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Pareek Hosiery Products v. Deputy Commissioner Of Sales Tax (Appeals), Jaipur And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.P. Beri, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner manufactures, among other articles, cotton vests (banians), underwears (jangias), mufflers and "topas" in Jaipur; each piece cost does not exceed Rs. 4. The State of Rajasthan, by Notification No. F. 5(3) E & T/58 dated 31st January, 1958 (exercising sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954), exempted from sales tax "the sale of any garment whether prepared within or imported from outside Rajasthan the value of which does not exceed Rs. 4 in single piece, from payment of any tax under the said Act".
The petitioner initially submitted returns without claiming the exemption. At assessment for the year 1958–59 before the Assistant Sales Tax Officer on 29th June 1960, the petitioner objected that his turnover comprised articles each priced under Rs. 4 and hence were exempt under the notification. The Assistant Sales Tax Officer rejected this contention, holding that although prices were under Rs. 4 the articles were not "garments" under the notification, and made the petitioner liable to pay tax (less amounts already paid). A demand was served.
The petitioner preferred an appeal, but the Deputy Commissioner (Sales Tax Appeals) refused to entertain the appeal unless the tax was deposited as required by the law. The petitioner therefore filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking prohibition to restrain recovery of such sales tax and quashing of the Assistant Sales Tax Officer's order dated 29th June 1960. The respondents contested the petition without disputing the facts, principally arguing that an adequate alternative remedy existed under the Sales Tax Act and that "garment" excluded the petitioner's articles.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the articles manufactured and sold by the petitioner (cotton vests, underwears, mufflers, "topas") each valued at less than Rs. 4 fall within the meaning of "garment" in the exemption notification issued under sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954.
- Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the availability of alternative remedies (appeal, revision, reference) under the Sales Tax Act, where the appeal would not be entertained unless the tax is deposited and the appellate authority had in another case expressed an adverse view.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner's total turnover consisted of sales of underwears, cotton vests, etc., each piece priced at under Rs. 4, and therefore these sales were exempt under the State notification of 31st January 1958.
- The alternative remedy by appeal was onerous because the appeal could not be heard unless the demanded tax was deposited; hence the appellate remedy was not an adequate alternative.
- The petitioner relied on a decision of the Deputy Commissioner (Sales Tax Appeals) in another assessee's case (M/s. Nisar Ahmed Faiyaz Ahmed) in support of the contention that pursuing the appeal would be futile because the appellate authority had already taken an adverse view.
- The petitioner invited the Court's attention to several precedents (discussed below) supporting intervention by the High Court despite alternative remedies.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents accepted the factual matrix but contended that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act (appeal, revision and reference) and therefore the High Court should decline to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
- They emphasized that an appeal cannot be heard unless the tax demanded has been deposited, which is a statutory precondition.
- Substantively, it was argued that the term "garment" should be understood to mean an outer covering and would not include underwear and similar articles manufactured by the petitioner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Calcutta Discount Co. v. Income-tax Officer (1961 A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 372; 41 I.T.R. 191) | The existence of an alternative statutory remedy is not always a sufficient reason for refusing urgent relief by way of writ; a party may obtain relief prohibiting action taken without jurisdiction and may additionally get orders quashing impugned acts even if assessment orders exist. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that availability of an appeal does not automatically bar Article 226 relief, particularly where prompt relief against action taken without jurisdiction is warranted. |
| Himmatlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1954 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 403; 5 S.T.C. 115) | A statutory remedy which requires deposit of the whole amount of tax as a precondition is onerous and cannot be regarded as an adequate alternative remedy. | The court invoked this principle to hold that the deposit condition made the statutory appeal remedy inadequate, justifying exercise of writ jurisdiction. |
| Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (1955 A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661; 6 S.T.C. 446) | Writ petition maintainable where the vires of a law or legal provision itself is challenged. | The court cited this case to show that challenges going to the validity or legal construction of exemption provisions can justify direct writ relief. |
| Firm Murlidhar Brij Mohan v. State of Rajasthan (1957 R.L.W. 431) | The High Court may interfere under Article 226 where special circumstances exist (in that case, a confidential circular indicating a departmental view on taxation) rendering the statutory remedy insufficient or inappropriate. | The court used this High Court precedent to justify interference where departmental practice/circulars or prior adverse views may make pursuing appeal futile. |
| Buchi Rajalingam v. State of Hyderabad (1954 A.I.R. Hyd. 1; 5 S.T.C. 401) | It is desirable for the High Court to issue appropriate writs providing guidance in matters affecting sales tax. | The court referenced this decision to support the proposition that High Courts have a role in resolving questions of sales-tax law and providing guidance by writ. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted its analysis in two principal stages: (A) consideration of the preliminary objection based on availability of statutory remedies; and (B) interpretation of the word "garment" under the notification.
A. Preliminary Objection — Availability of Alternative Remedy
- The Court acknowledged that the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act provides remedies by way of appeal, revision and reference, and observed that an appeal cannot be heard unless the tax demanded is deposited.
