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State Of Rajasthan v. Budhram .
Judgment Summary: Lodha, J. — State v. Budhram (appeal against acquittal)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ganganagar dated 5 August 1964, which had set aside the conviction and sentence previously imposed by the First Class Magistrate, Ganganagar, on the accused Budhram under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act (No. 8 of 1878).
The operative factual narrative in the opinion is: on 14 September 1958 Deputy Superintendent of Customs J.P. Tandon received information that the accused Budhram was in possession of dutiable and prohibited goods. A search warrant was obtained authorising Inspector Heerasingh to search Budhram's premises. In the search executed that night 11 gold bars with foreign markings were recovered. The Collector later confiscated the gold under section 167(8) of the Act read with section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. A complaint under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act was filed on 11 August 1961.
Before the Magistrate the prosecution relied primarily on the recovery and also tendered two statements made by the accused to Customs Officers (marked Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2) in which the accused is recorded as admitting purchase of the gold from one Chirag Ali (a Pakistani national) and that it was smuggled. The Magistrate convicted and sentenced Budhram to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine; the accused appealed. The Additional Sessions Judge (who heard the appeal) acquitted Budhram. The State appealed to the court delivering the present opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the statements made by the accused to Customs Authorities (Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2) were admissible and, if so, whether they were free and voluntary (not caused by inducement, threat or promise).
- Whether the goods (the recovered gold) were shown to have been in the exclusive possession of the accused.
- Whether the gold had been proved to be smuggled goods and, relatedly, whether a presumption under section 178-A(1) of the Sea Customs Act (that seized goods are smuggled unless proven otherwise) could be raised against the accused.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State / Deputy Government Advocate)
- Argued that it was amply proved that the gold was recovered from the exclusive possession of the accused Budhram.
- Contended the Additional Sessions Judge erred in holding the gold was not smuggled and in rejecting the accused's recorded statements.
- Relied on the accused's statements Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2 as clear admissions that the gold was smuggled and purchased from Chirag Ali with intent to evade restrictions.
- Relied on the decision in Vallabhadas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs (AIR 1965 SC 481) to argue that statements made to Customs Officers are not inadmissible under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and that section 25 has no application to such statements.
Respondent (Accused Budhram)
- Maintained that the gold was recovered from the room occupied by his brother (referred to as Ram / Ramjas in the record) and that he did not have exclusive possession.
- Claimed that the recorded statements Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2 were not voluntary, asserting in his section 342 CrPC statement that Customs officers had beaten him and obtained his signatures the next day; however, he produced no evidence to support this allegation.
- Presented evidence (defence witnesses) that he lived in the house along with his brother and son to challenge any inference of exclusive possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vallabhadas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs, AIR 1965 SC 481 | Held that statements made to Customs Officers are not inadmissible under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act; Customs officers are not "police officers" for the purposes of section 25. Section 24 (involving inducement, threat or promise) remains applicable. | The court relied on this authority to conclude that Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2 were not automatically excluded by section 25; instead they were relevant unless it was shown they were caused by inducement, threat or promise. This precedent removed the section 25 objection to the statements, but left voluntariness (under section 24 principles) to be tested on the facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a step-by-step analysis addressing admissibility and weight of the accused's recorded statements, the question of exclusive possession, and whether the gold was proved to be smuggled.
Admissibility and voluntariness of Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2
- The court accepted the legal principle from Vallabhadas Liladhar that section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act does not render statements to Customs Officers inadmissible; however section 24 (statements caused by inducement, threat or promise are inadmissible) remains applicable.
- The court observed that for confessions recorded by judicial or prescribed officers, section 80 of the Evidence Act can raise a presumption of proper recording, but that presumption arises only when the statement has been taken "in accordance with law."
- Because no statutory procedure is prescribed for recording statements by Customs Authorities under section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, the presumption under section 80 could not be invoked in respect of Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2; thus voluntariness had to be determined from the facts.
- Material factual concerns were identified: both statements were in English though the accused did not know English and appeared almost illiterate; there was no certificate that the statements had been interpreted to him in Hindi or that he understood them; the notation "Read over and admitted correct" appears but the mere reading-over in English to a non-English speaker was held to be inadequate; witnesses for the Customs did not sufficiently establish that the statements were taken with due care and attention.
- Further, the accused had been kept in custody overnight after the recovery and up to the time of recording, and he alleged beating by the Customs officers, though he produced no corroborative evidence. These circumstances created a reasonable doubt about the free and voluntary nature of the statements.
- Conclusion: In the circumstances the court found it would be unsafe to base a conviction on Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2 because doubts persisted about voluntariness.
