordered.
  • No novel legal doctrine was laid down by this opinion; the Court applied established distinctions (detinue vs. other remedies; burden to prove loss without default; limits of sovereign immunity for the State of Rajasthan) and followed prior authorities addressing State liability in Rajasthan and pleading requirements for mixed questions of law and fact.

This summary was prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions have been added beyond those expressly stated in that text.

Show all summary ...

1. Both the courts below having allowed the claim of plaintiff Gangadhar for the recovery of Rs. 2,390/1/-, with costs, against the State of Rajasthan, the defendant has preferred this second appeal.

2. One Zorawarmal was found to have been murdered in his house in Churu, in the former Bikaner State, during the night between December 13 and December 14, 1948. He had no issue and used to live alone in his house. The police sealed all his property. Subsequently, the police reached the conclusion that Zorawarmal had died heirless and that his property bad escheated to the Slate. They therefore prepared a detailed inventory (Ex. 2) on the 23rd 24th and 25th January. 1949, in the presence of 'motvirs', making it quite clear that the property bad been seized because of escheat. It consisted of a large number of articles including jewellery and utensils. All these were placed in four rooms of Zorawarmal's house which were locked and sealed. The keys of the locks were placed in the 'malkhana' of the police station The concerned Sub-Inspector of Police then submitted his report Ex. A. 2 on March 1, 1949, to the Tahsildar of Churu requesting him to take over the escheated property and to lake further necessary proceedings.

Rival claimants approached the Tehsildar with their competing claims for Zorawarmal's properly and the Tahsildar directed them to have them adjudged by a civil court. In the meantime, he allowed the property to remain in police custody. Ultimately, the Civil Judge of Churu, who tried the suit regarding the claims of Zorawarmal's heirs held on March, 27, 1952 that Gangadhar the present plaintiff was entitled to inherit Zorawarmal's property. That judgment was upheld by this Court on November 1, 1954. Armed with the Court's decree, Gangadhar approached the Collector of Churu for the delivery of the property to him. The Collector made an order on March 16, 1955, directing the police to deliver the property to Gangadhar. It was accordingly handed over to him, except for some gold and silver ornaments and utensils.

The plaintiff made various applications for the return of these remaining articles also, hut without success. According to him the articles were of the value of Rs. 2,396/9/- and adding Rs. 2/8/- on account of incidental expenses, he instituted the present suit for the recovery of Rs. 2,399/1/- on November 19. 1955, against the Rajasthan State. All these facts are not in dispute and were admitted in the defendant's written statement. It was however pleaded in defence that the article were not worth Rs. 2396/9/- and that the defendant was not liable because they had been stolen in spite of all care and attention.

3. The Civil Judge of Churu, who tried the suit, held that the value of the articles was rightly claimed by the plaintiff to be Rupees 2,396/9/- and that they were not stolen. He therefore decreed the suit on February 5, 1958 repelling the contention that the Stale was not vicariously liable in tort. The Stale preferred its first appeal to the District Judge of Bikaner, who upheld the findings of fact of the trial court. He took the view that the State was liable because the property had been entrusted to it as also in tort.

4. Mr. R. A. Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, tried to raise an argument that this was a case of a bailment within the meaning of Section 148 of the Contract Act and that the State's liability, as the keeper of the missing goods, was no more than that prescribed by Sections 151 and 152, and as the goods were stolen in spite of proper care and attention, the State was not liable for their value. The learned counsel, however, realised that the plaintiff was not a party to the delivery of the goods to the Stale, and that, on the other hand, the articles were seized by the police under a municipal law. They were withheld from the plaintiff in spite of his repeated demands. So there was no question of a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship between the parties. The learned counsel therefore based his arguments on the assumption that the plaintiff's claim was by way of an action in tort and not by way of a bailment or entrustment of property. Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, also conceded that it is this aspect of the mailer which requires consideration in this appeal.

