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Ramjiwan Ramnath v. Roop Chand

Rajasthan High Court
Sep 13, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Messrs. Ramjiwan Ramnath, obtained a decree from the Calcutta High Court on 3 February 1938 against Chhogmal and his sons (including Roop Chand). The decree was transferred to Aligarh in 1949. The appellant applied for execution by arrest at Aligarh in December 1949; proceedings in the Aligarh Court continued into 1950 and were ultimately struck off for default of the decree-holder on 3 November 1950. Later the decree was transferred to the Court at Merta and an execution application was made before the Merta Court (the record indicates an application before the lower Court in July 1951). The Civil Judge, Merta, dismissed the appellant's execution application on the ground that execution was barred by limitation and that there had been no "revivor" as required by Article 183 of the Limitation Act. The appellant appealed against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings in the Aligarh Court in 1949–1950 amounted to a "revivor" of the Calcutta High Court decree within the meaning of Article 183 of the Limitation Act, thereby permitting execution beyond the period otherwise barred by Section 48, Civil P.C.
  2. Whether certified copies of the Aligarh Court order-sheets ought to be admitted in the present appeal (the appellant sought admission on the ground that he had been refused time to produce them below).
  3. Whether Article 183 of the Limitation Act survives scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it treats decrees of certain High Courts differently from other courts (this constitutional challenge was raised by the respondents).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the proceedings in the Aligarh Court in December 1949 and 1950 constituted a "revivor" of the Calcutta High Court decree within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act, thus permitting execution despite the passage of time.
  • The appellant sought admission of certified copies of the Aligarh Court order-sheets in this appeal, asserting that the lower Court had refused adjournment to allow production of those copies in support of the contention on limitation/revivor.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (judgment-debtors) objected to the execution application on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
  • They also raised a constitutional challenge contending that Article 183 is discriminatory and offends Article 14 of the Constitution because it treats decrees of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts differently from decrees of other courts governed by Section 48, Civil P.C.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Shyam Das, 33 Cal. 543 Definition and understanding of "revivor" in the Limitation Act context; identification of historical procedure (scire facias / Section 248 of old Code) and its correspondence with Order 21 Rules 16 & 22. The Court relied on this leading authority to conclude that "revivor" must be construed in light of the historic procedure and that the procedure embodied in Order 21 Rules 16 and 22 (notice + judicial determination) is essential for revivor under Article 183.
Kamini Debi v. Aghore Nath, 4 Ind. Cas. 402 (Cal.) That an order for execution can operate as a revivor where the execution court overrules an objection and determines the decree is not barred by limitation. The Court used this case to demonstrate that a judicial determination overruling a limitation objection can effect revivor; thus notice plus a determination is the minimum requirement.
Chutterput Singh v. Sumari Mal, AIR 1916 Cal. 488 (FB) An application for transmission of a certified copy of a decree (even with notice) does not constitute revivor; the procedure under Section 248 / Order 21, Rule 22 does not apply to mere transmission applications. The Court cited it to show transmission/administrative steps alone are insufficient for revivor; formal execution procedure and determination are required.
Banku Behari v. Narain Das, AIR 1927 PC 73 Transmission of a decree from the High Court to District Court is a ministerial act and not a judicial act amounting to revivor. Applied to support the proposition that mere transmission/ministerial acts do not revive a decree.
Palanippa Chettiar v. Valliammal Achi, AIR 1929 Mad. 252 An order transferring a decree for execution to another Court does not give a new starting point of limitation qua the order of transmission. Used to reinforce that transfer alone does not restart limitation or effect revivor.
Harnarain v. Dayabhai Hira Chand, AIR 1940 Pat. 596 Mere issue of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 does not by itself amount to revivor; there must be a determination (express or implied) that decree is still capable of execution. Also, leave under Order 21, Rule 50 is not an order for execution and does not effect revivor. The Court used it to underline that procedure alone (notice) is not sufficient unless followed by the requisite judicial determination; also to show limits of other procedural steps.
Murugesan Chetty v. E. Kanniappa Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad. 124 An order bringing legal representatives on record and allowing them to execute the decree is an order of revivor; but an order of revivor against one of multiple debtors does not operate against others not before the court. The Court cited it to show scenarios which do constitute revivor (bringing legal representatives on record and an order permitting execution) and to note limits where revivor is partial.
Hasan Vali v. Isap Bapuji, AIR 1939 Bom. 51 If determination required for revivor is made more than 12 years after decree (or last revivor), revivor cannot be effected. Cited to stress the temporal limitation: the determination constituting revivor must occur within the 12-year period prescribed in Article 183.
Chandra Nath v. Nabadwip Chandra, AIR 1931 Cal. 476 Where notice under Order 21, Rule 22 has not issued but the judgment-debtors have been actively litigating and had opportunity to contest, non-issue of formal notice may not invalidate execution proceedings. The Court accepted the principle but distinguished its application in revivor cases: it held that informal participation cannot substitute for the formal procedure required for revivor under Article 183.
Grish Chunder v. Bhanoo Motee, 11 Suth WR 329 Authority cited among cases holding that failure to issue notice under the relevant rule is not necessarily fatal when debtors have contested proceedings. Referenced as part of the body of cases showing exceptions to formal notice requirement in ordinary execution — distinguished from revivor context.
Fakhrul Islam v. Bhubaneshwari Kuer, AIR 1929 Pat. 79 One of the authorities relied upon to show that non-issuance of formal notice is not always fatal where parties have had opportunity to contest. Referenced and distinguished — not treated as permitting dispensing with formal revivor procedure.
Shiyali Vengu Chetti v. Valjce Kanjce & Co., AIR 1936 Mad. 99 Case involving execution proceedings where formal notice doctrine was considered (not a revivor case). Noted as an exception among the cited authorities; Court held it was not a revivor precedent and thus not controlling for revivor requirements.
B.K. Mitra v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1945 Pat. 182 Held that an order for execution by arrest after a notice under Order 21, Rule 37 did not amount to revivor where procedure under Order 21, Rule 22 had not been followed. Applied to show that an arrest order without the prior notice/determination under Rule 22 cannot be treated as revivor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a two-part analysis: (A) admissibility of Aligarh order-sheets; and (B) whether the Aligarh proceedings constituted a revivor under Article 183.

