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Aksingh v. Durjansingh
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision arises from a suit originally brought by Bhupsingh—both for himself and as guardian of his two minor sons—against Durjansingh and others. On 12 August 1949 a compromise was reached by Bhupsingh (for himself and as guardian) and Durjansingh, by which part of the claim was given up and the remainder admitted by Durjansingh. On the same date Bhupsingh filed an application praying that he might be permitted to compromise the suit on behalf of the minors; the application bears only an endorsement that it was produced and should be put on the record. The court passed a decree in terms of the compromise on that day in favour of Bhupsingh and the minors.
The applicants (the minor sons by their guardians) subsequently filed an application for review, contending that the requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) had not been complied with, and therefore the decree should be reviewed. The Civil Judge dismissed the review application, holding that the requirements had been complied with (on the basis that the application for leave was before the court and the court's decree on the compromise sufficed). The present matter is a revision against the order dismissing the review application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the requirements of Order 32, Rule 7 C.P.C.—that leave of the court to compromise on behalf of a minor must be "expressly recorded in the proceedings"—were complied with in this case.
- Whether the court may infer grant of leave to a guardian to compromise on behalf of a minor from the fact that the court passed a decree based on the compromise.
- Whether a revision lies from an order rejecting an application for review when an appeal from the original decree may be available.
- Whether, in the absence of the requisite recorded leave under O. 32, r. 7, an appeal lies against a consent decree purportedly entered on behalf of a minor.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' (Revisionists') Arguments
- The provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 C.P.C. were not complied with because the court did not expressly record permission in the proceedings for the guardian to enter into the compromise on behalf of the minors.
- Because leave was not "expressly recorded in the proceedings," the decree based on the compromise should be treated as not effective against the minors and the review should therefore have been allowed.
- The original order was a consent decree and, due to the defect in recording leave, appeal would lie (i.e., the decree is not a valid, appeal-barred consent decree).
Civil Judge / Respondent's Arguments
- The application for leave to compromise was before the court on the same date, and the court passing a decree in terms of the compromise suffices to show compliance with O. 32, r. 7.
- The court's sanction to the compromise can be inferred from the fact that a decree was passed on the basis of the compromise; an explicit oral or written notation of leave was unnecessary.
- Counsel for the respondents relied on several authorities said to support the view that an inference or implicit sanction could suffice in certain circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mst. Mariam v. Mst. Amina (A.I.R. 1937 Alld. 65) | Establishes that leave under O. 32, r. 7 must be expressly recorded in the proceedings. | Described as the leading case; the court relied on it to hold that leave cannot be inferred and must be expressly recorded. |
| Chhabba Lal v. Kailu Lal (A.I.R. 1946 Privy Council 72) | Privy Council approval of Mst. Mariam; supports requirement of express recording of leave. | Used to reinforce that leave cannot be inferred and that decisions contrary to this approach are not good law post-approval. |
| Rajagopalan alias Seetharama Iyer v. T.S. Subbarama Iyer (53 I.C. 354) | Example where a single-word order ('granted') was an express recording of leave. | Held to be consistent with the requirement of an express order; not supportive of the respondents' inference-based stance. |
| Khushal Singh v. Labhsingh (102 Indian Cases, 358) | Concerns interpretation of section 462 of the old Civil Procedure Code (not O. 32, r.7). | Found to be irrelevant to the present question under O. 32, r. 7. |
| Badri Singh v. Chhotu Singh (175 I.C. 75) | Held that a strict view need not be taken where no express order was recorded (supported opposite party). | Court regarded this as inconsistent with later authority (Privy Council approval of Mariam) and not good law for present purposes. |
| Ramnarain Singh v. Atal Behari Singh (A.I.R. 1939 Patna, 387) | Held that circumstances might show the court applied its mind so that an order directing reference amounted to recording permission. | Court considered that view to be superseded by Chhabba Lal's case and not good law for present purposes. |
| Awudhesh Prasad Missir v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad Missir (A.I.R. 1940 Patna, 663) | Patna High Court took a different view in related matters. | Mentioned as a contrasting authority; the present court did not treat it as determinative. |
| Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai (A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court, 280) | Held that an express recording in words such as "Permission granted as the compromise is for the minor's benefit." suffices; no prescribed form required. | Referred to as an example where express recording was present and held adequate. |
| Ram Lal v. Ratan Lal (I.L.R. 26 Alld., 572) | Where an appeal lies against an original decree, an order dismissing review ordinarily should not be subject to revision. | Used to state the general rule that revision should not be resorted to where appeal is available. |
| Peddiboyima Viswanatham v. Sreemat Kalambi Sreenivasa ... (A.I.R. 1943 Mad., 377) | Same principle: where an appeal was open, revision should not be invoked under section 115 C.P.C. | Cited to reinforce the rule limiting revision when appeal remedies exist. |
| Sagwa v. Dalwa (A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 97) | Held that for a consent decree to bar appeal it must be a valid consent decree; where leave required under O. 32 r.7 is absent, the minor may appeal. | Relied upon to support the proposition that a decree procured without the requisite leave is not a valid consent decree and is open to appeal. |
| Banwari Jogi v. Jamma Kasaudhan (125 I.C. 587) | Earlier Allahabad authority holding that where there was no valid consent the decree could not be a consent decree under sec. 96(3) C.P.C. | Used to show earlier support for allowing appeal where consent is defective. |
| Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammed Hussan (29 I.A. 51) | Comments on the finality of awards and limited scope for appeal from arbitral awards; implied that an invalid reference (not the award) could still attract appellate remedy. | Distinguished and confined: the court held that where the reference itself is patently invalid an appeal would lie, so Ghulam Jilani does not preclude appeals where the originating order is illegal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by setting out the text of Order 32, Rule 7 C.P.C., which provides (in summary) that a next friend or guardian shall not, without the leave of the court "expressly recorded in the proceedings," enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor, and that compromises entered without such leave so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor.
The court analyzed the Civil Judge's conclusion that the presence of an application for leave and the subsequent decree on the compromise amounted to compliance with O. 32, r. 7 (i.e., that leave could be inferred). The court rejected this view on the following bases set out in the opinion:
- The rule's language—"expressly recorded in the proceedings"—is deliberate and strong; it requires an express recorded grant of leave and leaves no room for inferring leave by implication from the passing of a decree.
- The words were introduced in the 1908 Code and make it now "absolutely essential" not only that the court apply its mind to the issue but also that it expressly record the grant of leave in the proceedings.
- In the present case there was no express recording of permission on the petition for leave, in the order-sheet, or in the judgment; only the application itself was before the court and an endorsement that it was produced. This does not satisfy the rule.
- The court reviewed precedents and concluded that the leading case (Mst. Mariam) and its approval by the Privy Council in Chhabba Lal require express recording; earlier or divergent authorities that permitted inference or took a less strict view are no longer to be treated as good law in light of Privy Council authority.
The court then turned to the procedural question whether revision was competent in the present circumstances, given the general rule that where an appeal lies from the original decree, an order rejecting review is not ordinarily subject to revision.
On this point the court considered authorities (Ram Lal, Peddiboyima Viswanatham) establishing the rule that revision should not normally be invoked where an appeal lies, but then analyzed whether an appeal would lie here. The applicants contended that the original order was a consent decree and thus not appealable under section 96; the respondents relied on Sagwa v. Dalwa, which held that a consent decree bars appeal only if it is a valid consent decree.
Applying those principles, the court held that because there was a patent legal defect (i.e., the court did not record the requisite permission under O. 32, r. 7), the minors were, in effect, not parties to a valid consent decree and therefore an appeal would lie on their behalf against the decree. The court drew upon Sagwa and earlier Allahabad authority (Banwari Jogi) to conclude that a consent decree lacking the necessary leave is not a bar to appeal.
Consequently, since an appeal lay from the original decree on the ground identified (want of recorded permission), the High Court would not entertain a revision against the order rejecting review; the proper remedy for the minors was appeal from the decree itself.