5. Mr. Gupta has argued that the concurrent findings of the two courts below that the silver and gold articles were not lost on account of a theft in Zorawarmal's house, is not correct. The learned counsel has pointed out that the very fact that first information report Ex. A. 1 was registered by the police regarding the theft shows that a theft was really committed and that the contrary finding is perverse. The argument is quite futile because the learned District Judge has noted in life judgment that there was

"no dispute that there is no evidence on the record to show that the articles were stolen away from the house of Zorawarmal"
. It is not therefore open to the Stale, after having once made a concession in the lower appellate court, to turn round and reagitale the plea of theft in this Court.

It may be mentioned that the properly of Zorawarmal was seized by January 25, 1949 and remained in the custody of the Stale upto March 16, 1955. The first information report (Ex. A1) about the alleged theft was made as late as July 4, 1955, after the plaintiff had given a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of the remaining articles or their value. The mere fact that the report was registered, cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that a theft had really taken place. All the evidence bearing on the point has been duly considered by the learned Judge of the lower appellate court and it has not been shown how his finding could be said to be vitiated by any substantial error.

6. What has been urged is that the defendant wanted to examine one Prabhusingh in order to prove that the seals were found to be broken at the time of the delivery of the articles to the plaintiff, but that sufficient opportunity was not given for the purpose. No such argument was however, raised in the lower appellate court, so that if is obvious that the defendant did not feel aggrieved because of the non-production of Prabhusingh and the point was waived for that reason. It cannot therefore be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court.

7. As has been stated, the plaintiff has brought his action in fort for trespass to his chattels. That is actionable per se. The question arises as to what exactly is the nature of his claim? Mr. Bhandari has argued, and rightly so, that the plaintiff claims in detinue---one of the four actions which protect property interests in chattels, the other three being trespass, conversion and replevin. The reason is that where a man deprives another of his properly, he is guilty of what is known as trespass de bonis asportatis when he takes it wrongfully, of detinue when he wrongfully detains the properly, and of conversion when he wrongfully disposes it of. Trespass de bonis asporlatis is wrongful ab initio, while in detinue the possession of the property is acquired rightfully but is retained wrongfully. In the case of conversion, however, the defendant neither takes wrongfully nor detains the properly, but he acts in such a manner that the property is lost to the true owner. His remedy lies by means of an action for trover. Conversion really may be said to include instances of these modes of trespass. Replevin is of limited use, for it is a claim for immediate and provisional possession of chattels pending the result of a long range action based on title, and it is allowable when chatties have been taken by a trespass e.g. in the case of unlawful distress. This remedy is therefore temporary and is not quite common.

8. It would thus appear that Mr. Bhandari is quite right when he contends that the plaintiff's action is in detinue, because his chattels, it is conceded, were acquired rightfully but were retained wrongfully even after the civil court had decided that he was entitled to their return and an order for return had been made by the Collector. Moreover, detinue is available not only when there is actual detention of chattels i.e. refusal to deliver while they are in the possession and control of the defendant, but also when the defendant is unable, by his own default, to make the delivery. It does not really matter whether his default lies in wilful or wrongful disposition or in negligent loss of the property. It is detinue all the same. Since the plaintiff claimed specific restitution of the chattels, and the defendant has not raised the plea that it is their own, and since the defendant's initial acquisition has been shown to be lawful, detinue seems to be the only proper remedy available to the plaintiff.

9. What then must the plaintiff prove for an action in detinue? He has to prove not only that he is entitled to immediate possession, but also that the defendant has detained them even after the demand for restoration. Since, however, the plaintiff was never in possession himself, he must also show that he is entitled to possession because of his period title.

10. The plaintiff has proved that the properly belonged to Zorawarmal and that it was seized by the police soon after his death. He has also proved, on the basis of a decree of this Court in his favour, to which reference has been made earlier, that he is entitled to Zorawarmal's properly as his nearest heir. These facts have not been disputed and they are sufficient to make out a perfect title in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of the chattels in question, and he is no doubt entitled to their immediate possession. The Collector made an order in his favour on March 16, 1955, for delivery of the entire property to him. It would not therefore matter that he was not in possession earlier, at the time when the chattels were seized by the police.