A. Admissibility of the Aligarh order-sheets

  • The appellant had contended that the lower Court refused an adjournment to enable production of certified copies from Aligarh; an affidavit of counsel below asserted an oral request had been made. The Court examined the lower Court's order-sheets (September 1952 to October 1953) and found no record of any request for time to produce documents or for framing issues.
  • The Court emphasized that if an oral request of counsel is refused, it is incumbent on counsel to make a written application and obtain a written order — the Court would not disbelieve the order-sheet on the affidavit of learned counsel when a written application could have been made.
  • Because the copies produced had not been applied for in 1953 (as per the affidavit's timeline), the Court found the affidavit unreliable on the point that the lower Court had refused time for production. Nevertheless, recognizing the utility of the copies for the present appeal, the Court admitted them under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b), Civil Procedure Code.

B. Analysis of "revivor" under Article 183 and application to the Aligarh proceedings

  1. The Court began with the established principle from Jogendra Chandra Roy that "revivor" must be understood in the light of historic scire facias procedure and that the corresponding modern procedural safeguards are embodied in Order 21, Rules 16 and 22 of the Civil Procedure Code (notice and the judicial determination that a decree is still capable of execution).
  2. Drawing on subsequent authorities (Kamini Debi, Chutterput Singh, Banku Behari, Harnarain, Murugesan Chetty, Hasan Vali, and others), the Court distilled the minimum requirements for revivor: (a) issue of a notice in the manner prescribed by Order 21 (Rules 16 or 22 as applicable), and (b) a judicial determination — expressly or by necessary implication — that the decree is subsisting and executable, entitling the decree-holder to enforce it. The Court stressed strict compliance because revivor can defeat the ordinary time-bar under Section 48, C.P.C.
  3. Turning to the Aligarh order-sheets, the Court found the following facts from the documentary record:
    • 7-12-1949: District Judge, Aligarh, received copy of decree and directed that an execution application be awaited.
    • 15-12-1949: Decree-holder filed execution application; District Judge transferred execution application to Civil Judge, Aligarh.
    • 16-12-1949: Chhogmal filed an objection; matter transferred to Civil Judge for disposal and listed for 23-12-1949.
    • 23-12-1949: Order-sheet records that Chhogmal was absent; objection was dismissed and warrant for arrest ordered; no notice under Order 21, Rule 22 was issued to Chhogmal; no formal notice appears on the record.
    • 11-3-1950: Chhogmal brought under arrest, released for lack of maintenance funds; later warrants ordered but never served; proceedings continued and were ultimately struck off on 3-11-1950 for default of the decree-holder.
  4. The Court observed that no notice under Order 21, Rule 22 was issued and no Order 21, Rule 37 notice was recorded (though warrants were ordered). The appellant argued that because Chhogmal had appeared and objected, formal notice was unnecessary; the Court distinguished ordinary execution cases from revivor cases — while active litigation and presence may dispense with formal notice in some execution contexts, revivor is different because it can perpetually keep a decree alive beyond the ordinary limit. For revivor, formal notice under Order 21, Rule 22 (or Rule 16 where applicable) is essential.
  5. The Court examined the content of Chhogmal's 16-12-1949 petition and concluded it did not raise the sort of substantive objections to executability contemplated by Order 21, Rule 22 (it contained objections such as age, business reputation, assertions of a bogus decree, intention to move the Calcutta Court to restore suit, etc., which the Court found not proper objections in execution proceedings). Thus, even on substance the petition did not demonstrate that the Civil Judge had been required to or did address the executability question.
