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Maharana Bhagwat Singhji Of Udaipur v. State Of Rajasthan

Rajasthan High Court

Mar 28, 1962

Judgment

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Opinion Summary — Bhandari, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is His Highness Shri Bhagwat Singhji, Ruler of Mewar. On the death of his father, late His Highness Maharana Bhopal Singhji (the Maharaj Pramukh of Rajasthan), certain employees of the Motor Garage were discharged as surplus because the office of the Maharaj Pramukh was abolished. Those employees, through the Motor (Workers) Mazdoor Union Udaipur (Respondent No. 3 in the writ petition), made a representation to the Rajasthan Government (Respondent No. 1).

By Notification No. F9(15) Lab./57 dated 18 December 1957 the Rajasthan Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (Respondent No. 2) for adjudication. The petitioner raised several objections to the maintainability of that reference. Two objections (which the Tribunal has decided against the petitioner) are identified in the opinion:

The first objection: that, by virtue of Sec. 87-B read with Sec. 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), the reference was not tenable without the prior written consent of the Central Government.
The second objection: that on the date the reference was made no Industrial Tribunal had been constituted under the amended Act (as held in the unreported decision in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 107 of 1958, Mundra Metal Works Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan), and no fresh reference was made after a Tribunal had been lawfully constituted.

The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 seeking prohibition to prevent the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding. The Tribunal had so far decided only the two objections noted above against the petitioner; other objections remain undecided by the Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Industrial Tribunal is incompetent to adjudicate the referred dispute because proceedings before it would infringe sec. 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure (in light of the immunities given by sec. 86 to a ruler of a foreign State) and therefore require the prior consent of the Central Government.
Whether the reference to the Industrial Tribunal was invalid because, at the time of reference, no Industrial Tribunal had been constituted under the amended Act (as held in the cited unreported Mundra Metal Works decision), and whether a fresh reference was required once a Tribunal had been properly constituted.
Whether the Industrial Tribunal qualifies as a "court" within the meaning of sec. 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether sec. 86 immunities extend to proceedings before the Tribunal).
Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction at all because there may be no "industrial dispute" before it (this issue had been framed by the Tribunal but not yet decided).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The Tribunal is incompetent to proceed because sec. 87-B read with sec. 86 CPC grants immunities to the petitioner (a former ruler) and the reference without the prior consent of the Central Government is not tenable.
The word "sue" in sec. 86 should be read broadly to mean taking any legal proceeding against a person (relying on the observation of Mahajan, J. in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani & Co.), and hence immunities should extend beyond formal suits to other proceedings including the Tribunal reference.
The Industrial Tribunal, in substance and in the manner it exercises jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act, is a court in all essentials and so sec. 86 protections should apply to proceedings before it.
Because, as argued, no Tribunal was properly constituted at the time of reference (per the Mundra Metal Works unreported decision), the original reference was invalid and a fresh reference should have been made after constitution.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 contended (and the Tribunal held) that the petitioner is not being "sued in any court" in the sense intended by sec. 86(1), so the privileges in sec. 86(1) do not apply to the present reference.
They argued that the words "may be sued" and "competent to try the suit" in sec. 86 refer to proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., suits in courts to which the CPC applies), and not to proceedings before specialized tribunals like the Industrial Tribunal.
They asserted that the Industrial Tribunal is not a "court" within the meaning of sec. 86 and therefore sec. 86 immunities do not prevent the Tribunal from proceeding.
On the second objection, respondents relied on the fact that the Industrial Tribunal currently before the Court is a legally constituted Tribunal and that the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959 validates the earlier reference and proceedings by deeming them to have been made under the correct statutory provision (sec. 7-A).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mundra Metal Works Private Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 107 of 1958) — unreported (decided 30-3-1958)	Held that on the date in question no Industrial Tribunal was constituted under the amended Act (basis for the petitioner's second objection).	The decision is noted as the factual/legal basis for the petitioner's second objection, but the Court found that the present Tribunal is legally constituted and that the State Act of 1959 validates the earlier reference; thus no fresh reference was necessary in the circumstances.
Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani & Co. (Mahajan, J.)	Mahajan, J.'s observation that the expression "sue" means "the enforcement of a claim or a civil right by means of legal proceedings."	The Court acknowledged this definition but held that in the context of sec. 86 (a provision of the CPC) "sue" must be read with reference to proceedings under the Code; therefore the broader definition does not extend sec. 86 immunities to all proceedings such as those before the Industrial Tribunal.
Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunuwala (M. Hidayatullah, J.)	Distinction between "courts" (Courts of Civil Judicature) and "tribunals" (bodies appointed to decide controversies under special laws); discussion on whether certain bodies exercising judicial power are "tribunals" rather than "courts."	The Court relied on Hidayatullah, J.'s reasoning to support the conclusion that an Industrial Tribunal is not a "court" within the meaning of sec. 86 and that the CPC's immunities do not automatically attach to proceedings before such tribunals.
Raja Setrucharlu Ramabhara Raju Bahadur v. Maharaja of Jeypore (Privy Council)	Interpretation that the word "courts" in sec. 17 CPC refers to courts to which the Code of Civil Procedure applies.	The Court cited this authority to reinforce the view that "courts" in CPC provisions should be taken to mean courts governed by the CPC, distinguishing them from tribunals created under special statutes.
Compania Naviera Vascongado and Steamship “Cristina” and Persons claiming an interest therein (Lord Atkin)	Statement of principles of international law that courts will not implead a foreign sovereign or, by process, seize/detain sovereign property — foundational principles of sovereign immunity.	The Court accepted these international law principles as background but declined to extend sec. 86 beyond the immunities expressly provided by the CPC for a ruler of a foreign State; it held that sec. 86 must be construed in its statutory context and not expanded by reference to international law to cover all proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-wise analysis focused on statutory interpretation and institutional character:

Interpretation of sec. 86 CPC and scope of "may be sued": The Court observed that sec. 86 is part of the Code of Civil Procedure and must be read in context with the Code's focus on suits, executions, appeals and incidental matters. The words "may be sued" were interpreted as referring to proceedings for enforcement of legal rights as contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., suits in courts to which the CPC applies). The Court accepted Mahajan, J.'s general definition of "sue" but held that, in the statutory context of sec. 86, the meaning must be confined to CPC proceedings.
Whether an Industrial Tribunal is a "court" within sec. 86: The Court accepted the reasoning of M. Hidayatullah, J. (in Harinagar Sugar Mills) distinguishing "courts of civil judicature" from specialized "tribunals." It also relied on the Privy Council's interpretation that "courts" in CPC provisions mean courts to which the Code applies. On this basis the Court concluded that the Industrial Tribunal is not a "court" within sec. 86, and therefore the immunities in sec. 86(1) do not apply to proceedings before the Tribunal.
Role of international law principles: The Court acknowledged the international law principles of sovereign immunity (as stated by Lord Atkin) but emphasised that sec. 86 grants limited immunities as expressly provided by the statute. The Court declined to broaden sec. 86 by importing additional immunities from international law so as to make the CPC provision an independent and unlimited source of immunity for all types of proceedings.
Validity of the Tribunal and effect of the State validating Act: The Court noted that the current Industrial Tribunal is legally constituted. It further relied upon the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959 (which had presidential assent) that validates the earlier reference and proceedings by deeming them to have been made under sec. 7-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Because the subject matter is within the Concurrent List and the State Act has received President's assent, the validating Act operates to cure any defect and prevail in the State of Rajasthan for this matter.
On the question whether there is an "industrial dispute": That specific question has been framed by the Tribunal but has not been decided. The Court left that issue to the Tribunal to decide in due course; if the Tribunal's decision goes against the petitioner on that issue, the petitioner may seek further relief in this Court later.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The writ petition filed under Article 226 was dismissed with costs.

Implications and direct effects:

The Industrial Tribunal is permitted to proceed with the adjudication of the dispute referred to it; the Court found no infringement of sec. 87-B of the CPC by the Tribunal proceedings in the present circumstances.
The Court concluded that sec. 86 immunities (as presently framed in the CPC) do not extend to adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal because the Tribunal is not a "court" within the meaning of sec. 86 and because sec. 86 must be interpreted in its statutory context.
The Rajasthan Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959 validates the earlier reference and proceedings and thus removes the need for a fresh reference in the circumstances described.
On the separate question whether the matter before the Tribunal constitutes an "industrial dispute," the Tribunal will decide that issue; if the Tribunal rules against the petitioner on that point, the petitioner remains at liberty to seek recourse to this Court as appropriate.
The opinion confines itself to statutory interpretation and the facts before the Court; it does not purport to set a broader new precedent beyond the conclusions drawn from statutory context and cited authorities.