- The petitioner's counsel argued the statutory appeal remedy was onerous because of the deposit requirement, and that the appellate authority had already expressed an adverse view in another case, making the appeal effectively futile.
- The Court reviewed authorities (including Calcutta Discount Co., Himmatlal, Bengal Immunity and Firm Murlidhar Brij Mohan) and concluded that the mere existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to entertaining a writ petition. Specifically, where the statutory remedy is onerous (deposit requirement) or where prior departmental/adjudicatory views make pursuit of appeal futile, the High Court may properly exercise its writ jurisdiction.
- Applying those principles to the facts — the deposit requirement and an existing adverse view by the appellate authority in another case — the Court rejected the respondents' preliminary objection and proceeded to decide the merits.
B. Merits — Interpretation of "Garment"
- The controlling word for exemption was "garment". The Court noted it was not disputed that each piece sold by the petitioner was priced under Rs. 4.
- The Court considered dictionary definitions:
- Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary (1956): "1(a) any article of clothing; (b)(pl.) clothes, costume. Covering."
- Oxford Dictionary: "Any article of dress; in sing, esp., an outer vestment, in pl. clothes."
- The respondents had urged a restricted meaning — that "garment" meant only an outer covering and excluded underwear. The Court rejected this narrow qualification, holding that in its primary meaning "garment" embraces any article of clothing irrespective of whether it is visible to another person; its essential content is use for covering the human body.
- The Court observed that some items manufactured by the petitioner (for example mufflers or caps) would normally be outer coverings; more generally, the word "any" preceding "garment" in the notification widened its scope and there was no statutory qualification limiting the exemption to outer garments only.
- The Court also rejected the respondents' emphasis on the manufacturing process (hosiery) as a basis to exclude the articles; it held the relevant criterion was the use to which an article was put (covering the body), not the process of manufacture.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The Court quashed the order of the Assistant Sales Tax Officer dated 29th June 1960, directed refund of the tax already realized from the petitioner on the sale of such articles which the Court held to be garments under the notification, and ordered the respondents to pay the petitioner's costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The petitioner received immediate relief — quashing of the assessment order as to articles the Court characterized as "garments", refund of tax collected on those articles and an award of costs.
- Procedural consequence: The Court confirmed that availability of statutory appellate remedies does not automatically preclude exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction where the statutory remedy is onerous (e.g., requires deposit) or where pursuing it is likely to be futile because of prior adverse departmental/appellate views.
- No broader binding precedent beyond the facts of the case was explicitly stated by the Court; the decision operated to grant relief to this petitioner on the construction of "garment" and on the appropriateness of writ relief in the circumstances described.
Disposition: Petition allowed.
B.P Beri, J.:— This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ in the nature of prohibition restraining the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, Assistant Sales Tax Officer and the State of Rajasthan, respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively, from recovering any sales tax on certain hosiery goods manufactured and sold by the petitioner and for quashing the order of the respondent No. 2, dated 29th June, 1960.
2. The petitioner carries on the business of manufacturing amongst other articles cotton vests (banians), underwears (jangias), mufflers and “topas”, the cost of which does not exceed Rs. 4 each, in the City of Jaipur. The State Government, respondent No. 3, in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (Act XXIX of 1954), by Notification No. F. 5(3) E & T/58 dated 31st January, 1958, exempted from the levy of sales tax, “the sale of any garment whether prepared within or imported from outside Rajasthan the value of which does not exceed Rs. 4 in single piece, from payment of any tax under the said Act”. The petitioner kept on submitting his returns until June, 1958, without claiming exemption under the notification when he learnt of the existence of this notification. Even thereafter he submitted his quarterly returns in 1950 as well as in a part of 1959 on the old basis. When the question of assessment came up before the Sales Tax Officer, Jaipur City, Circle ‘B’, on 29th June, 1960, for the year 1958-59, on behalf of the petitioner an objection was taken that his total turnover consisted of sales of underwears, cotton vests etc., the price of each piece of which did not exceed Rs. 4 and, therefore, was exempted under the notification mentioned above. The Assistant Sales Tax Officer dealing with the case held that although on test check it was found that the sale price of the goods sold by the petitioner did not exceed Rs. 4 a piece, nevertheless they were not the garments which were exempt from tax under the notification. He accordingly rejected the contention of the petitioner and made him liable to pay the tax less what he had already paid. A demand was served upon the petitioner against which he preferred an appeal but the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Appeals) refused to entertain the appeal unless the tax was deposited as required by the law. The petitioner has now come up by means of this petition to this Court and has asked for reliefs, we have already noticed. The respondents have contested the present petition, without disputing the facts, mainly on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of an appeal and reference under the Sales Tax Act and due to the existence of such an alternative remedy this Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further urged in the course of the arguments that a garment means an outer covering and did not include the articles manufactured by the petitioner.
