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Bhuralal v. Jiwansingh And Another

Rajasthan High Court
Sep 5, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents Jiwansingh and Sohansingh (Sohansingh later represented by his assignee Motisingh) sued the appellant Bhuralal for redemption of a pledge of certain ornaments and obtained a decree dated 28-8-1940, entitling them to redeem the ornaments on payment of Rs. 547/4/- to the defendant. That decree was confirmed on appeal.

Execution proceedings followed with several applications and dismissals:

  • 30-1-1943: Sohansingh alone applied for execution; difficulties arose because Jiwansingh had not been made a party.
  • 9-5-1943: Sohansingh clarified he sought execution only for his share.
  • 6-2-1945: The judgment-debtor (Bhuralal) objected that he had already compromised with Jiwansingh on 20-5-1941; that objection remained undecided.
  • 18-12-1946: Motisingh deposited Rs. 530/- in court to be paid to the judgment-debtor.
  • 21-3-1947: An execution application was dismissed for the decree-holder's default.
  • 15-10-1947: Motisingh filed a second execution petition; it was dismissed on 20-1-1949 on the ground that Motisingh alone had no right to execute the decree.
  • 4-4-1949: A further execution application was filed by both Jiwansingh and Motisingh — this application is the subject of the present appeal.

At the executing Court Bhuralal raised two objections: (1) the decree had already been compromised with Jiwansingh and (2) the 4-4-1949 execution application was barred by limitation. The executing Court repelled both objections. On appeal the District Judge, Bhilwara, modified the executing Court's decree, holding that Jiwansingh was not entitled to execute the decree but that Motisingh, as assignee of Sohansingh, was entitled to execute to the extent of his half share on payment of half the decretal amount. Bhuralal appealed against that order (the opinion records the appeal and the ensuing consideration primarily on limitation grounds).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution application dated 4-4-1949 was barred by limitation.
  2. Whether the Mewar Limitation Act, 1932 (Article 29) precluded filing a further execution application after three years from the decree, or whether a liberal construction permitted refiling in specified circumstances.
  3. If the Indian Limitation Act (made applicable to Mewar by the United State of Rajasthan Limitation Ordinance, 1949) governs, whether Article 182 or Article 181 applies to the execution of a conditional decree.
  4. Whether the decree-holders' right to apply for execution in a conditional decree accrues immediately on the date of the decree or after fulfillment of the condition prescribed in the decree.
  5. Whether the compromise claimed by the judgment-debtor (with Jiwansingh) prevented execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Judgment-debtor's) Arguments