  6. Regarding the 23-12-1949 order dismissing Chhogmal for default, the Court noted there was no clear record that Chhogmal or his counsel knew the matter would be taken up then; the dismissal for default did not amount to a judicial determination that the decree was subsisting and executable. The Court concluded the Civil Judge had not addressed the question of executability and therefore no judicial determination sufficient for revivor had been made.
  7. Given that (a) there was no requisite notice under Order 21, Rule 22, and (b) there was no judicial determination (express or implied) that the decree was capable of execution, the Court held the Aligarh proceedings did not effect a revivor even as against Chhogmal. The appellant conceded that the other respondents were never served in Aligarh and thus could not have been revived there.
  8. Because the subsequent execution application before the lower Court (Merta) was made in 1951 more than 12 years after the 1938 decree (and no valid revivor had occurred within that period), the Court concluded the execution application was barred by limitation.
  9. The Court noted the constitutional challenge to Article 183 under Article 14 was raised by respondents but said it was unnecessary to decide that question in the present case because the Court's conclusion on revivor made it moot for the present facts.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The Court held that the proceedings in the Aligarh Court in 1949–1950 did not amount to a "revivor" within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act, because (i) no notice under Order 21, Rule 22 was issued, and (ii) there was no judicial determination, expressly or by necessary implication, that the decree was subsisting and capable of execution. Consequently the execution application made in 1951 was barred by limitation and the lower Court was right to dismiss it.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's execution application is barred by limitation and the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of the respondents. The Aligarh proceedings did not revive the 1938 decree even as against Chhogmal, and certainly not as against the other respondents who were never served there.
  • Procedural takeaway: For a decree of the kind contemplated by Article 183 to be revived, strict compliance with the procedure embodied in Order 21, Rules 16 and 22 (notice and judicial determination) is essential. Mere transfer, ministerial acts, transmission, or an arrest order unaccompanied by the prescribed notice and determination will not suffice to effect revivor.
  • Constitutional point: The Court declined to adjudicate the respondents' Article 14 challenge to Article 183, observing that the question was unnecessary to decide on the facts of this case and should be left to a proper case where revivor in the prescribed manner is actually shown.
  • No novel precedent: The Court’s decision applies established authorities and principles; it does not purport to overrule or create a new test beyond strict adherence to the procedural requirements already recognized in precedent.

Disposition

The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondents. The Court admitted the Aligarh order-sheets under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b), C.P.C. for purposes of this appeal but found them insufficient to establish revivor as required by Article 183.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by Messrs. Ramjiwan Ramnath against the order of the Civil Judge, Merta, dismissing the application filed by the appellant against ROOP Chand and others for execution of a decree obtained by them against the respondents from the Calcutta High Court, on the ground that execution was barred by limitation, and there had been no revivor as contemplated by Article 183 Limitation Act.

2. The facts are that the appellant obtained a decree against Chhogmal and his sons Roop Chand and others, who are respondents in the present appeal, from the Calcutta High Court on 3-2-1938. The appellant got this decree transferred to Aligarh in 1949, and applied for execution by arrest of Chhogmal, judgment-debtor, in December 1949. The proceedings in the Aligarh Court are said to have come to an end sometimes in 1950. Thereafter the appellant got the decree transferred to the Court at Merta and applied for execution.

