- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Hanuman Prasad v. Board Of Revenue And Others Opposite Party.
Judgment Summary — Ranawat, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Hanuman Prasad, applied under Section 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance to the Anti-Ejectment Officer, who on 29 January 1953 ordered his reinstatement. A revision petition to the Board of Revenue allowed the revision and set aside the reinstatement on the ground that the petitioner had failed to prove that he was a tenant. Thereafter the petitioner instituted a regular suit on 4 August 1953 in the Court of the Assistant Collector, Jaipur, seeking a declaration that he was a Khatedar tenant under Schedule I, Group B Item 30 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure & Jurisdiction) Act, 1951.
The opposite party raised a preliminary objection that the suit was barred by res judicata. The Assistant Collector overruled that objection, holding that the decision under the Ordinance did not operate as res judicata. On appeal the Additional Commissioner (1 November 1954) and subsequently the Board of Revenue (6 October 1955) disagreed, holding that the decision under Section 7 of the Ordinance, having been upheld in revision, operated as res judicata and therefore barred the suit. The petitioner sought relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the Board's decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a decision under Section 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance — reached after a summary enquiry — can operate as res judicata so as to bar a subsequent regular suit in the ordinary courts.
- Whether the proceedings under Section 7 of the Ordinance are of an exclusive and final character such that their findings bind parties in later regular litigation, or whether the regular courts retain jurisdiction to try the same questions.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments
- The decision under Section 7(2) of the Ordinance is of a summary nature and therefore not equivalent to a decision in a regular suit.
- Reliance on the Privy Council decision in Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Swaroop, AIR 1940 PC 7, which held that a decision in a summary proceeding that is not made final by statute does not operate as res judicata to bar a regular suit.
- Because the Ordinance contains no provision making Section 7 decisions final or excluding regular courts' jurisdiction, the Board's view that the Section 7 decision barred the regular suit is incorrect in law.
Respondent's (Opposite Party / Board of Revenue) Arguments
- The decision of the Anti-Ejectment Officer under Section 7, having been upheld in revision by the Board, should operate as res judicata on general principles.
- The Board relied on Chitaley's commentary (Note No. 28) and earlier decisions of the Board (Har Mukh v. Kanhaiya Lal; Gona v. Padma; Bachan Singh v. Panna) and on authorities such as Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen (AIR 1953 SC 33) to support the proposition that certain administrative or summary decisions may have res judicata effect in subsequent litigation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Swaroop, AIR 1940 PC 7 | Decision in a summary proceeding which is not a suit and not made final by statute does not operate as res judicata to bar a regular suit. | The court relied on this authority as directly governing the matter: because Section 7 proceedings are summary and not made final, the principle in Bhagwan Din means such decisions cannot bar a subsequent regular suit. |
| T.B. Ramchandra Rao v. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao, AIR 1922 PC 80 | Observation that the principle preventing the same case being twice litigated is of general application and not limited by specific words of the Code. | The court noted the Board may have been influenced by these observations but held they must be read as qualified by Bhagwan Din; they do not override the rule that summary non-final proceedings do not operate as res judicata. |
| Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33 | Consideration of whether prior proceedings bar subsequent litigation; cited by the Board as authority for the proposition that certain prior proceedings may be res judicata. | The court interpreted this authority as pertaining to decisions of courts of exclusive jurisdiction which become final; it held that Raj Lakshmi Dasi does not support treating Section 7 summary decisions (not of exclusive jurisdiction) as res judicata. |
| Har Mukh v. Kanhaiya Lal, 1954 RRD 36 | Cited by the Board as prior Board practice supporting the application of res judicata to bar subsequent suits. | The court observed that earlier Board decisions either failed to appreciate the summary nature of Section 7 proceedings or contained obiter statements; they were not accepted as controlling in the present case. |
| Gona v. Padma, 1955 RRD 99 | Decision relied on by the Board, which proceeded on the authority of Raj Lakshmi Dasi. | The court noted that Gona v. Padma followed Raj Lakshmi Dasi, but held that the special facts and the question of exclusive jurisdiction/finality distinguished those authorities from the present case. |
| Bachan Singh v. Panna, 1954 Raj LW 31 | Referred to by the Board; the Board had treated a decision as barring subsequent suit. | The court considered parts of that decision to be obiter and noted that it did not properly confront the summary nature of Section 7 proceedings; accordingly it did not support the Board's conclusion here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, as reflected in the opinion:
- Characterisation of Section 7(2) proceedings: The court emphasised that Section 7(2) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance explicitly describes the inquiry to be "summary" and quoted the provision showing the Anti-Ejectment Officer conducts a summary enquiry and may order reinstatement on being satisfied after such enquiry.