  • The execution application of 4-4-1949 was barred by time under the Mewar Limitation Act, 1932; specifically Article 29 limited an application for execution to within three years from the date of the decree and did not permit a further application after that period.
  • The second execution application filed in 1947 was incompetent because there was no Mewar Article corresponding exactly to Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act; therefore no right of further execution existed after the three-year period.
  • After 23-8-1948 the Indian Limitation Act (No. 9 of 1908) became applicable to Mewar by the United State of Rajasthan Limitation Ordinance, 1949, and since limitation is procedural the law in force when the application is made applies; thus, Article 181 (a residuary provision) rather than Article 182 should govern conditional decrees, limiting the right to three years from accrual of the right to apply.
  • As the decree in this case was conditional (redemption on payment), the time to perform the condition and to apply for execution was at most three years from the date of the decree; the respondents did not perform within that period.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' separate legal arguments; factual actions of the respondents (such as depositing Rs. 530/- on 18-12-1946 and filing the 4-4-1949 application) are recorded, but their structured legal submissions are not detailed in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramlal v. Jagannath, Misc. Ex. S.A. No. 21 of 1952 (Sinse reported in AIR 1955 NUC (Raj) 4670) Interpreting Article 29 of the Mewar Limitation Act liberally so that if an execution application filed within three years is dismissed, a further application within three years from the first application may be permissible (subject to Section 48 CPC). The court considered this Division Bench decision binding and cited it to repel the appellant's contention that Article 29 absolutely barred any subsequent execution application once three years from the decree had passed.
Narain v. Brij Narain, AIR 1931 All 326 Held that a decree which required deposit of a sum (with no date specified) was not immediately executable; Article 182 was inapplicable and Article 181 applied; right to apply accrues at once and delay beyond three years barred application. Used as authority for the proposition that conditional decrees are governed by Article 181, and that the decree-holder's right to enforce must be exercised within three years from accrual (accrual being at date of decree in this court's view).
Gopal Sattu Tippe v. Dnyanu Maruti Khade (AIR 1938 Bom 367) Adopted the view that conditional decrees are governed by the residuary Article (181) where Article 182 is inapplicable. Relied upon as a later Bombay High Court authority consistent with the court's view that Article 181 applies to conditional decrees.
Mt. Bhuribai v. Rahmatbi, AIR 1930 Nag 241 Contrary view: held that where payment to the judgment-debtor is a condition precedent to an application for execution, an application made without fulfilling the condition can still be valid. The court noted this contrary authority but observed a trend in later decisions (including Bombay and Madras decisions) against it and did not adopt its reasoning for the present case.
Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lalchand, 34 Bom 189 Earlier Bombay High Court case relied upon by the single judge in Mt. Bhuribai to support the view that an application can be made without first fulfilling the condition. Referred to in the opinion as background to the contrary view; the court indicated that later Bombay decisions suggest a trend away from this approach.
Nacharammal v. Veerappa, AIR 1945 Mad 485 Madras High Court decision adopting the view that conditional decrees are governed by the residuary Article (i.e., Article 181 applies where Article 182 does not fit). Cited as further support (in line with Narain and the later Bombay decision) for the court's conclusion that Article 181 governs execution of conditional decrees.
Rameshwar v. Homeshwar, AIR 1921 PC 31 (Privy Council) Held that Article 181 governs where appropriate and that the three-year period runs from the time when the right to apply accrues; emphasized that enforcement presupposes a decree capable of enforcement. Invoked as authoritative support (Privy Council) for applying Article 181 to conditional decrees and for the proposition that the right to apply accrues at a legally cognizable time and must be acted upon within three years.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main analytical steps: (A) examination of the Mewar Limitation Act provisions and the effect of a liberal judicial construction of Article 29; and (B) analysis under the Indian Limitation Act (as applied to Mewar by Ordinance) to decide whether Article 182 or Article 181 governs execution of a conditional decree.

A. Mewar Limitation Act (Article 29)

  • The court observed that a literal reading of Article 29 of the Mewar Limitation Act would limit an execution application to within three years of the decree, and on that basis no further execution application could be filed after that period.
  • However, the court noted historical judicial practice in the former State of Mewar where Article 29 had received a liberal interpretation allowing a further execution application (if the first was filed within three years and dismissed) to be filed within three years of the first application, subject to Section 48 of the CPC.
  • The Division Bench decision in Ramlal v. Jagannath (binding on this court) supported that liberal construction; accordingly the court rejected the appellant's submission that Article 29 absolutely barred subsequent execution applications in all circumstances.

B. Applicability of Indian Limitation Act and choice between Articles 181 and 182

  • The court accepted that the United State of Rajasthan Limitation Ordinance, 1949 made the Indian Limitation Act applicable to Mewar from 23-8-1948 and that limitation being procedural, the law in force when the application was made was relevant.
  • The court stated the correct method: first examine the clauses of Article 182 to see whether the execution application falls squarely within any clause; if none apply, then the residuary Article 181 governs.
  • The court held that a decree which requires the decree-holder to perform a condition (here payment of the decretal sum) before execution cannot be said to be immediately executable on the date of the decree; therefore Article 182 did not apply to this conditional decree.
  • Consequently the residuary Article 181 applied, fixing a three-year period of limitation to apply from the time when the right to apply accrues. The court concluded that, in such conditional-decree cases (where no date for performance is specified), the right to apply accrues at once (i.e., on the date of the decree) and the decree-holder must perform the condition and seek execution within three years, failing which the right is lost.
  • The court reviewed authorities (Narain v. Brij Narain; Gopal Sattu Tippe; Nacharammal v. Veerappa; and Rameshwar v. Homeshwar) which supported this approach, acknowledged a conflicting view (Mt. Bhuribai v. Rahmatbi and Nathubhai Kasandas), but preferred the trend of authority that Article 181 governs conditional decrees.