The plaintiff has also succeeded in proving that the suit property was kept by the defendant in its custody after seizure and it has now expressed its inability to redeliver it even after the plaintiff's demand. Thus when the plaintiff has proved that he has not been able to gel back the possession of the chattels due to the facts which can be reasonably explained only by attributing a breach of duly to the defendant, he has done what he could to prove his case and it is for the defendant to prove the contrary.

11. This raises the question of the nature of defence open to a defendant in an action in detinue. It would be no defence for it to plead that it has not got the possession of the chattels, as it has been proved that they were in its possession after they were initially seized in January, 1949, under memorandum? Ex. 2. R would equally be futile for the defendant to plead that it has lost the goods carelessly, for such a defence is not recognised in answer to an action of this nature. It would however be a good defence to prove that the possession had been lost without any default on the part of the defendant and it is this defence which has been taken in the present case, the defendant having pleaded that the chattels had been' stolen. This was the subject-matter of issue No. 2.

12. It would be recalled, however, that there is a concurrent finding of fact that there was no theft at all and I have no reason to disturb that finding. The defence that possession of the chattels was lost without default of the defendant, must be proved affirmatively, as has been held in Coldman v. Hill, (1919) 1 KB 443 and Houghland v. R. R. Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd., (1962) 1 QB 694. Since this has not been done, the defence is worthless and has rightly been rejected.

13. Faced with such a situation, Mr. Gupta has argued that the seizure of the goods was made in exercise of the sovereign function of the State and that the Stale is not liable in tort for that reason, The argument has been supported by reference to Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1039 No such plea was however taken in the written statement and it was not the subject-matter of an issue between the parties. The point could not therefore be tried. It can however be made as a pure question of law, but then the burden of proving it would lie on the State, which has to show that it is immune from liability.

14. Mr. Gupta has not been able to refer to any law of the former Bikaner State, or of its successor State, under which such an immunity could be claimed. His reference to Kusturi Lal's case, AIR 1965 SC 1039 is not material because that case relates to the State of Uttar Pradesh, the liability of which was the same as that of the so-called former British Indian Province of the United Provinces. The criterion of liability in such a case was laid down by the High Court of Calcutta as far back as 1861 in the well known case of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India-in-Council, (1868-69) 5 Bom HC App 1 on the basis of a distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts were referable to the exercise of the sovereign powers delegated to public servants, and acts committed by public servants which were not referable to the delegation of such powers, it being held that the Secretary of State in Council would be liable for damages occasioned by the negligence of Servants in the service of Government if the negligence was such as would render an ordinary employer liable.

This decision of Peacock C. J. has held the field all through by virtue of the Government of India Acts of 1858, 1915 and 1935. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have appreciated the clarity and precision with which the distinction was emphasised by Chief Justice Peacock and have recognised it as a classic statement on the subject. The distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where the acts were referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to the public servants and acts committed by public servants which were not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers, was made because of the provisions of Section 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858, which was carried over in the subsequent Acts. It provided that

"all persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings, legal and equitable, against the Secretary of State-in-Council of India as they could have done against the said Company; and the property and effects hereby vested in Her Majesty for the purposes of the Government of India; or acquired for the said purposes shall he subject and liable to the same judgments and executions as they would while vested in the said Company have been liable to in respects of debts and liability lawfully contracted and incurred by the Company"
(i.e. the East India Company). The protection was therefore of a qualified and a special nature to the extent permitted by the statute, for the sovereign could not be sued in his own courts without his consent. The liability of the Government of India as well as those States which are successors of the former British Indian Provinces is therefore on quite a different fooling by virtue of Article 300 of the Constitution

15. In the case of the Indian States, or the so-called Indian India, as it then was, the provisions of Section 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858, and the subsequent Acts, were not available and it was open to the rulers of those states to decide whether they would be liable to civil action in their own courts. We are concerned here with the former State of Bikaner There the Bikaner State Code of Civil Procedure, 1920, was admittedly in force. sections 71 and 72 of that code provided as follows:

"71 Suits by or against the Government shall be instituted by or against the State Council.

72. NO suit shall be instituted against the State Council or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left lit the office of the State Council or public officer staling the cause of action the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left."