Holding and Implications
Holding: THE REVISION IS DISMISSED.
Direct implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The court concluded that the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7 C.P.C. require that leave to a guardian to compromise on behalf of a minor must be expressly recorded in the proceedings; the mere existence of an application for leave or the passing of a decree on a compromise does not satisfy this requirement.
- Because the requisite permission was not recorded in this case, there was a patent defect of law in the consent decree; in such circumstances an appeal would lie on behalf of the minors against the original decree (i.e., the decree is not to be treated as an unassailable consent decree for purposes of appeal).
- Given that an appeal would be available, the High Court refused to interfere by revision with the order rejecting the review application.
- Costs: The court ordered that parties shall bear their own costs of the review proceedings in both courts.
Broader implications (as explained by the court): The decision emphasizes strict compliance with the express-recording requirement of O. 32, r. 7; where that requirement is violated, the decree based on the compromise is vulnerable and may be challenged on appeal by the minor. The opinion relies on existing authorities to support this conclusion rather than purporting to lay down a new principle of law beyond enforcing the textual requirement of the rule.
Wanchoo, C.J:— This is a revision by Aksingh and Ratansingh, and has arisen in the following circumstances.
2. A suit was brought by Bhupsingh, father of the present applicants, for himself and as guardian of his two minor sons against Durjansingh and others. On the 12th of August, 1949, a compromise was arrived at between Bhupsingh for himself and as guardian of the minors and Durjansingh. By this compromise part of the claim was given up and the rest was admitted by Durjansingh. An application was also filed on the same date by Bhupsingh praying that he might be permitted to compromise the suit on behalf of the minors. There is only an endorsement on this application to the effect that it was produced by Bhupsingh and should be put on the record. On the same day, the court passed a decree in favour of the applicants and their father Bhupsingh in terms of the compromise.
3. Then followed an application for review by the applicants. Their case in review was that the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 C.P.C had not been complied with, and therefore the decree passed should be reviewed. The Civil Judge, in whose court the case was pending by the time the review application came to be decided, however, held that the provisions of O. 32, r. 7 had been complied with, and therefore dismissed the review application. The present revision is against the order dismissing the review application.
4. O. 32, r. 7 is as follows:—
“(1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without leave of the court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.
(2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor.”
The contention on behalf of the applicants is that if express permission to enter into a compromise has not been recorded in the proceedings as required under O. 32, r. 7 C.P.C, the court cannot act on the compromise as if it was entered into on behalf of the minor. Therefore, any decree passed by the court in a suit in which such express permission has not been recorded in the proceedings would be of no avail as against the minor, and would be voidable against the other parties as well. In this case, the court has nowhere expressly recorded in the proceedings any permission and therefore the review application should have been allowed.
5. The view taken by the Civil Judge is that as an application for leave to enter into a compromise was given and was before the court, the mere fact that the court passed a decree based on the compromise is sufficient to comply with the provisions of O. 32, r. 7, and it was not necessary for the court to say that it allowed the guardian to enter into a compromise. In any case, such a sanction could be inferred from the fact that the court passed a decree in terms of the compromise.
6. I am of opinion that this view of the lower court is not correct. The rule specifically lays down that the leave of the court should be expressly recorded in the proceedings. These words are very strong, and there is, under the circumstances, no scope for holding that leave can be inferred by implication. These words, namely “expressly recorded in the proceedings” have been added in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, and it is now absolutely essential, not only that the attention of the court may be drawn to the fact that there is a minor concerned, and the court should apply its mind to the consideration of the question whether the compromise is for the benefit and in the interest of the minor or not, but that it must also record the grant of leave expressly in the proceedings. Where this grant of leave is not recorded expressly in the proceedings, the terms of O. 32, r. 7 are not complied with. In the present case, there is nothing, either in the order-sheet or on the application for leave to appeal, or even in the judgment, expressly recording the permission of the court to the guardian to compromise the matter.