3. The execution of the decree was objected to by the judgment-debtors respondents, and, among other picas, they raised the plea that the execution was barred by time. The case of the appellant decree-holder, however, was that by virtue of the execution which took place in the Aligarh Court in 1949-50 there was revivor within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act. The lower Court has, however, held that there was no revivor under Article 183, and has dismissed the application for execution in consequence as barred by time. The present appeal is against that order,

4. Before we consider the question whether the decree in this case was revived by the proceedings which took place in the Aligarh Court in 1949, we should like to deal with an application by the appellant for admission of certain copies of order sheets of the Aligarh Court.

5. The contention on behalf of the appellant in this connection is that a request had been made to the lower Court to adjourn the hearing for taking evidence in the shape of certified copies of proceedings before the Ahgarh Court; but the learned Judge did not give time for that purpose. An affidavit 'of counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant was also filed in support, and it was stated therein that the counsel and requested the Court for time on the question of limitation limitation on the ground that copies of proceedings, before the Court of Aligarh had not been received, but the Court refused to grant time. Therefore, the appellant prayed that, we should admit these certified copies.

6. We have gone through the order-sheets of the Court below from September, 1952,, to October, 1953. There were many hearings between this period, and the order-sheets show that the case was postponed from date to date for purposes of arguments. On none of these hearings, there was ever a request by the appellant for time to produce documents. Nor was there any request that issues should be framed before arguments were heard.

To say now that the Court below did not frame issues is of no avail to the appellant, for, in the first place, issues arc not necessarily framed] when objections in execution proceedings the decided, and, in the second place, the parties would not have allowed the ease to be postponed from date to date for almost a year for argument if anybody thought that issues were necessary. It is true that an affidavit has been filed by the learned counsel appearing in the lower Court that he made an oral request for adjournment on the ground of production of copies of the proceedings in the Aligarh Court.

There is no mention of any such request in the order-sheet of 24-10-1953. We must say that if a counsel feels that any oral request of his., which is material is being refused, it is his duty to put in an application in writing containing has request, and get an order from the Court on it. It is, in our opinion, not proper that this Court should be asked to disbelieve the record of proceedings contained in the order-sheet on the affidavit of learned counsel,' when it is open to learned counsel to make an application, and get an order in writing.

In any case, so far as the present matter is concerned, we feel that we cannot rely on the affidavit filed by the learned counsel who appeared in the Court below. According to him, he wanted time because he did not receive the copies which he wanted to produce. Copies have been produced in this Court, but those copies were not applied for in 1953. It seems to us therefore that counsel could hardly have asked for time to produce copied which had not been applied for till then.

We would not be prepared therefore to admit the copies which the appellant wants us to admit on the ground that lie was not allowed' an opportunity to produce them in the Court below. But we do think that these copies, which have been produced, will be useful to us in disposing of this appeal and we, therefore, admit them under Order 41, Rule 27(1) (b), C.P.C.

7. The decree in this case was passed in 1938, and ordinarily no fresh application for0 execution would lie in July, 1951, when application was made in this case before the Court below in view of the provisions of Section 48, C.P.C. The appellant however, relied on Article 183, Limitation Act which provides for revivor in cases of decrees passed by any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Thus a decree of the Calcutta High Court could be executed under the proviso in the third column of Article 183 within 12 years from the date of revivor, the relevant words being:--

"Provided that when the judgment, decree of order has been revived....the twelve years shall be computed from the date of such revivor... .or the latest of such revivers..."

8. 'Revivor' has riot been defined anywhere in the Limitation Act, but the leading case on the point is Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Shyam Das, 33 Cal. 543 (A) which has been followed by all the High Courts, It was pointed out in that case that the term 'revivor' was nowhere defined, but as it appeared in the Limitation Act of 1859 when there was a procedure for revivor of judgment prevalent on the original side of the Calcutta High Court it would be only proper to construe the word 'revivor' in the Limitation Act in that manner.

The procedure was that execution could not issue upon judgments more than a year old without issuing a writ of scire facias against the defendant. The learned Judges then considered the history of the writ of scire facias, and summed up the position thus at p. 552:

"The substance of the matter, so far as we are concerned, may therefore be thus stated: a scirc facias is a judicial writ founded on some matter of record and having for its object the prevention of undue surprise by interposing itself as a warning between judgment' and execution wherever a new party is to be charged or benefited by such execution, whenever such execution is contingent, after judgment, on the existence of certain circumstances to be first proved by the party charging; and lastly, whenever execution has been delayed beyond the specified 'period (a year and a day under the common law) after the judgment was signed, that delay not arising from the party charged."
) The learned Judges then went on to point out that it was not difficult to identify this writ substantially with the procedure embodied in Section 248, Civil P.C. (now equivalent to Order 2.1, Rule 16 and R- 22), though there are some differences in detail. Essentially, however, these two rules provide for issue of notice to the judgment-debtor when there is an assignment of the decree (Order 21, Rule 16), or when execution is sought more man a year after the passing of the decree, or against the legal representatives of the original judgment-debtor ( Order 21, Rule 22).