Exclusive possession and place of recovery
- The court examined witness testimony about the place and circumstances of recovery. P.W.4 (Heerasingh) and two other Inspectors stated the gold was found in a bedroom; other prosecution witnesses (P.W.3 and P.W.5) gave inconsistent testimony (P.W.3 later declared hostile; P.W.5 did not remember recovery clearly).
- The accused produced defence witnesses (D.W.1 and D.W.2) to show he lived in the same house with his brother Ram/Ramjas and his son. The Additional Sessions Judge had concluded that exclusive possession by the accused was not established, and the court considered this conclusion reasonable on the evidence.
- Given inconsistencies and hostile or uncertain testimony, the court found it unsafe to infer exclusive possession of the premises or the room by the accused solely from the recovery evidence.
Whether the gold was proved to be smuggled and the application of section 178-A(1) (burden of proof)
- The State relied on section 178-A(1) of the Sea Customs Act which places the burden on the person from whose possession goods were seized to prove they were not smuggled, but only where the goods were seized "in the reasonable belief" that they were smuggled goods.
- The court explained that to raise the presumption under section 178-A the prosecution must show direct evidence that the seizing officer entertained a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled at or before the time of seizure. This is justiciable and the court must be satisfied there were prima facie grounds for such belief.
- In the present case the application for the warrant (Ex. P.9) merely stated it was reliably learnt that "dutiable and prohibited goods are secreted" in the premises; it did not state that smuggled gold was believed to be present. The search memo (Ex. P.6) likewise did not state seizure on the basis of belief that the gold was smuggled. P.W.4 stated the gold was seized "as it was considered to be smuggled" but did not assert that he had a reasonable belief at the time of seizure. There was therefore no direct evidence that the officer entertained a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled.
- Because the necessary factual predicate for raising the statutory presumption under section 178-A was absent, that presumption could not be invoked and the burden of proving smuggling remained on the prosecution. The court found the prosecution had not discharged that burden apart from the contested statements Ex. P.1 and Ex. P.2 (which it had found unsafe to rely upon).
Net evaluative conclusion of the court: The combined doubts about voluntariness of the accused's statements, the lack of proof of exclusive possession, and the absence of evidence that the seizing officer entertained a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled meant the prosecution had not proved that the gold was smuggled or in the accused's exclusive possession. Accordingly, conviction could not safely be maintained.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal by the State is DISMISSED. The acquittal of the accused, as recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, stands.
Direct consequences stated in the opinion:
- The accused, who is on bail, need not surrender; his bail bond is discharged.
- The prosecution has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the gold was smuggled; no conviction can be safely based on the record before the court.
Implications regarding precedent: The court applied and relied on existing authorities (specifically Vallabhadas Liladhar) and statutory provisions (sections of the Evidence Act and the Sea Customs Act) to resolve the matters before it. The opinion does not state that it is creating a new legal rule or overruling prior authority; it resolved the appeal on the facts and the proper application of established principles regarding voluntariness of statements, presumptions under section 80 of the Evidence Act, and the scope of section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed. The accused remains acquitted; bail discharged.
Source: Opinion delivered by Lodha, J., quoting and summarising evidence and documents designated in the record (e.g., Ex. P.1, Ex. P.2, Ex. P.6, Ex. P.9) as set out in the provided judgment text.
Lodha, J.:— The State has filed this appeal from the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ganganagar dated 5th August, 1964 by which the conviction and sentence passed against the accused-respondent by the Magistrate First Class, Ganganagar under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act (No. 8 of 1878) were set aside.
2. The prosecution case briefly was that Shri J.P Tandon, Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Sri Ganganagar received information on 14-9-1958 that the accused Budhram was in possession of some dutiable and prohibited goods. He, therefore, obtained a search warrant from the First Class Magistrate, Ganganagar authorising Shri Heerasingh, Inspector, Land Customs, to search the premises of the accused. In execution of the warrant, Shri Heerasingh searched the house of the accused situated in Sri Ganganagar the same night and recovered 11 bars of gold which contained foreign markings. Further investigation was made in the matter and eventually the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, New Delhi confiscated the gold bars under section 167(8) of the Act read with section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Thereafter a complaint was filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act No. 8 of 1878 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”) before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Ganganagar on 11-8-1961. The case of the accused Budhram was that his brother Ram as lived with him in the same house and the gold in question was recovered from the room occupied by Ramjas. It may be added that the accused is alleged to have made statements before Shri Heerasingh, Inspector, Customs, Ganganagar and Shri J.P Tandon, Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Sri Ganganagar on 15-9-1958, and those statements were also put in evidence in support of the prosecution case and they have been marked Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2. In those statements the accused practically admitted the prosecution case that the gold was smuggled one and he had purchased the same from one Chirag Ali, a national of Pakistan. The learned Magistrate convicted the accused under section 167(81) of the Act and sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-; in default of payment of fine six months' further rigorous imprisonment. The learned Magistrate relied on the evidence produced before him which was mainly about the recovery of gold and did not attach any importance to the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 alleged to have been made by the accused before the Customs Authorities.