This summary is limited to information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

Bhandari, J.:— This is a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on behalf of His Highness Shri Bhagwat Singhji, Ruler of Mewar, and arises under the following circumstances.

2. On the demise of his father, late His Highness Maharana Bhopal Singhji, who was the Maharaj Pramukh of Rajasthan, the petitioner discharged certain employees of the Motor Garage as they became surplus on account of the office of the Maharaj Pramukh being abolished on the death of his father. Thereupon these employees claimed compensation for retrenchment and made a representation through the Motor (Workers) Mazdoor Union Udaipur (Respondent) No. 3 in the Writ petition) to the Rajasthan Government (Respondent No. 1), which by Notification No. F9(15) Lab./57, dated Jaipur the 18th of December, 1957, made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (Respondent No. 2) for adjudication of the dispute. The petitioner took several objections to the maintainability of the reference. The first objection was that in view of the provisions of Sec. 87-B read with Sec. 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure the reference was not tenable without the previous consent of the Central Government. The second objection was that on the date when the reference was made no Industrial Tribunal was constituted under amended Act as held by this Court in the un-reported case in D.B Civil Writ Petition No. 107 of 1958 Mundra Metal Works Private Ltd. Bikaner v. The State of Rajasthan — decided on the 30th of March 1958, and no fresh reference was made after the Tribunal was constituted in accordance with law. We need not set out the other objections taken as the Tribunal has so far decided only these two objections against the petitioner and is yet to decide the other objections.

3. In this writ petition it is urged that in deciding both these objections the Tribunal had committed errors apparent on the face of the record and that on a correct interpretation of law on both these matters the Tribunal is not competent to entertain and decide the matter and therefore by writ of prohibition the Tribunal should be directed from proceeding further in adjudicating the dispute referred to it. This writ petition is contested on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and it is contended that the findings of the Tribunal on these points are correct.

4. The first question that requires determination in this writ petition is whether the industrial Tribunal is incompetent to proceed to adjudicate into the matter referred to it on account of the provisions of Sec. 87-B CPC. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is a ruler of the former Indian State. He is entitled to invoke the privileges contained in sub-Secs. (1) and (3) of Sec. 86 which are available to a ruler of a foreign State. The relevant provisions of Sec. 86 are, as follows:—

“36.(1) No Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government:

Provided that a person may, as a tenant of immovable property, sue without such consent as aforesaid a Ruler from whom he holds or claims to hold the property.

(3) No Ruler of a foreign State shall be arrested under this Code and, except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government, no decree shall be executed against the property of any such Ruler.”

The contention on behalf of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 which has been accepted by the Industrial Tribunal is that the petitioner is not being sued in any court, and, as such, he cannot claim the privilege contained in Sec. 86(1). The Tribunal has held that the words ‘may be sued’ read with the words ‘competent to try the suit’ mean that Sec. 86(1) is applicable when a suit is filed against a ruler and not to any other proceeding. It also took the view that the Industrial Tribunal is not a court within the meaning of Sec. 86. The petitioner has challenged this interpretation of the Tribunal. It is urged that the word ‘sue’ means taking any legal proceeding against a person and it cannot be confined only to the filing of a suit. Reliance in this connection is placed on the observations of Mahajan, J. in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani & Co., (1). No doubt as observed by Mahajan, J. in that case, the expression “sue” means ‘the enforcement of a claim or a civil right by means of legal proceedings”, yet in the context in which this word has been used, it means taking any legal proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is to be kept in view that Sec. 86 is a provision of the Civil Procedure Code and is to be read along with the other provisions of the Code. The Code deals with suits, executions, appeals and other incidental matters. Under Sec. 86 a suit is to be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Thus, when the words ‘may be sued’ have been used in Sec. 86(1) they refer to the proceedings for enforcement of a legal right as contemplated under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. As pointed out by the Tribunal, this is further made clear when it is mentioned that the ruler of a foreign State cannot be sued in any court otherwise competent to try the suit. Sub-Sec. 2 to Sec. 86 further says that the consent of the Central Government may be given in respect to ‘a specified suit’ Sub-Sec. 3 also says that a Ruler shall not be arrested under ‘the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code’ and except with the consent of the Central Government no decree shall be executed against the property of the ruler of a foreign State. It is, therefore, difficult to divorce Sec. 86 and Sec. 87-B from its context and to say that immunities available to the ruler of a foreign State extend to all legal proceedings taken against him. We are therefore of the opinion that the Tribunal has committed no error of law in thus interpreting the words ‘may be sued’ in sec. 86.