The difference is that under Order 21 Rule 16, no notice has to be issued where the decree is transferred by operation of law, and further under Order 21, Rule 22 no notice is to be issued where execution is taken out within one year of the last execution. It appears, however, that in the case of scire facias notice; had to be issued even when the decree was transferred by operation of law, or when execution was being taken out more than a year after the passing of the decree, though it may not be more than a year after the last execution. The conclusion, to which learned Judges arrived in Jogendra Chandra Roy's case (A) is stated at p. 552 in these words:--

"It seems to us to be fairly obvious, therefore, that when the Legislature used the term "revivor of judgment" in the Limitation Acts of 1871 and . 1877, they had in view the procedure embodied in Ss. 216 of the Code of 1859 and 248 of the Code of 1.877."

It is obvious, therefore, that the procedure provided by Rules 16 and 22 of Order 21 is essential before it can be said that a judgment is revived within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act.

9. The matter was again considered by the Calcutta High Court in Kamini Debi v. Aghore Nath, 4 Ind. Cas. 402 (Cal.) (B). In that case, what happened was that there was an application for execution in 1894, on which apparently notice was issued under the provision corresponding to Order 21, Rule 22. There was an objection by the judgment-debtor on the ground that" the execution was parred by limitation. This matter was considered by the Execution Court, and the objection was ' overruled.

Thereafter, the decree-holder intimated to the Court that he did not wish to proceed with the execution at that stage. Therefore, by the same order the execution Court struck off tile application tor execution on the decree-holder's statement. The argument in that case was that as no execution was actually taken out, there could be no revivor. This argument was repelled by the learned judges in the following terms at p. 403;

"The essence of the matter is that to constitute a revivor of the decree, there must be, expressly or by implication, a determination that the decree is still capable of execution, and the decree-holder is entitled to enforce it. An order for execution operates as a revivor, because it necessarily implies such a determination. In the case before us, the objection of the judgment-debtor was overruled and it was decided that the decree was not barred by limitation. The effect of this order was to entitle the decree-holder to proceed with the execution and there was consequently a revivor of the decree."

10. Thus notice and a judicial determination, expressly or by necessary implication, are the minimum requirements which must be fulfilled before a judgment can be said to be revived within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act. We are also of opinion that this procedure must be strictly, followed if the intention is to revive the judgment or decree, for the result of the revivor is that a decree, which would otherwise be barred by limitation and could not be executed generally after a period of 12 years in view of Section 48, Civil P.C., becomes capable of execution for ever if it is revived within 12 years. That is why various Courts have held various proceedings which have been taken after the decree as not sufficient for reviving, the decree.

11. In Chutterput Singh v. Sumari Mal, AIR 1916 Cal. 488 (FB) (C) the requirements for constituting a revivor were restated, and an application for transmission" of a certified copy of a decree taken with an order thereon that the application should be granted was held not to constitute a revivor of the decree, even though the application was written upon a form which was applicable to an application for actual execution of a decree, and even though notice had been issued to the judgment-debtor 0:1 the application for transmission of the decree.

It was remarked that the procedure under S. 248 (now corresponding to Order 21, Rule 22) had no application to an application for transmission of the copy of the decree, and therefore a notice issued in proceedings for transmission of the copy of the decree taken with the final order for transmission did not operate as a revivor.

12. In Banku Behari v. Narain Das, AIR 1927 PC 73 (D), A was held that an application for transmission of a decree from the High Court to the District Court was not by itself a revival of the decree, inasmuch as it was a mere ministerial act of an officer of the Court, and not the judicial act of a Judge.

13. In Palanippa Chettiar v. Valliammal Achi, AIR 1929 Mad. 252 (2) (E), it has been held that an order transferring a decree for execution to another Court does not give a new starting point of limitation qua order of transmission.

14. In Harnarain v. Dayabhai Hira Chand, AIR 1940 Pat. 596 (F), it has been held that a mere issue of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 does not amount to revivor, and that there must be expressly or by implication a determination that the decree is still capable of execution, and the decree-holder is entitled to enforce it. It has also been held that the proceeding for obtaining leave under Order 21, Rule 50 is not an application for execution, nor does the leave granted amount to any order for execution, and does not therefore amount to revivor.