3. The accused filed an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Ganganagar but it was heard by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ganganagar, who acquitted the accused.
4. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has urged that it is amply proved that the gold was recovered from the exclusive possession of the accused Budhram he has also argued that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ganganagar erred in holding that the gold was not smuggled one. In support of his contentions he has placed strong reliance on the statements Ex. P. 1, and Ex. P. 2 made by the accused before the Customs Authorities. It is urged that there is a clear admission of the accused in these statements that the gold was recovered from the exclusive possession of the accused and further that this was smuggled gold which the accused had purchased from Chirag Ali knowingly with intent to evade the restrictions for the time being in force with respect thereto. These statements, according to the learned Deputy Government Advocate, are relevant and the learned Additional Sessions Judge committed an error of law in placing no reliance on them in support of his contention the learned Deputy Government Advocate has relied upon Vallabhadas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs, AIR 1965 SC 481. In that case the contention raised by the counsel for the accused that the statements made before the Collector of Customs were inadmissible in evidence under sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, was undoubtedly repelled and it was held that section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act has no application to such a case. It was observed that the Customs Officers are not Police Officers and statements made to them were not inadmissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act. Their Lordships were pleased to observe that,
“Section 24 would however apply, for Customs Authorities must be taken to be persons in authority and the statements would be inadmissible in a criminal trial if it is proved that they were caused by inducement, threat or promise.”
5. In face of this authority there is no room for argument that a statement made by an accused before the Customs Authorities is hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and we must therefore hold that the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 made by the accused before the Customs Authorities are relevant unless it appears that they have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise. P.W 4 Heerasingh states that he had taken down the statement of Budhram Ex. P. 1 and it was signed by Budhram. As regards Ex. P. 2 P.W 1 Shri J.P Tandon has stated that he interrogated the accused and all the questions and answers contained in Ex. P. 2 were written by him and also that the accused had signed the statement Ex. D. 2 after the same had been read out to him. In his statement under section 342 of the Cr PC, when the accused was asked to explain as to what he had to say with respect to his alleged statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 before the Customs Authorities, he replied that the Deputy Superintendent, Customs, and the Inspector, Customs had both beaten him and obtained his signatures the next day. However, he did not produce any evidence in support of his allegation. The learned counsel for the accused has contended that before the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 which are in the nature of a confession can be received in evidence, they must be shown to have been voluntarily made. The material question therefore is whether they have been obtained by the influence of hope or fear or under the influence of an improper inducement?
6. We may in this connection draw attention to the provisions of section 80 of the Evidence Act which inter alia provides that whenever a statement by an accused person, taken in accordance with law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or a Magistrate or by any officer authorised by law to take evidence, is produced before any Court, the Court shall presume that the document is genuine and that any statement as to the circumstances under which it was taken, purporting to be made by the person signing it is true and that such statement was duly taken. The presumption under section 80 can be raised only when the statement has been taken in accordance with law. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides how a confession is to be recorded by a Magistrate (See sections 164 and 364 of the Cr PC) and the moment it is shown that a confession of the accused has been recorded in accordance with law and all the acts required by law to be done have been done it can then be presumed to be duly taken. The presumption under section 80 thus arises only when a confession is recorded strictly in accordance with law.
7. Since no procedure has been prescribed in law for recording of the statement by the Customs Authorities under section 171-A of the Act, no presumption can be raised under section 80 of the Evidence Act, and it is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the confession was free and voluntary. It is noteworthy in the present case that both the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 are recorded in English, and the accused does not know English but from the way in which he has put his signature on these statements, it appears that he is almost illiterate. There is no certificate under either of these statements that these statements were interpreted to the accused in Hindi and that he understood the same. On the other hand what has been mentioned below these statements is “Read over and admitted correct.” In his statement before the Court Shri J.P Tandon (P.W 2) only states that the statement Ex. P. 2 was read over, to the accused and then he signed it. Reading over a statement in English to a person who does not know English is useless. Similarly it is not borne out from the evidence of P.W 4 Shri Heerasingh that the statement Ex. P. 1 was duly taken with due care and attention. The mode of recording deposition in civil and criminal cases is to be found in O. 18, Rr. 5, 6 of the CPC and Sections 356, 359, 360, 361 of the Cr PC. It is laid down that the depositions shall be read over or interpreted when the witness does not understand the language in which it is so taken down. It is of utmost importance that, if conviction is to be based on the incriminating statement made by the accused before the Customs Authorities the Court must feel convinced that the statement was duly taken by observance of all the care and caution. In the circumstances of the present case we are doubtful whether the accused put his signatures on these statements after fully understanding the contents of the same. This is one aspect of the matter.