C. Application to the facts

  • The appellate decree (the decree finally operative for limitation purposes in the court's view) was passed on 23-5-1941.
  • Under the court's application of Article 181, the decree-holders had at most three years from that date to perform the condition (payment) and seek execution.
  • Motisingh deposited the money on 18-12-1946 — more than five years after the appellate decree — and the present execution application was filed on 4-4-1949, both dates beyond the three-year period.
  • Accordingly, the court held the 4-4-1949 execution application to be barred by limitation under Article 181 and dismissed it on that ground.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the judgment of the District Judge and held that the respondents' application for execution dated 4-4-1949 is barred by time and must be dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The respondents' execution application (filed 4-4-1949) is dismissed as barred by limitation; the appellate order in favour of partial execution (as modified by the District Judge) is set aside.
  • On the law of limitation for conditional decrees the court adopted and reiterated the view that where Article 182 does not properly apply, Article 181 (residuary three-year period from accrual) governs; for conditional decrees (with no specified date for performance), the decree-holder's right to apply accrues at the date of the decree and must be exercised within three years.
  • The opinion notes contrary authorities but follows the trend of binding and persuasive decisions (including Privy Council authority) in reaching this conclusion. The court expressly considered the effect of the Mewar Limitation Act and the subsequent applicability of the Indian Limitation Act by Ordinance and applied the relevant articles accordingly.
  • The court did not purport to lay down broader changes to precedent beyond applying existing authorities; it confined its relief to allowing the appeal, dismissing the execution application as time-barred, and ordering costs to be borne by the parties themselves.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. Respondents' execution application dismissed as barred by limitation. Parties to bear their own costs.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor Bhuralal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Bhilwara, dated 3-3-1952, arising out of certain execution proceedings. The respondent Jiwansingh and his brother Sohansingh (who is represented in this appeal by his assignee Motisingh) filed a suit against the appellant for redemption of a pledge of certain ornaments and obtained a decree on 28-8-1940, that they would be entitled to redeem the ornaments on payment of Rs. 547/4/- to the defendant. This decree was confirmed on appeal. On 30-1-1943, Sohansingh alone applied for execution of the decree.

2. Some trouble arose as Jiwansingh had not been made a party to the application for execution and, therefore, on 9-5-1943, Sohansingh stated that he was asking for execution with respect to his share of the decree. In 6-2-1945, the judgment-debtor objected that he had already compromised the decree with one of the decree-holders Jiwansingh on 20-5-1941. This objection was not decided. On 18-12-1946, Motisingh deposited a sum of Rs. 530/- in court to be paid to the judgment-debtor.

3. On 21-3-1947, the execution application was, however, dismissed for the decree-hoder's default. Then Motisingh filed a second execution petition on 15-10-1947. This application was dismissed on 20-1-1949, on the ground that Motisingh alone had no right to execute the decree. This led to a further execution application on 4-4-1949, which was filed by both Jiwansingh and Motisingh and it is this application out of which the present appeal has arisen.

4. Bhuralal raised two objections: (1) that the decree had aready been compromised with Jiwansingh and (2) that the execution application dated 4-4-1949, was barred by time. The executing Court repelled both these objections. The judgment-debtor then went in appeal to the District Judge, Bhilwara, and the latter modified the decree of the executing Court and held that Jiwansingh was not entitled to execute the decree but Motisingh as assignee of the other decree-holder Sohansingh was entitled to execute the decree to the extent of his half share on payment of half the decretal amount allowed by the trial Court. This appeal has been filed from the above decree.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant judgment-debtor contended, in the first place, that the application for execution dated 4-4-1949, was bared by time. His plea as to limitation was based on a number of grounds. Firstly, he raised the contention that according to the Mewar Limitation Act, 1932 (Act No. 2 of Smt. 1988) which was in force in the former State of Me-war, an application for execution could be filed within three years from the date of the decree and thereafter there was no provision for filing a further application at all.

6. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on Article 29, Mewar Limitation Act, which is in these terms:

7. It was contended that there was no Article corresponding exactly to Article 182, Indian Limitation Act and, therefore, the second execution application which was filed by the decree-holder in 1947 was incompetent and the matter should have been allowed to rest there and if no right of further execution subsisted thereafter, the present execution application filed on 4-4-1949, was obviously of no consequence.

8. I have carefully examined the provisions of the Mewar Limitation Act and find that Article 29 is the only Article which relates to an application for execution and that its wording is very simple and brief as already cited above. A literal interpretation of this Article would undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that an application for the execution of a decree could be filed only within three years of the date of the decree and that if for some reason or another it was dismissed, then no further execution application could be filed after a period of three years for the execution of an unsatisfied decree.