- Application of Privy Council authority: The court relied on the Privy Council decision in Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Swaroop which held that a decision in a summary proceeding which is not a suit and not made final by statute does not operate as res judicata to bar a regular suit. The court treated that principle as directly applicable.
- On exclusivity and finality: The court observed that the Ordinance contains no provision declaring Section 7 decisions final nor does it exclude the jurisdiction of regular courts to entertain suits on matters covered by the Ordinance. Therefore, Section 7 jurisdiction is not exclusive.
- Examination of the Board's authorities: The court reviewed the Board's reliance on Chitaley's commentary (Note 28) and earlier Board decisions (Har Mukh; Gona v. Padma; Bachan Singh v. Panna) and the Supreme Court authority Raj Lakshmi Dasi. It concluded that those materials were either misapplied or concerned distinct situations — in particular, decisions that become final because they come from courts of exclusive jurisdiction — and so were not controlling when applied to non-final summary proceedings under Section 7.
- Logical critique of the Board's comparative examples: The Board's analogies to probate, insolvency, Land Acquisition Act and Indian Companies Act proceedings were examined. The court found the reasoning unsound for present purposes because those examples involved proceedings whose decisions had finality or exclusivity characteristics absent in Section 7 proceedings.
- Conclusion from applied principles: Because Section 7 proceedings are summary and not made final by the Ordinance, and because regular courts' jurisdiction was not barred, the court held that a Section 7 decision cannot operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent regular suit. As a result, the revenue authorities erred in holding the plaintiff's regular suit barred.
Holding and Implications
Application allowed; the decision of the Board of Revenue dated 6 October 1955 is set aside and the Assistant Collector, Jaipur, is directed to proceed with the trial of the petitioner's suit according to law.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Board of Revenue's decision upholding the plea of res judicata is quashed; the Assistant Collector must now try the suit on its merits.
- Broader implications: The opinion applies the principle from Bhagwan Din that non-final summary proceedings under an Ordinance which do not confer exclusive jurisdiction cannot be treated as operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits. The judgment does not purport to establish a broader or novel rule beyond applying those authorities and distinguishing the Board's prior decisions.
Per Ranawat, J.: Application allowed with costs.
This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.
Ranawat, J.:— This is an application under Article 226 of the-Constitution of India against the judgment of the. Rajasthan Board of Revenue dated the 6th of October 1955, dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner and upholding the judgment of the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur, of the 1st November 1954, by which he held that the suit brought by the-petitioner in the Court of the Assistant Collector, Jaipur, was barred by the general principles of res judicata.
2. The facts leading to this petition are as follows:
3. The petitioner, Hanuman Prasad, made an application under S. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection, of Tenants) Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) to the Anti-Ejectment Officer of Jaipur, which was allowed on the 29th January 1953, and he was ordered to be reinstated. A revision petition was filed in the Court of the Board of Revenue against the said order of the Anti-Ejectment Officer and it was allowed and the order of re-instatement was set aside on the ground that the petitioner Hanuman Prasad had failed to prove that he was a tenant. It was, therefore, held that he was not entitled to any relief under the Ordinance. Hanuman prasad then filed a regular suit, in the Court of the Assistant Collector of Jaipur on the 4th August 1953, for a declaration under Sch. I, Group B Item 30 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts. (Procedure Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, that he is a Khatedar tenant of the land in question. A preliminary objection was taken by the opposite party that the suit was barred by the provisions of res judicata. The learned Assistant Collector repelled the preliminary objection and held that the decision under the Ordinance did not operate as res judicata. An appeal was preferred before the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur, against the said order of the Assistant Collector which was allowed on the 1st. November 1954, and it was held that the decision of the Anti-Ejectment Officer under S. 7 of the Ordinance which was upheld by the Board of Revenue in revision operated as res judicata and the petitioner was not entitled to reagitate that he was a tenant in the subsequent suit which he had brought.
4. A second appeal was filed to the Board of Revenue and the decision of the Additional Commissioner was confirmed. The learned members of the Board referred to Note No. 28 in Chitaley's commentary on Civil Procedure Code in coming to the conclusion that the general principles of res judicata applied and the decision under the Ordinance on the point that the petitioner was not a tenant operated as a bar against the plaintiff.
5. In this petition it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the view of the learned Members of the Board is not based on correct principles of law and is inconsistent with the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Swaroop, AIR 1940 PC 7 (A). The decision, it is argued, under S. 7(2) of the Ordinance is of a summary nature and the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagwan Din (A) directly governs this case. The relevant portion of S. 7(2) of the Ordinance is as follows:
“On receipt of an application under sub-s. (1), the Sub-Divisional Officer or other officer of equal status, shall give a notice to the landlord and to the person, if any, in possession of such holding or part and shall, on being satisfied after such summary enquiry as he may consider necessary that the applicant was ejected or dispossessed as aforesaid, order that the applicant be reinstated in such holding or part thereof and that any other person in possession of it be ejected therefrom.”