8. Another aspect is, that the recovery of the gold was made on the night between 14th and 15th of September, 1958, and both these statements were recorded on 15-9-1958. It is clear from the evidence of P.W 4 Heerasingh that the accused Budhram was kept in his custody throughout the night after the recovery and also up-till the time the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 were recorded. Learned counsel for the accused has argued that these circumstances are sufficient to make it appear that these statements were made under the influence of some improper inducement. We have given our careful consideration to this aspect of the matter. The doubt created in the mind of the learned Additional Sessions Judge regarding the voluntary nature of these statements cannot be said to be unreasonable and in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, also, it would be unsafe to base conviction of the accused on these statements in view of the doubt subsisting on the question of the free and voluntary nature of these statements.
9. This takes us to the question whether, apart from the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2, there is sufficient evidence on the record to show that the gold was smuggled one, and whether it was recovered from the possession of the accused? As regards the place of recovery Shri Heerasingh, Inspector (P.W 4) has stated that the gold was recovered from a bag of time and a that lying in the room in which Budhram Was sleeping with his family. P.W 6 Jagdish Chander and P.W 7 Ajitsingh, who are also Inspectors of Land Customs Department have both stated that on search of the house of Budhram they found the gold lying in one bed room. As against the evidence of these witnesses P.W 3 Abhey Singh has deposed that it was Ramjas who had pointed out the gold lying in a bag of time and a that and that Ramjas and some children were in that room. This witness was of course declared hostile and permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. Another Motbir P.W 5 Shri Gopal states that he does not remember whether any thing had been recovered in his presence at all. The accused has examined D.W 1 Bachnaram and D.W 2 Amichand to show that he was living in that house along with his brother Ramjas and his son Hanuman.
10. In this state of evidence the learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that Ramjas and Budhram used to reside in the house from which the gold was recovered and the exclusive possession of the accused over the house and the room from which the gold was recovered is not established. Both the Motbirs produced by the prosecution viz., P.W 3 Abhey Singh and P.W 5 Shri Gopal have not supported the prosecution on this point, and in our opinion, it would not be safe to infer the exclusive possession of the accused merely because according to Heerasingh (P.W 4) the gold was recovered from the room where Budhram was sleeping with his family.
11. Apart from this there is another hurdle in the way of the prosecution and that is, whether the gold has been proved to be smuggled one? The learned Deputy Government Advocate has invited our attention to section 178-A (1) of the Act which runs as follows:
“178-A. Burden of proof:—(1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized.”
12. It has been urged by him that the gold in the present case was seized under the reasonable belief that it was smuggled and the accused had failed to prove that it was not smuggled. We may state at once, that there is no other evidence on the record produced by either side whether the gold was smuggled one or not except the admissions contained in the statements Ex. P. 1 and Ex. P. 2 which, as stated above, are not worth reliance, and, therefore, all that we have to determine is, whether a presumption can be raised under section 178-A of the Act. In order to raise the presumption under section 178-A of the Act the Court must be satisfied from the evidence that the officer did entertain the belief that the goods seized were smuggled goods and that such belief was a reasonable belief. In order to be satisfied on the first point, there must be direct evidence whether oral or written of the officer seizing the goods that he entertained at the time of seizing them or at time before it, reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled one. Now in the present case in the application (Ex. P. 9) made to the Magistrate for issue of a warrant, there is no mention that smuggled gold was lying in the premises of the accused but all that was stated was that it was reliably learnt “that dutiable and prohibited goods are secreted in the premises of Budhram.” Even in the search memo Ex. P. 6 there is no mention that the gold was seized as it was believed to be smuggled one. P.W 4 Shri Heera Singh did not state that he seized the gold as he entertained a reasonable belief at the time of seizure that it was smuggled gold. AD that he has stated is that the gold was seized as it was considered to be smuggled.
13. It is well established that the question whether there was a reasonable belief or not is justiciable and the Court has jurisdiction to consider whether there were grounds which prima facie justified the reasonable belief. In the present case, however, as already observed above, there is no evidence that the officer seizing the gold entertained, at the time of seizing them or at any time before it, reasonable belief that the gold was smuggled one. In these circumstances we are afraid, no presumption can be raised under S. 178-A of the Act for convicting the accused, and the burden of proof which lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that it was smuggled gold has not been discharged. The result is that there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed. The accused is on bail and need not surrender. The bail bond is discharged.
BNP/D.V.C
14. Appeal dismissed.
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