7. There is difference of opinion among the various High Courts as to the form in which the leave should be recorded. Generally speaking, however, it is now well settled that it is enough if leave is granted by the use of a single word like ‘sanctioned’, ‘allowed’, ‘permitted’, and so on. But the High Courts are generally agreed that the leave must be expressly recorded in the proceedings in some form or other, and cannot be inferred merely from the fact that a decree has been passed on the basis of a compromise. I may in this connection refer to the leading case of Mst. Mariam v. Mst. Amina (A.I.R 1937 Alld, 65). This case was approved by the Privy Council in Chhabba Lal v. Kailu Lal (A.I.R 1946 Privy Council 72). The lower court's view therefore that it must be held that the court had given leave by implication to the guardian to enter into the compromise because it passed a decree on the basis of the compromise is of no avail in view of the specific provisions of O. 32, r. 7, which requires that the leave should be expressly recorded in the proceedings. No stronger words could have been used in the rule to require the court to pass some order on the application for leave to compromise.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to certain cases in support of the view taken by the court below, and I may briefly consider them. The first case is Rajagopalan alias Seetharama Iyer v. T.S Subbarama Iyer (53 I.C 354). In that case, the court passed an order in one word ‘granted’ on the petition for leave to compromise. There was thus an order expressly recorded in the proceedings in that case, and it does not support the stand taken on behalf of the opposite party. The next case is Khushal Singh v. Labhsingh (102 Indian Cases, 358). That was a case which was concerned with the interpretation of sec. 462 of the old Civil Procedure Code, and not with O. 32, r. 7 of the present Code. This case also is therefore irrelevant.
9. The next is Badri Singh v. Chhotu Singh (175 I.C, 75). That case certainly supports the opposite party as there was no order which was expressly recorded in the proceedings. The learned Judges observed that a very strict view of the provisions of O. 32 should not be taken. This cannot be considered good law, specially after the Privy Council approved the decision in Mst. Mariam's case.
10. The next case is Ramnarain Singh v. Atal Behari Singh (A.I.R 1939 Patna, 387). In that case there was an application to refer the suit to arbitration. This application was signed by all the parties. There was also an application for leave by the guardians of the minor defendants, but there was no application for leave by the guardians of the minor plaintiffs. It was held that the circumstances indicated that the court had applied its mind to the application of the guardian of the miners for permission to agree to the reference, and hence the order directing reference to be made amounted to the recording of its permission. This also, in my opinion, can no longer be held to be good law in view of the Privy Council decision in Chhabba Lal's case cited above. It may, however, be mentioned that the Patna High Court took a different view in another case Awudhesh Prasad Missir v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad Missir (A.I.R 1940 Patna, 663).
11. The last case that was cited is Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai (A.I.R 1951 Supreme Court, 280). In that case, however, there was permission expressly recorded in these words—
‘Permission granted as the compromise is for the minor's benefit.”
It was held by the Supreme Court that was enough as the law did not prescribe any set form in which leave is to be granted.
12. A review of these authorities leads to the conclusion that except in a case here and there, the view of the High Courts generally is that permission in some form must be expressly recorded, and that if it is not so recorded, the provisions of O. 32, r. 7 are not complied with. If I may say so with respect, I agree with this view and hold that in order that provisions of O. 32, r. 7 are complied with permission must be expressly recorded in the proceedings in some form of words. In this case, the permission has not been recorded in any form either on the petition for leave, or in the order-sheet, or even in the judgment. The mere fact that a petition for leave has been made is not enough, for the rule requires that the leave of the court should be expressly recorded. As such leave has not been recorded in the case, the court should not have passed a decree on the basis of the compromise.
13. It has, however, been urged on behalf of the respondents that no revision lies in this court from an order rejecting an application for review as the applicants could come in appeal from the decree itself.