9. This state of affairs and, if I may say so. I have in mind all execution applications whatever, — could only be justified on the assumption that an execution application once filed in Mewar was never intended to be dismissed until the decree was fully satisfied. But this was not so, and so far as I understand, this Article had received from the Courts of the former State of Mewar a iberal interpretation so that if an execution application which was filed within three years had been dismissed for some reason, a further application within three years from the first application could aways be filed subject of course, to the maximum period provided under Section 48 of the CPC.

10. This point came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in — ‘Ramlal v. Jagannath’, Misc. Ex. S.A No. 21 of 1952, which was not cited at the bar and is not yet reported) (Sinse reported in AIR 1955 NUC (Raj) 4670 (A)) and I am glad to find that the view taken there is in complete accord with my own view. In any case, the decision of the Division Bench is binding upon this Court and I have no hesitation in repelling this contention.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant next argued that the application for execution filed on 4-4-1949, was barred by limitation from another angle. His contention was that by the time this application came to be filed, the United State of Rajasthan Limitation Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance No. 33 of 1948) had come into force in the former State of Mewar on 23-8-1948. By this Ordinance, the Indian Limitation Act (No. 9 of 1908) was made applicable to Mewar with certain modifications which are not material for our present purposes, and as it is well settled that the law of limitation is procedural it was argued that, it is the law which is in force at the time a suit or an application is made which applies to it.

12. It was, therefore, this law by which the execution application of 1949 falls to be governed. Now in the Indian law of limitation, in addition to Article 182 with all its various clauses, we have also Article 181. The contention of learned counsel is that the former article can have no application to decrees which are conditional, as in the present case, and that the correct Article which applies in such cases is Article 181. Article 181 reads as follows:

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. 181. Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by section 48 of the CPC, 1908. Three years. When the right to apply accrues.

13. I may as well quote here the relevant portion of Article 182:

182. For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by section 48 of the CPC, 1908. Three years. 1. The date of the decree. 2. Where there has been an appeal, the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court 3…………. 4………….

14. The decree of which execution is sought was, to my mind, undoubtedly conditional. It said that the decree-holders would be entitled to redeem the pledged ornaments on payment of the sum of Rs. 547/4/- to the judgment-debtor. Now, it is well established that Article 182 is not exhaustive in the sense that it is not the only Article which applies to execution applications and that Article 181 may also be applicable to such applications. (See ‘Rameshwar v. Homeshwar’, AIR 1921 PC 31 (B).) It is, of course, true that Article 181 is a residuary Article and will only apply where the application of Article 182 is excluded.

15. It appears to me that the correct approach to the question whether an execution application in a particular case is governed by Article 182 or 181 is first to examine the clauses of Article 182 and to see whether such application falls within the four corners of any of the clauses of that Article. If on such examination, the Court comes to the conclusion that none of the clauses of Article 182 is properly applicable in a particular case, then I am clearly of opinion that such an application for execution must be governed by Article 181 and the period of limitation applicable for the filing of such application would be three years only and this period should be counted from the date when the right to apply first accrues to the decree-holder.

16. Applying this test to the present case, I am of opinion that Article 182 is inapplicable to it for the decree cannot be said to be capable of immediate execution on the date of the decree unless the decree-holder put in the money which is the condition precedent for the satisfaction of the decree by the judgment-debtor. Putting the matter in another way, I would say that the decree-holder is required in such cases to perform a certain condition before he can ask for execution from the judgment-debtor and it is, therefore, obvious that the period of limitation in such cases cannot be said to run merely from the date of the decree without more.

17. When Article 182 thus does not apply, the residuary Article 181 must be held to be applicable and, therefore, the period of limitation is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. The question then is: when does the right of a decree-holder to apply for execution in a conditional decree accrue? The true rule appears to be that this right cannot be allowed to accrue merely at the sweet will and pleasure of the decree-holder whenever he may choose to perform the condition and, therefore, the right to apply accrues to the decree-holder as soon as the decree is passed in his favour.

18. In this view of the matter it would be open to the decree-holder to put in the money in a case like the present at any time within three years of the date of the decree; but if he does not do so, then, inevitably he forfeits his right no levy execution thereafter. In support of the view, which has commended itself to me, I may cite a few cases although I may state at once that there is a certain amount of conflict of opinion on this point.