5. Nor do we find that the Tribunal has committed any error of law in holding that the Industrial Tribunal is not a court within the meaning of sec. 86. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act showing the manner in which the Tribunal is to exercise its jurisdiction and adjudicate the matter and from this it is argued that in all essentials the Tribunal is a Court. But as pointed out by M. Hidayatullah, J. in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunuwala (2)—

“By ‘Courts’ is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by ‘tribunals’, those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State.”

We are conscious of the fact that in that case Hidayatullah, J. was in minority but he was in minority on the point whether the Central Government exercising appellate powers under sec. in of the Companies Act is a Tribunal exercising judicial functions or not. Hidayatullah, J. took the view that it was not so, while the majority held that it was judicial tribunal subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. So far as the distinction between a court and a tribunal is concerned, the observations of Hidayatullah, J. are to be treated with due respect by this Court. We may also point out that their Lordships of the Privy Council interpreted the word ‘courts’ in sec. 17 CPC, meaning courts to which the Code of Civil Procedure applies. Reference may be made Raja Setrucharlu Ramabhara Raju Bahadur v. Maharaja of Jeypore (3)

6. It has been argued before us that sec. 86 is based on the principles of International Law which grant immunities to foreign sovereigns and this section should not be narrowly construed so as to restrict the immunities for proceedings taken under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is no doubt true. The principles of International Law on this subject may be taken from the judgment of Lord Atkin in Companik Naviera Vascongado and Steamship “Cristina” and Persons claiming an interest therein (4), wherein he has observed, as follows:—

“The foundation for the application to set aside the writ and arrest of the ship is to be found in two propositions of international law engrafted into our domestic law which seem to me to be well established and to be beyond dispute. The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process against his person or seek to recover from his specific property or damages.”

“The second is that they will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of which he is in possession or control. There has been some difference in the practice of nations as to possible limitations of this second principle as to whether it extends to property only used for the commercial purposes of the sovereign or to personal private property. In this country it is my opinion well settled that it applies to both.”

The immunities referred to in the observations above have been granted to a ruler of a foreign State under sec. 86 to a limited extent inasmuch as a suit against a ruler of a foreign State may be filed with the consent of the Central Government and proceedings in execution may be taken also with the consent of the Central Government. We are not called upon to decide how far the immunities referred to in the observations of Lord Atkin may be available to a ruler of a foreign State with respect to other proceedings on the principles of international law. There is no necessity to embark on a general discussion as to what further immunities are available to a ruler of a foreign State for to the ruler of an Indian State the law has only granted such immunities as are contained in sec. 85 and sub-sec. 1 and 3 of sec. 86. It may be that by applying International Law a ruler of a foreign State may be held entitled to other immunities of like nature in respect of other proceedings. But the same is no consideration for construing sec. 86 in a wider sense going so far as to treat the provision embodied in the Civil Procedure Code an entirely independent provision available to foreign Rulers in all proceedings of whatever nature.

7. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief that the proceedings against him before the Industrial Tribunal should not proceed on the ground that it will be an infringement of sec. 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure.

8. Coming to the second contention, it is not claimed that the constitution of the Industrial Tribunal as at present is not legal. It is a legally constituted Industrial Tribunal which is proceeding to adjudicate the disputes referred to it by the Rajasthan Government and we do not think that any fresh reference to this Tribunal is necessary in these circumstances. Moreover, the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959, which received the assent of the President, has validated the reference made to and all proceedings taken by the Industrial Tribunal which was constituted under sec. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by enacting that such references should be deemed to have been made as if the said Tribunals were constituted under sec. 7-A of the said Act. The subject of industrial and labour disputes falls within the Third List Concurrent List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and the State Legislature was competent to enact the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959. It has received the assent of the President and must prevail over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act in the State of Rajasthan.

9. It was also argued before us that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter as there was no industrial dispute before it. The point whether the matter before the Tribunal constitutes industrial dispute or not has not been decided by the Tribunal and the Tribunal has framed a definite issue on this point which shall be decided in due course. If the decision goes against the petitioner, he may, if so advised, then come to this Court for redress.

10. The present writ petition has got no force and is dismissed with costs.