15. In Murugesan Chetty v. E, Kanniappa Mudaliar AIR 1952 Mad. 124(G) it is held that an order bringing on record legal representatives of decree-holder, and allowing them to execute the decree is an order of revivor within the meaning of Article 183. But in the case of a decree against two persons an order of revivor made on an application for execution against only one of them does not operate as a revivor against the other.

16. On a consideration, therefore, of these authorities, it seems to us that a revivor takes place only if the procedure provided by Rule 16 and Rule 22 of Order 21 is followed, namely that a notice is issued, and a determination made either expressly or by necessary implication that the decree is subsisting, and the decree-holder has a right to enforce it.

Naturally this determination has to be made within 12 years of the passing of the decree or of the last revivor as the case may be. If it is made more than 12 years after, there can be no revivor even though tlie procedure prescribed by Rules 16 and 22 has been followed, and a determination made. Reference in this connection may be made to Hasan Vali v. Isap Bapuji, AIR 1939 Bom. 51 (H). We are further of opinion that there should be strict compliance with this procedure for reasons already mentioned,

17. Let us now see what actually happened in this case as evidenced by the copies of order sheets of proceedings in the Aligarh Court On 7-12-1949, the District Judge, Aligarh, received a copy of the decree from the Calcutta High Court, and he passed an order to the effect that an execution application be awaited. On 15-12-1949, the execution application was filed by the decree-holder. Thereupon., the District Judge ordered that the execution application be transferred to the Civil Judge, Aligarh, for execution.

On 16th of December an objection was filed by Chhogmal, judgment-debtor, and it was ordered that the application be also sent to the Civil Judge along with the execution appli cation. The matter was put up before the Civil Judge, Aligarh, on the same day, and the order-sheet shows that the decree-holder applied for issue of warrant of arrest without issue of notice.

The application of Chhogmal judgment-debtor was also put up, and it was ordered that the matter be put up on 23-12-1949, in the presence of counsel for parties for further orders. The order-sheet of 23-12-1949, says that the application for execution as well as the objection of the judgment debtor was put up, but the judgment-debtor was absent, and consequently the objection was dismissed. It was also ordered that warrant for arrest be issued. No notice was issued to the judgment-debtor.

Thereafter, proceedings continued, and the order-sheet of 11-3-1950,, shows that Chhogmal was brought under arrest to the court on that date. As, however, expenses for maintenance of Chhogmal in jail had not been deposited, he was ordered fro be released. Thereafter, on the same day, another application was put up on behalf of the decree-holder for issue of warrant against Chhogmal and his son Roop Chand (one of the respondents before us).

It was ordered that warrants be issued on deposit of nccessiry expenses. The proceedings then dragged on till 3-11-1950, when trie execution was struck off for default of the decree-holder. The warrants ordered to be issued on 11-3-1950, were never served on Chhogmal and Roopchand, though they were issued a number of times.

18. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that in view of these proceedings the decree was revived as against Chhogmal. It is admitted that as the present respondents were never served, there could be no revivor of the decree against them. We have, therefore, to see whether on these facts it can be said that the decree was revived even against Chhogmal,

19. The first point, that is clear from the copies of the order-sheets that have been produced, is that no notice under Order 21, Rule 22 was ever issued by the court in this case. Further it is clear that no notice under Order 21, Rule 37 was ever issued, though warrants for arrest were issued. It has beep urged that the absence of notice so far as Chhogmal is concerned is of no importance in this case because Chhogmal did appear at one stage of the proceedings and made an objection to the issue of a warrant of arrest against him.

Reliance in this connection has been placed on a number of cases to show that non-issue of a notice under p. 21, Rule 22 is not fatal to the execution proceedings which were carried on. These cases are:--

(i) Grish Chunder v. Bhanoo Motee 11 Suth WR 329 (1).

(ii) Fakhrul Islam v. Bhubaneshwari Kuer AIR 1929 Pat 79 (p.

(iii) Chandra Nath v. Nabadwip Chandra AIR 1931 Cal 476 (K).

(iv) (M Anil Kmnar v. Ahammed Ali AIR 1940 Cal. 23 (L).

(v) Shiyali Vengu Chetti v. Valjce Kanjce and Co., Madras, AIR 1936 Mad 99 (M).