19. The first case to which reference may be made is ‘Narain v. Brij Narain’, AIR 1931 All 326 (C). In that case a decree was passed for delivery of possession of certain property upon the decree-holder depositing to the credit of the judgment-debtors a certain sum no date of payment whereof was specified in the decree. It was held that the decree was not immediately executable and the right to recover possession depended upon the fulfilment of certain contingencies provided for in the decree and so Article 182 was inapplicable and the only Article governing the execution was the residuary Article 181.

20. It was further held that the right to pay the money under the decree accrued to the decree-holder at once, and the decree-holder was not entitled to prolong the date of payment by his inaction or laches. It was therefore, held that as the legal representatives of the judgment-creditor had made their application more than three years from the date of the decree, their application was clearly barred by time under Article 181.

21. The same view was adopted by the Bombay High Court in — ‘Gopal Sattu Tippe…(Original Defendant), v. Dnyanu Maruti Khade…(Original Plaintiff), .*’, AIR 1938 Bom 367 (D). A contrary view appears to have been taken in — ‘Mt. Bhuribai v. Rahmatbi’, AIR 1930 Nag 241 (E), where it was held that where payment of a certain amount to the judgment-debtor is a condition precedent to the making of the application for execution, an application made without fulfilling that condition is still valid. The learned single Judge relied on ‘Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lalchand’, 34 Bom 189 (F), an earlier case of the Bombay High Court but the recent trend of authority in that Court as appearing from the later decision in — ‘Gopal Sattu's case (D), appears to be on the other side.

22. The same view was adopted by the Madras High Court in — ‘Nacharammal v. Veerappa’, AIR 1945 Mad 485 (G). The terms of Arts 181 and 182 do not appear to me to have been considered in these cases and I find it difficult to understand how a right to enforce the decree arises in cases of this type merely from the date of the decree unless the condition prescribed in the decree is fulfilled by the decree-holder. The last case to which I wish to invite attention is — ‘Rameshwar v. Homeshwar’ (B) which went; up to the Privy Council and has already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment.

23. The question in that case was whether the appellant was entitled to execute his decree dated 27-7-1906, or whether it was barred by limitation, when he applied for execution thereof in December, 1914. The Subordinate Judge held that the execution was not barred by limitation on the ground that the decree had then become capable of execution for the first time in 1914. The High Court reversed this decision.

24. Their Lordships of the Privy Council disagreed with the High Court and held that as the Limitation Act prescribed three years as the period for the enforcement of a decree, it was implicit that such an order or decree must be capable of being enforced. They further observed that the decree against E could not have been executed without a further application, which could not have been made till E had come into possession of the property of J and that by Article 181, the period of limitation for making an application was three years from the time when the right to apply accrued.

25. In the light of the principle deducible from this case and the other cases discussed above I hold that the correct Article applicable to applications for execution in conditional decrees is Article 181, Limitation Act and not Article 182, and that as there is nothing in law to preclude the decree-holder from performing the condition laid down in the decree on the very day the decree is passed, where no date for the performance of the condition is specified in the decree itself, the decree-holder has the liberty to perform the condition within three years of the date of the decree at the most but not beyond it, and he cannot be permitted to extend this period by a belated performance of the condition which it was for him to fulfil.

26. Holding, therefore, that Article 181 is applicable to this case, my conclusion is that the application for execution dated 4-4-1949, is barred by time. The appellate decree was passed by the District Judge, Bhilwara on 23-5-1941. Motisingh deposited the money on 18-12-1946, and the present application for execution was filed on 4-4-1949. Motisingh clearly put in the money after more than five years of the date of the appellate decree which, he was not entitled to do.

27. The maximum period that could be allowed to him for the payment of the money was, in my opinion, three years from the date of the appellate decree. On the view held by me, Motising cannot be allowed to prolong the period of payment beyond the prescribed limit of three years. The present application which was filed in 1949 was, therefore, barred by time and hold accordingly. In this view of the matter I consider it unnecessary to decide certain other points raised on behalf of the appellant.

28. Consequently, I hereby allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the District Judge & hold that the respondents' application for execution is barred by time and must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs throughout.

G.M.J

29. Appeal allowed.