6. The provision of S. 7(2) reproduced above expressly lays down that the nature of the proceedings of inquiry under S. 7 of the Ordinance is of summary character. The observations of their Lordships in AIR 1940 PC 7 (A) are as follows:
“They hold that the decision of the District Judge under the Act of 1920—a decision from which by S. 12 there is no appeal—is a decision in a summary proceeding which is not a suit nor of the same character as a suit; that it has not been made final by any provision in the Act; and that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply so as to bar a regular suit even in the case of a person who was a party to the proceedings under the Act.”
7. It is evident that the jurisdiction of the Anti-Ejectment Officer under the Ordinance is not exclusive as there is no provision in the Ordinance barring the proceedings in regular Courts on matters provided in the Ordinance. It is also clear that the Ordinance does not make any provision about the finality of the decisions under S. 7 of the Ordinance. The learned members of the Board might have been influenced by the observations of the Privy Council in the case of T.B Ramchandra Rao v. A.N.S Ramchandra Rao, AIR 1922 PC 80 (B), that “the principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application, and is not limited by the specific words of the Code in this respect,” but it may be pointed out that these observations should be read as qualified by the decision in Bhagwan Din's case (A). A decision in a summary proceeding which is not made final under the law, cannot be considered to operate as res judicata so as to bar a subsequent regular suit in cases such a suit is not expressly barred. The learned members of the Board have referred to Note 28 in Chitaley's commentary on Civil Procedure Code in support of their view but the note of the learned author does not appear to have been properly appreciated. The earlier decisions of the Board in the cases of Har Mukh v. Kanhaiya Lal, 1954 RRD 36 (C), Gona v. Padma, 1955 RRD 99 (D) and Bachan Singh v. Panna, 1954 Raj LW 31 (E) have also been referred with approval in the judgment of the Board. The decision in 1955 RRD 99 (D), proceeds on the authority of Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33 (P). The objection which was raised in that case was that as the Anti-Ejectment Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent suit it was not barred by Section 11 of the CPC. The said objection was repelled by the authority of Raj Lakshmi Dasi's case (F). It may be observed that the fact of the proceedings under S. 7 of the Ordinance being of summary nature escaped the notice of the learned members of the Board who decided the case. The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1953 SC 33 (P) which have been referred to in the said judgment do not appear to have been correctly appreciated by the learned members of the Board inasmuch as the observations regarding application of general principles of res judicata were in respect of cases of the decisions of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction which became final under the law. As has been discussed above, the jurisdiction conferred by S. 7 of the Ordinance is not exclusive and the powers of the regular Courts to try such matters have not been barred. In 1954 RRD 36 (C) the learned members of the Board followed their own decision in 1954 Raj LW 31 (E). In 1954 Raj LW 31 (E) the observations of the learned members of the Board are in a way obiter as the decision also proceeds on the merits of the case in spite of the fact that it has been mentioned that the proceedings in the suit were barred by the principles of res judicata. It may be pointed out that in their judgment the learned members, of the Board at first propounded the principle as follows:
“It has been held that the remedies under the regular law and the Ordinance are not mutually exclusive of each other. If a person first seeks remedy under the Ordinance and is unsuccessful it is certainly open to him to seek his redress under the regular law.”
8. The learned members of the Board, however, modified the view already quoted on the reasoning noted below:
“The findings in connection with probate proceedings have been held to operate as res judicata by the High Court of Bombay and similarly a decision on the merits in insolvency proceedings is final and binding on the parties as-res judicata. A proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act is not a suit but a decision in such proceeding by a competent Court will be res judicata in the subsequent litigation on general principles of law. A judgment in a Civil Court will bar a remedy by way of an application under the Indian Companies Act in respect of the same matter and vice versa under general principles of law.”
9. The logic of this argument does not appear to be sound. The principles underlying the cases referred to in the aforesaid reasoning were not analysed and appreciated. It is obvious that proceedings under S. 7 of the Ordinance are of summary nature and in view of the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Bhagwan Din's case (A), a decision in summary proceedings which is not of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction and which is not made final under the law in summary proceedings, cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the other side has not been able to refer to any authority to the contrary. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that a decision under S. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance cannot be regarded as having the force of res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. The revenue Courts have failed to exercise jurisdiction vestad in them by law when they held that the remedy by way of regular suit of the petitioner was barred by a decision under S. 7 of the Ordinance. Under these circumstances, it is the duty of this Court to direct the revenue Courts concerned to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law.
10. This application is allowed with costs and the decision of the Board of Revenue dated the 6th October 1955, is set aside and the Assistant Collector, Jaipur, is directed to proceed with the trial of the suit of the petitioner according to law.
V.R.B
11. Application allowed.
Alert