14. There is no doubt that where the applicant can come in appeal from the decree itself, an order rejecting his review petition cannot be taken in revision. Reference in this connection may be made to Ram Lal v. Ratan Lal (I.L.R 26 Alld., 572). In that case, an appeal was dismissed. The appellant then applied for review of judgment on the ground of discovery of new and important evidence. That application was dismissed, and thereupon there was a revision in the High Court. It was held that where such an application for review is dismissed, the matter cannot be taken in revision to the High Court.
15. Reference may also be made to Peddiboyima Viswanatham v. Sreemat Kalambi Sreenivasa Venkati Varadaeharyulu Ayyavarlam Guru (A.I.R 1943 Mad., 377 (1)). In that case also the trial court had rejected an application for review of judgment, and there was a revision to the High Court. It was pointed out that the petitioners could have appealed against the judgment in the three suits, and when such a remedy was available sec. 115 C.P.C should not be invoked. There is no doubt that if a party has a right to come in appeal from the original decree, he should do so, and the High Court would not interfere in revision with the order rejecting an application for review.
16. This raises the question whether an appeal would lie from an original order in the present case.
17. It is contended on behalf of the applicants that the original order was a consent decree and no appeal lies against it under sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, relies on Sagwa v. Dalwa (A.I.R 1952 Alld., 97). In that case, it was held that in order that an appeal may be barred against a so-called consent decree, the consent decree must be a Valid consent decree. A decree passed upon a compromise against a minor, for which leave of the court was not obtained under the provisions of O. 32, r. 7 cannot be said to be a valid consent decree. As such, the minor can challenge it by way of appeal and sec. 6 does not bar it. In this case, reliance was placed on Chhabbalal's case already cited. There is also an earlier Allahabad case Banwari Jogi v. Jamma Kasaudhan (125 I.C, 587) where also it was held that where there was no valid consent, the decree could not be called a mere consent decree within sec. 96(3) Civil Procedure Code, from which no appeal could be preferred.
18. The appellants rely on Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammed Hussan (29 I.A, 51), which was a case of a decree following an arbitration award. Their Lordships, while dealing with the provision of appeal under sec. 522 C.P.C observed as follows at page 58—
“The principle of finality which finds expression in the Code is quite in accordance with the tendency of modern decisions in this country. The time has long gone by since the courts of this country showed any disposition to sit as a Court of Appeal on awards in respect of matters of fact or in respect of matters of law.”
These observations show that their Lordships were against any appeal from the decision of the arbitrators once a decree followed on their award. But those words do not mean that if there was some obvious illegality in the very order of reference by the court as distinct from the decision of the arbitrators, there could be no appeal from a decree based on an award on such illegal reference. The decision in Chhabba Lal's case (A.I.R 1946 P.C, 72) already cited makes it clear that if the reference to arbitration is itself obviously invalid, an appeal would lie on that ground. This decision does not, in any way, contradict the view taken by their Lordships in Ghulam Jilani's case because there they were dealing only with appeals from the award of the arbitrators on matters of fact or in respect of matters of law, and were not considering the question that the reference itself was patently invalid. These words, therefore, in Ghulam Jilani's case must be confined to cases where the reference is valid.
19. In Sagwa's case, the Allahabad High Court has extended the principle enunciated in Chhabba Lal's case to cases of consent decree. It seems that where there is patent want of consent either on account of some defect in law or on account of some party or other not joining in the compromise, the party affected can come in appeal treating the consent decree as no decree at all against him.
20. In the present case, there is an obvious defect in law in as much as the permission to compromise, which was necessary to be recorded in writing under O. 32, r. 7 was not recorded at all by the court. In the absence of such record of permission, it may in a sense be said that the minor was not a party to the consent decree, and therefore the decree that was passed against him was not a consent decree within the meaning of sec. 96. In this view of the matter I am of opinion that an appeal would lie against the original decree on behalf of the minors on the ground that they were not party to the consent decree as the court had not recorded any permission to their guardian to compromise. Hence, under these circumstances, I am not prepared to interfere in revision with the order rejecting the application for review.
21. I, therefore, dismiss the revision, but, in view of the circumstances of the case, order parties to bear their own costs of the proceedings in review in both the courts.
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