It is obvious from these provisions that the Bikaner State had consented to the filing of civil suits against it without any reservation, except that it provided for the issue of a prior notice of two months That State was therefore clearly liable in tort also The United State of Rajasthan, which came into existence on April 7, 1949, was equally liable by virtue of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance No. 1 of 1949), which continued all the existing laws of the covenanting States. There was thus no reservation of any kind regarding the State's liability for civil action and by virtue of Article 300 of the Constitution the same liability was carried over on the commencement of the Constitution.

This point has been elaborately dealt with in two Bench decisions of this Court--State of Rajasthan v. Rikhabchand Dhariwal, ILR (1960) 10 Raj 784: (AIR 1961 Raj 64) and State of Rajasthan v. Chiranjilal,, First Appeals Nos. 8 and 10 of 1957, D/. 7-12-1965 (Raj). The point arose for consideration at the hands of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati. AIR 1962 SC 938 and they made it quite clear that the rule applicable to the liabilily of the Government of India was not attracted in the case of the State of Rajasthan That case related to Udaipur, and in the absence of any provision showing that the State of Rajasthan was not liable by any rule of positive enactment or otherwise, their Lordships held that that State was vicariously liable and upheld the decree in an action in tort. It is therefore beyond doubt that it is not open to the appellant State to claim immunity from an action in tort on the authority of (1868-69) 5 Bom HC App 1 or Kasiuri Lal's ease. AIR 1965 SC 1039.

16. However, an ingenious argument has been made by Mr. Gupta that the maxim "respondent superior" does not apply in the case of a Government servant who purports to act under a statutory power, for he does not act in that capacity as an ordinary agent of the State. The learned counsel has pointed out that the seizure of Zorawarmal's chattels was made under the provisions of Section 23 of the Bikaner Police Act 1922, for, according to that section, it was the duty of every police officer to take charge of all unclaimed property, and to furnish an inventory thereof to the Nazim of the District. Further, that section directed that the police officers would be guided as to the disposal of such properly by such orders as they were to receive from the Nazim. According to Mr. Gupta, the seizure of the goods under memorandum Ex. 2 was made in pursuance of this requirement of the statute and that the Rajasthan State could not therefore be held to be vicariously responsible as laid down by this Court in Rikhabchand Dhariwal's case. ILR (1960) 10 Raj 784: (AIR (901 Raj 64).

17. This argument cannot really be allowed to be raised for the first lime in this Court because there was no such plea at any earlier stage, so that the respondent did not gel an opportunity of showing that the police officers did not make the seizure under Section 23 of the Bikaner Police Act, 1922. Under that section the police officer had to furnish an inventory of the seized property to the Nazim of the District who was a higher officer than, the Tehsildar, and to dispose of the property according to the Nazim's order. But it is beyond dispute that the police, in the present case, made a report to the Tehsildar and the papers were never sent on to the Nazim. It was therefore necessary for the defendant to allege and prove the facts which could form the basis of the present argument of Mr. Gupta as it does not relate to a pure question of law and raises a mixed question of law and fact: Ganapathi Bhatia v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 Mys 222.

18. Even otherwise, the argument is of no avail in the peculiar circumstances of this case. As has been stated, it is not disputed that the properly was seized by way of escheat and so the seizure was beneficial to the State Moreover the property was in the State's custody. The State has not taken the plea that it was lost, or misappropriated or otherwise wasted by one of its employees who should have been sued individually. Its only defence was that the chattels were stolen in spite of all care and attention. That defence has not been proved to be correct. So it was for the State to show what the true facts were and what really prevented it from delivering the properly to the plaintiff. Far from setting up any such defence, the State has not even taken the plea that any of its officers was responsible for the loss and that in doing so he acted in the exercise of some statutory authority. The argument of Mr. Gupta cannot therefore avail the appellant.

19. It must therefore be held that it has been proved that the chattels in question were taken in the possession of the defendant State rightfully and that the State is unable, by its own default, to make the delivery. Whether its default consists in a wilful act of wrongful disposition or mere negligence leading to the loss or destruction of the properly, the defendant is all the same, liable in detinue to return the goods or their value. The plaintiff is satisfied with a decree for the value of the goods and there is now no dispute about the price. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.