20. It may be accepted as well settled that when; notice under Order 21, Rule 22 has not been issued, and proceedings have gone on in the presence of the judgment-debtors and their objections have been decided, the mere non-issue of the notice does not invalidate the subsequent proceedings 'in execution. The law, if we may say so with respect, has been laid clown in the following observations of Rankin C. J. in -- 'Chandra Nath Bagchi's case (K)' at page 478:

"I do not in any way seek to throw doubt upon the proposition that where such a notice has not issued and the party who is entitled to notice docs not in substance get notice and is not given or docs not take an opportunity to object to the execution of the decree, the sale which follows will lie without jurisdiction in the sense that, even if the sale is to a stranger, the sale will not be binding or valid. The parties in the present case have been litigating actively with each other upon the question whether this execution should proceed and how it should proceed...........

It appears to me to be merely piling unreason upon technicality to hold upon the circumstances of this case that it is open to the judgment-debtors on these grounds to object to the jurisdiction of the Court because they have

" not got a formal notice to do something, namely to dispute the execution of the decree when in point of fact they were busy disputing about it in all the Courts for the best part of the last two years."

But none of these cases, except 'Shiyali Vengu Chetti's case (M)', are cases of, revivor. "Shiyali Vengu Chetti's case (M)' was also not a case of revivor,, though the decree in, that case appears to have been passed by the Madras High Court., We are, therefore, of opinion that notice under Order 21 Rule 22 is not necessary where the judgment-debtor has been fighting out the execution tooth and nail in cases which have nothing to do with revivor It is an altogether different thing to apply that principle in a case of revivor where there is a specific procedure which must be undergone if there is to be revivor. As we have already pointed out, it is possible to keep a decree alive by revivor for ever against the provisions of Section 48, Civil P. C. In such circumstances, we are of the viwe that notice under Order 21, Rule 22 is essential.

21. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to two cases in this connection. In Chutterput Singh's case (C), it was said at page 490 that the order, which was made on 12-2-1900, for the execution of the decree by the arrest of the defendant, constituted a revivor within the meaning of that clause. But the circumstances,, in which that order was made, do not appear in the judgment.

It is enough to say that the procedure under Order 21, Rule 37 relating to arrest comes into play after the notice under Order 21, Rule 22 has been issued in oases where notice has to be issued under that rule. Therefore, it is possible that the order of 12-2-

1900, for execution by arrest, which has been treated as a revivor in this case, might have been passed after issue of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 also, or the corresponding provision of the previous Code That case, therefore, is no authority for holding that an order 'for arrest will necessarily constitute a revivor without even going through the procedure pro-

vided by Order 21, Rule 22.

22. Similarly in 'Hamarain's case (F)', the learned Judge doubted whether an order under Order 21, Rule 37 without issue of notice would amount to a reviver; but as that was not the point before him he assumed it for purposes of that case that it would amount to a revivor against the person who was arrested. But he went on to bold that it could not amount to a revivor against the other judgment-debtors who were not parties to that execution proceeding. It is enough to point out that an order for execution by arrest under Order 21, Rule 37 can also amount to revivor if it is passed after notice provided in Order 21, Rule 22.,

23. The direct case on the point relating to arrest is -- 'B.K. Mitra v. Bhajan Lal', AIR 1945 Pat 182 (N). In that case, it was held that an order for execution by arrest after a notice under Order 21, Rule 37 did not amount to revivor as the procedure provided by Order 21, Rule 22 bad not been gone through. The Courts cannot, in our: opinion, dispense with the notice under Order 21, Rule .22, or Order 21, Rule 16 where they have to consider whether the decree has been revived or not,

24. In the present case, as there was no notice whatsoever under Order 21, Rule 22, the decree cannot be said to have been revived merely because Chhogmal judgment-debtor was arrested in pursuance of a warrant issued under Order 21, Rule 37.

25. We are also of opinion that the petition made on behalf of Chhogmal on 16-12-1949, was not the sort of petition" contemplated under Order 21, Rule 22. Let us see what he has said in that petition. He first says that the decree against him was ex parte, and no summons or notice was ever served on him. That is an objection which no judgment-debtor can take in .execution proceedings.

Then he says that the objector was an old man; and the decree was- not legally executable against him. That is a meaningless objection because the age of the judgment-debtor has nothing to do with the executabifity of the decree against him. Then he says that the decree was bogus, and execurtion, was being taken out on account of enmity in order to wreck his business. This again is not an objection which can be taken in execution 'proceedings.