3. Before we proceed to examine the merits of the case it will be appropriate to consider the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. It is correct to state that under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, remedies by way of appeal, revision and reference are provided. In is equally true that an appeal cannot be heard unless the tax demanded has already been deposited. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this Court should interfere firstly because the petitioner having already appealed but his appeal was not entertained merely because he had to deposit the demanded tax as a condition precedent for the hearing of his appeal. Therefore, the alternative remedy is an onerous one. Secondly, he has placed before us a judgment of the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, (Appeals), Jaipur, M/s. Nisar Ahmed Faiyaz Ahmed, Jaipur, in relation to the case of another assessee wherein he had held that hosiery goods are not garments and, therefore, are not exempted from sales tax. In this view taken by the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner, no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the appeal when the Sales Tax Appellate Authority has already taken a view which is adverse to the petitioner. He invited our attention to Calcutta Discount Co. v. Income-tax Officer 1961 A.I.R 1961 S.C 372; 41 I.T.R 191., Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar 1955 A.I.R 1955 S.C 661; 6 S.T.C 446., Himmatlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1954 A.I.R 1954 S.C 403; 5 S.T.C 115., Firm Murlidhar Brij Mohan v. State of Rajasthan 1957 R.L.W 431 and Buchi Rajalingam v. State of Hyderabad 1954 A.I.R 1954 Hyd. 1; 5 S.T.C 401.. In Calcutta Discount Co. v. Income-tax Officer, a notice under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act was issued, the validity of which was challenged. On behalf of the Income-tax Officer it was submitted that the assessee would have had sufficient opportunity to raise the question whether the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under-assessment had resulted from non-disclosure of material facts in the course of assessment proceedings and if necessary before the Appellate Officer or the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court. Their Lordships held that “the existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action.” When it was submitted that the assessment order had already been passed, their Lordships held that there being an assessment order did not prevent the petitioner from getting the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and the petitioner was entitled to an additional relief of quashing of the order.
4. In Himmatlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“Moreover, the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensome character. Before the appellant can avail of it he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy.”
5. In the case of Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar also the writ petition was held maintainable on the ground that the vires of law itself was challenged. In the case of our own High Court in Firm Murlidhar Brijmohan v. State of Rajasthan, an objection was taken that specific procedure directed under the Sales Tax Act existed and it was, therefore, for the petitioner to appeal and that this Court should not interfere at that stage. In this case whether groundnut oil was or was not exempt from sales tax was in question. In that case there was a confidential circular issued by the Sales Tax Commissioner to the effect that the groundnut oil is not edible oil and should, therefore, be taxed. Having regard to this circumstance this Court did interfere and granted relief to the petitioner. In Buchi Rajalingam v. State of Hyderabad, it has been observed that it is desirable for the High Court to issue an appropriate writ by way of guidance in the matters affecting sales tax. In our opinion, whether the petitioner should be refused relief in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution on account of the availability of alternative remedies, no hard and fast rule can possibly be laid down. We have already taken note of the considerations which have induced the Courts to interfere. Therefore, in the circumstances set out in the present case we are not inclined to leave the petitioner to pursue his remedies of appeal particularly because it is available to him only on payment of the tax and further he is not likely to get any relief as the appellate authority had already expressed the opinion in another case. In these circumstances we reject the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents.
6. Coming to the merits of the case the word which calls for our interpretation is “garment”. It is not disputed before us that the value of each piece manufactured by the petitioner is less than Rs. 4. The word “garment” in Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary (1956 Edition) means:
“1(a) any article of clothing; (b)(pl.) clothes, costume. Covering.”
7. In Oxford Dictionary the word “garment” has been stated to mean: “Any article of dress; in sing, esp., an outer vestment, in pl. clothes.”
8. The learned Deputy Government Advocate stressed that it only meant an outer covering as distinguished from an underwear. We regret we are unable to accept this qualification sought to be put by the learned counsel. In its primary meaning “garment” means any article of clothing irrespective of the fact whether it is visible to another or not. It is the use of covering human body which gives content to the word. Besides articles such as muffler or caps normally constitute an outer covering. Under the notification there is no qualification, except its price, mentioned to distinguish garments before they are exempted from tax. Rather the word “any” preceding the word “garment” has the tendency of widening its amplitude. We see no reason to import any qualification either. In another assessee's case the Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax (Appeals) distinguished “garment” from articles made by the process of hosiery. We have already observed that the kernel of the word “garment” appears to lie in the use to which it is put, viz., an article of dress intended for covering human body rather than the process by which the material was manufactured out of which it has been made. This argument also, therefore, does not appeal to us.
9. In this view of the matter this writ petition is allowed. The order of the Assistant Sales Tax Officer dated 29th June, 1960, is quashed and he is further directed to refund the tax already realised from the petitioner on the sale of such articles as are garments on the view of law taken by us. The respondents shall pay the costs of the petitioner.
10. Petition allowed.
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