Then he says that he was intending to move the Calcutta court for restoration of the suit, and was collecting information regarding it This again is not an objection which can be raised in an execution court. Then he says something about his son Roopchand, namely that Roopchand was an agriculturist, and that the decree could not be executed, against him, by arrest.

We need not attach any importance to this objection because it is not even the appellant's ease that the decree was revived against Roopchand,.

Lastly, it is, said that the issue of a warrant of, arrest without any opportunity being given to the judgment-debtor will seriously harm his reputation as a business man. .

There is thus not a single objection in the application of 16-12-1949, which can be said to refer to the executability of the decree, and which can"

be properly raised in an execution court.. Finally, it was prayed that the objection be allowed, and the proceedings be stayed. So all that Chhogmal was praying for was stay of proceedings presumably with the intention of moving the Calcutta High Court;

under Order 9, Rule 13, and getting the ex parte decree set aside.

If a notice bad been issued under Order 21, R, 22 asking Chhogmal to show cause why execution should not 'be levied against him, be, might have been' able to raise proper objections to the executability of the decree. The fact, therefore, that such an objection.

was made by Chhogmal is, in our opinion, of no consequence in the absence of a notice under Order 21,.

Rule 22.

26. The next question is whether, even if it can be said that Chhogmal having made the application dated 16-12-1949, the formality of a notice under Order 21, Rule 22 can be dispensed with in his case (though we are of opinion that a notice in terms either of Order 21, Rule 16, or Order 21, Rule 22 is necessary if the decree is to be revived), it can be said that there was a judicial determination of the question of the executability of the decree.

We have already shown that, on 15-12-1949, the decree-holder applied for execution to the District judge. On 1.6th of December, Chhogmal made his objections also to the District Judge. On the same day the execution application as well as the objection was transferred to the Civil Judge for disposal, and an order was passed that this application should be put up on the 23rd of December for further orders.

There is nothing to show in the order-sheet of the 16th December, 1949, in the court of the Civil Judge Aligarh, that Chbogmal or his counsel' was present when tbe matter was ordered to be put up on 23-12-1945. There is nothing also in the, order-sheet of the 16th of December requiring the presence of Chhogmal personally on the 23-12-1949.

We do not know whether Chhogmal or hi? counsel even knew that the application of. Chhogmal would come up for decision on the 23rd of December. Yet the order of the 23rd December says that Chhogmal is not present in person to show that he was old and intirm, and there was no application on his behalf, and consequently the objection was dismissed.

In our view, this can hardly be called a judicial determination of the question that the decree is still capably of execution, and the decree-holder is entitled to enforce it. The court does not seem, to have addressed itself to that question at all, and Chhogmal's application was dismissed for default without it being certain that he had even notice of that date, namely the 23-12-1949.

In any case, the only matter considered, according, to the order-sheet of 23-12-1949, was whether the decree should be executed by issue of a warrant. This is a subsequent question and arises only alter the court has decided after issue of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 whether the decree is executable at all.

27. We are, therefore, of opinion that in this case it can neither be said that there was such notice as is necessary for purposes of revivor, nor that there was judicial determination, expressly or by implication, that the decree was capable of execution., and the decree-holder was entitled to enforce it.

The order of 23-12-1949, at any rate, does not show that the court ever addressed its mind to this question of executability. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the lower court was right in holding; that the proceedings in the court at Aligarh were' not sufficient to revive the decree even1 against Chhogmal. Therefore, as the present execution application was made. In 1951, more than 12 years after the decree, it is barred by limitation, and has been rightly dismissed.

28. Another argument was raised on behalf of the judgment-debtors respondents with regard to the validity of Article 183 itself after the coming into force of the Constitution in 1950. The argument is that Article 183 is a discriminatory piece of legislation, and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution ' inasmuch as there is no sufficient reason why the decrees of the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras on the original side should be treated differently from decrees of other Courts of other States which are all governed by Section 48, Civil P. C.

In the view, however, that we have taken in this case of what revivor is, and what is the minimum requirement for the revivor of a judgment, decree or order, we do not think it necessary to enter into this rather difficult question raised by the respondents. It may have to be decided in a proper case where the court may come to the conclusion that there was actually a revivor in the manner provided by law.

29. Learned counsel for the respondents, wanted to raise other points. We have, however, not permitted , him to do so because the judgment of the court below is based entirely on one point only namely revivor, and we would not be prepared to go into other points without the benefit of the lower court's view on those other points.

30. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs ' to the respondents.